

## Collected Papers VI. Literary Reality and Relationships

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ALFRED SCHUTZ  
COLLECTED PAPERS VI. LITERARY REALITY  
AND RELATIONSHIPS

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Michael Barber  
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# Collected Papers VI. Literary Reality and Relationships

Alfred Schutz

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ISSN 0079-1350

ISBN 978-94-007-1517-2

ISBN 978-94-007-1518-9 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1518-9

Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012950000

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# Contents

<b>Editorial Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
Michael Barber	
 <b>Life Forms and Meaning Structures</b>	
<b>Editor’s Introduction .....</b>	<b>11</b>
Helmut Wagner	
<b>The Outline of the Project .....</b>	<b>19</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Author’s Introduction .....</b>	<b>23</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Part I Theory of Life Forms and Symbol Concept .....</b>	<b>35</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Life Forms and Meaning Structures .....</b>	<b>37</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Part II Theory of the Structure of the Objectification of Meaning .....</b>	<b>117</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Meaning Structures of Language .....</b>	<b>121</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms .....</b>	<b>151</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera .....</b>	<b>171</b>
Alfred Schutz	

<b>Part III Object and Methods of the Social Sciences .....</b>	<b>197</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>The Problem of Personality in the Social World .....</b>	<b>199</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>The Problem of Personality in the Social World</b>	
<b>Chapter Three: The Social Person and the Thou-Problem .....</b>	<b>243</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Chapter One [I. General Development of the Problems of the Unity of the Person] .....</b>	<b>257</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Chapter Two Genesis of the Social Person in the Solitary Self .....</b>	<b>265</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Two Goethe Texts</b>	
<b>Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre and Wanderjahre .....</b>	<b>313</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>VI. On Wilhelm Meister's Years of Travel .....</b>	<b>331</b>
Alfred Schutz	
<b>Author Index .....</b>	<b>407</b>
<b>Subject Index .....</b>	<b>409</b>

# Editorial Introduction

Michael Barber

The papers by Alfred Schutz in this volume have been selected because they deal with the specific features of the human condition on which literature focuses; because they present a theory of multiple realities, of which literature is one; because they describe in detail the Thou-relationship of which the interconnection between author and reader is an example; or because they are actually instances of how Schutz read literature, what he looked for or what impressed him, as he read, in particular, Goethe's novels. In addition, these papers have been collected here because the first paper (itself originally a book), *Life Forms and Meaning Structures*, is out of print, and the second two papers represent translations of Schutz's work by Professors Fred Kersten and Michael Barber that have not been previously published in English.

*Life Forms and Meaning Structure* contains the early writings of Schutz from his so-called "Bergson-period" (1924–1928) in which he sought to provide philosophical foundations for the social sciences by turning to the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Although Schutz eventually turned to Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to provide such foundations, these writings are important in that they show Schutz's philosophical mind at work in seeking to establish a base for the social sciences. In the first essay, itself entitled "Life Forms and Meaning Structure," Schutz distinguishes and discusses through ideal-type constructions three life-forms, namely duration, memory, the acting I (without discussing three other life-forms, namely the I in relationship to the Thou, the speaking I, and the thinking, conceptualizing I—all of which are treated in the following essay, "Meaning Structures and Language"). Such life-forms are lived dimensions of the subject, which are thoroughly intermingled in everyday life until the reflecting philosopher, Schutz, distinguishes them and articulates what characterizes them. Schutz also develops a theory of symbolization, including its revelatory capacity and its limits, both of which appear whenever one from within a higher life-form, such as memory, seeks to symbolize experiences present in a lower-level life-form, such as duration. For instance, when one within the life-form of memory remembers a segment of duration, she is able to convey something of that duration's ongoing experience, but of course, the

remembered segment differs from what is remembered insofar as the remembering introduces distinctions that are at the least blurred in duration or omits features of duration's lived flow.

This first large essay, though it aims at providing a philosophical foundation for the social sciences, is also of great importance for Schutz's views of literature. Indeed, in the essay he repeatedly shows himself preoccupied with the relationship with the Thou even though it is not explicitly addressed until the second essay of *Life Forms and Meaning Structures*. Such an interpersonal Thou relationship, in particular the one between author and reader, becomes a central focus of his reading of literature, as the third essay of the volume, "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms," demonstrates. In addition, in this first essay, Schutz goes to pains to insist upon diverse strata, or realms, of experience and to uphold the diversity and plural nature of experience that rationality often undervalues. This concern for diverse spheres of reality will reappear in "The Problem of Personality in the Social World," which is a prelude to Schutz's "On Multiple Realities," although the life-forms of this first essay vary from the spheres of reality in the later two works, which include such things as the spheres of fantasy, dreaming, and theoretical contemplation. In his writings on Goethe, Schutz will demarcate the distinctive sphere of literary reality against the sphere of everyday life and theoretical contemplation, and these distinctions become the centerpiece of his interpretation and defense of Goethe's novel the *Wanderjahre* because Goethe's critics attack him for violating the rules governing everyday experience within the novel. Moreover, in this large essay from the Bergson-period, Schutz analyzes the pervasiveness of duration, even though it is hidden beneath other life-forms, such as that of memory or the acting I—and hence it should come as no surprise that it will be Goethe's concern in his novels and poetry for the passage of time that will intrigue Schutz. Hence, in Goethe's novels, Schutz is drawn to consider the special case of metaphysical "wandering" that the *Wanderjahre* novel symbolizes or the passage of time that suggests that our past destines our future in the *Lehrjahre* novel. Furthermore, in this large essay, Schutz is acutely aware of the perspective from which one looks back on the past and selects events and details of significance, and in novels, we find readers, narrators, and even characters working in a kind of common project as they continually reinterpret the past in the light of new data emergent in the present that compels such reinterpretation. The building-up of a novel is massive intersubjective construction achieved by characters and readers and author all in relationship with each other and across time. Finally, the theory of action that Schutz spells out in this large essay takes account of how unexpected obstacles impede planned actions or make possible unexpected outcomes, and Schutz's analyses of literature, whether Goethe's novels or Shakespeare tragedies, are often based on just such occurrences. In summary, this first large essay presents a picture of the fundamental nature of human experience including the Thou-relationship, pluralized realms of experience, the passage of time, perspectival interpretation, and action and its impediments, all of which are either central themes in literature or the kinds of structures that make it possible.



Schutz's "Meaning Structures of Language" takes up the other life forms that were not addressed in the first essay, that of the Thou-relationship, of the speaking I, and of the thinking/conceptualizing I. He also treats the functions of nouns in language, the transition to plural nouns, the relationship between subject and predicate, and the distinction between attributive and predicative adjectives.

In addition, Schutz's third essay in the book *Life Forms and Meaning Structures* entitled "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms" examines carefully how language forms develop and, importantly for our purposes, how social relationships between author and reader/listener are at work in poetry, drama, and novels. Schutz describes in great detail, for instance, how the poet produces a self-expression of which the reader becomes an external observer, how the author of a drama withdraws behind the play in which the reader enters into the action the actors present, and how the author of the novel plays a more commanding role in giving the reader only what she intends him to have access to in the time when she wants him to have such access. In that essay, Schutz highlights the difference between artistic expression and everyday communication, and he discusses in depth the laws of unity and unfolding particular to art, including the laws of art for specific times, material rational laws (tied to specific materials and crafts), and the laws of meaning, particularly appropriate for literature. The latter have to do with the unities of action, time, and space that literary forms satisfy in diverse ways.

In his essay "Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera," Schutz traces the history of opera and analyzes drama as presenting living Thou-relationships in which characters' inner duration is revealed, as actors for the time of the play take their dramatic world to be real, though in ways different from which the Thou-relationship is experienced in everyday life. Schutz contrasts the views of Wagner and Nietzsche about whether music reaches for language, as the former thought, or whether the word is the servant of music, as the latter believed. A final comparison is drawn between the operas of Wagner and Mozart, in which Schutz, though admiring Wagner's sense of the tragic and his use of the leitmotiv, praises Mozart for capturing Thou-relationships to a greater degree than Wagner and for creating ensembles involving a simultaneous experience of them.

Although Schutz abandoned his view of distinctive life-forms whose symbolization processes tended to leave in a noumenal state, out of reach, the lower-level life-forms symbolized by the symbols employed in a higher level life-form, he never gave up his views on the social relationship between author and reader/listener in various literary genres. In fact, Schutz's later "Social Aspects of Literature," based on an outline of a talk Schutz gave at the New School for Social Research in 1955, only develops in a bit more detail the ideas on the literary relationships found in "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms," filling in commentary on the relevances, motives, and time-dimensions at play in the author-reader relationship that Schutz had already depicted in the 1920s.

*Life Forms and Meaning Structure* was originally translated and edited by Helmut Wagner. Wagner's general "Editor's Introduction" is preserved here, and in it he briefly describes the history of the production of the previously never-published manuscripts that made up the book, the characteristics of the manuscripts themselves,

the strategic choices he made in the translation process, and explanations of the terminology employed. Each subsection of the book contained briefer introductions by Wagner that are also preserved here.

Literature, though, is not only a matter of a social relationship between author and reader/listener, but it also involves entrance into a literary reality-sphere, a finite province of meaning, that is distinctive from the everyday world of working. The stage for understanding literature this way was set by Schutz's 1945 essay, "On Multiple Realities." The essay "The Problem of Personality in the Social World," based on unpublished manuscripts produced by Schutz in 1936 and 1937 and appearing in English for the first time thanks to an excellent translation by Professor Fred Kersten, is an earlier version of the 1945 essay. Professor Kersten presents an informative discussion of these manuscripts and of his strategies in producing the translations in the preface to the essay, and he accompanies the text with rich footnotes offering explanations and abundant cross-references.

The topic of these manuscripts is not so much the origin of the social person, but the kind of unity that the social person achieves. The first manuscript (of 1936) stresses the importance of *attention à la vie*, the relevances, and the motives that shape different social persons. It illustrates how reflection converts the *ego agens* into a *me ipsum* and into partial personalities, and it explains how the surrounding world is broken into diverging perspectives depending on one's pragma (actional intervention in the world) and pragmatic relevances. This first manuscript includes perceptive descriptions of somatic unity and temporality, including the experience of the dying off of earlier selves, and it concludes by analyzing the reality-spheres of working, phantasy, dreams, and theory that are later presented in "On Multiple Realities." The second manuscript (of 1937) describes the different attitudes (without using much the language of "relevances") of the self insofar as one is, for example, a citizen, church member, or party member, and these attitudes, seldom reflected on in straightforward living, are hierarchized. Again pragmatic motives, bodiliness, and temporality are key themes, and in regard to time, Schutz observes how the passing of dead partial selves, no longer present as possibilities, reveals how death is immanent in life, though he suggests that a harbinger of hope might be found in the fact that the *ego agens* is always present ever anew. This second manuscript presents a developed theory of will, and it extensively explains the world of working for the first time, which involves the *epoché* of the natural attitude, a world of potentialities for movement and bringing within reach, and pragmatic motivations. The second manuscript's account of the world of working sets the stage for the "shock-experiences" that, it explains, will catapult one into diverse provinces of meaning, such as phantasy, dreams, and theoretical contemplation. These manuscripts, which emphasize the pragmatic dimensions of the world of working, shows how Schutz moved beyond *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1932), and they reveal that even before his encounter with pragmatism on American soil after 1939, he was already thoroughly aware of and interested in the pragmatic dimensions of everyday experience. Not only, then, do these manuscripts bring into focus the finite provinces of meaning that are key for Schutz's understanding of literary reality—indeed the second manuscript even mentions fiction and art as finite provinces of meaning which can become aspects of a self engaged in them—but

the phenomenologically insightful descriptions of temporality, bodiliness, possibilities, relevances, and the many facets of the self provide the stuff of literature itself, as Schutz's Goethe manuscripts will show.

Schutz does not only theorize about literature, the social relationship between author and reader, and the literary sphere, but this publication of Michael Barber's translations of two unpublished manuscripts on Johann Wolfgang Goethe's *Lehrjahre* and *Wanderjahre* further illustrates how he actually read literature. In the *Lehrjahre* manuscript, written in 1948, Schutz examines how Goethe treats the themes of fate and freedom and the relationship between life and art. The repeated appearance of a Stranger who guides and engages Wilhelm in discussions of destiny and freedom runs like a thread throughout the *Lehrjahre*. At repeated points, Schutz revels in explaining how chapters or events that might seem irrelevant space-fillers (e.g., Lothario's visit to a former woman-companion in book seven, or the sixth book of the novel, the "confessions of a fair soul") actually fit and serve well Goethe's deeper literary purposes. Lothario's visit stands between Wilhelm's just finished encounter with Theresa and his dream- encounter with the deceased mother of his child, thereby providing commentary on these two love-relationships of Wilhelm. Similarly, the confessions are those of the aunt of a young woman who shares many characteristics with her aunt and who is about to enter into a close relationship with Wilhelm who has been seeking her throughout the novel. Moreover, attunement to the details of a literary text resembles the kind of sensitivity to biographical details that, at first taken for irrelevant, are subsequently seen to have led unexpected momentous outcomes, some tragic and some fortuitous. In considering how earlier experiences, seemingly insignificant, come to take on new meaning in the light of later events, Wilhelm and Schutz (and perhaps we as readers) are drawn to speculate on the possibility that our lives have destinies to which we are being guided despite ourselves. For instance, Schutz dwells on the case in which Wilhelm dresses up in the clothes of a count who returns home earlier than expected and startled by the experience of seeing what he takes to be himself undergoes a conversion of heart and joins the Moravians. Or Schutz highlights the situation of the countess whom Wilhelm embraces, accidentally driving a broach pin into her breast and causing a wound that she subsequently thinks is cancerous and that leaves her melancholic for the rest of her life—an outcome ironic in being produced by an embrace. Or he emphasizes how the unexpected discovery that Theresa, to whom Wilhelm had committed himself, is not the daughter of a woman who was the mother of her brother, whom she loved but could not marry, frees both her to wed the man she loves and Wilhelm to pursue the relationship with Nachodine, whom he has finally discovered after having sought her in vain throughout the novel. Of course, these unexpected outcomes, prompting reflections on fate, all depend upon the ongoing stream of temporality, oscillating always between empty or vague anticipations of the future yet to be fulfilled or reflections on the past from a present shaped by one's present relevances that enable one to select what past moments as are taken significant for one's present and future. In addition, the structure of inter-subjectivity is latent within temporality itself insofar as the subjective meaning of one's actions available to oneself at a certain point are able to be seen in a broader

objective context, by oneself as “another person” at a later point in time or by other characters or even by the reader of the novel who sees perhaps what characters, from their own subjective point of view, cannot see. Novel-reading is not merely a matter of the flowing of time but consists in an intersubjective construction of reality in which characters and reader alike have differing perspectives enabling them to understand the significance of actions from an “objective” perspective that may not coincide with the “subjective” perspective of a character. But these basic features of human experience are just the topics that are central in *Life Forms and Meaning Structures* and “The Problem of Personality in the Social World.” These central characteristics of the human condition that literature thematizes also inform Schutz’s approach to the social sciences, as is evident for example when he cautions economists against blaming economic agents for earlier “mistaken economic decisions” that actually may have been the correct ones, given the data the agents had available *at the time* and their lack of access to the data that the subsequent unfolding of time might have made available to those economists.

The *Wanderjahre* manuscript, which frequently simply narrates the plotline of Goethe’s novel and which is handwritten rather than typed, shows itself, for both these reasons, to be in a less developed form than the *Lehrjahre* manuscript. Nevertheless, Schutz in this manuscript, produced in the summer of 1948 while traveling back and forth from Europe, defends Goethe in multiple ways against critics who argue that his second version of the novel (published in 1829) contains careless inconsistencies (e.g., characters in a novella within the novel end up actually appearing in the novel) that are not found in the earlier shorter version of (1821). Schutz constructs his defense by arguing that the literary sphere of reality, one of the multiple realities, is not bound by the rules of everyday life or rational theorizing. Hence, when one asks why more detail is not filled in, why fuller explanations are not given, or why novella characters suddenly appear in the novel, the problem is not with the carelessness of the ageing Goethe, but with the inquirer. This inquirer mistakenly expects the novel to follow the rules of practical everyday life instead of the norms governing the literary sphere of reality which is not bound by everyday constraints and which is able to omit details that might be necessary in everyday life—if these transgressions against everyday life serve well the literary purposes of the author. There is, Schutz claims, a “logic of the poetic event” that follows neither the logic of everyday life or rational theorizing, and art in his view involves the “conscious re-interpretation of the relevance structure of the life-world.” Schutz also defends Goethe by showing the inconsistency in the diaries of his critic/literary executor, Johannes Eckermann. Again defending the elderly Goethe, Schutz demonstrates how several changes made in the second version, such as having Hersilie give Wilhelm the novella “The Foolish Pilgrim” about a woman like herself is superior to Friedrich’s giving of it to Wilhelm in the first version.

In the manuscript, Schutz also demonstrates how the theme of metaphysical wandering and temporality unfolds throughout the novel, accompanied by the kind of renunciation that the flow of time requires, especially since Wilhelm, due to an unexplained pact with his love Natalia, is forced to wander without staying in any one place for more than 3 days. In the novel, Wilhelm is often seen reflecting on his past

history under the influences of the relevances of the present, as when he speculates about how his becoming a surgeon results, at least in part, from having witnessed the death of a childhood friend who could have been saved by expert medical intervention. Following the pattern of the *Lehrjahre* manuscript, which reflects on how little causes can have the most significant of effects, Wilhelm's training as a surgeon leads to the unexpected outcome that he saves the live of his son at the end of the novel. In defending Goethe, Schutz spends a great deal of time demonstrating how the poems ("Testament" and "On Schiller's Skull") that end books two and three of the novel respectively fit in with Goethe's preoccupation for the flowing of time, ageing, and death—a preoccupation that appears in many of his other well-known poems as well as in the whole structure of the novel's focus on wandering, contrary to Eckermann's charge that these poems were merely space-fillers. Goethe's fascination with temporality converges with Schutz's own immense interest in the topic that is to be found in *Life Forms and Meaning Structures* and "The Problem of Personality in the Social World." The manuscript is filled with perceptive comments about how Goethe's brief descriptions reveal the entire personality of a single character or how the themes of Goethe's *Faust* or *Die Wahlverwandtschaften* reappear in the novel. Also of great interest are the several moments in this manuscript, where Schutz makes comparison between music and literature, and, at one point, in which he illustrates how the rhyme contributes to the meaning of Goethe's poetry in the novel, one has the feeling that Schutz is re-addressing the question of the interrelationship between music and the word that he considered in his early essay "Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera."

In brief, the essays in this book can be seen to support a theory of literature that takes account of the social relationship between author and reader and the distinctive reality one inhabits when one opens a novel, and they show how Schutz actually read literature, that is, what he did when he entered the literary sphere.

# **Life Forms and Meaning Structures**

# Editor's Introduction

Helmut Wagner

In the years between 1924 and 1928, Alfred Schutz worked on a book project which, in scope and intent, anticipated his major work, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, which he wrote in 1930 and 1931 and which was published early in 1932. The earlier project had no overall title; I selected the title Schutz gave to the first main part of the study as general title: “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur” (in translation, “Life Forms and Meaning Structure”).

At the outset, he had considered but rejected the idea of seeking a philosophical basis for his undertaking in Husserl's earlier work, notably the *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901) and *Ideas I* (1913). Instead, he seized upon various works of Bergson, most of all *Time and Free Will* (1889) and *Matter and Memory* (1896).<sup>1</sup> For reasons which I have discussed elsewhere,<sup>2</sup> he found himself compelled to abandon the whole project and to return to Husserl, whose writings of the middle period, in the meantime, had become available, and to re-orient his undertaking by accepting the latter's phenomenological psychology.

Thereby, he did not disavow Bergson; rather, he made him a quite important second foundation of his work. For this reason, the manuscripts of his Bergson period are not obsolete. In fact, they remain valuable documents of the germination of fundamental conceptions which entered his work of 1932 and remained with him throughout his scholarly activities. In addition, they contain observations, insights, and theoretical considerations which remain genuine contributions to his

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<sup>1</sup> As far as I could ascertain, Schutz worked exclusively from the French original texts of Bergson's writings.

<sup>2</sup> See Helmut R. Wagner, The Bergsonian Period of Alfred Schutz. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 38, 1977: 187–99.

life work. Even though the whole project and most of its pieces remained unfinished, these manuscripts add to the scholarly stock of the intellectual inheritance which he left to the growing international circles of his followers. Their publication, then, is not merely a tribute to his memory; it is offered as a service to the phenomenological movement.

Dr. Ilja Srubar, of the University of Constance, has taken care of the preparation of the German original manuscripts, for publication in 1981. Since space limitations prohibit the inclusion of an extensive theoretical introduction into the present volume, the editor plans, in collaboration with Dr Srubar, to publish a companion volume containing an expository and critical appraisal of Schutz's thinking during his Bergson period.

## THE MANUSCRIPTS

The manuscript collection of the Bergson period consists of four textually coherent manuscripts; three of them definitely unfinished. In addition, there exists a collection of shorter manuscripts, containing sundry preparatory matters. In my as yet not published/annotated bibliography of Schutz's writings, they fall under the group of unpublished manuscripts (UM) and are individually identified by the approximate year(s) in which they originated. The list of these titles is the following:

- UM 1924–1925 “Soziale Aspekte der Musik als Artform”  
“Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera”
- UM 1925 “Spracharbeit”  
“Meaning Structures of Language”
- UM 1925–1926 “Goethe: Novelle”  
“Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms”
- UM 1925–1927a Preparatory materials for an untitled book
- UM 1925–1927b “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur”  
“Life Forms and Meaning Structure”

The key to the planned structure of the whole project is found in the preparatory materials. The sequence in which the manuscripts are presented in this volume follows the given outlines; that means, it differs from the chronological sequence of the previous list.

## CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MANUSCRIPTS FOR THE MAIN BODY OF THIS VOLUME

### (1) “The outline of the project”

A comprehensive outline for the whole project was put together by me by telescoping four separate but overlapping outlines of altogether seven handwritten pages.



At the beginning of the main body of this book, I will render a shortened translation of the major items of this outline.

(2) "Author's introduction"

Three coherent shorter manuscripts, belonging to the collection of preparatory materials, are offered sequentially under three different subtitles. Together, they comprise ten handwritten pages of the German texts.

(3) "Life Forms and Meaning Structure"

This is by far the largest of the manuscripts of the Bergson period. It comprises a typescript of 168 pages legal<sup>3</sup> size yet breaks off unfinished. Schutz designated it as the first of three main parts of his study. For reasons explained in the technical introduction to this part, the translation contains a number of condensations of more or less elaborate and rather technical passages.

The next three manuscripts originated in Schutz's Bergson period but were not written as chapters of the planned book. At least two of them originated as, or became background material for, oral presentations. In their substance, however, they fall within the range of the second main part of the Bergson project; they touch upon a number of themes relevant for this part.

(4) "Meaning Structures of Language"

This unfinished manuscript consists of 41 handwritten and 10 typed pages. Its purpose was to establish the relationships between language and other life forms.

(5) "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms"

This unfinished manuscript consists of 42 typewritten pages, legal format. It is concerned with the symbolization of experiences in literary language. Its original title was "Goethe: Novelle." It was not appropriate to maintain it because the manuscript broke off before Goethe was introduced and the art form of the novella, the story inserted into a novel, was discussed.

(6) "Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera"

Although with 39 typewritten pages (legal format) the shortest of four major manuscripts, it is the only one which gives the impression of being finished in itself. However, the original title, "Social Aspects of Music as Form of Art," is much broader than the one imposed by the editor as more adequate. It is possible that Schutz considered it as merely one part of a larger study, which he failed to execute. He took up the topic of music in considerably greater depth later.<sup>4</sup>

The titles of these three manuscripts of the second part of the study have been provided by the editor. The general designation, "meaning structures," was chosen for all of them in order to emphasize their substantive relevance for the central

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<sup>3</sup> About 14 in. long.

<sup>4</sup> See Alfred Schutz, "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music". Edited by Fred Kersten. *Music and Man* 2, 1976: 5–71. This manuscript was written in 1944 and exists in mimeographed form, that the essay is published in *Collected Papers* 4.

theme of the whole project. The specification of the titles was chosen not in accordance with the central topic Schutz had intended to treat in each manuscript, but in agreement with the actual content of the existing fragmentary texts.

(7) "Object and Method of the Social Sciences"

This is a token representation of the third main part of the project. It consists of a seven-point outline of the major topics which Schutz intended to treat in the last part of his study. It was taken from one of the manuscripts which provided the overall outline of Schutz's Bergson project.

## STYLE AND FORM OF THE TRANSLATION

The German edition of the original texts of Schutz's Bergson manuscripts, as prepared by Dr Srubar, is a documentary edition which preserves Schutz's formulations faithfully. Anyone who seeks text-critical exactness and literal correctness will have to refer to this edition.

The existence of this documentary edition has allowed me to treat the task of preparing this English-language edition with a certain amount of freedom. Such freedom was the more desirable as Schutz's texts themselves provide particular difficulties for their translator and, in a sense, resist translation. Essentially, the manuscripts available were first drafts. That is, they were not subjected to the careful process of correction and rewriting which Schutz used to prepare his publications, doing his drafts three to five times over. What he originally pinned down on paper were formulations of thoughts jotted down without any regard for style. In consequence, a dual problem arose. On the one hand, many of his coherent expositions were full of complex sentences, beset with inserts and inserts within inserts whose meanings were sometimes difficult to figure out. On the other hand, he resorted to a telegram style: jotting down words and phrases, leaving their expansion to coherent sentences and paragraphs for later.

The main purpose of the English-language edition of Schutz's Bergson manuscripts is not that of a literally faithful translation—an impossible task—but a faithful rendering of their meaning in a form which allows the maximum of understanding by English and American readers. Therefore, I have not hesitated to take Schutz's compound sentences apart, making two or three sentences out of one, whenever necessary. With a few exceptions and in reverse, I have expanded outline terms and phrases into complete sentences. In this, I based myself on the immediate textual context, or on the larger context of the manuscript in question, or finally on my knowledge of Schutz's later work.

On occasion, a singular noun in the texts has been changed to the plural when the more consistent rules of English grammar advised it. The definite article has been omitted from some nouns, especially when they were used in abstract or typified form.

In the texts, Schutz was sometimes given to the abundant use of prepositions which, when rendered in English, would sound redundant. In this and some other respects, the translation has been simplified in accordance with English-language

usage. In dealing with the compound sentences of Schutz, I have sometimes linked as well as separated two parts of a statement by a colon (:). Often, the colon simultaneously replaced conjunctions and transitional expressions, such as, "because," "to wit," "namely."

## NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY

A few explanations will have to be given concerning the selection of terminological equivalents for Schutz's theoretical or philosophical terms, for the handling of foreign phrases or sentences in his texts, and finally about the selection of some particular expressions by Schutz.

The words chosen for rendering the many specific terms of the texts in English, as far as possible, follow the terminology of Schutz's English writings. In a few cases, Schutz used two terms homonymously. In this case, I have taken the term most consistent with his theories, so: "conduct" instead of "behavior" if intent and deliberation is involved. Only in one case did I deviate from Schutz's terminology. He, and most other English-writing phenomenologists, rendered Husserl's term, *die natürliche Einstellung*, with "natural attitude." As sociologist, I find myself unable to follow this example; in my field, attitude means not a general disposition to respond to all phenomena coming to attention within a broad era of experience, especially of the life-world, but a specific mode of responding to specific types of objects, situations, or persons. Therefore, I have rendered Husserl's term "natural stance."

According to the custom of Central-European scholars with an intensive humanistic education, Schutz occasionally inserted Latin and Greek phrases or sentences into his texts. I have tried to render their meaning, as emerging from the given textual context, rather than to aim at an essentially literal translation. It would have served no specific purpose, to render the original Latin or Greek formulations in parentheses or otherwise mark the translated passages from the classical languages in every specific case. However, when the terms in question were of a flavor which I could not adequately catch in English, I added the original expression to the text.

A few expressions, which Schutz used frequently, became standard equipment of his expositions without being explicitly defined. Obviously, he found the latter unnecessary because they were standard equipment also of those of his intellectual contemporaries in Central Europe who worked in the areas of the *Geisteswissenschaften*. Five of them, however, call for comments either because he largely abandoned them in his American writings, or he maintained them in their English equivalent but used them with a different meaning. They are: Law, Logic, Material, Phenomenon, Symbol, and their derivative forms.

In the exaggerating manner of his period, Schutz occasionally referred to "laws" pertaining to social and cultural matters. Thus, he spoke of "laws of artistic creation." In contrast to positivist sociologists, adherents of the German *Geisteswissenschaften* used the concept of "law" not in deference to the model of the natural sciences but in defiance of positivist philosophers. In spite of our sharp separation of the human

sciences from the natural ones, we too are scientists in our fashion. Thereby, they referred to their adherence to the principle of impartiality ('objectivity' in common terms), to their rationally controlled procedures, and to the claim of the validity of their findings, subject to the same condition as the validity of the findings in the natural sciences: valid as long as no counter-evidence was found which challenges them.

While, in the opinion and practice of most scholars working in the fields of the so-called social sciences, the same criteria obtain today, the need for asserting the "scientificity" of their undertakings has greatly lessened. The aggressive prestige of Science, fostered both by the triumph of Evolutionism and the breathtaking progress of Physics in the last decades of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century, has long since been broken by a growing scepticism about the validity of the simplistic principles that Science has the answer to every answerable question and that questions which are unanswerable by Science are devoid of meaning. It is no longer important to decide whether or not the criteria of scientific operations, as mentioned above, are both necessary and sufficient conditions for calling humanistic disciplines "sciences."

In any case, where Schutz in these texts spoke of laws in the scientific sense, while referring to matters of the analysis of consciousness and/or social relations, he spoke according to the intellectual usage of his time. In all cases in which he used the term positively, that is, not critically, we could replace it by the term, "rules," in accordance with a more adequate present-day understanding of the nature of the regularities involved.

Schutz also followed the usage of his European contemporaries, who, in the early decades of the century, tended to speak of "logic" and of "logical conclusions" not only when they actually referred to the strictly formalistic correctness of deductions and propositions, but also when they were concerned with the substantive consistency of empirical comparisons and conclusions. Schutz sometimes used the terms logic and logical in the narrow technical sense, and sometimes in the loose sense of judgments about the factual context and content of a theoretical argumentation.

A further conspicuous term in the present manuscripts is that of "material." The term was generally accepted at the time as a label for the substantive subject matter to which a scholar directed himself. Schutz used it in this fashion. Thus, the term may point to anything which makes for the content of any kind of experience, the given phenomenological data in Husserl's manner. In the "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms," it also denotes the contents of literary creations as linguistic expressions of imagined experiences.

Occasionally, Schutz spoke of "phenomenon" or "phenomena." At the time he wrote the Bergson manuscripts he had not accepted the specific meaning these terms have acquired in Husserl's philosophy. He used these terms operationally and in the loose fashion of most of his intellectual contemporaries. Thus, they indicate not merely anything which appears to our senses or in our consciousness, but also general categories which label wholegroups of data and observations. Thus, Schutz spoke of the "phenomenon of memory" as if the ability to remember and to recall were of the same quality as a concretely appearing "memory image."

Finally, Schutz made use of the term “symbol” in the same omnibus fashion in which his contemporaries used it. In the light of his later elucidation of the problems of signs and signification, symbols and symbolization,<sup>5</sup> his expositions do not bring out the for his purposes relevant distinctions between the “symbol system” of language and the “symbol systems” of life forms or realms of meaning constructed with the help of linguistic “symbol” systems, and finally the distinction between the symbolizations of everyday life and those of the spheres of artistic experiences.

These short remarks on some of Schutz's terms ought not to be read as a critique. Rather, these terminological characteristics are pointed out because they are indicators of the transitional stage of Schutz's work during the period of 1924–1928. He tried to deal with the problems of subjectivity and consciousness to a large degree with the terminological equipment he had acquired prior to his involvement with Bergson's writing which, in turn, were not entirely free from traditional, especially biological and evolutionary, conceptions. What he achieved in the direction of a phenomenal psychology of consciousness, even though with the help of Bergson, demands all the more respect because it was achieved with partially inadequate means.

## EDITORIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF INSERTS IN THE TEXT

- (-----) Either passages set in parentheses by Schutz or rendering of the German original term for which a translated term stands.
- (-----, HRW) Short explanatory term or phrase added by the editor.
- [-----] Passage or paragraph crossed out by Schutz in the original manuscript but preserved in the translation.
- [[-----]] Passage or paragraph which has been either condensed or added by the editor.

## ABBREVIATIONS IN NOTES

In order to distinguish notes written by the author and such added by the editor, the following identifying letters appear before the note text:

AS: Alfred Schutz

HRW: Helmut R. Wagner

Where all notes in a part of this book originated either with the author or the editor, this identification of individual notes is omitted. Instead, a corresponding note is given on top of the relevant notes section.

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<sup>5</sup> See Alfred Schutz, “Symbol, Reality and Society”. Chapter VII of Lyman Bryson et al. (editors), *Symbols and Society*, New York, Harper, 1955: 135–203.

Only two other abbreviations occur in the text of notes:

E.T. English translation

MS(S) Manuscript(s)

## **SHORT OMISSIONS IN TEXTUAL PASSAGES**

According to generally accepted usage, I have indicated the omission of words and phrases or short sentences in the text by three dots (ellipses). Such abbreviations were made most of all in the case of terms and phrases which repeated statements made shortly before but which, in the differently arranged English text, did not require repetition.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION**

In the present publication, the compilation of a list of all bibliographical references occurring in texts and notes would hardly serve any tangible purpose. The necessary information, at least in the Introductory Part, can be found in the text: for the manuscripts of Schutz, it has been given in notes attached to the actual textual places at which hints at the corresponding publications appear.

# The Outline of the Project

Alfred Schutz

## Editor's Introductory Note

By Helmut Wagner

The documents from which the comprehensive outline of Schutz's project of 1925–1927 was composed consist of a short indication of the over-all content of the planned three main parts of the study, and three other manuscripts specifying in considerable detail the content of an introductory part and of the first main part, drafts for both of which have been executed. My combination of these documents covers nine pages, typed single-spaced. The outline is reproduced here with the omission of overlap and lower-level details. The latter abound but, in part, would call for comments and explanations which would serve the purposes of the analysis of the scholarly-historical background of Schutz's approach but are not needed for the comprehension of his undertaking itself.

The titles and points of this outline are rendered in Schutz's formulation and arrangement. On a few occasions, I have added titles which were missing in the documents. They are marked by my initials, added in parentheses.

The greater part of the points and sub-points of the outline manuscripts carry identification marks in forms of Arabic or Roman numerals or else lower and upper case letters. The systems used in different documents are not necessarily consistent with one another. I have given the outline without these auxiliary identifications.

## INTRODUCTION

### Life and cognition

Sciences of Life and *Geisteswissenschaften*

Crisis of epistemology and logic

### Approaches and objectives (HRW)

Applicability of modern epistemological tendencies to the social sciences

Subject matter and method of the investigation

### Access to the central problem of the project (HRW)

Attempt at gaining access by way of Kant and the a priori-theory

Weber's theory of a sociology of understanding

Extraction of the categories

Reduction of these categories to Thou problem, reality, becoming and passing-away, symbolic action

Weber's social-scientific categories and logic

Weber's social-scientific categories in their practical application in the work of Max Weber himself

Result

### Bergson's intuitionist philosophy

Representation of the *not* biological part

The critique; missing topics

Requirements of a vitalist philosophy

Method of such an investigation

### Attempt at gaining access by way of Bergson and the philosophy of duration

## PART I. THEORY OF LIFE FORMS AND SYMBOL CONCEPT<sup>1</sup>

### Life form and symbol' concept

Ideal-typical structure; auxiliary hypothesis

Selection of concrete life forms

### The individual life forms

Pure duration

Memory-endowed duration

The acting I

The I in the Thou relation

The speaking I

The interpreting I

### The concept of symbol relation and the concept of meaning

The function of duration

Laws of the symbol function

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<sup>1</sup> An alternate title was given as "Theory of Life Forms and Analysis of Symbol Strata." Both forms differ from the title of the major manuscript for the first main part: "Life Forms and Meaning Structure." It was written along the left margin of the first page of manuscript UM 1925-1927b. As stated at the beginning of the "Editor's Introduction," the same title was given to the present volume.



Positing of meaning and interpreting of meaning

Meaning as complex symbol structure

PART II. THEORY OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIFICATION  
OF MEANING

PART III. OBJECT AND METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

# Author's Introduction

Alfred Schutz

## Editor's Note

By Helmut Wagner

It was not possible to ascertain the dates at which the three pieces of this introduction were written. It stands to reason that they originated in the first preparatory stages of the project and in conjunction with the outlines. However, these outlines show that they definitely belong to the introductory sections of the projected book. Every one of them has its specific characteristics. The one rendered first starts with historical-philosophical considerations of the development of a traditional position which has closed the door to the understanding of the phenomena of daily life. Attempts to open this door have been made by Ernst Cassirer, Henri Bergson, and Max Weber. Postulating his objective as that of dealing with "the pre-scientific materials of life as totality," Schutz changed to an outline style in order to set down the last four points of his introduction: the difficulties and the expected results of the planned investigation, and the discussion of the proposed methods and their justification.

The second introductory piece is of theoretical-philosophical character. It deals with the problem of "founding," in Scheler's sense, the point of departure and central over-all problem of the planned study. It stresses the significance of Bergson for the solution of this problem but also mentions the incompleteness and shortcomings of his attempts. In continuation, Schutz subjects Kant's position to a more extensive criticism. Finally, he begins a discussion of his concept of life forms. He contrasts the idea of an undetermined multiplicity of such life forms to both Kant's antithesis of sensuality and cognition and Bergson's opposition of duration and reason. Further, he underlines the basic unity of the experiences of the undivided I in the face of theoretically set limitations of single life forms. But he simultaneously explains that the life forms occur as a hierarchical order with a generally fixed characteristic mode of linkage between each of two adjacent ones. The text offers a detailed explanation of this.

The third piece of Schutz's introduction turns to Bergson in particular, characterizing his conceptions of duration and memory, linking them to symbolization, and contrasting the planned analysis as mere reflection about life to 'life itself.' These indications, too, have found fuller explanation in the text of the first main part of the project.

Obviously, the three pieces of Schutz's introduction were segments of a first draft. I have arranged them in an order which seemed substantively most consistent. This, of course, does not mean that Schutz, had he proceeded toward a final version, would have done the same; I even doubt that he would have maintained the three pieces in their preliminary structure. The title for the second one, "The Theory of Life Forms and the Analysis of Symbol Concepts," was provided by Schutz; the other two have been labeled by me.

## (1) THE OBJECTIVES OF THE INVESTIGATION

By Alfred Schutz

Philosophy, as developed during the last half-century, was unable to achieve anything for the *Geisteswissenschaften*. The cause for this is as follows:

Kant, to whom all systems can eventually be traced back, started from mathematical physics. Since then the prevailing ambition has been to subsume the object of cognition under a minimum of categories according to formal procedures. (This has been done in two major ways, HRW.) There is the neo-Kantian assertion of the production of the object by the method, combined with the postulate of the purity of method and the prohibition of syncretism<sup>1</sup>; that is, a way of chopping-up the unitary object of experience into the objects of uncounted special sciences. And there is the establishment of ultimate spheres of irreconcilability by Husserl's essential ontological analysis, the search for formal laws being unconditionally and generally valid for the forming of categories and their use in categorizing, and the establishment of the universal science.

Both procedures are of high value for the mathematical natural sciences; their cognitive goal is to find lawful regularities in the inanimate world. They are useless where one deals with the areas of knowledge of the *Geisteswissenschaften* and their animated and understandable objects. Therefore, these sciences vacillate between (a) empirical-historical collections of materials; (b) attempts at constructing methodologically pure theoretical systems which, however, do not serve the cognitive goal of the social sciences because they already alter their object so that it loses any

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<sup>1</sup> The term syncretism is usually used negatively as a label for an uncritical mixing-together of elements from various philosophical systems. Schutz seems to introduce it here with a positive connotation, meaning a treating-together of 'things' which have been arbitrarily separated by the criticized analytical method.

connection with the real reality; and (c) mystical or misunderstood metaphysics on the basis of "a prioristic" valuations and ethic-political postulates.<sup>2</sup>

Consequences of (b) are: ever-growing remoteness from life; no attempt at explaining the most fundamental phenomena of our daily life with the help of these methods: awakens, sleep; Eros, music, understanding, Thou; dualism, syncretism, etc.

(Discuss the example of, HRW) Russel(l)'s hypothesis of the intelligence of other humans which is both nonprovable and nonrefutable.

(Consider the hopeless alternatives of accepting, HRW) either solipsism as necessity or pre-established harmony or occasionalism<sup>3</sup> (as interpretation of the reciprocity of mind-body relations, HRW).

Misgivings about this situation are felt in philosophy itself. Attempts at bridging the opposition of life and cognition have been made: Cassirer referred to Goethe's conception of the possibility of a non-mathematical recognition of nature. Simmel gained insights into the transcendence of life. Bergson demonstrated that, in principle, the methods and conclusions which were gained from and applicable to an inanimate subject matter do not apply to an animated subject matter.

The last-named attempt is particularly significant. Through the introduction of the conception of duration, it is shown that a philosophy which is constructed on the time basis of inanimate matter is a special case. There are really experienceable yet essentially unreal worlds. Attempts at grasping the phenomena of duration with the methods of the natural sciences are fruitless. The central concepts of Bergson are: life, duration, and a particular conception of consciousness.

Bergson realized the stream of duration as the central problem. Next to this achievement, Scheler's last writings must be mentioned. In them, he emphatically designated as main problems of the *Geisteswissenschaften* the understanding of others and the evidence for the existence of the Thou.

Weber's sociology, too, places understanding in the center; it demonstrates that the cognitive goal of the social sciences is different from that of the natural sciences. Without naming it, he moves the Thou problem into the center. In addition, he introduces the eminently important concepts of the interpretation of meaning and of subjective meaning; and he refers to the empirical merely in the concept of the objective chance.

Common to all of these three attempts is the following: Rejection of the cognitive goals of the natural for the social sciences; emphasis on central concepts characteristic for the *Geisteswissenschaften* (or sciences of life): duration/Thou; occupation with what is offered by everyday life; the so-called pre-scientific material which is scorned by methodologically pure sciences and which every one of the empirical

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<sup>2</sup>The figures 1, 2, 3 were written at the end of this paragraph. They could have been meant as indicators of successive footnotes, since three notes were set down at the bottom of the page. However, it seems more likely that the three notes indicate three additional points Schutz intended to insert between this and the next paragraph. Leaning to the second explanation, I have placed them in the text.

<sup>3</sup> According to the Cartesian theory of occasionalism, seemingly causal relations (e. g., between spirit and body) are merely occasioned by a third agent; they do not originate in the necessities of the corresponding phenomena themselves.

sciences declares the responsibility of other sciences; and reality of life as totality. (Natural-science, HRW) cognition is arbitrary for the problems of the social sciences and pointless because it produces irreal segments (of the indivisible totality of life, HRW).

From this follows the postulate of an occupation with the prescientific materials of life as totality, of an attempt at its analysis according to duration and Thou, and of applying the results thus gained to a theory of the *Geisteswissenschaften* which are always social sciences.

#### *Difficulties of this investigation*

- (a) The habits of thinking in the social world of daily life are already highly complex constructions of the data of experience.
- (b) The instrument of language is supposed to penetrate beneath language.
- (c) The intimate person, who alone could elucidate the depth strata (of the human psyche, HRW), is ineffable.
- (d) Recognition of self already presupposes duration and the positing of the Thou.
- (e) In consequence, unavoidable paradoxes result.

#### *Expected optimal results of the investigation*

- (a) Demonstration of the identity of duration and Thou as exclusively primary facts of consciousness.
- (b) Analysis of the formative strata leads from life to thinking.
- (c) Discovery of a kind of regularity in the relationship (of life and thinking, HRW) to one another.
- (d) Discovery of the step-by-step transformation (of experience into thinking, HRW), shedding light upon the epistemological problems of the in theory "methodologically pure" systems and demonstrating the impossibility of realizing their postulate (rejection of the theory of dualism) and showing their uselessness for the social sciences.
- (e) Clarification of a few essential connections thus far left obscure (language-conditioned thinking, Thou-conditioned language, etc.).
- (f) Obtaining a theory of founding (*Fundierungstheorie*) in the sense of Scheler.

#### *Proposed methods*

Arbitrary construction of ideal types of the facts of consciousness which are experienced undifferentiated and as a whole in the totality of life. The artificial analysis of these ideal types. Investigation of individual events and their mutually reciprocal effects. Establishment of the mechanism of symbolization.

From the results gained will be derived the nature of the object of the social sciences. The consequences of the executed analysis for the theory of methodology and basic concepts of the sociology of understanding will be shown.

### *Justification of this method*

- (a) The how of artificial analysis: Since it is ideal-typical, it is exclusively justified by its purposiveness, its output of results.
- (b) The why of the analysis: synthesis by way of constantly relating individual spheres to each other and through the respective reconstruction of the unity of the experiencing I.
- (c) Contrast to logic: solution of all apparent paradoxes in generally conscious integrations which, in the end, will be reconcilable with logic as a special case.
- (d) To penetrate through language beneath language: demonstration by way of data of daily life whose images are vaguely described by language (Eros, music, dance, breathing, sleep, etc.), even though only in form of "parables." But language itself is nothing else.

## **(2) THE THEORY OF LIFE FORMS AND THE ANALYSIS OF SYMBOL CONCEPTS**

The point of departure is Scheler's problem of "founding." In "life" this question cannot come up because all experiences are equally spontaneous, regardless whether they are apperceptions, sensations, or in any way symbolically preformed matters. Now, what significance has to be granted, from the view point of actual experience, to the problem of the separation of individual realms of experience and the relation of these realms to one another?

Bergson's attempt at a solution: The realm of inner duration, accessible to intuition and even instinct, is juxtaposed to the realm of time-space, of objects, of action, of the social sphere accessible to concept and intellect. He deals with the relation of these two realms to each other in the totality of daily life: degrees of tension, of attention toward life as regulating agent. He shows the tyranny of the acting I, toward which the intellect fashions objects, concepts, etc.

### *Significance of Bergson's formulation of the problem*

It is a first attempt of constructing ideal types of consciousness; a pointing-out of the inadequacy of the intellect to grasp the problem of duration; a dissolving of the polarity of the unity of the experiencing I and, through this, an overcoming of dualism of every kind, for instance: body/soul, spirit/matter, finalism/vitalism, causality/teleology, freedom of will/determinism.

### ***Critique of Bergson's execution (of the investigation of the problem HRW)***

Bergson is satisfied with singling out *two* planes. While his theory is suitable like no other for overcoming dualism, it apparently re-introduces it. His dualism, far from being accidental, becomes a constructive principle. (He chooses this way, HRW) instead of deliberately and methodologically becoming a *pluralist*. One could object that Bergson's problem formulation, which alone justifies the usefulness of such an ideal-typical construction, demands only two planes. Therefore, intermediate stages could be ignored. However, this is not the case.

The following presuppositions make for the incompleteness (of Bergson's theory, HRW):

The historically conditioned limitations of the sciences of his time;

A taking-for granted of "the givens" (so of the social world) which, today, becomes more and more problematic;

The selection of a biological natural-science orientation as path into metaphysics, emphasizing most of all things relevant for a biological conception of life and development;

The overrating of *action*, in no way justified, as constituent of (a) memory, (b) intellect, (c) the material world and thus of time and causality.

Where is the realm of drives, of values, of the Thou?

Bergson knows that contexts are concealed through symbol formations, particularly through language, and he puts into account the fact of "symbol deception"; but he does not investigate the origin and growth of these symbol systems in their relevance for the planes of consciousness. (Is the "symbol" experienced in the same fashion as the fundamental phenomena of consciousness, so duration, or different, and if so, how?) Therefore, he does not recognize intermediary stages. Only an unambiguous distinction of the latter will make it possible precisely to circumscribe the "problem of founding" and therewith Bergson's problem formation as well as to find solutions to other questions which occupy philosophy and in particular epistemology.

### ***The problem of founding is an old problem of philosophy***

It occurs in various disguises. Two main examples—many could be cited—are: (a) the problem of apriority, and (b) the "primacy" of practical reason. Both demonstrate that the basic problems cannot be solved when reduced to one plane. Their investigation merely in terms of the logical-cognitive formation of concepts must needs conflict with all data which are directed upon experience.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>During his years of study, and possibly up to 1924, Schutz subscribed to a neo-Kantian position. The following paragraphs mark his radical departure from this philosophical approach.

Kant limited metaphysics to the epistemological question: How are synthetical judgments a priori possible? He also confined religion to the sphere of mere reason. These restrictions show the limits of the intellectualization of these realms but not the boundaries of the realms themselves. They all are open to experience on the far side of these limitations. Likewise, the a priori itself was relativized through epistemology. We point to deeper areas which are inaccessible to an epistemological formalism. This clearly manifests itself, for instance, with regard to all essential questions of *life* which are encountered, by pure reason, merely as antinomies or contradictions. Finally, the Kantian "moral imperative in me" and its derivative, the primacy of practical reason, merely show the renunciation, by the intellect, of the foray into the realm of life.

*But is it truly the inadequacy of our intellect which leads us to this partial agnosticism?* Kant himself answers this question. He formulates the synthetic unity of apperception as the uppermost principle of every use of reason and he differentiates between the objective unity of self-consciousness and the subjective unity of consciousness, considering the latter a mere designation of the inner sense. Having done this, he feels compelled to admit that the manifold must needs be given in apperception before Reason can accomplish the synthesis; it is independent of it. However, it remains undetermined ('Kritik der reinen Vernunft' and earlier):

Because should I imagine a reason who apperceives himself, like maybe a divine one, who not only imagines non-existing objects but through whose imagination the objects themselves would be simultaneously given and created, the categories—in the face of such a realization—would have no significance whatsoever. They are rules for a reason whose whole capacity exists in thinking, that is, in the action which brings into the unity of apperception the synthesis of the manifold which, otherwise, was given him in perception. Therefore, for himself he *recognizes* nothing; he merely connects and orders the materials of cognition, the perception of which has to be given to him through the object.

In this sense, Kant also executes the separation between 'inner sense' and apperception. The first occurs as a mere form of apperception without connection with the manifoldedness of perception, the latter as source of all connections with 'the manifold of perception as such under the label of the categories prior to all sensory perception of objects as such.'<sup>5</sup>

These passages show that the whole (Kantian, HRW) transcendental logic is tailor-made for cognition. Yet, by definition, the latter has already cut out a well-defined sector from reality, selected according to the same principles which are postulated a priori as ultimate logical necessities (*Denknotwendigkeiten*). According to Kant, the free creative life which produces the 'apperceived' simultaneously in 'apperception' lies beyond the categories. If applied to these realms, they become meaningless and purposeless. It is characteristic of reason to make certain selections from that which is given and to symbolize these selections as if they were the whole. To symbolize means to execute certain changes on the 'givens' of our life for specific purposes. The selection of materials is determined by this purpose. Therefore, the

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<sup>5</sup> I was unable to ascertain which edition of Kant's writings Schutz was using.



question of an Apriori, an immediacy, is relativized to a degree which makes the answer relevant only for a very small area of real life.

Seen from this angle, the Apriori turns from a differentiation between the mediate and the immediate into a differentiation between that which can be communicated and that which cannot be communicated. Different gradations are possible; therefore, the Apriori, in principle, remains capable of relativization. The self-contemplation of reason, the subsumption of the sensory manifoldness under categories, the transcendental schematism of pure rational concepts—all are obviously of symbolic character. That means they are abbreviations for more complex events which, through extraction of one aspect, become simpler because easier to comprehend rationally. Further, it is uncontested that language, the basis of all logical-cognitive operations, represents in itself a symbol system. This system transforms the true stock of life data in a highly complex manner. Therefore, logicians should treat it only with great caution. What is situated beyond these two symbol systems, seems to be immediate or non-communicable. Thus, for logic, the sensory manifoldness already becomes a given which cannot be reduced further. Likewise, individual experience as such, which cannot be identical with the experience accessible to a multitude, becomes ineffable for language—and the more so the closer it is situated to the boundaries of the ‘intimate person.’ In the light of this, it can be easily established that there are, (1) on the one hand, a series of experiences which, being ineffable, cannot even reach the threshold of language; and (2) on the other hand, a series of ‘modes of communication’ which—because situated beneath language—seize experiences which occur in a layer deeper than that which is accessible to language. Under (1) fall all phenomena of duration, body consciousness, the Thou; and (2) communication through the given body (body as ‘field of expression,’ erotic relations, etc.), music, dance, pitch of voice, etc.

It seems that there exist, between the Kantian antithesis of sensuality and cognition or between Bergson’s duration and reason, a series of *intermediate stages*. Each of them is adequate to a different ‘symbol sphere’; the relation among them is that of relative non-communicability. It is just for this reason that they are accepted as ‘immediate.’

Non-communicable, here, shall mean that the experiences of the deeper (= less complex) intermediate stage, although understandable in its own characteristic symbol system, are non-transferable into the higher (= more complex) sphere. It is even possible, by following the boundary lines of these symbol systems, to make cuts through the totality of life.

Here an important correction is necessary. Just below the realm of language, ‘communicability’ loses its meaning as criterion provided one is not inclined to designate as communicability the ability to make one’s own experience evident in consciousness. Here, completely clearly, the significance of the Thou problem manifests itself. However, those relations which we designated as ‘communicable’ do not stop with the accentuation of the Thou. Even within the most intimate sphere occurs the continuation of the stratification (of layers of experiences and symbols, HRW), accompanied by adequate symbol systems through which the evidence of these experiences enters consciousness. For this reason, we will call these individual

planes appropriately not planes of communicability but planes of consciousness. And this also because in them manifests itself a particular stance of the I to the world: the I in an actually given place of consciousness (= this is always only an artificially selected part of the total I =) the life form of the I.

Of course, an infinite number of such planes of consciousness of life forms can be projected into the totality of the real ego. Which of them is selected remains a question of purpose.

The following basic considerations prevail. The total world as object of experience stands opposite to each life form. In principle, all experiences of the total I enter into *every* life form. But each experience (gains awareness, HRW) only in the life form which is adequate to the actual given consciousness. That means the experiences undergo different changes within the individual planes of consciousness in which they attain evidence. We designate as symbolization that process of transformation to which experiences are subjected when they enter into the specific stance of life which we call consciousness. And we designate as symbols the transformed experiences which have been turned into evidence.

Evidence is the experience of being Now and Thus affected by experiences. It is the sole aprioristic presupposition of our speculations but not of our life. This life, as *our* life, is accessible to us even in the lowest life forms. On the strength of its existence, it re-enters the Now and Thus of the evidence.

The principal thesis is that all experiences of the total I enter into every life form. It is subjected to the restriction that all experiences enter into the given life forms only as symbols. The changes thereby affected have the following consequence: The experiences of the deeper life forms enter into the higher ones only after passing through innumerable processes of symbolization; thus, their Now and Being-Thus no longer affect the consciousness of higher planes. It is only by their *existence* that they give a specific coloring to life or the total stance of the I.

In reverse, it is impossible for the symbol system of higher forms of life to affect the Being-Thus of deeper experiences; they can do no more than state their existence. On their part, deeper experiences express the evidence of their Being-Thus through the symbol system adequate to a deeper layer. The tension between experiences as existing and as Being-Thus is a trade mark of the artificial ideal-typical structure of the introduced concept of life forms. This is so because life itself finds ever only that which is Now and Being-Thus; it does not grasp existence without Being-Thus.

The totality of life demands a characterization of the I who becomes cognizant of this totality. Kant's difficulties in ascertaining this I (necessitate the choice of, HRW) our point of departure: the Bergsonian duration.

### (3) ON DURATION, SYMBOLIZATION, AND LIFE

Bergson offers several metaphorical images for describing the flow of duration: it is like a tune without music, a rubber band, a course or stream (see his 'Introduction into Metaphysics').

Characteristics of the stream of duration are: (a) continuity (transcendence of the Now and Thus), (b) manifoldedness, (c) irreversibility, and (d) stream as that which streams. These characteristics are said to be testable through intuitive meditation about one's own duration. This has to be countered by the argument that 'pure duration' remains an unexecutable hypostasis because the last stratum to which we can penetrate is already 'memory-endowed.' This is so because:

- (a) Consciousness of the 'past,' that is, continuity and transcendence of the Now and Thus already presupposes memory. Otherwise, I would have only many 'Now and Thus' experiences placed side by side without cohesion. I could not reach the continuity into the future (past and anticipation).
- (b) A manifold exists only for *memory*; without it, the differentiation between homogeneous/heterogeneous would be meaningless.
- (c) 'Irreversibility,' too, can only be ascertained in memory; it could never become 'evident' within 'pure' duration although continuity exists within it.
- (d) The 'stream of that which streams' becomes meaningful only if juxtaposed to the achievements of memory.

Actually, duration and memory are by Bergson in principle coordinated; they are reciprocally founded by each other. Bergson's starting point is a life form which is more complex and symbol-penetrated: that of memory-endowed duration. This is not a fault because it merely contains the admission that *pure duration* can only be deduced with the help of the symbol system of the more complex life form (memory): it is impossible immediately to *experience* pure duration, even by intuition. Nevertheless, the givenness of memory presupposes the presence of the four characteristics, as stated above, in deeper (that is, memory less, HRW) life forms. I do not intend to assert the impossibility of pure duration without memory (so, the duration of plants) but only the impossibility of experiencing it *immediately* in the sense of 'evidence.' This merely means that evidence (as 'Being-Thus' experience of a 'Now and Thus') can only appear in a least complex symbol sphere which can occur in memory. Pure duration is a necessarily marginal concept, an unexecutable postulate, like its counterpart immortality. Thus, in this investigation, I can only speak of a 'relative approximation of duration.' The reason for this is the necessity to assume the existence of a symbol-free life form below memory combined with the impossibility to reach below memory.

(Pure duration is a postulate of a symbol-free life which is inaccessible to our symbol-conditioned thinking, nay, even to our still symbol-conditioned intuition.) Every symbolization has to step out of duration because:

- (a) an experience is grasped as Now and Thus which is transcended in the mere stream of duration.
- (b) Unity (homogeneity) is posited in place of the manifold (heterogeneity).
- (c) That which did pass is maintained; this could not happen within the irreversible stream of duration.
- (d) Therefore, experience is posited as having passed.

Symbolization begins already with 'being conscious' of the past (continuity) of our duration; thus, with memory. Also duration as stream is *relative* for every life form; if not for the immediate experience so for every *conscious* experience and thus also for *primary evidence as experience of experiencing*.<sup>6</sup>

The characteristics of 'memory' are in truth characteristics of every *symbol*. This is so because memory in itself has already symbol character. To wit, every symbol is tension between what has passed and what is passing relative to that life form whose 'content' becomes the foundation of the process of symbolization.

This is linked to the attempt at positing a system of relevance for the 'momentarily actual I.' Every analysis of consciousness ... finds itself compelled to make this attempt in so far as each of these systems of relevance are relatively 'pre-given' to the superordinated symbol system. It must be remembered that the analysis (to be offered in this book, HRW), with all its difficulties is merely a reflection about life, never life itself. *Life itself* does not need a 'system of relevance' ... and a regress to deeper planes of consciousness: all states of consciousness are contained in the momentarily given Now and Thus of the total I and constitute it. There is no difference between experience and symbol because the latter too becomes experience and constitutes the Thus of the Now. There is no positing of the having-passed (the dead) in the possibility of that which lives Now. Due to this, life as *streaming experience* is simultaneously *meaning-free* and necessarily *meaningful* because it is symbol-related in *looking-back* (reflection). If I were alive only as streaming I, 'consciousness' of 'I' would solely occur in the form of 'I stream' (*Ich dauere*).<sup>7</sup>

Now, we reflect constantly in the sphere of the total I. This is because consciousness is already = reflection = interpretation, we can posit 'I' *meaningfully* only as 'I stream.' *Meaning* is solely contained in the transformation of selected past experiences into becoming symbols. 'Now' is only meaningful in relation to 'earlier'; 'Being-Thus' is only meaningful in relation to a different "Being-There" (*Dasein*). For this reason, all meaning and symbol systems are relative because they (a) are coming from a Now and Thus and (b) are directed upon a past experience. ... In every case, however, they are meaningful only in contemplation and for the I who surrenders to the stream of life.

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<sup>6</sup> This short paragraph has been lifted from a different short manuscript of UM 1925–1927a.

<sup>7</sup> In ordinary German language, the verb *dauern* means to last, to persist. In this context, Schutz plays on his translation of Bergson's term, "duree" by the noun *Dauer* but links the corresponding verb *dauern* to the meaning of the French noun. To translate the statement "*Ich dauere*" literally by "I persist" would be grossly misleading.

# Part I

## Theory of Life Forms and Symbol Concept

Alfred Schutz

### Editor's note

By Helmut Wagner

According to Schutz's outline, the first part of this project was to serve three purposes. The first was to introduce the concepts of life form and symbol in their general ideal-typical structure. Secondly, it was to offer the analysis and discussion of six specific life forms, representing cross-sections of an actually continuous life of consciousness and forming a hierarchy of ideal types in ascending order, ranging from the spontaneous flow of inner duration to the highest forms of rational thinking. Finally, a general treatment of the concept of symbol relations and the concept of meaning was foreseen.

The first main part is the only one which Schutz managed to execute to a substantial degree. Yet, it was broken off before the analysis of the fifth life form had been finished. Nevertheless the themes of symbol relations and meaning have found considerable attention in the given text, since they were needed for the treatment of the relationship of adjacent life forms to one another.

Schutz sectioned off the manuscript into numerous parts, separated by dividing lines. I have numbered these sections and provided them with adequate sub-titles.

This manuscript offered the relatively greatest difficulties for the translator and posed serious problems for the editor. After careful consideration, I decided to circumvent the seven quasi-mathematical diagrams and their algebraic denotations which Schutz introduced into the manuscript and discussed at considerable length. In justification of this circumvention, I state the following: The "mathematization" of parts of Schutz's expositions served merely illustrative purposes. It cannot possibly serve any function in the development of the substantive argument. To the contrary, it shows Schutz resorting to extreme quantitative means for the description of by definition unquantifiable happenings and experiences, all located in or connected with "inner duration." This purely qualitative concept of Bergson, for

instance, is in utter opposition to the linear conception of a mathematical continuum which, in addition, consists of an infinite series of discrete points laid out in space.

As the reader will learn from remarks of Schutz, found both in the text and in notes, he himself was highly concerned with undoing the unwarranted effects of his quasi-mathematical illustrations. He was, of course, completely aware of the general paradox of speaking about inner duration in a language which, as Bergson said, laid out everything in space, and knew that the language of a mathematical formalism drives the spatialization of time to its uttermost extreme.

That there was no inner necessity for making use of this formalism is demonstrated by Schutz's discussion of duration and inner time in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau* of 1932. Here, he expressed the gist of his earlier expositions in terms of a language which, in spite of its pragmatic character, at least allows for description with the help of qualitatively-descriptive terms.

I suggest that Schutz, in the mid-1920s, used quasi-mathematical illustrations for pedagogical reasons. He planned to address himself to fellow intellectuals who, like him, had had a good general mathematical training and could be expected to gain an easier access to the strange considerations of Bergson if they faced it first in, for them, convenient mathematical terms and made the corrections later. Whether such expectations were justified, I am unable to decide. In any case, 55 years later and for an English-speaking audience—at least in North America—the effect of an illustrative mathematization would likely to be the opposite of that expected at the time from a German-Austrian readership. It would confuse the issues even more than any ordinary descriptive language could.

# Life Forms and Meaning Structures

Alfred Schutz

## (1) IMAGES, DURATION, SPACE AND TIME

My experiencing I is placed into the cosmos. I may allow the latter to affect me; and I may take the world into myself, without cognitively objectifying it, simply as stuff of my being-here and as material of my existence: accepting, processing, and transforming it. If I accept the World not as mental representation but as experience, the abundance of its phenomena yields to me “images” which, although differentiated, are not at all heterogeneous.<sup>1</sup>

They are differentiated: when I move, within finite spheres, in various directions, I seem to move toward the infinity of that which is forming itself. Nevertheless, these differentiations are unitary; all these experiences belong to *me*. The experiences of my environment are different in quality, quantity, and possibly also in intensity; they are most differentiated in their intentional content. Yet, they unify themselves in the experience of my own I in a manifold unity which is not merely the unity of my consciousness (in the logical sense). Between nature and art, God and world, feeling and spirit, the sensuate and the supernatural, I experience this many-colored life colorful and undifferentiated as a constant change in the mode of succession. I differentiate it afterwards and artificially on reflection. Only conceptually do I grant the quality of coexistence to the separate phases of my ideal I.

Many dreams leave in the awakening person at first nothing but the vague feeling of having experienced something. The situation which caused—or more accurately accompanied—the dream experience reveals itself only after some reflection.

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<sup>1</sup> AS: This is an intentionally a-logical position but not therefore a psychological one. For the time being, we abstain from investigating the logical character of these “images.” For now, we merely refer to the significance of this term by Bergson. “Images,” for him, are impressions of experiences of the non-speculating human, a human who is nonscientific in the real sense. They are situated midway between representations (or appresentations, HRW) and objects.

Similarly, all that which is observed, felt, and enjoyed during the experience of a summer evening, remains closely bound to this experience in its unity—even though only for its duration. That which is remembered differentiates itself into mountain and lake, sun and tree, ringing of the bell and conversation, movement of the rowboat and color of the woods only for the consciousness which turns back (to an experience after it has passed away, HRW) and now forms sharply delimited images. Established in retrospect, their simultaneous side-by-side makes the experience, “summer evening,” comprehensible and easily remembered. But, nevertheless, reflection is not capable of bringing back the experience.<sup>2</sup>

What resulted for us originally was only an ever-changing but steady succession, a unitary but manifold development of the experience of the I. For reasons still to be given, it cannot be communicated in concise form, and therefore not at all.

The first philosopher who forced modern philosophy to accept this basic difference between experiences as such and the reflection about experiences—a difference important for many reasons—was Bergson. He showed, for the first time, the unity of the manifold in the stream of duration whose criterion is continuous change of quality. He was the first to make matter, as an order of memory images, into a function of memory.

But already Bergson has pointed out that we are rarely allowed to self-contemplate the experiencing I, to become absorbed in pure duration. Our I-experience is banished into time and space; it is tied to consociates through language and emotions; it is accustomed to thinking, that is, to spatialize streaming changes of quality and to form them into concepts. Therefore, we have to push aside the whole layer of our habits of thinking and living in order to achieve a first primitive/surrender to duration. This is so because our world of thinking, our concepts, our science demonstrate their time-space character at every move. Nothing, however, can suppress the experience of continual change of quality more than the constant reflection on the world around us. Reflection represents a realm of side-by-side quantities; even movement, which most resembles duration, is spatialized through concepts. Our adaptation to commerce with the external world and our acquisition of habits of thinking have forced us to replace our experience of duration by the experience of space and time, and to remain entangled in reflection and thinking. Our experiencing is almost ever coupled with reflection about the experience. We control ourselves by our thinking; often we are unable to see the image on account of the concepts. Our consciousness of the stream of duration holds on only timidly to the unambiguous “now” and “thus,” using them as rigid boundaries between which we squeeze our experiences-turned-into-concepts.

At first glance, it seems to be most of all one circumstance which forces me to exchange the subjective experience of duration with the conceptual experience of

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<sup>2</sup> AS: The particular means which the artist uses in order to make this manifoldness into an experience in each by us preconstituted picture will be treated in a separate chapter.



time and space, nay more, to project duration into time and space. This is the fact that I live in duration not alone. I am surrounded by objects which exist simultaneously with me. I know about consociates, that is, of other egos who experience their own duration and whose consciousness flows similarly to mine. Initially, we shall examine this dual experience of the object and the knowledge about a Thou and we shall investigate whether and in what way we are thereby forced to modify our experience of duration. Further, we will examine the means at our disposal for unifying in our consciousness the two realms of our existence: the experience of the I in duration and the Thou experience in space and time. Further, we will try to ascertain, within the realm of science, the systematic possibility of the recognition of this state of fact.

## **(2) THE PASSAGE FROM DURATION TO SPACE-TIME**

The experience of space and matter became a major problem of philosophy long before Kant. The central point of the Aristotelian logic and of the whole medieval scholastic is the concept of substance. Since Kant, the problem received a different formulation, but did not lose anything in significance. The “Copernican turn” of Kant did not concern the question of the essence of the object but our possibility of cognitively realizing the object. This reversal of the question subsequently proved itself extremely fruitful. But it presupposed a fundamental insight into the nature of the world outside ourselves which was apriorily given and relegated the conception of the “phenomenon” into a pre-scientific sphere. Thus, the transsubstantiation of the sensorily perceptible into a conceptual-categorical recognizable had to be made possible through the mystery of the transcendental schematism. The experience which, according to the system, was focusing on the external world, could only in this way be brought in agreement with the (neither denied nor considered) discrepancy between the intensive experience of continuous quality changes and the quantifiable discontinuum (of space and time fulfilled). Now, when the Kantian philosophy demonstrated space and time as pure forms of our thinking, it deliberately banned from its field of vision the experience of the concept of space (and thus of matter) through apriorization. It limited itself to demonstrating that phenomena are given to our senses and that space and time are apriorily given prior to all thinking and, in fact, making the latter possible. Starting with the configuration of experience of science, and especially of mathematical natural science, it made the latter possible and produced a critique of pure reason, that is, of scientific experience. It demonstrated the laws of scientific experience which themselves were conditioned in many ways. It had to renounce the efforts to assume that scientific experience is secondary and that space and time is relative. And it was right in doing so. It found as object of its investigations an intellectual world in which, indeed, space and time were postulated as apriorily given. In the course of our investigation, we hope to show why this is so: the world of space and time, into which we are placed in the

experience of our inner duration, is socially conditioned by way of memory and Thou experience; and our “concepts” (in the sense of the original materials of our experience) are erected upon the socially conditioned fundament of the linguistic symbol. The transition from the world of the inner I experience to the outer world of the Thou is already executed in memory image and symbol.

To clarify this difficult linkage, we will initially try to retrace the path from the inner experience of pure duration to the concept of space. We will do this on the basis of Bergson’s conception, especially as formulated in his later writings. Thereafter, we will speak about the phenomenon of memory and, after closer inspection of this fundamental factum, to derive the symbol from it. Having made ourselves familiar with these basic factual complexes, we may calmly return to the social world of space and time, of concepts and experience. But more, we have to do it if we want to come close to the actual purpose of these investigations: the grounding of the social sciences in the Thou experience. Practising science, we will intentionally move within the sphere of the “space-timely” conditioned concept. In reverse, it will therefore be our task to investigate in what way is possible a science, that is, a conceptually-categorically comprehensible “series of experiences” of the Thou. The experience of the Thou by far precedes conceptual-categorical comprehension. The former conditions the latter and makes it possible just by resisting it. We will ask which method such a science would have to use in order to lift the irrational fundamental experience of the Thou out of its own specific sphere and to transfer it into the rational realm of science without abandoning the circle of “symbols,” to wit, the language-directed concepts of experience.

### **(3) DURATION OBSERVED**

When I lock out all sensory impressions and turn completely into myself, I become aware of a steady and continuous change, a continuous transition of qualities which is comparable to a melody. I distinguish an altered Before which through change became a Now. This Now itself, however, having become noticed by me, passed at that very moment into a Before by way of a change of which I became conscious with the help of my memory. But, by making these considerations, I already have left the sphere of the pure experience of duration. Only by remembering a Before have I been able to get hold of the qualitatively different Now. I have “made present” the immediately following Now only through letting it become rigid, through fixation by fiat as the Now which just was, as one qualitatively different from the other. Intentionally disrupting the eternal stream, I formed an image of my inner “condition” out of the Now, which is just forming itself, and the Now which just had been. This image was preserved in my memory; through comparison, it shows to me my present “I am” in contrast to my “I was.” Thus, if I wish to distinguish the qualitative change in my sphere of the stream of duration, I have to fixate, as it were, some points in the course of my inner experience. I will have to have noticed the second-last tone of the melody in order to know whether the tone sounding now is

higher, lower, stronger, weaker, or of different timbre—in short, whether it is different from its predecessor. I achieve this by an artificial process, through an image which I form in my memory.

If I now open my eyes and look around, I notice images of objects which are in movement or at rest, which are changeable or, apparently, non-changeable. I become aware of my body as an image in the outer world. While writing these lines, I see my hand executing movements on this paper; I remember that I intended to make these movements. Now, they participate in my inner duration as well as they are perceived by me in the outer world. At first, these images are for me mere qualities of my I, states of my duration. If I lift my eyes from a piece of paper, covered with letters, and look through the window at the landscape, “paper” and “landscape” are only conspicuous qualities of two moments of my being.

Nevertheless, I can co-ordinate exactly several such qualities with every moment of my duration. While writing this down, I see my hand slide across the paper; I hear the scratching of the pen; I smell the smoke of my cigar; I feel the warmth of the stove; and I am aware of the position of my body at the desk. All these moments, and many others neither named nor countable, constitute the experience of my being-Now-and-Thus. In a minute, a comparison of them will enable me to establish the quality differences between the moment which had been a Now but did just pass, and the moment which just now became a Now.<sup>3</sup> However, if I frequently make such comparisons among the images which I find as qualities in my experience of duration, I notice series of images which remain unchanged. That means, they codetermine the quality of my earlier Now as well as that of my present Now. First of all, I notice this quality of belonging-to-the-moments-of-my-duration on my body. Always in a different position, it is always sensed by me as an image of the outer world and as an experience in my duration. Thus, it is most of all that I know my body to be everlastingly coordinated to every phase of my being. But, strictly speaking, I know this also only by comparing a Now with a Before, the latter having been preserved in my memory.

This comparing activity of memory becomes still clearer with regard to objects which, in contrast to my body, are not consistently coordinated with the course of my inner duration. For the contemplation of my inner being there is not yet an “object”; for it, there exists no being-outside at all but only images of changing quality. It is exactly the task of this investigation to pursue the process in which we project these images into the outside, thereby discovering the realized (*erfüllten*) space and, with and in it, the qualities of matter and time.

We mentioned earlier already that the comparison of the phases of our duration shows a series of qualities which are common to several of its phases.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> AS: When I spoke of the simultaneity of these impressions, meant nothing more than that they, together, make up the quality of my Now and Thus in the experience of my inner duration.

<sup>4</sup> AS: We realize that the comparing function of our memory is in no way self-understood. For the time being, we replace a complicated unknown within the complicated formula of the whole process by another unknown. This is done for the sake of simplification. Already the next section will prove that it is necessary to analyze further this provisional formulation.

By way of mathematical analogy we may say that we “take out” and “put in brackets” these unchanging qualities. Through this activity of our comparing memory, we obtain groups of qualities which belong together and of which we can say that they partake in our duration. We grant these groups persistence in the always changing stream of our experiences in duration. Therefore, they will have to show a continuity similar to that of our duration; they must have something in common with this duration. On the other hand, they must also be basically different from our duration: with the exception of our body, they signify for us quality experiences only in stretches. In fact, there exists a common quality in all these groups by virtue of which they are different from the quality of our experiences of duration. This is the quality of extension of matter.

In stating this, we anticipated a result supposed to be produced by our investigation. We recognized and identified the quality of matter, with the help of our memory, as something extended, and extension as similar to our duration. Therewith, we have already abandoned the experience of our duration. Duration is manifold and unextended; yet it is a continuum. It can get hold of extension and discontinuity, the two criteria of the space-time world, only in the artificial process of remembering. Thus, the formulation attempted above seems to be paradoxical. But this paradox is merely apparent. It disappears in the closer investigation of the mechanics of the process in which our memory transforms the flowing and becoming of mere continuing qualities into the concepts of extension and matter.

#### **(4) MEMORY PARTICIPATES IN DURATION**

We said already: our duration is a continuum of changing experiences of quality. We cannot force the stream of our experiencing into form without thereby abandoning the realm of duration. Embossed form is opposed to living unfolding. We transform being-becoming into being-of-that-which has-been-formed. That which has been formed, however, belongs to the existing and delimited realm of concepts. There is nothing stable in the course of duration. Speaking exactly, there is not even a “Thus and Now” because, as statement, “Thus and Now” appears in time. As an activity, it claims a fraction of the time, while my inner duration continues to flow.

How do we recognize differentiation in the flow of our duration? This question was posed in the previous section where we tried to follow the comparative activity of memory on hand of the example of the body. But this formulation was provisional, and less precise as required. We clarified only that we become aware of a preceding change through the comparing function of our memory. As yet, we did not speak about the fact that our memory itself participates in the manifoldedness of our duration. Nay, more: on the one hand, it effects the change of quality; on the other hand, like anything immediately given in consciousness, it changes itself differentiatingly and continually with and in duration. We intend now to investigate these two phenomena but state already now that our formulations will come closer to the actual state of affairs but will represent still provisional states of transition.

Let us imagine a concentration of our attention exclusively on a single object. For the sake of simplicity, we choose an unanimated object, maybe an ancient coin which a researcher scrutinizes under a magnifying glass. He prefers to use artificial light in order to avoid being distracted by the play of sunlight on metal from his observation of the coin itself. For the time being, we abstain from considering the inscription of the coin which would have to be deciphered. Our researcher does not know the meaning of the signs in an unknown language; he merely wants to make a drawing of this coin in order to reproduce its character as faithfully as possible. A first glance allows him to see a blurred, scrambled mixture of lines, little differentiated from each other. But, in concentrated prolonged scrutiny, the structure of the inscription becomes clear and impressive; it is simple to transfer it exactly on the drawing. One says, the eye has accustomed itself to the observed object. What did happen? How can one explain that the same object under unchanged external conditions (light, position, etc.) provided two different images?

The following hypothesis may provide a plausible explanation. We said, no “moment” of our inner being can be equal to the one which preceded it. If we want to convince ourselves of this fact, we have only to consult our memory. It has faithfully registered everything “before”; now, it offers us the occasion to compare this memory report with the actual state of things of the “Now.” Of course, we have to recall our memory image; but does this recall consist in the re-experience of the Before? Does “representing” mean to enter the image of something past into the book of our memory, or do we merely consult this actual diary in order conveniently to re-read the notice we find there? Everything speaks against the second, many things against the first assumption. Because, if every “remembering” indicated a new experience of the image, it would be impossible for us to distinguish between that which is actually experienced and that which is remembered. In reality, we can do this at any time.<sup>5</sup>

A still other phenomenon shows clearly that the first thesis does not apply. I refer to the enigmatic and still unclarified roles played in our inner experience by fantasy, be it of artistic or otherwise conceptive nature. Great similarities exist between fantasy experience and memory image; both functions of our I provide “virtual” images. The factual circumstances become still more complicated through the fact that there are memory images of fantasies as well as of any other experience. Nevertheless, each of us clearly knows the difference between memory, directed toward the past, and fantasy, directed toward the future. In particular, artistic fantasy seems to offer important elucidations. Starting with given materials, it takes a path into the future. The I of the artist follows it on this path in vicarious experiences. By contrast, our memory has absorbed only our experiences. Therefore, memory too belongs only to us and our earlier experience. It belongs, so to speak, totally to the I whose identity for us is

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<sup>5</sup> AS: It goes without saying that Plato’s theory of anamnesis deals with another kind of memory. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the need for a metaphysical derivation of our memory issues from the mystical function which it has for our life.

beyond doubt by virtue of the experience of duration. By contrast, fantasy anticipates something in the future. It is as if it explodes the boundaries of our I; it seems to participate in the great enigma which all metaphysics left behind unsolved.

In particular, these circumstances seem to demonstrate that our memory, even without our asking, participates in and registers every phase of our I. Every moment of our duration is the memory image of the preceding one plus an X. This X constitutes that which is essential for this moment; in fact, it is responsible for the unending variations of duration. In the case of our numismatic researcher, does possibly the same visual impression add itself once more to all already accepted visual impressions of the same object which have been stored in his memory? The same? Not at all. Apparently, nothing has changed. The coin still lies in the same place under the magnifying glass, which has not been moved. The light remained unchanged. Now as before, the attention of the researcher is undividedly aimed at the character of the inscription. He sees the same and he sees it anew. The experience of the inscription of the coin under the magnifying glass joins the memory images of many moments of inner duration, each of which had as its content the experience, “inscription of the coin under the magnifying glass.” *For this reason*, a new image results; it did not exist before.

This observation is familiar to all of us. From experience, we all know enough examples for the fact that adding what is “similar” means a change of quality in our experiencing.<sup>6</sup> One may only recall a noise which regularly repeats itself (ticking of a clock, miller and mill) and which we at first perceive as unpleasant; later, we “do not hear it” any more. Again, if the noise grows in intensity with repetition, we experience it with a constant level of pain (judged by its cause). To recapitulate: every moment of our duration contains, as virtual memory image, all earlier moments of our I. Memory makes duration into a manifold experience and thus conditions our actual inner life.

But, one may object, in how many cases does the appeal to memory fail? How little do we really remember? This objection is in no way justified, because our “experiences” are falsified, materialized, socially conditioned—in short, they are conceptual. We think, that is, we live in our environment a totally different life as that of pure duration. Our habits of thinking suppress our *mneme* (*mens*, “mine”) and transform it into memoria. The German language took the same path from “remembering” (*Erinnerung*) to “memory” (*Gedächtnis*). But if we succeed in transposing ourselves again into pure duration, we will be able again to “become aware” of those experiences which belong to our own duration.

The recognition that our memory preserves a complete and continuous image of our inner duration, however, explains the fact that it partakes in our inner duration and changes with and in it.

I recall an experience of my school years which, at the time deeply shook and tormented me but now, my remembrance is friendly. I came across a letter which

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<sup>6</sup>AS: One should excuse this preliminary imposition of the “similar.” The term, of course, can only be applied to the sphere of concepts and objects but not that of images. Here, we mean only that we deal with experiences which are similar to each other when removed from our, duration and formulated in concepts.

I wrote years ago, and which renewed the pain of this experience. Both times I thought of the same event. But how much has it changed! How did it become, for him who escaped the tormenting and fear-ridden atmosphere of the school, an idyllic image? In the intervening time, I have lived through much; I have become “older” and “more mature,” and my memory with me. Here, I have intentionally used a phenomenon of the emotional life as an example; the discrepancy of memories becomes especially clear in the case of affectual experiences. But the memory of specific objects of the outer world, too, shows changes of this kind. Countless examples for this are provided in daily life.

However, now we must ask whether, by introducing this dual function of our memory, we again go beyond the circle of our problem configuration. On the one hand, we asserted that it is our memory which conditions the manifoldedness of our duration. On the other hand, we stated that our memory changes with us and our duration. In short, it also is duration. As in the case of our body, we stated now that a moment of the flow of our memory is coordinated to every moment of our duration. Did we, then, not artificially double our I by transposing all functions of duration to memory, which belongs to but is not identical with it? With this dualization, did we not rob the I of its existence? Is there, maybe, duration *only* in the flow of memory?

At the present stage of our considerations, this serious objection cannot be refuted. We merely set it down. It will still occupy us in various contexts. Hopefully, it will allow us to show that the problem arose from the intermingling of the sphere of pure duration with the sphere of the world which evolved in space and time. However, already now will we have to point out that this objection will become indispensable for the solution of our problem.

## **(5) REALITY IMAGE AND MEMORY IMAGE: THE PROBLEM**

After these statements, we will take up the preliminary formulation of the existence of space and objects and the provisional derivation of the “concept” extension at the point, at which we interrupted it. We will check whether we are already in a position to replace the provisional formulation by another one—not less problematic but nevertheless closer to the truth.

Starting with the change of quality, we had observed that we become aware of these changes only through what we called the comparative function of our memory. Only the combination and ordering of these comparisons leads to the establishment of the fact that several quality groups (my body, “objects of the outer world”) display a “steadiness” which is adequate to that of my inner duration. We saw just now how this comparing function operates. We realized that our memory absorbs all moments of duration. This More is added to a Given. Through it, the “reality image,” which joins a “memory image,” brings about that continuous change which forms the essence of our duration-experiences. Now, we know how much the manifoldedness of our experience impressions depends on our memory; but we do not know anything about the nature of the images as such. Originally, we assumed that we will



arrive at the “object” through a comparing function which, so to speak, provides us with unchanging groups of images which, again, among themselves have in common certain “quality groups,” for instance, expansion. After the investigation of the mechanism of our flow of memory, we have to realize that this path does not lead to the object, to space, to time, in short, to anything external. This is so because these “qualities” of extension, of time, etc., enter so to speak automatically and without our help into our memory images. They are contained in the image of our “Now” and “Thus,” but just as qualities, as virtual and unextended images. We still have not broken through to the essence of matter. We have not even clearly enough comprehended how the reality image unites itself with the memory image and how, on its part, it becomes memory image. Still less clear for us is the capacity of establishing the “sameness” of the two images of two states of our I, or better, of establishing that certain quality groups are common to several images.

Indeed, it seems that every speculation encounters here unsurmountable difficulties. The relation between image and object, duration and spacetime, sensation and concept, in one word the problem of cognition itself, shows itself here completely inaccessible. We cannot comprehend how that which is not extended could stand in any kind of relationship to that which is extended. All attempts at explaining this mystery are either a humbly believing credo, like the theory of the pre-established harmony, or hypotheses which aim at reducing that which is incomprehensible to something which is no less incomprehensible. It is characteristic of philosophy that its history displays a constant wavering between these two poles of explanation. Thus, modern philosophy, tired from the Kantian struggle for a rational solution of the problem, accepts as given the linkage between our mind and the objects. It merely attempts to examine the functions of such “recognition of essences” or “relatedness to meaning,” “value-surrounded reality” or “value experience,” or whatever complicated names are assigned to the investigation of the epistemological problem of judgment and concept, method and system.

Up to now, this study has tried to rather faithfully follow the genial investigations of Bergson. He, too, had to face this question. But it occurs to me that he did not seek its solution. On the contrary, he availed himself of several auxiliary means in order to reject as irrelevant for his investigation the question: “how does that which is extended reach that which is unextended, the sensation the image, the object the concept, the outer the inner?” The world presents itself to him as ultimately “given” as it does to Kant and all others. This, in fact, seems to be last resort of all speculation. We live “in” the world and we “experience” “the” world. The world is “object” only for our experience. Placed into it, we use it as a “circumstance of space and time.” Only the renunciation of the possibility of recognizing this state of things allows us to recognize what is basic to it: the relations of our “images,” our “concepts” among themselves on the one hand, and the relations’ among the objects of the outer world on the other.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> AS: We beg to excuse this formulation, which is raw and intentionally exaggerated. Here, we aim only at working out the sharpest contrast possible.



This extended space-time world, into which we are placed, becomes in various ways perceivable to our I. This I experiences inner duration, even if it may be denied to the human mind to explain it rationally. Most of all, our body mediates between the I, tied to pure duration, and the outer world which simply exists for every consciousness. And this in two respects: First, as already said above, a quality image of our body is coordinated to every moment of pure duration. However, this body has one characteristic which it has in common with all other “objects” of the outer world: it is extended. Being evenly coordinated to our inner I and the outer world, the body offers a particularly suitable link between the I and the outer world. It is an image among other outer images, but it is very special and uniquely privileged image; it is privileged because it is, for our I, more than an image because it partakes in our duration. This leads to the second function of the body which makes the recognition of the outer world possible to a still higher degree. Our body is tool or carrier of the *acting I*. However, for this acting I, in contrast to the reflecting I, there no longer exists, according to Bergson, the problem of the Inner and the Outer, even though it still belongs to pure duration. For it, every ap-perception and every image transforms itself immediately into movement which acts into the outer world and, thereby, partakes in space, time, and matter. Therefore, for this living, that is, acting, I exists no conflict between pure duration and extended space-time, between that which becomes and passes away in the flow of duration and that which exists in space. It belongs equally to both spheres through the transformation of that which is apperceived into action. Nay more: apperception, subsumed under the powerful primacy of action, already selects among the images. This selection is determined by the apparently potential action which is supposed to release just this apperception in the I. Moving and moved, the acting I places its duration twofold into the space-time world. Therefore, for Bergson, movement must mean two things because it must partake in inner duration as well as in the space-time world. This, in fact, is so: movement, as flow, is that which moves, belongs to inner duration; movement, as path followed and as space traversed, is something external and extended and thus quantifiable and measurable—in contrast to movement in inner duration, which is continuous change of quality.

In this way, Bergson tried to ignore the solution of the epistemological problem, in its usual form, in the formulation of his questions. He did this not inadvertently. He started with the correct presupposition that the epistemological problem, in form of an inquiry into the relation of the Inner to the Outer, is only possible in a sphere which approaches the experience of our duration with the help of language and concepts, and thus with the equipment of the world conditioned by space and time. He only hints at that which forthwith will occupy us most of all: word and concept as tied to space and, time. As Bergson thinks, the acting I may not know of the contradiction because it participates in space and duration. We are most of all interested in how and whereby the “apprehending” (a reflecting, HRW) I or the I as such partakes in the outer world by creating or acquiring concepts and language. We do not doubt that an outer world exists, as Berkeley did. We also do not investigate the relation of our duration, and of the images which unwind themselves in this manifold continuum, to the outer world and the objects which are

located in discontinuous space. We do not pretend to solve the epistemological problem; we do not even try to do so. On the contrary, we will find justification in the avoidance of two dangers which the attempts at solving this problem contain in themselves: either to dissolve the world in Berkeley's ideas or else to postulate an Absolute Thing behind our sensations. We will try to demonstrate that the epistemological problem in this form has its solution in its presuppositions. That means, that the solution becomes possible at all only when we are sure of our belonging to the realm of duration as well as to that of the Extended. Therefore, we do not ask: how enters the extended object into my unextended apperception? How turns that which becomes and passes away into an Existing? But, at first, we ask: which path is traversed by the image when moving from pure duration to concept? What, for our consciousness which belongs to pure duration, differentiates becoming and passing-away from existing?

As stated, we will have to justify this event in two ways. We will have to demonstrate that the question of the relation of the object to the I, in fact, is only meaningful for a thinking which has already absorbed the elements of time and space yet, nevertheless, knows about the flow of inner duration. And further, we will have to investigate whether our I-in-duration is connected with the outer world also by another bridge aside from that of action and movement. One demonstration will yield the other, but we will reach it only after various discussions. However, before discussing the transformation of the image into the concept, we want to stop a bit in order to recall our aim, once more to review the path we have gone thus far, and to make sure of the direction in which we want to proceed.

## **(6) THOU AND MEANING AS CONTENT OF EXPERIENCE: THE PROBLEM**

This study aims at investigating the methods of the sociology of understanding. Max Weber had made this sociology into a science. He was sure of his method and his aim as only a few others were. Thus, he did not find it necessary to say much about the preconditions of his scientific undertaking. But he speaks all the clearer about his method as derived from his investigations. He abstained from constructing a concept of Society and from hypostatizing social relations into an "as such." Only the Thou, the consociate, was given to him. And further the fact that this Thou, can be understood as being meaningful to himself and also to the person who asks him. The Thou, then, stands in the center of Weber's considerations. He intends to comprehend the Thou and his meaning scientifically, that is, conceptually. However, this Thou is different from all other objects of experience in that it can be understood. Therefore, his comprehension demands a particular method. To exactly formulate this method is the purpose of the main part of this study.

However, with the conceptual grasp of the Thou, understandability is presupposed but not clarified. We discover meaning contexts. But, as long as we remain in

the sphere of sociology, we cannot know more about “meaning” as its existence, its forms, its recognizability.

This study starts with the notion that “Thou” and “meaning” are not primarily objects of experience but contents of experience. Therefore, it places a deliberately “pre-scientific” investigation of the experience of duration and of meaning before the scientific-conceptual analysis of these contents as objects of experience. It hopes, from the realized uniqueness and specificity of these experiences, to gain knowledge for answering the question: according to the opinion of the author of the sociology of understanding, which method has to be used by an experiential science of the Thou. However, this pre-scientific investigation is directed upon an *experience*, and thus upon an experience which belongs to the I and is widely remote from concept and object of experience. As Bergson demonstrated, this I has pure duration as primary content. Therefore, we have to check the Thou experience of the I and to establish how this experience becomes known to the I: whether it still belongs to pure duration or to the realm of concepts; whether it is conditioned by the concept or whether it conditions the concept which, certainly, is not primary; whether “meaning” becomes possible only through the experience of the Thou or whether the “Thou” experience presupposes meaning already.

However, the form of experience of the I, pure duration, had to be considered. We had to start with the experiences of the I, while ever anticipating the results, without paying attention to the Thou and to “meaning” relatedness. We have attempted this in the preceding chapters.

The experience of pure duration as continual change of duality was our starting point. Already here arose two questions: first, the manifoldedness of pure duration as such was not recognizable: By what means do we convince ourselves of the difference between the “Now” and “Thus” and that which just has been? Provisionally, we answered, through the comparing function of our memory. The second question, however, concerned the cause of this manifoldedness itself. Also provisionally, we found the cause of this manifoldedness in our memory which preserves our memory images and adds the experienced images to them.

Still, we had not yet reached the outside, matter, space, and time. We tried first to explain the phenomenon of expansion in terms of a group of qualities which, due to the comparing function of our memory, had to be unchangeable and were as such kept in memory. This attempt foundered pitifully on the recognition that our memory maintains all experiences evenly without a specific comparing function. In addition, the assertion of something “remaining the same” in duration was coarsely inaccurate. Therefore, we stopped trying to find a way from the experience of pure duration to the outside of space and time. We noticed that we were facing a form of the epistemological problem as such. Now, we had to decide in which direction we should pursue our investigation next. We decided to leave aside the question of an Outer and an Inner. Should we succeed in this, we will direct our attention again to the function of memory because we hope to find here a partial answer to the last posed question of the path from image to concept.

## (7) SCRUTINY OF THE RELATION BETWEEN EXPERIENCE AND MEMORY: MEANING

Each of us who reflects about his life will be able to remember a series of events which gave direction to his later fate. As a rule, this is a matter of circumstances whose full significance transpires only in retrospective survey. At the time, they were submerged by other events, apparently being without significance or else of no greater significance than many other events. How does it come to pass that just these “accidents,” seemingly irrelevant, gain in retrospect importance for the total course of our life?

This example will bring us to a consideration of the nature of the “significance” of “meaning.”

Analyzing our faculty of remembering, we stated two things: First, memory stores the events of our inner duration without our help. Second, it partakes in our inner duration and changes with and in it. Now, what happens when we remember a specific event of our life? Obviously, we direct our attention upon that image of our experience which our memory picked up and registered. However, this memory image displays significant deviations from the experience—a fact which we already mentioned and which has several causes. Most of all, the irreversibility of the flow of our inner duration conditions the discrepancy between experience and memory image. We had defined inner duration as continuous manifoldedness, stating thereby that, in every phase of this flow, an as yet not existing  $x$  must be added to that which is given.

Since anything which passed away has been integrated into our memory, this new  $x$  can only consist of an additional experience. Our duration flows unequivocally and continuously. While we add new contents of experience to the experiences which we stored in memory, we are getting older. It follows that an identity of experiences with memory images is impossible. Such an identity would have as precondition the reversibility of duration. Remembering a specific event consists essentially in the reproduction of a memory image which has been removed from the flow of our duration.

[[The phenomena of memory are complex events. Let us depict inner duration mathematically as a semi-ray<sup>8</sup> propagating itself unilaterally from zero toward infinity. On it specific points are indicated, marking a specific “moment” of experience turned into a memory image (B) and other points as later “moments” of remembering the event for which the memory image stands (A, A 1, etc.). Any memory image is embedded into a long chain of memory images, some of earlier, others of later origin. Due to the continuity of inner duration, the memory image itself is a kind of combination of all preceding experiences. It appears from an experience

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<sup>8</sup>HRW: At this point, Schutz inserted a line diagram called “Figure 1.” Almost two pages of the MS. which follow are covered with the interpretation of the diagram in mathematical-algebraic symbols. In the paragraph set in double brackets, I have given the core of the exposition in ordinary terms. The reason for this has been given in the “Editor’s note” on [p. 35–36].

which itself changes the totality of the previous memories. By the same token, it changes with every moment of re-remembrance because in each interval new experiences have been added to memory. At face value, a certain image seems to be fixed by past experiences and memory images; yet, it varies with every new retrospective glance since new experiences have been made in the meantime. The retrospective “moment” is actually a whole set of “moments” no matter how short the time-intervals between them. Thus, the “moment” of remembering itself flows along and changes; it too is variable.]]

Let us free ourselves of the diagram, which served only illustrative purposes. It contains an eminent danger for our problem: it spatializes the flow of duration.<sup>9</sup> Let us transfer the given considerations into the terminology which we have used so far.

Our memory has preserved for us all experiences of our inner duration up to the (present, HRW) Now and Thus and, therewith, also the experience which I now intend to evoke. However, at the moment of concentrated attention, my memory contains more and different images than those it contained at the moment of the experience which I want to take in focus. I have expressed myself here imprecisely. The nature of inner duration is constant change of quality. Hence, we cannot speak of “more” images because inner duration does not allow any kind of quantification. I can only say that my memory image “now” is different and more differentiated. And more, the flow of memory has something in common with the flow of inner duration, which it conditions: it too consists of a mesh and mixture of changing moments of quality. It is continuous and manifold, and we become aware of our inner duration only through our memory. Therefore, I intentionally interrupt the flow of this continuum as soon as I “pick out a point,” say the experience B. This experience has been absorbed into uncounted other experiences. Together with these, it has been carried forth in my memory; it has become part of my “Now” and “Thus.”

How do I pass from my (present, HRW) “I am” to “I was”? Obviously, my memory image B has not been completely absorbed by the memory images which followed it. My memory does not mechanically register the experiences of my inner duration; it affects them also in a different form: it *integrates* them.

In the moment A of my inner duration, actually I have not been able to recall the naked memory image of my experience B. Because this experience was a condition for moment A, it is contained in it. I am not able to analyze the experience of the “Now” and “Thus” (of moment B, HRW) in order to arrive at B (the memory image, HRW). This would mean to grant the reversibility of pure duration (which is impossible, HRW). Yet, I am capable of remembering the experience. If memory had no other faculty than to register the images of my experiences, the dilemma would be insoluble. In fact, the problem cannot be solved as long as we continue to identify memory with pure duration. But let us pay undivided attention to the dual activity of “memory.” On the one hand, we called memory the condition of the manifoldedness of our inner duration. As such, it seizes every experience; it flows “with us” and

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<sup>9</sup> AS: (In fact, our line ... does not present inner duration (how could it do this!)) but the line of time which corresponds to it.

it makes duration “conscious” for us. On the other hand, we spoke of the memory images of a specific experience. Thus, we lifted this specific experience out of the flow of pure duration. We have intentionally interrupted the continuous flow; actually, we spoke about something which no longer occurs in the pure experience of duration which is constant change of quality. The experience remembered is something which has been given a stable form; as such, it is only conditionally subject to quality change.

Nevertheless, we believe that we did not make a mistake when we used the term “memory” for both phenomena: Absorption in the Now and Thus is common to both. The Now and Thus consists not merely of something different from something which was earlier. In it, too, I am conscious of the continuity of my duration. I am aware of the individual experiences which I have experienced. The unity of the I is a quality of every “Now” and “Thus.” This unity, however, consists of the awareness of that “I was” as much as that “I am.” We believe, then, that we have to justify the unity of memory by resorting to the most primary experience of pure duration, the experience of the unity of the I. What, at first, we encountered as two forms of memory now represents itself in view of the unity of the I—as two functions of one and the same phenomenon.

As discussed, the function of memory is to make the continuum of pure duration into a manifold. It ties together the different moments of our being, which are differentiated in quality: *It is the awareness of the ongoing I*. With regard to its other function, to allow us to remember individual quality experiences of our I, we can only form a hypothesis. Its soundness will have to be demonstrated in the course of this investigation.

We do not assume that our memory preserves our experiences unchanged. A quality experience, in itself, is not necessarily determined in any direction. Precisely on account of the changes in the continuum of pure duration, there is no delimitation of a former “Now” and “Thus” from the “Now” and “Thus” which, figuratively speaking, follows it. In its function of consciousness of the ongoing I, however, memory affects this change; it achieves something else. So-to-speak, it delimits the quality experience by isolating it as a “Now and Thus.” It achieves this not only by changing the Before to the Now but also by freezing it. In other words, memory as consciousness of the ongoing I proceeds in a specific direction which is given in duration. It is this *consciousness of direction* which enables memory to freeze the changed individual experience and contrast it with that which follows. But more, it freezes the quality image of this experience only so far as it passes from one Now and Thus to a later Now and Thus. What our memory preserves for us as the quality image of something before is the change of this image seen from the moment of a new Now.

In order to illustrate this event,<sup>10</sup> we [[modify our earlier illustration. We assume that experience B immediately precedes experience A; the distance is infinitely

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<sup>10</sup> HRW: Here, Schutz introduced “Figure 2,” a variation of Figure 1. The latter is enriched by the introduction of Greek-letter symbols for the designation of time elements. The illustrative discussion of the diagram covers also two pages of the original MS. I give the essential content of this exposition, as far as possible, in the words of Schutz.

small. Experience A consists of the quality experience of the memory image B, modified by the time elapsed. As consciousness of the ongoing I, memory froze the image B. It will absorb the change brought about by the time elapsed and refreeze the image thus obtained. The same recurs when the newly frozen image is viewed at a moment later than A. Yet, we do not obtain an addition of changes in the memory image. Different moments of remembering the “same” event represent different quality experiences; they are incommensurable and cannot be reduced to each other]].

[[At the moment at which memory absorbs changes occurring in time, the experiences themselves have disappeared; now they are only memory experiences of the ongoing I. The *becoming* memory image of a past quality experience contains a memory image of the original quality experience and the quality experiences of the succeeding moments. A *passed-away* memory image holds in primary givenness only past quality experiences of passed-away moments. This does not mean that the memory correlate<sup>11</sup> of the first experience has been lost. Successive memory images of the same event belong to one duration, are mine and have been preserved in memory for me. But this memory image is not commensurable with the original experience. Memory posits two acts with the absorption of the experience of remembering an earlier experience. They are similarly significant for the *passing-away* experience and the *becoming* later experience. The earlier is seen from the perspective of the later moment: the memory image exists only in so far as it underwent a change in time. Thus, our memory does not maintain an experience which has passed-away but only a becoming memory experience. It preserves a memory image of the earlier experience as viewed in the perspective of the later moment.]]

Here, we find the actual confirmation of our earlier second proposition, saying that our memory changes with the flow of duration (example: school experience). This connection will gain on clarity when we free ourselves from algebraic examples and draw the results of our investigation together.

Our memory does not maintain our experiences unchanged, after they have passed away. It itself both evoked and underwent the change which occurred in the passing-away of the experience. It does not preserve the experience; instead, it preserves a *symbol* of it. Like any symbol, this symbol is not absolute; it is valid only for a specific Now and Thus. In other words: our memory does not preserve the experience but its *meaning*; that is, exactly the meaning which it acquires in the Now and Thus which emerges out of it. Every experience is meaningful for retrospective memory. This is guaranteed by the indivisible unity of the I in the flow of inner duration. That means, it is guaranteed by memory itself. For *becoming* duration, it is awareness of the ongoing I.

To become interpretable, every meaning calls for a frame of reference. Thus, the meaning, which our memory bestows upon a passed-away experience in the flow of pure duration and which is directed upon a *coming* quality experience, demands and

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<sup>11</sup> HRW: The typed German text says “*korrekt*,” a term which does not make sense in this context. I assumed that this was a typing error and replaced the term by “*Korrelat*,” the term most likely meant.



owns a reference system. It inheres in memory itself, representing the consciousness of the ongoing I. Therefore, our experiences become meaningful for us only after they have gone. To ask about the meaning of an experience means to look for the place of an experience-having-past in the flow of pure duration. It means asking how a past experience of ours fits into the general line of our life. In becoming experiences, that is, in pure becoming duration, there is no question of meaning. Inner experience exists exclusively in pure awareness of its quality. However, as soon as this quality has been “experienced,” it is submerged in a new experience of a new quality. What remains is only a symbol of our experience—a memory-bound meaning relation to our inner duration. This duration with its experiences, which emerge and develop from passing-way experience, is still meaning-free. The question about the meaning of a Now and Thus no longer belongs to the Now and Thus.

While we investigated this, our duration carried us to new moments in which meaning was absent. But the Now and Thus, which just was meaning-free, became a symbol for us. It became meaningful and interpretable in terms of the direction followed by our duration in its flow into that which (as yet, HRW) has no meaning.

## **(8) MEANING AND SYMBOL RELATION**

The concept of “meaning,” I as introduced here, needs further clarification. The latter is important for the symbol relation itself.

Prevailing, Psychology and Metaphysics assume that abstraction is the existence of pure images of perception. One is concerned with isolating an “image” from pure duration and analyzing it without any connection with what went before and came after the pure Now and Thus. And this is done only partially, for instance, according to a visual impression which corresponds to this Now and Thus. Of course, if one does this, he abandons the only way of reflection which is adequate to pure duration. In pure duration exists no Now and Thus which could create the isolated “visual space” in which alone purely visual perception exists. For the moment, we could forget that, in pure duration, our “pure awareness” apperceives only the totality of the quality experience of a Now and Thus and that any other conception signifies an artificial disruption of the eternal flow which characterizes pure duration. We still have demonstrated that pure perception cannot at all exist when we assume that inner duration is endowed with memory. The memory images of our whole life have become determining for the quality experiences of each and every Now and Thus.

Nevertheless, we are not inclined to deny the possibility of “pure” awareness—even though we are cognizant of the questionability of such an attitude—for the purpose of establishing the difference between apperception and memory image. However, we understand by “pure awareness” the quality experience of any given Now and Thus as offered in our apperceptive image—for now intentionally ignoring the part which memory plays in such an image. Assuming the possibility and existence of such an apperceptive image, we appose it to the memory image of pure awareness, which forms its base. We know clearly that such an apposition cannot be



made within pure duration, simply because the apperceptive image is awareness image only as *becoming* experience of quality. *Having passed away*, it must already have been turned into a symbol.

Now, we assert that the memory image of pure awareness acquires symbol character when apposed to the apperceptive image. Thereby, we intend to state that between the two exists a certain difference whose causes we have just tried to clarify. Obviously, we mean that we can ascertain a commonness between them in spite of the established discrepancy. This commonness enables us to ascribe both a memory and an apperceptive image to one and the same quality experience of a specific point of our pure duration. What we called symbol must be different from what it symbolizes in the same sphere of experience, yet the symbol became possible thanks to a higher identity of both spheres. Apperceptive image and meaning image are images of one and the same quality of a Now and Thus of our pure duration. The one is actually experienced, the other is seen from the perspective of a later Now and Thus, filtered through the intervening quality experiences. In our earlier investigation, we clarified the origin of the discrepancy between the symbol and that which it symbolizes, between apperceptive image and memory image. We formulated the hypothesis that our memory does not preserve our experiences unchanged. It absorbs the quality experience of a Now and Thus only in so far as it is transferred from this Now and Thus to a later Now and Thus. If this hypothesis holds, it also must provide an explanation of the fact that we recognize the "higher identity" of the memory image with the "apperceptive image."

Above, we indicated a possible explanation for this... : the function of the same memory which, through change, determines the manifoldedness of inner duration as awareness of the ongoing I. The sphere of "higher identity," which is essential for any symbol function, exists exclusively in the unity of the I. It is this indivisible I, identical with itself and yet different at every different moment of inner duration, which creates the paradox of the identical yet different symbol function. But, here too, the paradox is only apparent. It springs from our attempt at approaching the experience of inner duration with linguistic-conceptual means. Doubtlessly, we experience our I as unity within our duration. The experience of changing quality belongs to the I. Reason, however, attempts to carry into pure duration a preconceived object relation which originated in the sphere of the concept and thus in space-time. The unity of the I experience becomes a dualism for Reason only. On the one hand, it splits the experience of the I who experiences himself, in his own duration, as continuum. On the other hand, it breaks up the experience of qualities, which constitute the manifoldedness of duration. That the habitual subject-object relation is applied to duration is very curious but deeply rooted in the nature of conceptual thinking. The question of the subject-object dualism does not arise in the primitive experience of pure duration. Every I experiences quality changes as belonging exclusively to himself; he is not tempted to interpret quality experiences as *states of the I*. The latter, however, is done by Reason which is bound to space and time and operates with concepts even when it seeks out the I who experiences his own duration. It arrests duration; that is, it places it in the space-time sphere to which it is accustomed. It assumes that quality experiences exist and identifies them with an existing I; but it declares them to be *states* of the I and separate experiences of the I. Conceptually, operating Reason

robs inner duration of its manifoldedness and its flowing. Thereby, it obtains an unanimated I tied to space and time. Thereby, it cuts this I into states and juxtaposes it to the states of rigid qualities. The latter are thought to belong to the I and yet to be something different from it. In this way, Reason imputes to pure duration matter, space and time, language and concept, and symbol. Thinking, again, asks about its own presuppositions. All solutions of problems of pure duration, which it pretends to have found, have themselves as presuppositions.

(This is fallacious, HRW) because in pure duration there is no externality and no outer existence: there are only becoming and passing-away experiences.<sup>12</sup> However, due to memory, the passed-away quality experience is re-experienced by the I. I enter pure duration as new quality experience; yet, both belong to the indivisible and unitary I. This makes possible the identity of symbol and that which it symbolizes. However, to assert such an identity is already a concession to the conceptual sphere. By the dual function of memory as awareness of the ongoing I and as a transformer of quality experiences, the symbol function is secured as a life form. From this follow very significant consequences for the differentiation between apperceptive image and memory image.

As said before, [[only for passed-away quality experiences exist memory images of the original experience and the quality experiences of later moments. These are given in primacy as a succession of memory images of the quality experience of earlier memory images. By contrast, a becoming memory image is the pure apperceptive image of the event which is absorbed by memory, functioning as awareness of the ongoing I. As soon as the experience passes away, it turns into a memory image proper.]] Thus, the pure apperceptive image exists in exactly the same way in which a quality experience “exists” in pure duration. It becomes and passes-away in memory, functioning as awareness of the ongoing I. *Becoming*, it is *apperceptive image*; *passing-away*, it is *symbol (meaning image)*.

In other words: the earlier assumption of pure apperception in memory-endowed duration contradicts itself. The question concerning the relation between apperceptive image and meaning image of a quality experience is an incorrectly formulated question.<sup>13</sup>

Within pure duration, there is no existence as such but only becoming or passing-away of quality experiences. Becoming quality experiences are absorbed by memory as awareness of the ongoing I. These images are apperceptive images but never pure apperceptive images, because they are conditioned by memory. Passed-away quality experiences are meaning images, that is, memory images of apperceptive images which were received in becoming quality experiences. Now, the identity of the symbolized with the symbolizing phenomena manifests itself clearly in the unity

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<sup>12</sup> AS: There is a good reason for our statement that the symbol function of memory can only occur with regard to quality experiences which passed away. The relation of *the I* to the becoming quality experience is not different from its relationship to the quality experience of that which passed away.

<sup>13</sup> HRW: I omitted here nine lines of the original MS in which Schutz pointed to the “most arbitrarily assumed representation in Figure 2.” Its mathematical expressions symbolize relationships between experiences about which “nothing can be said.”

of the I to whom belong becoming as well as passing-away. Yet, the discrepancy between that which is symbolized and that which symbolizes shows itself no less clearly in the tension, in the change of attention from that which is passing-away to that which becomes. When saying that we concentrate our attention on a passed-away experience, we indicated a change in the direction of our view. The meaning image is the passed-away apperceptive image of passed-away quality experiences. *Meaning is the tension between that which becomes and that which passes away. This tension resolves itself in the unity of the I: due to the function of memory, it enters into our duration as function of the ongoing I.*

Yet, the assertion stands that the memory image, the meaning image of one of our quality experiences, is not congruent with the “apperceptive image” of this quality experience. Its justification derives from the irreversibility of inner duration. Meaning does not originate within the flow of our experience merely by the acceptance of quality experiences as apperceptive images. Only an arrest, brought into our life by “remembering,” allows us to experience anew passed-away quality experiences in memory images. The concentration of attention, however, does not hamper the flow of inner duration.

From this follow important consequences: first, for the nature of symbol relations; second, for the relation between I and memory; third and most of all, for the insight that memory-endowed duration ... is only one among many forms of our consciousness. Simpler forms precede memory-endowed duration; more complex ones follow it. But it is the most primitive form which we can grasp conceptually and which is symbol-conditioned: it alone creates the symbol.

Prior to our investigation of the phenomena of memory, we hinted at the world of pure, memory-free duration. Now, we have to pay attention to it: It is possible to an explanation of the phenomenon of the symbol in the relationship between pure duration and the form of consciousness of the memory-endowed I.

## **(9) THE PRIMARY FORM OF MEANING PROBLEM AND SYMBOL RELATION**

Up to now, we have spoken only of the symbol relation within the memory-endowed duration of the living I. Not only the method of our investigation but also the content of the concepts of “meaning” and “symbol” will gradually change with the introduction of the acting I, with the experience of the Thou, with the birth of the word, with the origin of the conceptual sphere and with living and thinking in the purely spatial-temporal world. The more “material” (in a totally primitive sense) is grasped by our experiences, the more manifold will be the possibilities of grouping the materials interpretingly, the more varied become the relations among the materials on the one hand, and between materials and the I on the other. The meaning problem—a major problem of sociology—and the symbol relation will be basic to all these relations. They will occur in many forms, themselves transformed innumerable times and transforming the materials, but also reduceable to one primeval form.

We shall carefully attempt to find this primeval form. We will single it out in every phase of our prior investigation, and we will inquire into its continuation within (more complex, HRW) symbol and meaning concepts. It will be necessary to demonstrate that the expected changes, and expansions of the meaning concept spring from that sphere of our life form with which the changed meaning concept is coordinated.

(1) *The nature of the symbol relation is rooted in the identity of symbol and that which is symbolized in a more primitive sphere of the I, and in the discrepancy between symbol and symbolized in the respective life form.* By life form—presently not quite understandable for the reader—we understand a stance toward the world which I-consciousness assumes.

If one starts with the most fundamental experience of the I, when inquiring into the significance of I consciousness, the content of this experience reduces itself to the experience of unity. Posited unity is addended by the awareness of pure duration as an expanded life form. Looked at in itself, this duration signifies at first only the continuous and ever-changing awareness of qualities. The memory-endowed I presents another life form. Here, the pure apperceptive images have disappeared. Neither pure awareness nor pure memory (both are conceptual, unreal abstractions which cannot be experienced) represent themselves as life forms to the memory-endowed I. Pure duration, as unity of the I, embraces both.<sup>14</sup> It undertakes the mixing of awareness and memory in the meaning image on the one hand, and it adds images, acquired in awareness, to pre-existing meaning images on the other hand.<sup>15</sup> These forms, and most of all that of memory-endowed duration, have been treated in previous sections.<sup>16</sup>

In the course of this study, other life forms will be encountered: the acting I, which experiences its body not only as a quality in pure duration but also as “extended in expansion”; the Thou-related I, who knows of an other duration and is capable to experience it; the speaking I, who experiences meaning relations in the same manner in which the acting I experiences realities; the thinking I, whose experiences are spatial-temporal and conceptual.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> HRW: At about this point, Schutz wrote on the margin: “*Besser Spracharbeit 2ff.*” Obviously, he meant that the thoughts expressed in the present paragraph had been better presented on pp. 2ff of the essay on “The Meaning Structure of Language.” I refrain here from a comparison of these two versions. The reader may consult the text of this essay in the present volume.

<sup>15</sup> AS: In no way can it be taken for granted that memory inheres in every ongoing I, even though human reason would not comprehend this. Of course, the duration of a memory-free I would lack the criterion of continuous quality change. But is the *plant* (cf. Richard Semon, *Mnemontheorie*) not just such an ongoing I which, merely for the want of memory, is not accessible to our life form?

<sup>16</sup> AS: Up to now, the difference between pure and memory-endowed duration played no role in our investigation. Therefore, we indiscriminately used the term “pure duration” without any differentiation. Now, it will become necessary to clearly differentiate between these two life forms.

<sup>17</sup> AS: Needless to say, all these “life forms” are constructed concepts. As auxiliary hypotheses, they serve to explain certain phenomena of life. But the (existence of, HRW) symbol relations shows that consciousness is aware of these differences.

This series of life forms does not claim completeness. They are nothing but ideal types, formed for purposes of this investigation. The series is characterized by a strict polarity of its extreme members. This bipolarity becomes especially clear when one ignores the primary I as unity (beyond pure duration) which, in a manner of speaking, has been posited as mathematical point of origin. A few key phrases will contribute to the understanding of the continuous series:

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I in pure duration	conceptual, logical I
pure duration	pure world of time and space
pure quality experiences	everything quantifiable
realm of the unextended	realm of extension
continuum, eternal flow	discontinuum, continuous formation
indivisible manifoldedness	divisible homogeneity
freedom	necessity
image	concept
free of meaning in itself prior to birth of symbol	complicated construction of meaning systems and dissolving of meaning systems in pure logic
value-free in principle	completely value oriented
solitary	essentially social
world as exp	world as form ("representation")

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For the time being, these pairs of opposites are set down hypothetically, and without proof, for purposes of illustration. They shall convey an idea of the bipolarity of the life forms. On occasion of the discussion of the individual life forms, each pair of opposites will have to be carefully examined.

Living in all life forms simultaneously, we sense this bipolarity as the limiting points of a continual transition flowing through uncountable gradations. We would not at all notice the contrasts were it not for a specific phenomenon which forces us to reflect about them: our inability to gain access to extended spiritual realms through rational thinking as long as we bow to the primacy of conceptual thinking. Amidst the rational world of our categorical-conceptual cognition of experience, the non-rationality of our I experiences seems to entitle us only to the assumption that certain functions of our I do not reach into the highest and most powerful life form, that of categorical-conceptual thinking. Rather, these functions lose their particular character when subjected to habitual and necessarily conceptual formulation, in so far as they are not completely pushed aside and diverted. In reverse—and the theory of life forms is based on this assumption—these functions reach not down into the more primitive life forms. To a relatively more primitive life form is added a new function of the I which cannot be derived from the earlier form. Provided one could experience life forms in isolation all by themselves, one could not experience the new I function in the more primitive form. Therefore, thanks to the unity of the I, a new, more complex and more differentiated, life form originates; we call it higher without intending an evaluation. In this higher life form, the "function" of the preceding stage can be experienced—further: in this form, it becomes the dominant experience.

These are preliminary considerations made in order to clarify the first postulate of the symbol relation. Returning to this postulate, we divide its dual thesis into its two components.

(1a) *Symbol and symbolized are one in the awareness of the life form which precedes the symbol experience.*

This thesis is justified in terms of the following difference between pure and memory-endowed durations: Within the sphere of pure duration exist no symbol relations but only changing quality experiences and pure apperceptual images of every "Now" and "Thus." Each of them is replaced by an other Now and Thus which has nothing in common with the earlier one aside from the I who experiences both. The images of quality experiences in pure duration—still assumed to be memory-free—can be called pure apperceptive images without falsification and hypostatization provided we understand by "apperceptive" the pure influence of the qualities of a given "Now and Thus" upon an ongoing I. We have little more to say about the nature of memory-free pure duration, in which alone exist apperceptive images in purity, except that this life form is not ours even though we know about it through the phenomenon of the continuity of pure duration. Most of all, memory-free duration cannot be a necessary manifold like ours, from which we started and beyond which to go is denied us. The former presents pure continuity in itself; the latter signifies a continuum of manifold quality changes.

As we tried to show above (coin and researcher), memory is the actual condition of our manifoldness. Yet, the same memory also produces the symbol. The sphere of pure duration lies beyond all symbols; our symbol-conditioned thinking cannot penetrate it. No more can we grasp, in our original experience of manifoldness, the idea of a homogeneous continuum without the simultaneous idea of a homogeneous discontinuum, namely, "empty space." However, the apperceptive image as such does not exist in memory-endowed duration; it cannot be experienced as pure apperceptive image. Memory preserves all quality experiences which preceded the particular "Now and Thus." This memory image, earlier identified as meaning image, becomes a quality image of the "Now and Thus." It corresponds to the meaning images of all the quality experiences which preceded this "Now and Thus," but also to the pure apperceptive image of the correlate of *pure* duration which corresponds to the same Now and Thus. However, it is no longer a pure apperceptive image in itself. If one speaks of pure apperceptive images within the memory sphere, one introduces a hypostasis. Intentionally or not, with its help one excludes from consideration the memory-bound character of quality experience.

How did we conceive of the function of our memory? At one occasion, it appeared as awareness of pure duration. At another occasion, we stated that it does not preserve our experiences pure and unchanged; it *interprets* them while transversing intervening changes and reduces them to their meaning. Thus, for the first time, we encountered symbol concept and meaning image. However, what is a meaning image? Obviously, an already passed-away quality image which is "reproduced" at the present moment (hypostatized apperceptive image). In memory-free pure duration, this image would have been a pure apperceptive image. Thereby, the identity of the symbol (meaning image of a former Now and Thus in the present Now and

Thus) with that which it symbolizes (actual quality experience or hypostatized apperceptive image of a Now and Thus) would be resolved (*beschlossen*). However, no pure reality pictures exist in the sphere of memory-bound life. Thus, the quality image of a Now and Thus can only be a “quality image,” that is, a meaning image of all earlier phases plus an actual quality experience. Or, in grossly simplified terms, a hypostatized apperceived image is produced....

[[If meaning images of quality experiences<sup>18</sup> were diagrammed, they could not be placed along a single line because, then, they would be indistinguishable from quality experiences. Thus, they have to be placed on a deviating line of memory-endowed duration which, for its part, would oscillate between the quality image of the apperceptual boundary and the realm of meaning; it would continue into the realm of the latter. The lines of meaning would be tangents on the curve of memory-endowed duration. The meaning images of a passed-away experience would be projected upon one tangent of meaning-endowed duration, and this image at a later moment upon another such tangent.]]

This means that, in the factual context of symbol relations, the unity of the I is refracted in the same fashion in which the prism refracts white light into the colors of the spectrum: symbol relations become recognizable only in a so-to-speak optical diversion from the direction of pure duration in the same fashion in which a prism is required in order to bring about, by refraction and deflection, the colors of the spectrum. Therefore, the task of the investigation of the symbol has to pay full attention to the phenomenon of the refraction of pure duration in the actual life form through symbolic relations as well as through the synthesis of the symbol relations in the flow of the next higher life form. It is necessary to find the rhythm in which life forms follow each other, in the dominating unity of the I, by focusing on symbol construction and symbol dissolving. It follows that every investigation, which aims at symbol construction, needs to operate within the sphere of the actual life form. Yet, it will have to find these phenomena in the next lower life form, although not in order to demonstrate that they do not appear there. This is precluded by the theory of life forms. The aim is to reach, through the pursuit of the colored rays, the prism which causes the deflection and refraction. We intended to express this in the thesis that symbol and symbolized are identical in the lower life form. In our case, all meaning images of an experience B are reducible to a pure

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<sup>18</sup> HRW: Here, Schutz introduced “Figure 3.” In this diagram, he corrected the impression created by the earlier diagrams that apperceptual and meaning images are situated on a single unidirectional line. Figure 3 shows tangential lines, representing memory-endowed duration, which separate the apperceptions of memory images from the meaning images which they evoke. The explanatory text runs over two and a half pages of the original MS. I have kept my summary to a bare minimum. Schutz’s comments largely serve the purpose of undoing the erroneous impressions created by the linear form of the first two diagrams. He remarked that one objection could be raised with regard to the seeming contradiction between the assumption of the identity of event and symbol in pure duration and their presentation as separate features in the new diagram: “For the larger part, this objection is justified by the simply grotesque distortion of the actual facts (*Sachverhalt*) which we were compelled to commit in our diagram for the sake of perspicuity.”



apperceptive image B in the life form of pure duration in the same manner in which all colored light rays, no matter how far deflected, can be—reduced to an unrefracted white ray which enters the prism.

The pure apperceptive images of pure duration, refracted by memory, create meaning images and spread their color over the whole sphere of the memory-endowed world. The phenomena of *this* life form become recognizable only in the reflection (*Abglanz*) of these meaning images. In the higher life form, these colors are reunited as in a concave mirror and the spectrum is reconverted into a white ray. Thus, the actual life form appears in the white light of the perspective of the higher life form. But the colors of these symbols remain in the perspective of the higher life form, thanks to the unity of the ongoing I which in himself unites all life forms.

One may distance oneself from such abstractions which are of a mere methodological value. Yet, the colors of these symbols remain, flow into each other, change into colors which are produced by a new medium in the new life form: The world of the I becomes more colorful, richer, and more articulated with every new life form. This is so on account of the ongoing I...<sup>19</sup>

After scrutinizing the incident ray, we inquire now into the nature of spectrum and prism while investigating the second part of our first major proposition.

(lb) *Symbol and symbolized are discrepant. This is mainly due to the difference between the points ascribed to them in the flow of duration. The symbolized passes into the symbol like becoming glides into passing-away.*

An intermediate remark, concerning that which is symbolized, has to be inserted here. Part of the nature of the symbol is belonging simultaneously to two life forms. More exactly, since we cannot present the “life form” as preceding the symbol, we state that the boundary between two life forms can be symbolized at each point of experience. This does not affect the assertion of the “identity of the symbol with the symbolized in the lower life form.” In order to be symbolized, the experience “B” can and has to belong to two different life forms. In our case, one of them is *pure* duration. Its concomitant experience occurs as *pure* apperceptive image. The other life form is memory-endowed duration; experience enters it as qualitative or hypostatized apperceptive image. This dual position of the symbol is logically necessary because symbolizing consists ever in selection from multiple possibilities of interpretation (*Mehrdeutigkeit*) (namely in the direction of pure duration and in that of the line of symbolization).

This dual position is nothing but a *logical* postulate. After all, the whole theory of life forms consists of a series of logical hypotheses concerning the analyzability of consciousness. The theory of a specific life form will have a claim to validity only if, time and again, it can be reduced to the unity of the I and the ongoing consciousness. By the same token, it is not paradox to speak of a dual unity of the symbolized

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<sup>19</sup> HRW: About nine lines of the original MS were omitted here; they repeated notions stated in the preceding paragraph.



experience. This dual interpretability shows itself as a purely analytical-logical phenomenon. The unity is evident to the experiencing I ... Nevertheless, it makes theoretical sense to pose the completely abstract and essentially non-practical question of the dual interpretability of that which has been symbolized....

The symbol<sup>20</sup> ... remains unequivocal (regardless of its relativity, which ties it to a specific Now and Thus)...

Another difference stands up under any approach. Symbolized and symbol are ascribed to different points of inner duration, be the latter seen as pure or as memory-endowed. The discrepancy between the points of coordination manifests itself whether I place my experience B on the line of pure duration or whether I add it to already preformed meaning images of past experiences occurring either as qualitative or as hypostatized apperceptive images...

In my opinion, this difference is decisive. It is the reason why the symbol relation cannot yet occur in pure duration but, most of all, presents a function of memory. The constitution of the character of the symbol is (essentially influenced by HRW) the discrepancy between that Now and Thus to whose duration belongs the image of that which is symbolized ... and the Now and Thus to whose duration belongs the symbol or the meaning image of the symbolized. This discrepancy can only be established in memory. It cannot appear in the life form of pure duration as succession of not even necessarily manifold quality experiences...

The symbol relation is already tied to the flow of memory phenomena by one fact. In the becoming Now and Thus only the passed-away quality experience (as that which is symbolized) acquires meaning (as symbol). Thus, the quality experience becomes interpretable only through its passing-away. But it is interpretable only in a Now which, just through the acceptance of something passed-away as quality experience, becomes a Thus. Here, the correlativity of the symbol relation manifests itself clearly: *Something which has passed-away becomes symbolizable only in a becoming Now and Thus; the symbol-experiencing Now becomes a Thus only with respect to a passed-away Now and Thus.* Here, the dual thesis of our first major proposition manifests itself especially clearly. Symbol and symbolized are one in the consciousness of the lower life form. The symbol becomes visible only in that which has passed away.... Symbol and symbolized are discrepant already by virtue of the correlativity of the various quality experiences whose "Thus" they represent in relation to the "Now" at the moment in which this "Thus" enters duration.

A still other phenomenon appears in this linkage of the symbolized with that which has passed away, and of the symbol with that which becomes. We cannot ignore this dependence of the symbol function on the "direction" which is pursued by our becoming, our inner duration. As said before, the symbol relation can be recognized only if one considers it outside of the duration of the actual life form .... Our present problem does not touch upon this question. At present, we

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<sup>20</sup> HRW: Here follows a paragraph of 12 lines, repeating prior considerations in condensed form. It has been omitted with the exception of one remark.

do not inquire into the recognizability of the symbol; we seek criteria for the relativity of this recognizability of the qualifications of a quality experience as symbol. In short, we look for the possibility of interpreting a symbol. Two such criteria have to be stated:

First, there is the already postulated discrepancy between the symbolized and the symbol as the discrepancy between something passed-away and something becoming. From this follows that every symbol relation is relative to a specific Now and Thus.<sup>21</sup> Second, as just stated, there exists a relation between symbol function and flow or “goal direction” of inner duration. This results necessarily from the experience of the irreversibility of inner duration ... It allows us to draw important conclusions concerning the nature of the symbol itself. If the relation between symbolized and symbol is embedded into the tension between that which has been experienced (symbolized) and the present symbol experience, this function itself depends directly on the direction of inner duration. Therefore, the possibility of experiencing the symbol rests necessarily and exclusively in the Now which becomes a Thus. It will never become “actual,” that is, experienced as something passed; it will always remain “potential” as something continuously becoming. In other words, everything which has passed away and was symbolized will be symbolized time and again. Although the symbol enters the quality image of every Now and Thus, the symbolized is not thereby disposed of. The Now and Thus which follows, too, forms a symbol of the same passed experience, and so on.<sup>22</sup>

One can speak of the actual experienceability of the symbol only by identifying the symbolized with the symbol, that is, in a lower than the actual life form. Only there does the symbol pass away with and in the symbolized. The potential continuation of the symbol is extinguished only in the actual experience of this passing-away. The symbol originates only in the passing-away of the symbolized; yet, the symbolized never passes away in the higher life form. The symbolized always transforms that which has passed away, but it itself does not pass away. It is never actually experienced. Potentially, it always changes what has already passed away through its transformation into something continuously becoming. In other words: *No experience simply passes away. Although it passes away as quality image; at every point of inner duration, it becomes anew a meaning image.* It passes away merely in the artificial isolation of the life forms from each other, because it can never yield a meaning image. It can never be elevated from actuality into potentiality. It does not constitute passing-away when, in the higher life form, quality images become meaning images, and when these again transform themselves into quality images. This is so because, according to our definition of memory, every quality image of every Now and Thus as consciousness of inner duration creates a meaning image of every

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<sup>21</sup> HRW: An algebraic illustration of the preceding statement, given in parentheses, has been omitted.

<sup>22</sup> AS: This, however, does not touch the possibility of symbolizing the symbol; we will discuss it later.

passed-away Now and Thus.<sup>23</sup>—‘These considerations may be reformulated in the second proposition about the symbol relation.

(2) *The symbolized (as having passed away) can be actually experienced only in the more primitive life form. In the present one it is symbol. For this reason, it is only potentially experienceable. This means it becomes with our inner duration.*

The third proposition about the symbol follows from this:

(3) *To turn to the symbol means to move in the direction of inner duration within a specific life form as totality of becoming. To inquire into the symbolized (that which is meant) means to search for that which has passed away in a different life form.*

A conflict for pure experience occurs in all life forms in which we encounter the symbol, particularly in the higher ones in which complicated symbol systems exist: a conflict between surrender to inner duration and the deliberate transfer into a realm outside of pure duration, that of time and space. This conflict of the experiencing I can theoretically be solved without resorting to the symbol problem. But it also appears in the sphere of the symbol. Since everything symbolized can become a quality image which, in turn, can be symbolized, it follows with necessity that every quality image can be dually interpreted. We intentionally speak of dual *interpretability*. In immediate pure experience, in pure duration, the symbol lacks the possibility of interpreting quality images. “Interpretation” itself presupposes a superstructure of symbol systems. This superstructure conceals the facts of pure experience, in so far as we mean by the latter quality experience within pure duration.

But we must stress once more that our “life forms” represent artificial types of ideas, constructed for the purposes of this investigation. Even as heuristic principles, they are only serviceable when we assume that we all live in them simultaneously.<sup>24</sup>

Due to our symbol-conditioned thinking, pure, simple, memory-free duration is absolutely unimaginable. Every other life form comes in contact with the symbol; in it, every experience is paralleled by interpretation. But interpretation itself enters into the experience and evokes a new interpretation. This will have to be considered further. We have already sufficiently explained the function of interpretation in the sphere of memory-endowed duration: memory does not preserve a fact of experience without change; it merely preserves a meaning image. As we know from our second major proposition, this meaning image can be interpreted in the direction of our flow of duration in the given Now and Thus.

In the sphere of memory-endowed duration, in which alone the symbol originates, it was impossible to recognize the problem about which we will speak now. In memory-endowed duration, we deal with the interpretation of primitive quality experiences. In higher life forms, by contrast, we deal with the interpretability of symbols

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<sup>23</sup> AS: We will show later that the meaning image of a former quality image, which became a quality image, is again transformed into the meaning image of a later quality image. In this manner, the first quality image continues to persist in untold meaning images.

<sup>24</sup> AS: We allow ourselves only one presupposition: the assumption that lower forms of life can be thought (to exist, HRW) without the existence of higher ones. But higher life forms cannot be thought without the lower ones; according to our hypotheses, they issue from the latter.

which on their part became quality experiences of a specific nature. They became interpretable and symbolizable in a process similar to that in the primitive sphere of memory-endowed duration. In higher life forms, as we will demonstrate, the symbol *system* originates in a most characteristic act of consciousness. More correctly, this act constitutes the symbols. In it, the quality experiences of the next lower life form are interpreted in the same fashion in which memory interprets primitive quality experiences in pure duration. The superordinated symbol series originates only in such an act of consciousness. And this symbol series enters the Now and Thus as quality experience, which serves as basis of interpretation. This occurs in the same fashion in which memory images (symbols) enter into the given Now and Thus of memory-endowed duration. The difference is the following: in a symbol system, the experience can direct itself consciously to the symbol series or to the experience series of the lower life form. This is solely possible because, in more complex meaning systems, the symbolized level (quality experience of the next lower life form) rests already on a solid substructure of symbol relations. It is much closer to the life form of the cognitive space-time world, which we have acquired in education, than the lower life forms whose symbol character we can unravel only through difficult self-scrutiny and the artificial exclusion of the higher life forms.

Here results a dual possibility. Either we hold on to the symbol which is "just in the process" of entering the given quality image of our Now and Thus; or, by an artificial act, we turn our attention to the passed-away quality experience in our former life form, which has been symbolized in the symbol. In the first case, we accept the symbol, like any other quality experience: as a datum, an ingredient of our becoming, an event which moves exclusively in the direction of our flow of life. In the second case, it seems, we abandon pure duration. We turn away from the realm of the ever-becoming and toward that which has passed away. Yet, we can approach that which passed away only through the medium of all qualities which have been experienced since then.

What has passed away is not something absolute; it is relative to our consciousness. As we said before, it cannot be re-experienced, except "potentially." That means: through and in its symbols. It has never been actually experienced in the life form to which the symbols belong; in it, it never *became*. It merely entered the life form, which is adequate to the symbol series, by way of transformation. By contrast, it belonged completely to the more primitive life form; in it, it *became*. In it it was actual experience and as such identical and united with the symbol series. Thus we could state in our third proposition that, to inquire into that which is symbolized means to look for it in a different and, to be sure, lower life form.

But, does this thesis not contradict the assertion made in our second proposition, which said that the symbol becomes with our inner duration? Does not what has passed away, the symbolized, re-become in its transformation within our higher life form (which is adequate to the symbol)?

This objection is justified. It forces us to make more precise what we have said about the symbol.

Up to this point, we used the terms "symbol" and "symbolized" indiscriminately as designation of two processes of consciousness. Now we will have to separate them.

Let us remember that we first encountered the symbol concept while considering the phenomenon of memory. Conspicuously, we found that memory does not preserve quality images in purity but in changed states. They are conditioned both by the given Now and Thus and by the goal direction of the flow of inner duration. On this occasion, we said that memory preserves for us meaning images; it reinterprets quality experiences. This is imprecise and the source of the apparent discrepancy between our second and third propositions. Our second proposition started with uninterpretability of all quality experiences; the third proposition presupposed the availability of symbol series for the phenomenon of interpretation. The latter was justified if one did not wish to do violence to linguistic usage. We felt entitled to avail ourselves of this usage. Now, however, we will have carefully to substantiate our point of view.

When memory preserved a quality experience in pure duration ... it executed an act of interpretation by transforming this quality experience, viewing it from the perspective of the given Now and Thus and the direction of the flow of duration. However, it did not interpret a meaning context but a quality experience. The meaning image originated exclusively in this "interpretation," if this term is at all acceptable to reason. The act of interpretation constituted a meaning or symbol relation between experience image and meaning image. Here, memory executed an act of *positing meaning or positing a symbol*. In the future, this will be our designation for the transformation of something *symbolized* into a *symbol*. With the exception of that passage in which we spoke of the dual interpretation of everything symbolized, in this investigation so far we have always spoken about the act of positing meaning.

However, when speaking about dual interpretability, we thought of a different process of consciousness—one which for our field of work, Sociology, is of fundamental significance: the process of *interpreting already posited meaning contexts or symbols*. Such an "interpretation" occurs outside the context of the act of positing meaning. It is so-to-speak complementary to it; it is the reduction of the colored ray to the white ray of light. The act of positing meaning, to which the interpretation of the symbol refers, may be most different. The following possibilities present themselves to the external and superficial view:

- (a) The positing of the symbol occurs in the same life form as that of symbol interpretation.
- (b) The positing of the symbol as well as its interpretation occurs in the next lower life form.
- (c) The positing of the life form occurs in a remote life form.
- (d) The positing of the symbol does not occur in my life form; it presents itself to me as already "posited."

These possibilities will have to be checked painstakingly. The propositions, which we have formulated thus far, will have to be reinvestigated in terms of the applicability of these possibilities.

After all we said before, it can no longer be taken for granted that "positing the symbol" occurs in the same life form in which "symbol interpretation" occurs. This

is the less likely as, up to now, we have made a close scrutiny only of the life form of memory-endowed duration. Yet, we believe that, in this life form, we encounter a typical case of positing the symbol in the life form of the interpretation of the symbol. Let us assume any quality experience at all which suffered specific changes in our memory over a period of time.

As a child, I had been anaesthetized during an operation. For a long time, I preserved this unpleasant event with all its details in memory. Often, I dreamed the whole event night after night: I am put on a stretcher. I am examined by men in white robes. I am tied down. One man pulls my tongue out of my mouth and ties it to my chin. I want to fight back but I cannot do it. Another man steps next to me with a mask in one hand and a curiously formed bottle in the other; he holds the mask upon my face and demands that I count. I count to three; I inhale the obnoxiously sweet smell of the liquid. I cannot inhale the vapors and think I will suffocate. Somebody—I do not know who—orders me to breathe deeply. I do. More and more do I feel the pressure on my chest. It breaks my resistance; and I count, count, count till I lose consciousness completely. Vomiting, and with a heavy headache, I awake in my bed; and I see the face of my mother who bends over me.

I described the whole and rather common event in such detail because I think that it roughly corresponds to the quality experience, “anesthesia.” This experience will serve as object of my investigation I know definitely that, for several reasons, my presentation is not completely adequate to the quality experience. First, I use language and operate with concepts with which the 5-year-old could not have been familiar. Second, I take an event, which consisted of uncounted quality experiences, as having been *one* quality experience, “anaesthesia.” Who would be able to characterize in words even one single quality experience, not to mention to lift it completely out of the flow of duration, in which it had been conceived, into which it entered and in which it passed away. Third, while penning down the event, I do not remember the event itself but only a memory image of it, an image which my memory, to my tenth year and later, preserved, relived, dreamed, etc.<sup>25</sup> Fourth, intentionally or unconsciously, I integrated into my representation everything I have since heard, read, thought, or otherwise “came to know” about anaesthesia.

For the moment, let us ignore those unavoidable sources of error and assume that the quality experience anaesthesia<sup>26</sup> occurred as represented, as far as possible, with the means of language; now, from my recollections, I will recount the memory images of the event as quality experiences, not the memory images (of other recollections of it, HRW). Of course, I am aware that, in each single case, I will commit the same errors which I could not avoid in my account of the (original, HRW) quality experience.

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<sup>25</sup> AS: We will have to return to one characteristic circumstance: All memories of memory images tend to be stronger than the memories of the quality experiences themselves; they in part suppress them or even replace them totally.

<sup>26</sup> HRW: This account is interspersed with algebraic symbols. They are omitted here; hopefully, without impairing the clarity of the exposition.

Up to my tenth year or so, I relived this event, at regular time intervals, in a fashion described here with almost complete detail. In particular, the “man in white” played a big role in my thinking and my dreams. At that time, he was truly characteristic of the event as remembered by me. Later, the vivid (*plastisch*) remembrance of the preparation of the anaesthesia faded away more and more. The memory of the smell of the liquid alone remained conspicuously. For long years, I had to fight nausea whenever I smelled ether (in a drugstore or during chemical experiments in high school). Later, I retained merely the memory of counting. Still today,<sup>27</sup> this memory returns sometimes before falling asleep; I “breathe deeply” and lose consciousness.

Thus, in my recollections, I imputed three memory images to the quality experience of anaesthesia: man in white, smell of ether, counting. They occurred at different periods of my inner duration. It is worth noting that, successively, each of the three memory images was felt to be characteristic of the event.

How did I at all arrive at the fixation of these three types of memory images? Was it not, in reverse, “association” during the smelling of ether which made me think about anaesthesia? This is well possible and even probable, but it does not appear as a contradiction to me. Up to now, the nature of “association” has remained most obscure. Maybe some light can be shed on it from the perspective of the theory of the symbol, which we offer here. In any case, it remains possible that every “memory image” is provoked by one association or other. We will have to speak clearly about this possibility later.

Let us assume that we can reliably ascribe three memory images to one and the same quality experience. (In the initial example, the three memory images ... are not meant to exhaust the totality of my memory of the event ‘anaesthesia.’ remembered other features. But, without doubt, the three elements named are characteristic for the typical divergence among memory images of one and the same event.) Let us further assume a memory image which, as “hypostatized apperceptual image,” corresponds to a quality experience ....<sup>28</sup> In pure duration, there would be a pure apperceptual image; in memory-endowed duration, it would be a meaning image of the hypostatized apperceptual image. At an initial moment, a quality experience would have been ascribed to a given moment of time. In the next moment, memory executes an act of positing meaning; in the resulting memory image, it interprets the original quality experience by integrating it into the life form of memory-endowed duration ... Our first main proposition applies to the act of positing symbols; it was executed by our memory. In the life form of pure duration, symbol and symbolized are one. Yet, they are not one in meaning context; they are not related to

<sup>27</sup> HRW: When writing this passage, Schutz was at least 26 years old.

<sup>28</sup> HRW: Here, Schutz inserted “Figure 4.” It was a single unidirectional line diagram, starting with O and showing transitional points N, G1, G2, etc., but also A, B, C, etc. The first indicate apperceptual or memory images, the latter time moments. The explanation of the diagram covers almost six pages of the original MS. Contrary to other presentations of the content of Schutz’s diagram illustrations, the present one has not been set between double brackets. It follows Schutz’s formulations closely with the omission of the algebraic-symbolic parts. Omission of such passages (part of one sentence or a whole sentence) have been marked by a row of dots (...).



meaning ... When we say that symbolized and symbol are one in pure duration, we resort to a linguistic representation which itself rests on a most complicated symbol system. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for starting such a representation at the symbol.

The positing of meaning belongs exclusively to the life form of memory-endowed duration. It realizes itself through integration or, as said earlier, through interpretation—of the quality experience according to known determinants. The symbol of a quality experience is different from the latter because it is posited a moment later in inner duration, even if the two moments are experienced as one. A *becoming* quality experience entered at a specific moment into pure duration. At the next moment, it was elevated to a *becoming* symbol in the sphere of memory-endowed duration. Thus, also the second part of our first major proposition has been confirmed.

It must be kept in mind that the transition from becoming to passing away takes place in the sphere of simple duration; it occurs as quality experience. But what has passed away can be re-established only by a new becoming, that is, by what is posited as symbol in the next-higher life form. In our first major proposition, we said that the symbolized passes into the symbol just as becoming leads into passing away. This makes good sense. Only, we have to add that the symbol itself is something becoming, although not in the sphere of quality experience but for the consciousness of a higher life form which, at the least, does posit symbols....

If a direct apperceptive image enters into the memory-endowed sphere as something becoming, would it not also have to pass away in this sphere? This is a decisive question for the investigation of the difference between (a given symbol, HRW) and a just-positing symbol, which is applied in the interpretation of this already given symbol. According to our theory it is possible—nay, necessary and automatic—that we posit at every point of our memory-endowed duration a meaning image of one and the same quality experience assigned to a particular moment. This meaning image enters into duration, thereby making for the manifoldness of this duration. Were our memory images—man in white or smell of ether, referring to the quality experience anaesthesia—posited at the moment they occurred? Nothing speaks against this assumption which we, in general, used as a basis for the derivation of the symbol concept. Accordingly, the memory image “man in white” is the later meaning image of the original quality experience, anaesthesia ... Our second major proposition also speaks for this assumption.

I could also assert that my memory image does not, or not primarily, refer to the original experience; rather, it is an interpretation of the symbol of the quality experience. This would mean that my quality experience stands in a meaning relation with the memory image, which was established later ... Then, the memory image, “man in white,” would not go back to the actual visual experience of the “surgeon,” but only to the remembrance of the actually experienced event of anaesthesia. Maybe, the “man in white” was something the child had dreamed. Should this be so, we must investigate what the phenomenon of interpretation consists of.

The answer would be less difficult, had we not based our investigation of the symbol on the fundamental phenomenon, the symbol function of memory instead of choosing an example from a complex meaning system: language, work of art, law.



But the primitive sphere of the memory-endowed I can reveal many important things about the phenomenon of interpretability—provided one tries to reflect exclusively on the data which are provided by memory-endowed duration while maintaining some distrust of language and spatial-temporal logic.

The data of memory-endowed duration present us with the following factualities;

- (1) A quality experience “anaesthesia” was reinterpreted as a memory image of an original experience. I remember that I have been anaesthetized. That means, a man in white stepped close to the operation table, in one hand a mask, in the other a bottle, etc.
- (2) The quality experience, “anaesthesia,” passed away into my simple pure duration. Assumedly, I was operated on after the anaesthetic took hold. In the chosen example, the fading-away of consciousness is identical with the moment of the quality experience “anaesthesia,” or better, of the complex of all those experiences which have been summed up under the label “anaesthesia.”
- (3) My memory image of the event, the remembering of the man in white who stepped close, etc., entered into my memory-endowed duration. This remembrance became meaningful for me and is this today as much as it was for the 5-year old. Meaningful by virtue of what? Through the circumstance that this scene has been experienced by *me*, that I was involved as acting or suffering participant.<sup>29</sup>
- (4) The meaning image created by me enters into my memory-endowed duration in the same way as the quality experience, anaesthesia, into my pure duration. Only; the quality image became and passed away, but the memory image (meaning image) lives on in me. I say “lives on,” although I have yet to justify this expression. It is a fact that my memory of the experience “anaesthesia,” in the long-range course of my duration, accentuated different moments as characteristic; man in white, smell of ether, counting. All these moments are continued in my experience of “anaesthesia” as well as in the first memory image of this experience. Do my later memory images then appeal to the original quality experience? Do they symbolize the experienced anaesthesia on their own, or do

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<sup>29</sup> AS: Let us assume that it was not me who was anaesthetized but Peter, and that I witnessed the event. If, at the time, I had never been anaesthetized and had never heard anything about anaesthesia, the scene would necessarily have been incomprehensible to me. Nevertheless, I would have noticed the man in white who stepped close to Peter’s table; I would have heard Peter counting. If I stood far enough from the table, I would not have smelled the ether; and I would not have felt anything of Peter’s fears. Yet, my memory image of Peter’s anaesthesia would be no less meaningful than that of my anaesthesia. What I noticed of this event has been brought into my memory sphere as my apperceptions. Therewith, it has been meaningfully integrated into my (memory-endowed) duration, even though the event was incomprehensible to me and I was unable to re-experience Peter’s feelings. (These considerations do not belong into the present context. They have been written down only because the example of anaesthesia will again be referred to for purposes of explaining the concept of the understandability in the sphere of the Thou. Here, it suffices to maintain that positing a meaning, in the sphere of memory-endowed duration, signifies nothing but the inclusion of the experience into duration. This has nothing to do with understanding.)

they not refer to the quality experience? And, should the latter be the case, do they reach back to the first meaning image in order to ‘interpret’ it? That means, do they reach back in order to single out aspects relevant for the direction of the flow of my duration and the Now and Thus of later moments? To assert this means to assert the reversibility of the flow of duration and thereby to void the unity of consciousness. Thus, we are forced to conclude that, in fact, meaning images issue from the original quality experience. Exactly as the original meaning image, they are determined by the given Now and Thus and the direction of the flow of duration—only with the difference that the Now and Thus is adequate to the later memory image. This Now became a Thus only because in a former Now the quality experience had already become a memory image. Further, through the memory image, the event had already been integrated—and that means meaningfully integrated—into the flow of pure duration. On its part, the latter determined the later meaning image.

The first memory image is especially important because it enters into the determinant factors of these meaning images. Without the first, a second meaning image cannot be imagined; but the first can exist without the second (so, for instance, if the patient had died during anaesthesia).<sup>30</sup>

Thus, we can say that the original memory image lives on in us, “becomes” constantly in our duration. Two conclusions follow from this:

(A) With regard to memory-endowed duration, one cannot speak of a contrast between symbol positing and symbol interpretation. Every symbol interpretation is a new symbol positing, that means, a regress to the original quality experience and integration into the flow of duration. But the following difference obtains: The original quality experience was already meaningfully integrated into the two determinants for every positing of meaning: the respective Now and Thus and the direction of the flow of duration.<sup>31</sup> It is again “meaningfully” integrated.

The discrepancy between the originally posited and a later memory image can be explained by the discrepancy between the earlier and later Now and Thus involved and the direction of the flow of duration between them. This is valid not only for memory-endowed duration but for any life form whatsoever. Thus, we can now formulate the fourth major proposition of the theory of the symbol:

*(4a) In the same life form, every symbol interpretation is the positing of a symbol out of the Now and Thus which became a Thus by way of a preceding symbol positing of the same quality experience.*<sup>32</sup>

We will have to return to the significance of the difference between symbol positing and symbol interpretation in those cases in which symbol positing belongs

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<sup>30</sup> HRW: Points (1) and (4) as well as the last paragraph have been slightly altered by the replacement of algebraic symbols by qualifying adverbs.

<sup>31</sup> HRW: At this point, this paragraph carries a vertical pencil line and a large question mark on the left margin.

<sup>32</sup> HRW: This formulation, too, is challenged by a question mark.

to another life form than the symbol interpretation. However, before doing so, we shall draw the consequences of our results, so far, for the concepts of becoming and passing-away.

(B) We see clearly ... that, taken absolutely, “becoming-and-passing-away” do not belong to pure duration. They are only auxiliary means of representation, used to make the phenomena of continual flow comprehensible to our reason, which is conditioned by time-space and which is bound to conceptions. There is no having-passed in itself; there can be no existence itself for duration. Strictly speaking, there also exists nothing having passed away within the same life form. Because, in pure duration, I would not know anything of anything having passed away. And in memory-endowed duration, I know about anything having passed away only by way of the constantly becoming positing of symbols. Seen from here, of course, the symbolized “has passed away”; this, however, in the next-lower life form of pure duration. Thus, we have to state that becoming-and-passing-away can never occur within the same life form. To assert this would be completely meaningless. The becoming can be separated from the having-passed-away only from the viewpoint of a higher life form. This indicates nothing else but the tension between symbolized and symbol: change of perspective; arrest brought into our life through “attention.” Every symbolized must needs be a having-passed-away. Only that which has passed away can be symbolized. However, that it has passed away I know only in the superordinated life form. The latter allows me to experience becoming symbols; in them I can infer, by conceptual and spatial-temporal means, that something symbolized is something having passed away. However, this assertion is of no consequence for immediate life. All investigations of the symbol are—and can only be—of theoretical significance.

Due to the unity of the I, we move simultaneously in all forms of life and consciousness: we think, speak, act, and remember, and are affected simultaneously by quality experiences. To our experiencing I, the difference between becoming and having passed away is not at all given as a datum—in contrast to sensory apperception. The difference is ascertainable merely, but at all times, in reflection. Yet, the contrast of becoming and passing away is conditioned by the tension between the life forms—in other words, by the “meaning” of our life. And this “meaning” is given in the fact that, in spite of the unidirectional flow of our duration, we know about experiences outside of the quality experience of our Now and Thus. Just for this reason, we call them “having passed away.”

However, the strict correlativity of becoming and passing-away on the one hand, and symbol and symbolized on the other, is of mere conceptual nature. The concept, like thinking as such, is conditioned by an “a priori” of time. The assertion of the rigid correlativity of the two pairs of concepts gains greatest significance for the study of this a priori. We may let matters rest with this statement. It has been circumscribed in our second and third propositions, and it has been unequivocally discussed during the investigation of the symbol-producing function of memory. *Everything having passed away becomes in the symbol; everything which became passes away in experience.*

After this digression we may return to the four types of meaning positing and meaning interpretation, as set down earlier. We have now to derive the justification

for the unity term, “symbolized symbol,” from proposition (4a), at least to the degree necessary for the present state of our investigation. Proposition (4a) also answers the question about the relationship between symbol positing and symbol interpretation in different life forms. At present, we can make only general statements about this problem in order to round out the theory of the symbol. Anything more definite will have to be stated after the discussion of the individual life forms.

We may assume a symbol context which reaches into several life forms, such as the symbol context of language, the arts, the natural sciences ... We notice that in every one of these symbol systems a problem arises which is of equal significance in all of these heterogeneous areas: the problem of subjective and objective meaning, of the intended (posited) and the interpreted symbol.

To select a few examples: in jurisprudence arises the problem of the discrepancy between considerations of the law-giver, *de lege ferenda*, and the practitioner of the law, *de lege lata*. All present day aesthetics waver between laws which presumably determine the production of the creative artist, and the demand to seek “rules immanent in the work of art but unknown to the artist.” The latter would be binding not for the artist but for viewing a work of art. The natural sciences, for example physics, accept the world as positive meaning context which has to be interpreted according to the specific methods of physics. Medieval philosophy and theology knew of a still different problem: the theodicy in form of cosmogony; the world not as something created but something to be created; not a positive meaning context but a meaning context which has to be posited by the Creator; the world as symbol of the creative will of God which to interpret is our task. With regard to language, daily life furnishes plenty of examples of the discrepancy between positing meaning and interpreting meaning in form of purely linguistic “misunderstandings.”

These examples serve to make the problem visible and to bring into focus their parallelity in the relation between that which constitutes and that which is constituted, between noesis and noema, between the subjective (intended and to be posited) meaning and the objective (posited and to be interpreted) meaning. All these highly specialized applications can be reduced to one formula: the positing of meaning in another life form than that of meaning interpretation.

There exist meaning contexts which are not constituted by memory but originate in a higher life form. Such experiences enter meaningfully into our duration without passing through the medium of memory-endowed duration. However, the matter is not exhausted with meaningful integration into duration. The superstructure of symbol series, erected atop of every one of these life forms, has to reinterpret the symbol which had been constituted earlier. *That means, it has to integrate the already constituted symbol into the symbol series which have been explicitly created in the respective life form.* This is the actual difference between symbol positing and symbol interpretation. The former is satisfied with making meaningful quality experiences, which in themselves are meaningless, by integrating them into the course of duration. The latter returns to something which is already endowed with meaning; it merely integrates it into a new symbol system which actually contradicts the symbol system of the original meaning. Rules for the interpretation of symbols result here too; they are similar to those which, in the present chapter, we have formulated with

regard to the positing of meaning. Only in the second, sociological, part will we find the occasion to formulate these propositions on the basis of the materials which will be offering themselves to us in the investigation of the individual life forms.<sup>33</sup>

Now a final proposition concerning symbol relations. It results, as a matter of course, from our earlier investigations:

*(5) Turning from the symbolized to the symbol, and vice versa, occurs in a act of consciousness which is characteristic for the given life form.*

In the sphere of memory-endowed duration, this act is that of attention. By attention, we designate the specific attitude of consciousness which is directed upon quality experiences. Attention, or possibly clearer, the faculty of remembering, is that act in the life form of memory-endowed duration which is characteristic for the constituting of symbols.

## (10) IMPLICATIONS OF SYMBOL THEORY

At this point, it may be appropriate to recapitulate the basic idea of the theory of symbols, as offered here, and to point out the implications of our conception of the symbol.

Much has been written about symbols and symbolic forms. But the problem has rarely been treated in general terms, focusing on cognition as such. More often, one of the special applications of the symbol relation was made the subject of a specific discipline—for instance in those sciences which are concerned with works of art. Practically always the concept of symbol has been treated as given and not in need of further explanation. Or else it has been considered unexplainable or as belonging to the logical category of representations. In the latter case, it was treated in analogy to the theory of judgments, that is, according to rigid logistic principles. Almost all investigations of symbol systems were concerned with the effects of symbol phenomena in individual cultural objectifications; the origin of these phenomena was not pursued. Without doubt, this has its reasons. The investigations were scientific and had to occupy themselves with the materials of experience. At best, they considered pre-scientific materials as presuppositions but not as objects of cognition. However, it seems that the symbol phenomenon is actually situated in the realm of the shunned pre-scientific materials. Seen from there, it appears to condition all experiences and, still more, to govern their subsumption under categories.

This investigation is forced to deal mainly with “pre-scientific materials” because it plans to investigate the methods of a science, that of the sociology of understanding. The subject matter of this sociology—the Thou problem—certainly is situated in the pre-scientific sphere ... Therefore, we had to muster the courage

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<sup>33</sup> HRW: Since Schutz did not write the second part of this study, the announced propositions have not been written.

to recognize the symbol problem as such where it originally occurs.<sup>34</sup> We did this in our investigation of the function of memory.

The pre-scientific sphere, in which this investigation operated, is distinguished from the scientific sphere in this way: Its objects are the phenomena of experience, not those of cognition. The delimitation of the material occurs in the unity of consciousness, which is not challenged by science and not refuted by any experience. Therefore, a science which occupies itself with the facts of experience has no reason to be afraid of the spectre of the syncretism of methods (the mixing of different methodological systems, HRW) which is feared in every, theoretical and empirical discipline. The method of a science of experience can only consist of acts of self-inspection.

However, a book must needs use language; more, it is forced to resort to conceptual formulations. Therefore, such an investigation is always in conflict with its material, which is beyond language and concept. We will never succeed in breaking through the cover of language and concept. To try this would be meaningless. But, with the method of this work, we may be able to prove that it is possible to irradiate this cover, as with X-rays, and to show what is hidden behind it, even if only in outline. The nature of the symbol is recognizable only in symbols. Why should this fact be more astonishing than the famous self-reflection of cognition by returning to its preconditions, which is the character of all epistemology?

These considerations had to use linguistic-conceptual means in order to approach the phenomena of experience. Therefore, they had to resort to an auxiliary device. They constructed a series of ideal types, that is, forms of consciousness or of life reaching from pure simple duration to conceptual thinking in the world of space and time (thus, in the actual realm of the experience "science"); all experiencing takes place in them. We constructed these ideal types for mere practical reasons. The erection of such auxiliary construction is justified if it produces usable results. No science can say more in justification of its method. But the auxiliary construction cannot be allowed to be in contrast with empirical reality. In our case, it must take care that the unity of the experiencing I is not disturbed. This, it seems, has not happened in the theory of the life forms as offered.

What advantages inhere in such an auxiliary construction? Most of all, it allows us to investigate and order, according to their origin, the continuous flow of the most heterogeneous experiences. It indicates in what fashion the experience enters into our consciousness, how it is changed, which new experiences it initiates. It offers the possibility of seeing the experiencing I, affected by thousands and thousands of experiences, as if it were being fed from only one source of experience and as if it had to react only upon one specific group of experiences. Further, it shows us the relation in which such groups of experience stand to each other and to the experiencing I. More, it clarifies the way in which one group develops out of another one,

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<sup>34</sup> AS: In a separate chapter, to be placed after the First Main Part, we shall deal with the argument that the recognition of a pre-scientific sphere is simply impossible. However, we will have to have to refer already here to some methodological points. (HRW: This chapter was not written).

which it has as its precondition. Finally, it teaches us the unity of the I within the manifoldness of conscious experience and spontaneous experiencing (*Erfahrung und Erleben*). Thus, it connects Life and Thinking, Freedom and Form, Idea and Gestalt. As logistics, science can never achieve this.

Now, a curious and remarkable discrepancy occurs already in the primitive life form of memory-endowed duration and in the mere phenomenon of memory: the discrepancy between that which is experienced and that which is remembered. It must be rooted in the nature of memory. It occurs that the act of reflection on a former Now and Thus in our life brings about an arrest, and thereby a tension between the (formerly, HRW) experienced Now and Thus and the experiencing Now and Thus. This tension was object of our investigation. We ascertained the existence of a symbol relation between memory image and quality experience. Further, we arrived at the assumption that special symbol relations correspond to every life form which we established. And more: the character of these symbol relations conditions the life form; it separates as well as connects them from and with each other. This will have to be tested further.

The recognition of the circumstance that the symbol with all its characteristics occurs already in the life form of memory-endowed duration is most important for the nature of the symbol. This, on one hand, explains why the sphere of pure, simple and symbol-free duration remains inaccessible to our symbol-conditioned thinking. On the other hand, it explains the fact that every experience of which we are conscious, even if we merely notice it, is symbol-conditioned and symbol-bound. We established five major propositions concerning the nature of the symbol *relation*; they will have to be amended. But we are now able to assert that all, even the most complicated, symbol systems must be reducible in their characteristics, respectively their functions, to these or analogous propositions, in so far as these theses prove themselves valid at all.

Here, it will be worthwhile to consider one circumstance: with every positing of a symbol, the I steps more out of pure duration and into an objective world. To symbolize an experience means to rob it of its belonging to a specific Now and Thus and, instead, to endow it with general validity. For instance: if I have meaningful integrated one of my quality experiences into the flow of my duration, I have lifted it out of the Now and Thus to which it belonged and in which it constituted itself while I experienced it as quality. I have objectified it, even though only for myself. Now, the memory image of this quality experience became determining for every Now and Thus which I experienced since then and which I will experience in the future. By an act of self-reflection, I can at any time make sure of this. *My life acquired a specific meaning only with the positing of meaning for the quality experience; but my quality experience became meaningful only through the meaning given to my life.*

In a way, the act of symbol positing detaches individual experiences from the string of my inner duration, in the manner in which one strips pearls from the string which united them, and restrings them on another thread, that of meaning relation. This event, too, belongs to my life. I do not merely go on, I go on *meaningfully*. This and nothing else is meant by our theory of life forms. All of them—including the



spatially-temporally conditioned form of consciousness of conceptual thinking—belong to my duration. Experiences, which belong to this form of (conceptual, HRW) consciousness, are no less my experiences than those which belong to pure duration. But, for me, they are more meaningful experiences. They are not only connected with one another on the tape of my inner duration, which, unwinds evenly; they are connected also through other manifold and special relations which nevertheless belong to me, to my flow of duration, to my life.

After all, what is “meaning” if not the integration of an experience into the flow of duration, that is, its, actual apprehension by the I? Bestowal of meaning, or positing of meaning, is the royal gesture with which memory seizes experience.

This distinguishes the theory of the symbol, offered here, from all others which were constructed about this subject matter. In the bestowal of meaning, it recognizes not merely a constituent of cognition but of every kind of experiencing. It accepts as meaningful not only thinking but every kind of experience; this, however, not in the sense of value accentuation, but exclusively as seen from the viewpoint of the experiencing I. Therefore, it asserts the strongest correlativity between individual experience and the course of life in general. Everything lying in the future will be influenced by the experience which, in itself, receives meaning and significance only from and through everything which went before.

Therewith, we arrived at an important conclusion from our symbol theory: *If every preceding experience influences the meaningful integration of a Now and Thus, the transformation of the symbolized into the symbol occurs simultaneously with an act of selection—or, to take a term from a highly complex meaning system, an act of evaluation.* In my opinion, it is this moment which Lask<sup>35</sup> subsumes under his theory of a “meaning-evaluated (*sinnungoltene*) reality.” We symbolize at every moment. Thereby, we affirm the meaning of our life and the value of our experience. Would it serve any purpose, one could establish unconscious and most relative evaluations already in the most primitive sphere, finding there the existence of values and the fact of valuation. Maybe, with this (insight, HRW), the value problem will solve itself; the assumption of its universal validity renders it useless as principle of cognition. But, in reverse, it may become thereby the main problem of philosophy, and not only of philosophy.<sup>36</sup> This question cannot be decided in this investigation. But its consequences may be shown later. The importance of the problem of meaning remains in any case, whether one sees in everything which passes away merely an allegory, or in every allegory only that which passes away.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> HRW: Emil Lask was a member of the Southern German school of neo-Kantianism which, through Heinrich Rickert at Heidelberg University, influenced Max Weber’s methodological thinking considerably.

<sup>36</sup> AS: Of course, we speak here not of “ethical” or other particular evaluations but only of the significance of the *principle* for life and cognition.

<sup>37</sup> HRW: The last sentence is an allusion of a famous quote by Goethe: “*Alles Vergaengliche ist nur ein Gleichnis.*”



## (11) THE VIEW OF THE WORLD IN MEMORY-ENDOWED DURATION

Prior to the investigation of the second life form, that of the acting I, we will shortly look at the view of the world which emerged in memory-endowed duration.

Here, the world is not yet expanded. Nothing in it allows us to assume a contrast between outside and inside. All experience is quality experience, my experience. I-consciousness is limited to the continuity of duration. *In the symbol of language formation, "I" means something entirely different. Most of all, the I would be linguistically meaningless without the opposite pole of the Thou (or an It). The necessity of singling out the I, as something special, from all subjects which (at first purely linguistically) can be combined with predicates - this necessity presupposes a manifold of such linguistic subjects: nouns.* However, this would mean to break through the succession of quality experiences and to assume a coexistence or at least a simultaneity which contradicts the nature of duration. In addition, every pronoun, be it flexible or not, receives its significance through the possibility of entering into a relation with a verb. Every verb form, including auxiliary verbs, is capable of modification in tense, mode, and person; thus, it presupposes the Thou projected into space and time. Aside from this, we still lack any justification for positing an agent beyond all dimensions, especially since it would not be confronted by an act. If we speak of I-consciousness in memory-endowed duration, we mean nothing but a constant reference to the flow of duration.

Changing quality experiences flow inseparably and indivisibly into each other. A thing, something outside, is recognizable neither in spatial existence nor in name. Space, for instance, would be recognizable only as quality experience, such as a splash of color or a tactile impression. My memory, my faculty to remember, is the only regulator of the unregulated abundance of experiences. I know that my memory is the cause of the manifoldness of my duration. But this same memory unifies and separates the materials of experience; it lifts groups of quality experiences out of the flow of pure duration and integrates them meaningfully into the course of duration. It enables me to relive all experiences again and again, not as quality which affects me immediately but as symbol which, formed and transforming, makes every Now into a Thus.

Thus, the I experiences its pure duration only with the help of memory. Even though we started with sensory impressions as materials of empirical observation, this I must be thought to be essentially immaterial. That means: without body, without the ability to carry out an action, without awareness of its bodily I. It presents itself as one-dimensional, like a mathematical line moving in the direction of pure duration. Everything I know in memory-endowed duration about my body is neither more nor less than any quality experience. For me, my hand is quality experience as much as the pen which it uses, or the paper on which it writes—maybe with the difference that "my hand" belongs to every Now and Thus of my duration, whether I am conscious of it or not. It shares its duration with me.

But this is a very imprecise representation. When I write the letter "A" on paper, the quality experience which I earlier called "my hand" is not at all given. At best,

I have a quality experience of my-hand-which-writes the letter A, meaning this letter here and thus. This, again, is an abbreviation for the quality experience of the muscular movements of my hand which, artfully complicated, are hardly interpretable in physiological and anatomical terms. Just here and now and thus, it begins the first slanted line of the letter A, draws it downward, interrupts, starts the other line, draws it, interrupts, adds the cross line, etc.

With these considerations, I wish merely to show the gross inaccuracy of the earlier introduced theory that the quality experience of the body accompanies all other quality experiences. This inaccuracy occurred because we put something which is conceptually unequivocally determined (*my hand*), something named, in the place of muscular contractions and extensions.<sup>38</sup> The latter do not reach language consciousness, not to mention conceptualization. The expression “my hand” was set down as abbreviation, as frozen metaphor setting the effect for that which effected it.

And all this because I replaced all these movements, actions, and quality experiences by one word, “hand,” and by the individual concept based on the word, “my hand,” and thereby tied them together to a rigid unity of our spatial-temporal-conceptual consciousness. With this, we also supposed them to be a unitary quality experience in pure or memory-endowed duration.

However, in memory-endowed duration we can in no way assert that the quality experience “my hand” is particularly privileged in comparison to the quality experience “paper” or “pen.” Through my memory function, I coordinate the quality experience “hand” to the experiences “paper” and “pen.” Yet, in actuality, the former presents thousands and thousands of quality experiences, and this in an entirely different sense than the quality experience “pen.” Yet, the latter too is but an abbreviation of a long series of quality experiences. The functional moment of naming aside, it is “pen of this form,” of “this color,” in “this light,” in “this position”; it is “posed now, here, and thus for drawing the first line of the A,” and so on.

What, then, is the difference between the group of quality experiences which I sum up under the name “hand,” in particular the individual term “my right hand,” and those which I sum up under the name ‘pen’ or—in order to also create a rather precise individual term, “my black fountain pen ‘Diplomat Nr. 46212’”?

First, a negative answer: certainly, the difference does not issue from the fact that the experience “pen” belongs only partially to consciousness, the experience “hand,” however, constantly. One could say, when I close my eyes and put the pen down, it has disappeared from consciousness. Maybe, it no longer exists, is changed, has disappeared, etc. However, I am always aware of my hand, my right hand as belonging to me regardless of whether I close or open my eyes, or move my hand from one position to a different one. I know that it did not disappear. The pen which is beyond

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<sup>38</sup> AS: It bears mentioning that “muscular contractions and extensions,” too, indicate a “frozen metaphor.” The first, “my hand,” belongs to popular language; the second to the language of the “well-informed” layman.

my reach needs proof for its existence. The existence of my hand, which I do not see, is still immediately evident.

This (kind of, HRW) argument appears time and again in the history of philosophy. It may be correct or incorrect (it is not possible, at this stage of our study, to investigate this). In any case, it solely fits a world of concepts in which “hand” and “pen” are spatial “bodies” of the “outer world”; they have their exact location in space. It does not fit the investigation of the nondelimited and continuous quality experiences which we had agreed to call “hand” and “pen”—paradoxically and contrary to essence and possibility of memory-endowed duration. The pen, which I put aside and no longer see, is no longer a quality experience: no “proof” will succeed in making it into one. Memory-endowed duration cannot say anything about this “pen” beyond the preserved memory image of that pen which had entered a Now and Thus of my past as quality experience. I may pick up the pen again and, under otherwise equal circumstances, place it in the position which my memory has preserved and restart the first slanted line of a specific A. Yet, I am still not in a position to assert that it is the same pen—not as thing (this is self-understood: there are no things) but also not as quality experience. In the meantime, my duration was flowing on; according to our conception of the character of inner duration, I can never experience two qualities as the “same.” In addition, the memory image itself changes with duration; this deprives me of the third point of comparison. But does this not also apply to my hand? Is the quality experience of my hand in this or that position the same, when I close my eyes? Is it still the same when I open them again? Even if I leave my hand “at rest,” is the quality experience “my hand Now and Thus” still “now and thus” in the next moment? To aver this would mean to deny everything we have said about the nature of duration. No “memory image” entitles me to state that my hand, which draws a cross line now, is the same (or the same quality experience) which drew a diagonal line earlier.

We inserted these lengthy considerations for several reasons. First, we wished to demonstrate that it is untenable to think that “things of the outer world are quality experiences which have been abstracted by memory and, so to speak, have been bracketed”—even though such a notion seems obvious to our primary and primitive realm of ideas. Second, we wanted to demonstrate that the whole problem has its origin exclusively in an arbitrary transposition of the conceptual apparatus of the spatial-temporal world upon the phenomena of duration. In other words: within memory-endowed duration, such a problem does not and cannot exist. Naturally, there is no solution for this problem.

Two quality experiences are never comparable to one another. The faculty of memory to form symbols of quality experiences does not make possible the identification of a quality experience with a symbol or—worse—with a passed-away quality experience by means of a symbol. In inner duration, it is simply impossible to assume the existence of “two” things, that is, of one object which is compared with another one, not to mention a “third” one as standard for comparison. To posit “two” means already juxtaposition, simultaneity, coexistence, which belong into discontinuous space but not into the continuum of duration.

Therefore, the solution of the problem of the privileged position of the body has to be banished from the realm of the investigation of memory-endowed duration. In the sphere of this life form, no quality experience acquires a privileged rank—not even that of the body. Only the unity of consciousness feigns such a circumstance. If one intentionally ignores the unity of consciousness, as we did in our theory of the forms of consciousness, one can investigate all phenomena separately. In this procedure, however, all phenomena have to be reducible to the unity of consciousness. Under this condition, the problem has no place in the life form of memory-endowed duration. We have to look for it in another form of consciousness: in the sphere of the acting I. We turn now to this sphere.<sup>39</sup>

## (12) THE SOMATIC FEELING OF LIFE

Let us forget for a moment what we said earlier about duration and memory. Let us make an effort to divest ourselves of all sensory perceptions, quality experiences, memory images, and fantasy representations. Let us ignore all thinking and feeling, all willful movements of our body. Instead, let us turn our attention to the phenomenon of duration. This will be the easier as we have freed ourselves from all quality experiences. In spite of all this, the awareness of our “I” will not abandon us; although not in the sense of pure duration. But every breath of my chest, every heartbeat is mine, belongs to me. It is my heart which beats, my chest which rises and falls. I completely feel the rhythm of my body, of the heartbeat, of breathing. We may call this I-consciousness of the body the feeling of life, the feeling of existing. *This essence of feeling (esse) does not result in knowledge (cogito)*. Basically, I do not know anything about my existence. But I know that I breathe, that my heart beats, and that I live in immediate evidence. *That this being-alive (vivere) is in fact an essential mode (modus essendi), I indeed come to know only by detour through cognition*.

Let us compare this experience with the experience of pure and simple duration. For the latter we could establish the continuous transfer of qualities. While contemplating our purely somatic feeling of life, we were unable to discover either differentiation or continuity. Systole and diastole, breathing in and breathing out, follow each other rhythmically in our feeling of life, in no way *differentiated*, in nothing different from each other. Although rhythmically advancing, nothing passes into something else. I breathe deeply and distinguish exactly the moment at which my ribcage begins to expand: I feel how it takes in more and more air

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<sup>39</sup> AS: In his *Confessions*, Saint Augustine reflected: “You, who wish to know yourself, do you know who you are? I know. How do you know? I do not know. Do you know whether you are homogeneous or manifold? I do not know. Do you know whether you are set in motion (motivated, HRW)? Do you know whether you think? I know.” (HRW: Schutz quoted this passage in Latin. I am obliged to Professor Ford Weisskittel of the Department of Classics of Hobart and William Smith Colleges for this translation).

but then exhales it again, sinking down: two acts which can be clearly distinguished.

For the sake of testing, let us imagine that the act of breathing is a quality experience in the flow of duration. What has changed? The acts of breathing in and out became codeterminants of a series of "Now and Thus" in our inner duration. Can I compare two breathings? Between two exchanges of air, I find in the continuum of pure duration a world, a world of experience of such fullness and manifoldness that I am unable to account even for a few of these quality experiences. The flow of inner duration is indivisible even between two breathings. Therefore, no exchange of air will resemble the next. Should I want to compare them, I could only resort to comparison with the memory image of my prior breath. But this image partook in the change which occurred in the whole world situated in our inner duration between two exchanges of breath. In pure duration, the quality experience of breathing in the Now and Thus is absolutely different from that which it was in the Now and Thus of the earlier act of breathing.

However, "pure duration" as well as pure somatic feeling of life are assumptions, artificial abstractions, which we made for specific heuristic purposes. It took specific and very difficult acts of self-reflection to limit ourselves to such a form of consciousness. The unity of the experiencing I contains both experiences as one: pure duration and pure somatic feeling of life; "elan vital," to use Bergson's related term. We experience everything in duration as well as in the rhythm of somatic processes. Thanks to our awareness of their regularity, our breathing and our heartbeats create a division of the indivisible, a discrete arrangement in the manifold of duration. In the latter, everything somatic is quality experience. All awareness of duration is harnessed by the periodicalizing rhythm of the somatic feeling of life.

Let us turn back to the "somatic feeling of life" I and go beyond the, "spontaneous" movements of breathing and heartbeat. Some kind of "stimulus"—its nature and provenance are not clear to us and cannot be so in the sphere of the somatic—hits a place of my body, say the eye: I make a movement, recoil, close the eye. What kind of consciousness, in our consciousness, lies at the bottom of such "reflex movements"?

First, we may offer an interpretation from the viewpoint of the life form of memory-endowed duration. Here, the event presents itself as a series of quality experiences, independent of each other and not reducible to each other. They are merely strung together by the thread of my duration. The only thing they have in common is that they are my experiences. We know that it is impossible to capture this event in even remotely adequate words. But if I permit myself such an interpretation, I may say that the events—light ray, pain, feeling blinded, closing eyes, no pain, opening eyes—occur absolutely independent of, but run into, each other; and this next to thousands and thousands of other quality experiences which, together and intermingled, may constitute the respective Now and Thus. They all occur along the line of the quality experiences of duration, which flow ever manifoldly, streamingly, continuously and differentially. Separated from one another by nothing, they are by nothing set apart, or distinguished, from other quality experiences.

How do these events present themselves in the consciousness form of the pure feeling of life? I have assumed that my body is completely at rest; only the rhythm

of heartbeat and breathing produces the awareness of the feeling of life. Before the stimulus hit my eye, I did not at all take notice of my eye. For the experiencing I (for instance, in pure duration), it is impossible to establish from where the quality experiences come. The statement, that I see with my eyes, demands a most complex cognitive apparatus. It presupposes *experience*, mostly scientific experience, in order to realize that I move these or those muscles which, in some fashion, change that part of my body which I called “eye” by an act which I called “closing the lid.” Thereby, I have conceptually presupposed “sensory apperceptions” as label for a group of quality experiences. They suffer rather specific changes; for instance, disappear from consciousness, are forgotten, etc.

Our considerations are still far away from the sketched series of experiences. For these experiences, the “eye” as such does not exist. Likewise, for this form of consciousness there exists no “stimulus” hitting the eye. The muscular movement of the lid of my eye during its “closing” and “opening” is the one and only event which is evident in my feeling of life; it belongs to me as evidently as heartbeat and breathing.<sup>40</sup>

Another example: I want to lift the little finger of my left hand, and do this. What does this mean for my consciousness?

Physiology teaches that an impulse issues from a certain point of my central nervous system, passes the spine, affects the motor nerves, enters ganglions, causes the contraction of this or that muscle.

In memory-endowed duration, most manifold quality experiences take their course, even if I lift the little finger while keeping my eyes closed. Bergson spoke of the “cinematographical function”<sup>41</sup> of memory which forms each of the “states” of lifting the finger—in reality, this act occurs in continuous motion. This function is

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<sup>40</sup> AS: To prevent basic misunderstandings, we stress that this kind of investigation has nothing at all to do with empirical psychology. One may refer to the “movement of my digestive organs” which occurs unnoticed by consciousness, in order to refute my theory that all that which is somatic becomes evident only as movement, as the functional factor in our feeling of life. However, this is definitely no argument against my theory. Actually, I know extremely little about some somatic processes—for instance; inner secretion. But what I know about them, I have not evidenced in my feeling of life; I have learned it from strictly *scientific* empirical investigations of a physiological and biological nature. Likewise, we must refute the objection that, in certain pathological cases, this or that contraction of muscles occurs unconsciously even though, according to my conception of feeling of life, it should have become evident. The (concept of, HRW) consciousness of physiologists and psychologists is completely different from that evidenced by the feeling of life. By introducing the life forms, I make a deliberate abstraction which is justified by its usefulness. To the psychologist, consciousness may mean the totality of “psychic facts.” In addition, he comprehends these facts empirically, that is, as being subsumed under a scientific-conceptual frame of reference.

<sup>41</sup> HRW: On first sight, one may think that “kinaesthetic function” would be a better expression. However, Bergson’s choice of “cinematographic function” is as correct as any technical term could be. Attention is not paid to the physical process but to its experience: in duration. The cinematographic analogy is introduced in order to describe a succession of apperceptive images appearing in duration; they are viewed as discretely and minutely changed from one “moment” to the next, somewhat like the frames of a moving picture strip. In his correction of Bergson’s idea of successive “states” by speaking of “continuous motion,” Schutz. may have tried to lessen the mechanical implications of the analogy.

an essential ingredient of the corresponding Now and Thus. Without it, the Now simply would not be a Thus. *Only, this quality experience would not consist* in “lifting a finger.” I could convince myself of the latter only if I opened my eyes and, in the given Now and Thus, receive a group of visual experiences which, by way of retrospective interpretation through conceptual and linguistic symbols, we could comprehend as “lifting a finger.” We ignore here the “act of will” which is involved. In the somatic sphere of a pure feeling of life, I evidently know about this or that muscle movement as belonging to me.

Let us remain, for another moment, with the example of the “lifted finger.” In the sphere of memory-endowed duration, we established two series of quality experiences which were evoked by the event of “lifting a finger”: First, when at this moment I look at my finger, the series of visual quality experiences enter into my Now and Thus like any other quality experience. Second, the series of sensual or somatic quality experiences of which I got hold while having my eyes closed; they consist in the experience of the contraction of muscles. We said of the second series that it belongs to the sphere of the evident feeling of life. Now, we experience these events also as qualities in memory-endowed duration.

The unitary I-consciousness does not execute a separation of the life forms; it exists simultaneously in all of them. The series of experiences mentioned offer to I-consciousness the guarantee that the experiences concern the movement of my muscles, the action of my finger. This is so because the experiences of my muscle contractions are by my memory assigned to duration: yet, they had already been executed in the form of somatic feelings of life as belonging to me in absolute evidence. With regard to the first series of quality experiences, namely, the visual experience of the lifted finger, the following must be stated: within memory-endowed duration exists no precondition whatsoever (to assume, HRW) that it is just my finger whose movement I now apperceive visually. The coincidence of both qualities experiences could only be established through (the combination of, HRW) the memory image of the visual movement and the memory image of the muscle contraction. (This, however, would be necessary only, HRW) if I had not already, in the sphere of the somatic feeling of life, identified in full evidence this muscle contraction as belonging to me. In other words: quality experiences of my body, perceived *only* in memory-endowed duration, do not suffice for giving these quality experiences a privileged position above all others. This privileging occurs exclusively because I experience in immediate evidence this action as belonging to me in another form of consciousness, which we called the sphere of the purely somatic feeling of life. In mere, maybe visual, apperception in memory-endowed duration, it is not possible immediately to recognize that the event issued from my body.

The lamp next to me throws a grotesquely distorted shadow image of my head against the wall. It almost looks like a horned devil. Is this horn the shadow of a lock of hair or of a finger? I move one finger after the other and find that my middle finger threw the shadow of the horn. In the same manner, the purely visual quality experience is in need of control by the somatic feeling of life. On the basis of visual impressions, I cannot theoretically decide that the finger I saw in movement is in fact the finger I *moved*. However, this series of experiences



coincides with a quality series issuing from the somatic sphere. It is only thus that the experiencing I actually ascertains that the finger I saw in movement is identical with the finger I moved. This leads to important implications for the theory of the “visual field” and the “tactile field.” It also justifies the dual conception of “movement” as quality change within duration and as path traveled. Both phenomena shall be treated more extensively later.

In our example of the “lifted finger,” we have up to now intentionally neglected the factor of the act of will. Let us now investigate this aspect of the phenomenon. In order to gain a provisional common starting point, we will mean here, by “will” what Schopenhauer<sup>42</sup> understood by it during his discussion of the concept of will: that is, an act of consciousness which transforms itself immediately into a bodily movement. Without being grossly inexact, we may view the bodily movement as “expression of an act of will”—or, since this is a tautology, as the act of will in itself. Earlier, we asserted that we “know” our body also in the sphere of the somatic feeling of life when it, respectively one of its organs, starts to act. I know about my finger only if I want to lift it and start doing so. The fact that I have a finger comes to the fore in my somatic feeling of life only in the moment in which I move it. Aside from “sensations of pain,” which will be discussed later, I actually do know nothing about the immovable parts of my body in the sphere of my somatic feelings—for instance, of my hair, my eyebrows, my eye lashes, my spine, my liver, my spleen.

I am able to “locate” certain sensations of pain or experiences of touch in certain organs merely on the basis of a more or less exact knowledge which I borrow from the scientific-empirical contexts of anatomy and physiology. By way of a very complicated detour, which leads through several chains of symbols, I conclude that these organs are my organs. This phenomenon will be extensively treated later. Here, it suffices to state that these phenomena have nothing to do with what we called immediate evidence in the sphere of the somatic feeling of life. In this sphere, only the movable and the moving body exist in immediacy.

This does not mean that only the deliberately movable and moving parts of the body are objects or carriers of this “life feeling.” As our example of the blinded and reflexively closed eye shows, spontaneous muscular contractions, of which we become aware, also evoke the immediate evidence of life feeling (reflex movements of any kind, heartbeat, breathing, etc.; but not, for instance, the movement of blood through my veins, or inner secretion).

These considerations may be summed up in the following proposition: *In the form of consciousness of the immediately evident feeling of life, the I experiences its body only in movement, that is, in functional context.*

What is the nature of this movement, and how is it linked to inner duration?

We said before that all somatic quality experience must occur in pure duration. The immediately evident feeling of life adds to this quality experience merely the

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<sup>42</sup> HRW: Arthur Schopenhauer: *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (The World as Will and Idea)*, Leipzig: 1819.



sensation which issues from my body, that is, from part of my I. Therefore, it is practical to start with the experience of movement in duration when answering the above question. We assume a regular and uniform movement and exclude, as well as we can manage, all external manifoldness. Perhaps I move my finger regularly and uniformly over a homogeneous surface, that is, a surface even in terms of temperature, structure, form, etc. I am closing my eyes; only the impressions of the moving fingers enter into my consciousness, not those of the finger seen in motion.

During the “duration” of this movement, my inner duration also flows along. I can assert that, in my pure duration, a quality experience is coordinated to every moment in simultaneity. This experience corresponds to the image of the homogeneous object as mediated to me by my sense of touch. I cannot yet speak of movement and of the experience of movement; in the sphere of pure duration I cannot even assert the similarity of these quality experiences—not to mention the duration of this similarity or the evolvment of this quality experience, “moved finger,” respectively, “tactile impression,” at moment A (which precedes moment B of our experience, HRW). Pure simple duration as such is without cohesion aside from that of the flow of duration of the I in itself. I can only experience a touch impression at moment A and one at moment B; both belong to me. I do not know anything about the nature of the touch impression or about the relation between the two impressions: the one passed away before the other became—both as quality experiences without entering as symbols into my duration.

The latter can happen only in memory-endowed duration; only here occurs the awareness of a continuity of the whole event. The quality image of the movement at moment A, which is turned into a symbol, has its after-effects at moment B. In itself, the quality experience at moment B is similar (to that at the earlier moment, HRW). But it turns into something completely different: it is not in itself experienced by me, but by my I who already experienced the earlier moment in a Now whose Thus constituted the preceding A. The meaning images of the passed experiences join the quality (apperceptive) images of the becoming experience. This means nothing else but that the movement occurs continuously in my consciousness.

This derivation is valid for every kind of movement but also other experiences. We have shown in the earlier example of researcher and coin that the amassing or repetition of similar images never produces similarity but manifoldness. From this, we concluded that our memory is the cause for the manifoldness of our inner duration. As long as we deal with moving (but not with having-moved) in the sphere of memory-endowed duration, it cannot make any difference whether the experience movement-of-my-finger has been executed by me or another object. However, one difference remains: in this case, the sphere of evidence has to be sought in the somatic feeling of life, in the experience of my body as functional context. Yet, here, the identity of the I cannot come into evidence; it does not at all issue from the somatic sphere. Rather, it is limited to the succession of quality images which are merely mediated by sensory impressions.

Let us assume that it is not *I* who moves my finger along a homogeneous surface but that the surface is moved below my finger at rest.<sup>43</sup> If we ignore visual control, the quality experiences accepted in memory-endowed duration are in both cases similar: they are mediated by the sense of touch. However, if I myself move the finger, an entirely new and in principle different series of quality experiences is added: a series of quality experiences of my finger in a functional context. In other words: the experience of my body in the somatic sphere enters as quality experience into my duration; it joins the series of images which have been mediated by pure “sensory impressions.” Not considering other experiences, the “Thus” of the Now at moment B does not only establish the experience of the homogeneous mass at moment B and the earlier experience of this mass at moment A, continuing as meaning image. Mediated by the somatic feeling of life, it also constitutes the quality experience of *my finger* at moment B together with the memory image of my finger at moment A.

This formulation is only provisional. In our example, this becomes evident as soon as we open our eyes. Aside from other quality experiences, we then obtain the following constituents of the “Thus” as moment B (imagined as immediately following moment A at which the movement started).

- (1) Quality experience of the touched homogeneous surface at moment B, mediated by a “sensory impression.”<sup>44</sup>
- (2) Meaning image of the touched homogeneous surface at moment A, mediated by memory.
- (3) Quality experience of the seen homogeneous surface at moment B, mediated by sensory impression.
- (4) Memory image of the seen homogeneous surface at moment A, mediated by memory.
- (5) Quality experience of the seen moving finger at moment B, mediated by sensory impression.
- (6) Meaning image of the seen moving finger at moment A, mediated by memory.
- (7) Quality experience of the finger, moved by me at moment B, mediated by the somatic feeling of life, experienced as functional context.
- (8) Meaning image of the finger which I moved at moment A (and experienced as functional context), mediated by memory.

With reference to this tabulation, we can state the following: the seventh and eighth experiences represent the “Thus” at moment B of memory-endowed duration. They alone differentiate the movement executed by me from other movements which I may experience in memory-endowed duration. The fifth and sixth experiences,

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<sup>43</sup> AS: That I say also, in this case (that the surface, HRW) “is moved,” of course is knowledge which has been conveyed to me by my observational practical knowledge (*Erfahrungswissen*) of the world; it is not grounded in memory-endowed duration or the somatic sphere.

<sup>44</sup> AS: If I guide my finger not over a “homogeneous surface” but an area of my body, the touched finger replaces the touched surface!

too, offer no criteria. As explained, I have no possibility whatsoever of experiencing the finger, which I see moving, as my finger, as the finger moved by me, as long as the seventh and eighth experiences do not penetrate into my consciousness.<sup>45</sup>

In this manner, the life form of the somatic feeling of life is linked to the life form of memory-endowed duration: on the one hand, memory in its function as awareness of the ongoing I; on the other hand, the somatic feeling of life as awareness of the acting I. Earlier, we have attempted to represent this acting I as quality experience of the ongoing I. If we want the I to be one, and if we claim validity for our theory of symbol and life form, we have to try the following: to interpret the acting I as a life form *sui generis* on the basis of the somatic feeling of life. We will have to answer the question of the specific symbol structure of this life form, and we have to demonstrate the linkage between both life forms—namely, that of memory-endowed duration and that of the acting I—on the basis of the “somatic feeling of life” and of its symbol relations. If the hypothesis of life forms is to prove itself, it must be shown that the manifoldness of the world finds support in the lowest as well as the highest life forms, even if only imperfectly. The imperfection itself follows from the symbol relation of the higher life form. The unitary I, which exists, acts, and lives simultaneously in all these forms, becomes accessible to analysis only when we attempt a total synthesis of the living (*Lebendiges*).

### (13) SOMATIC EXPERIENCE AND QUALITY EXPERIENCE

When considering the functions of our body, we found that the somatic feeling of life enters into our consciousness only as functional context and that the duration of the feeling of life is exclusively effected by the steady movement of our body in heartbeat and breathing. The exception is pain, whose phenomena have still to be clarified. I spoke of “duration of the feeling of life,” even though the difference between this feeling and inner duration is clearly recognizable in the characteristic periodification and rhythmification which distinguishes the somatic feeling of life.

We may imagine a deliberately executed movement of our body, for instance, of my right hand writing the letter A on this sheet. Thereby, I execute deliberately (what deliberately means will have to be established later) certain muscular contractions in my body. These are muscular contractions which, in case I had the necessary anatomical and physiological knowledge, I would be able exactly to describe and label. Unfortunately, I lack this knowledge. For the moment, I also try to keep memory-endowed duration out of my considerations. Thus, as actor, I have no reason whatsoever to doubt that my hand, which draws the first diagonal line of the letter A—respectively those muscular movements which I execute in order to draw

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<sup>45</sup> AS: In view of the whole derivation given above, it must be maintained that we deal always with a movement during its duration; that is, with becoming movement but never with passed-away movement which is retrospectively reconstructed.

this line—belongs to me. But this less or in different fashion than those muscular movements which I make in order to add the cross line. The doubt arose earlier because I viewed “my hand” at first as “hand seen by me.” Thereby I considered it a quality image of memory-endowed duration. In this context, it was indeed important to coordinate a specific Now and Thus of inner duration with every one of the quality images in which individual movements manifested themselves in consciousness. I could say that the quality image of my hand at moment X concerns only the muscular movements called hand: the hand, which just here, just now, and just thus, draws the first diagonal line of this A on this paper, at this moment, under this light, etc., now starts, now draws, now ends.

For my somatic feeling of life, in which my hand muscles become evident just through and in their functions, such doubt cannot exist. Rather, I could assert that I become aware of *every* movement of the hand muscles in question, so-to-speak somatically, whether I execute the first line of this A or of any other A (on another sheet, at a different time). As long as I do not resort to my memory, I would find no theoretical difference between a first and a later line. However, I would also not be in a position to compare the two phenomena. Yet, it is impossible for me to think away memory, whenever I am at all set to think. I cannot merely appeal to the somatic sphere. Like pure duration, it does not offer me the possibility of comparing two phenomena with one another. By isolating the somatic feeling of life I merely arrive at evidence for all bodily movements which belong to me. I was not in a position to do this solely from memory. But, without resorting to the latter, I will never be in a position to establish the similarity of, or the difference between, my muscular movements. In order to do this, I have to appeal to memory. Yet, this appeal too will remain effectual. Memory, as cause of the manifoldness of inner duration, necessarily has to designate every one of these muscular movements as different simply because each of them belongs to another Now and Thus of inner duration. In the sphere of memory, nothing similar exists. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the muscular movements of drawing a line for the letter A are “the same” or “similar” to the muscular movements of drawing any other comparable line. Obviously, this probability issues not from memory but from the somatic feeling of life. Only in the latter is the similar, if not established, at least possible.

At this moment, it may be practically impossible to find a way out of this dilemma. Obviously, we deal here with an equivocation of the word “similar,” that is, of a term which is meaningful and valid only in the space-time world of concepts. But the fact that the phenomenon of similarity has its origin in the sphere of the somatic feeling of life calls for reflection. We did not even answer the question “*what* is actually similar”? The muscular movement as such? Or has one *inferred* similarity in a most complicated conceptual-logical fashion, starting from the similarity of the effect, that is, the visually perceived A-lines? My feeling of life offers as evidence merely the execution of muscular movements. My memory necessarily reveals the differentiation of the quality images which have been coordinated to these muscular movements. Here, we cannot say more.

The circumstance that the problem of similarity arose just here, however, shows with absolute clarity that the investigation of the acting I has to be carried further. We

must pursue the effects of this I beyond the sphere of the pure somatic feeling of life. Under comparable circumstances, the recognition of the manifoldness of our duration had forced us to investigate our memory-endowed duration. The experience of similarity is not limited to muscular contraction. It is not merely the movement of my body during the execution of movement which appears “similar” to me; the already executed movement seems to produce a similar result.

Another example: I bent a little finger. What does my somatic feeling convey to me? I feel the flexors of my finger in movement. ... With the execution of the movement, in the functional moment, the muscular movement enters into my experience of inner duration with the help of my somatic feeling of life. Uncounted quality images offer themselves to my memory while I execute the movement; of them, I will select only two—two which I can establish also when the movement has been concluded. For reasons still to be explained, these two impress themselves especially upon my memory: the beginning and the end of the movement: thus, the memory image of the straight and the bent finger. With regard to the consequences, I will stress once more that, in this case, it *is* not a matter of the finger seen in movement but of the finger moved. Primarily, it is experienced in the sphere of the somatic feeling of life: it penetrates memory-endowed duration solely through the somatic medium.

The comparison of these two quality images or of their symbol relations can never be achieved in the sphere of memory-endowed duration alone; it can only be accomplished by us as humans who exist in space and time and think conceptually. If I make the comparison, I first of all establish a being-different. According to our theory, this is self-understood .... I have grown older between the two quality experiences. Disregarding this for the time being, I obtain only a partial cause of this being-different: a purely somatic experience which is rooted in the state of tension of my flexors. Physiologically speaking, it may manifest itself sooner or later in a “tiring” of the muscles in question.

At first glance, this vaguely posed assertion seems to contradict the postulate that I experience my body only in movement, that is, as functional context. The fact of the origins of these experiences in the somatic feeling of life comes to light only when I refer to other quality experiences—experiences both which entered into my memory-endowed duration without having passed through the somatic sphere. So-to-speak, I mobilize them as means of control.

Let us assume that, eyes closed, I move my left hand along my stretched and then bent right finger. We may now set up a table of the experiences which, in this case, make up the constituting Now and Thus. For the sake of simplification, the movements of my left hand are not included.

- (1) Quality image of the flexors of my right finger, mediated by the somatic feeling of life.
- (2) Quality image of the right finger felt by my left hand. According to our earlier view, it enters pure duration as “sensory impression” of touch sensations without mediation of the somatic feeling of life.
- (3) Quality image of my left hand which moves along my right finger, likewise mediated by sensory impression. The difference between (2) and (3) is obvious.

If not I but Peter would move along my finger, (2) would disappear while (3) would be maintained. The same would be the case if I did not use my left hand but a piece of wood.

Thus, I have executed a control movement with closed eyes. For the moment, I shall limit myself to (2) and (3) in the analysis of the corresponding quality experiences .... Is it possible to establish a relationship between these two experiences—that mediated by the somatic feeling of life and that accepted by way of sensory impressions—without interpolation of a series of experiential contexts and regular sequences (of quality experiences, HRW)? This question has to be answered with a categorical “No.” Nothing instructs me that the finger, which I touched, is also the finger which I bent, unless it is the touch sensation of even this bent finger. But, this we have excluded. Maybe I did not glide with my left hand over my right finger but over a glove into which I slipped my finger. It follows that, in this case, only the sensory impression which my finger gained from the touch of the hand produced a quality image which is different from that of the stretched finger.

It turns out that we can, and must, generalize these results. It is not entirely irrelevant whether the touch impression (3) was evoked by my hand, the hand of Peter, a piece of wood, by a breath of air, by water, etc. If this is the case—no reason speaks against it—I can assert *that every somatic experience of the body as functional context is accompanied by a quality experience which is guided into my inner duration by the touch sense of the moved organ*. In other words: indeed, I somatically experience my body in a functional context. Yet, thanks to the quality experiences which reach me through my sense of touch, I am ever aware of the *boundaries of my body*. This awareness is truly constant: it is coordinated to every moment of my inner duration: it inheres in the touch impression which I receive from the medium in which I live. This recognition forces us to revise our whole theory of the somatic feeling of life: we have to remove the inexactitudes which we introduced earlier....

## **(14) THE ACTING I AND THE SOMATIC FEELING OF LIFE**

We stated earlier that the I experiences his body only as functional context. This assertion calls for a dual correction. It assumes that the somatic feeling of life is mediated only through the movement of parts of the body, meaning thereby a tensing and relaxing of certain muscles. From this it could be concluded that, aside from breathing, I am deprived of all “somatic feeling of life” and of all awareness of my body when it is in a state of absolute rest. However, such an “absolute rest” position for my body, or even a part of it, can be imagined neither theoretically nor practically. In fact purely somatic—I am always aware of the position of my body. Whether I stand, walk, lie down, sit; whether my arms hang down or are akimbo: certain muscles are always in “action”; others are “switched off.” In my somatic feeling of life, I am ever aware of the state of tension of my muscles.

...This pure somatic feeling of life is subjected to correction by the continual experience of the boundaries of the body through the sense of touch. This includes the points of contact with surrounding matter. Here is the true core of the idea that our body, at every moment, is correlated to pure duration. This is indeed so but not, as one may believe, in the mere somatic feeling of life. It is so by virtue of a quality experience which enters directly into pure duration and is mediated through the sense of touch. The quality experiences of the boundaries of the body are common to pure duration and the somatic feeling of life. But this too is imprecisely expressed. Actually, somatic feeling of life and the quality experiences of the sense of touch are strongly correlated, but not identical.

The somatic feeling of life, as such, abandons me no less than the experience of quality. What, then, means the proposition that the acting I experiences his body only as functional context? Here a second correction of the proposition is called for.

The proposition is valid only for the acting I. With it, we intended to break through the sphere of the pure somatic feeling of life and to speak of an experience which goes beyond the mere awareness of muscular tensions, which has as object the change of the state of tension, the movement of our body. Thereby, we deliberately ignored that this body always enters into our inner duration as quality experience and into our somatic feeling of life as awareness of muscular tension—the first, however, without ascribing a privileged position to the body in contrast to all other quality experiences.

Through his acting, the acting I creates the synthesis between quality experience and somatic feeling. For it, indeed, the body may become experience only in movement. However, what is decisive is that the acting I experiences his body *in* functional context but not *as* functional context. Rather, he reinterprets this context and puts a symbol in its place: the body as something expanded, extensive, as body in space. What is performed here is the miracle of the inclusion of extension into the intensive world of experience. The experience of this movement is not transformed by the fact that I move, and not by experiencing this movement simultaneously as somatic context and as change of quality images, which are mediated through the sense of touch. Rather, the transformation takes place because this experience is necessarily and exclusively reinterpreted, by and for the acting I, as an experience in space. This opens up access to the world of extension; it alone mediates the experience of space and therewith of time and of external objects. It will be shown forthwith that this alone secures the privileged position of the body. Only as actor do I execute this most significant step out of the non-dimensional manifoldness of qualities and enter into the discontinuity of heterogeneous space, filled with quantities.

## (15) THE ACTING I

The important symbol function of the acting I will be investigated later. Its first precondition is the realization that this symbol function is due to the acting I and not to memory-endowed duration. The latter, as stated, claims the sensory experience of



the “boundaries of the body.” This experience inheres in the respective Now and Thus; like any memory-bound experience, it is differentiated. The experience of the “boundaries of the body” at moment A is basically different from that at moment B, whether my body moved in the meantime or not. It is also basically different from the experience of the body as extension. As purely sensual experience, it may be comparable to seeing our body. As object of sensory apperception of touch and vision, the body assumes no privileged position whatever. On the one hand, it merely occurs as subject of my sensory apperceptions, as mediator of the images of my inner duration, and as content of my somatic feeling of life in functional context. On the other hand, the body—more exactly, the image of my body—attains a position privileged above all other images. Of the two constituents of the privileged position of my body, only the second presents immediately evident experience: experience of the acting I. The first is cognitively obtained; it is context of observation, result of eminently scientific speculation. That my body is mediator and carrier of my sensory impressions, is a fact very much in need of proof which, to the satisfaction of experience, can only be produced negatively (visual images disappear with the loss of the eyes, etc.). By contrast, the movement of the body, and most of all its deliberate movement, is immediately evident experience of the acting I.

The experience of that which is extended is rooted in the immediately evident experience of the movement of my body. The experience of extension is nothing but the symbol of bodily movement, posited by the acting I. Only by transposition into language does there result an “outside” which is given together with the sensory images of the boundaries of my body. Actually, this image is totally embedded in pure duration; it has no more claim to “reality” in the sense of the materialization of extension than any other sensory experience. I can experience the existence of an “outside” only when I succeed in changing the boundaries of the body, that is, when I move. I experience my body as something extended, something spatial, only in the shifting of its boundaries which brings the awareness of outside space. In other words: the symbol function of the acting I, which consists in the reinterpretation of movement as spatial extension, does not stop at the image of the moving body. He projects it into an outside sphere, experiencing it as something external.

Of what nature is the movement which is experienced somatically? Is this experience the same that the acting I transposes into spatiality?

I am holding a pen in my hand and intend to draw a line from one point to another on a sheet of paper.<sup>46</sup> (What happens? HRW)

[I do this slowly and continuously. I move my hand through various points in succession, starting at M and finishing at N.<sup>47</sup> However, I did not have the intention to draw a line from one successive point to the next: there would be an infinite number

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<sup>46</sup> HRW: Here follows another line diagram. It would be “Figure 5,” but any designation has been omitted. The diagram shows two parallel lines; one gives groups of points passed through by moving from left to right, the other gives the correspondent moments of time. Diagram and explanatory text cover about two pages of the original MS.

<sup>47</sup> AS: It is irrelevant for the present investigation that ... I draw a straight line. Even if I would draw an ... undulating line, the phenomena described here could be observed.



of intermediary points. In fact, when I started drawing the line, I did not know anything about intermediate points.]]

At the time the movement was projected, at the time of positing this act of will, only start and final point of the movement were given to me. I neither imagined that points between these two points existed, nor did I intend to touch them. For the (planned, HRW) direction of my movement, they were irrelevant. But does this not seem to be a paradox? When my hand executed the movement from M to N, did it not also execute, in partial movements, the move [[to and from every intermediate point in succession]]?

The answer is that, in the given case, we deal neither with a movement which has been executed and finished, nor with a movement in progress. We deal merely with an intended movement...

For good reasons, the word movement can be interpreted in at least three ways. If these three connotations are confused, insoluble paradoxes occur. In our example, the first major connotation was inspected: the *intended movement*: a movement which as yet does not presuppose anything moved or moving. It is the project, the design, the idea of an intended movement, in short, a willed movement. It may never be executed and become reality. This "movement" asks only about the goal, the direction, the path, as would a hiker on an unknown road. He wants to reach the next village. The farms, the trees, the rocks left and right of the road are not the object of his inquiry, unless they are inexpendable points of orientation. In a similar fashion, definitely relevant intermediary goals exist for the intended movement. In such a case, the purely intentional character of movement disappears; it is planned on a rigid rational basis. That means, a context of experience is evoked which is adequate to conceptual thinking but not to the sphere of the pure acting! If I had been given or set myself the *task* of moving in a *straight line* from M to N, I would be dealing with such a *rational* intended movement. Since I know that points A and B are situated directly between M and N.

I will first try to reach A in order correctly to reach N. This concept of the *rational intention of acting* will gain great significance for us. Thus, we will state what we mean by it: the intention of an action which depends on intermediate goals known from experience.

Aside from rational intention, the type of intended movement is characterized by the exclusive givenness of starting point and goal of the movement but also in the circumstance that this movement belongs to the acting I. What function it fulfils in the symbol system of the I will have to be shown.

(II) While my hand guides the pen from M to N, I co-experience this movement in my memory-endowed duration—and this in a dual manner, since I assume that I execute the movement with eyes open: first as constant change of quality in the visual image of the respective Now and Thus, as mediated by my eyes; second, in the series of quality images which my somatic feeling of life projects into my memory-endowed duration.

The flowing-along of these quality images amounts to an ongoing intermingling, a continuum of manifoldness. In essence, it coincides with duration: therefore, it is absorbed by duration. While I execute this movement, while it unfolds, there is

nothing spatial about it. [[When my hand begins the line, two experiences of my inner duration begin: the visual quality image of the “writing hand” as well as the somatic experience of muscular tension. Both are attached to the functional context of the “hand moved” in a certain direction. However, while my hand has moved part of the intended way, I have grown older. Therefore, the experience of the “hand moved” has changed, even if there was no change, during the movement, in the “muscular tension.” Movement, while flowing along, is without residue dissolved in memory-endowed duration. Yet the somatic feeling of life—if dissolved in quality images of duration—remains as residue.]]

What is the relationship between the *ongoing movement*, which enters memory-endowed duration, and the intended movement? In the search for an answer, we begin with a course of movement which is not initiated by my body.

(1) I stand before the pendulum of a clock and follow its swings with my eyes. It offers certain visual quality experiences which are connected with one another because they belong to me.<sup>48</sup>

Without reference to my inner duration, I do not know whether my experience of the pendulum at the start of the movement is related to the experience at the next movement ... Only my spatial-temporal and conceptual experience allows me to infer an inner connection between the two experiences themselves. This is supported by the circumstance that I speak and that I gave the name “pendulum” to the group of experiences which I transposed into space. But this is an inference which does not have to occupy us here. At the moment, there remains a series of quality experiences of the seen swings of the pendulum which hang together because they belong to my inner duration.

(2) Now, I put my finger on the pendulum and allow it to swing with it. I assume that the pendulum is heavy enough to carry my finger along without my deliberate “help.” What has changed?

The visual image, analyzed under point (1), has been added by the quality experience of the somatic feeling of life. I experience part of my body—my finger, my hand, maybe my arm—as functional context, as specific muscular tension.<sup>49</sup>

Herewith, a new element is added to the pure visual experiences. Immediately, it subsumes all individually diffuse quality experiences under a unity which, in

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<sup>48</sup> HR W: Between this and the next sentence a space of four double-spaced lines has been left open in the MS. Obviously, this was done to keep space open for another diagram (“Figure 6”):—I have the vague impression that a diagram of a pendulum in motion was drawn either on the back of the preceding or the same sheet. If so, it was overlooked in the xeroxing or the photographing process.

<sup>49</sup> AS: Here, it is in principle immaterial whether I intended the movement and carry it out myself, or whether it is executed *on* me. The only important thing for the somatic experience of the body as functional configuration is that changes of the “relations” of individual parts of my body occur .... If this is not the case, my somatic feeling of life does *not* enter “action.” So I do not somatically experience the movement to which my body is exposed by the rotation of the earth. I *recognize* this movement in terms of already executed movement, as space traversed, for instance, in the change of day and night (see point (3) below).

principle, is different from that related in the flow of my duration. It unitarily refers to the movement of a part of my body to which, thereby, are coordinated the visual quality experiences. The latter, up to now, had been independent. It follows that, by way of the somatic feeling of life, the unity of movement enters without residue and completely into pure duration.

(3) I now retract my finger from the pendulum; I intend to copy with my finger the movement of the pendulum, a whole swing, without touching it ... First of all, I have here an “act of will.” In the conception of the projected movement, I intended the movement of my finger from point of return to point of return. The rest of the actual movement occurs analogous to the event analyzed under (2): as a series of experiences of visual quality experiences, unified in reference to my inner duration and my somatic feeling of life. But a third moment of greatest importance has been added. Namely, the intended movement did not disappear: it continues to be operative in a dual sense. (a) In the realization of the planned movement, it transformed itself into a functional experience of my body. (b) It acts forth as meaning image in my memory, into which it entered, at the moment it was conceived, as quality experience of my inner duration. In cases (1) and (2), memory created symbols or meaning images of movement. It allowed the individual “states” of the movement to enter into pure duration without dissolving them in traversed space and without impairing the continuity of the course of the movement. In the, present case, we are facing a second series of symbol experiences:

[[My movement was intended at one moment of inner duration and started at a specific point. The important question, whether the moment of intentional decision is identical with the moment of the beginning of the movement, is here irrelevant. At the later moment, I have erected not only a meaning image of the- start of the movement, but also of the movement intended at the earlier moment.]] The intended movement itself has been symbolized—and this at every moment of the flow of duration. This is so because the intention of the movement (or the act of will), as any other experience, enters as quality image into memory-endowed duration. There it is subjected to the same reinterpretation as any other quality experience. This process again creates a connection between the quality image offered by the ongoing flow of an intended movement in memory-endowed duration. In this case, we obtain the following connections:

- (a) Memory-bound unity relation by the appearance, in the flow of my inner duration, of all individual quality experiences of the course of movement.
- (b) Somatic unity relation between the course of movement and the experience of my body as functional context. This again, as quality experience, enters into memory-endowed duration.
- (c) Intentional unity relation established with the belonging to ongoing duration of the intended movement as experience of a Now and Thus of my inner duration.

The third movement links the “ongoing movement” to the “intended movement.” It actually constitutes the specific experiences which distinguish a movement of the acting I from every other movement experienced: the execution of a movement,

which was intended by the acting I, belongs exclusively to him. Of the three examples, only the third one has as object a movement of the acting I. The other two are to be thought of either as mere quality experiences of pure duration, or in the second case, as affecting the somatic feeling of life. Both lack any intentional relation to the acting I. However, in all three cases the nature of the course of the movement becomes completely recognizable only in the flow of duration even though they enter it by a detour through several symbol processes which exclusively belong to the sphere of memory-endowed duration.

(III) We now turn to the third meaning of the term movement: passed-away movement. The distinction between ongoing and passed-away movement is one of the deepest and most fruitful discoveries of Bergson. As practically everywhere, the present expositions try to follow Bergson.

[[We now return to the example of the hand drawing a line and state that our hand moved along the line and finds itself now at another point. Obviously, we thereby mean something basically different from the assertion that our hand moves between two points. The latter expression indicates a manifold continuum, an event which occurs solely in inner duration and will never be projected into the external sphere. When I assert that my hand has moved a certain distance, which I can do only at a later moment, I definitely interrupt the flow of inner duration. I simply state that my hand has traveled along a certain path. Thus, by “passed-away movement” I mean here nothing but the traversed path. According to my assumptions, my hand directs a pen. Consequently, the “passed-away movement” is identical with the distance I drew on paper.]] This movement is completely different from the intended movement in the course of its execution. It is not a quality experience in inner duration. It is nothing intensive at all; its character is exclusively extensive. It is something expanded in expansion, something quantitatively measurable and homogeneous; it is the substratum of a formerly differentiated inner event which has been robbed of all differentiating manifoldness. In itself, the past movement is not reducible to the ongoing movement: it is the symbolic form into which the ongoing movement has been transformed by the acting I. Thus, the third connotation of the term movement is movement as traversed space, as traveled path. We know it well from physics, which counts among its constituting categories just this kind of measurable movement in space and time.

An investigation of the relations among intended, ongoing, and passed-away movement may serve a better understanding of the symbolic function of the acting I.

Again, I stand before the clock with the pendulum and, without touching it, try to follow its swing with my hand.<sup>50</sup>

[[I intend to traverse a path, to execute a movement, which matches the swing of the pendulum. However, at a certain point, my finger meets a solid object, preventing it from moving on. When I planned the movement, the obstacle was “unknown”

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<sup>50</sup> HRW: Here follows the heading, “Figure 7.” Four double-spaced lines have been left open in the text. No diagram has been drawn. The explanatory comments take up almost two pages of the typed MS.

to me. I may say that I discovered the object when it stopped my movement. By being stopped, I became aware, in terms of passed-away movement, of the distance traveled thus far.]]

Up to this point, everything would be simple and obvious, were (p. 131) it not for the ongoing movement which occurred between intended and arrested movement. Let us look at the ongoing movement of the pendulum which our finger intended to follow. [[Since the object hampers only the movement of my finger but not that of the pendulum, I can visually follow the complete swing of the pendulum. I can experience it, in inner duration, as flowing-away quality experiences. The same would be the case if I would put my finger on the pendulum and let it be carried along with its swing. When my independently moving finger is stopped, what happens to the rest of the intended movement? I do not experience this rest in the same manner in which I experienced the intended and executed movement. The preconditions for the ongoing movement of the acting I, the memory-conditioned and the somatically given unity<sup>51</sup> in inner duration are totally absent. Yet, the intentionality of the movement of the acting I remains. The idea of the intended total movement continues to be effective in memory-endowed duration. The question is whether the intended movement would be experienced, after the interruption, as ongoing or whether the intentional unity relation is not a suitable criterion for differentiating between movement and action.]]

As insoluble as it appears, this paradox springs from a tautology in terms, in the conceptions of “action” and “movement.” The case is highly remarkable; on it depend all theories of freedom and determination of the will. With the unmasking of this paradox as a false problem, the dispute between determinism and indeterminism—an abundant ingredient of the history of philosophy—is also characterized as a false conflict.<sup>52</sup>

The reason for the confusion is given in the treatment of the life form of memory-endowed duration as completely equal with the drastically different symbol structure of the life form of the acting I: The characteristic aspect of symbol formation by the acting I is ignored. Intended movement, ongoing, and finished movements in themselves are not comparable. Similarly, the flowing-away of duration and (the events in, HRW) the spatial-temporal world are incommensurable.

Indeed, the connection, established under (II) in terms of the ongoing movement, is merely a connection among quality images. The three unity relations which we established there apply only to memory-endowed duration. If we postulated under the (II) the existence of the intentional unity relation as criterion of “action,” we did so only in order to distinguish the “experience of action” from all other “experiences of movement.” This investigation was necessary. Thanks to the unity of the I, reciprocal relations between individual life forms must allow their mutual reduction

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<sup>51</sup> HRW: Schutz’s term was “*Einheitsbezug*.” The second part of this combined noun means reference as well as relation. I was unable to form an adequate combined noun in English.

<sup>52</sup> HRW: Schutz referred here parenthetically to an unnumbered and untitled chapter of the second part of the study. It was not written.

to one another. Our example showed most clearly that the acting I merely executes the symbolization of intentional movement into finished movement, and that the flowing-along of the movement belongs exclusively to duration. In so far as the “acting I” participates in the ongoing movement, it does so only by executing it. In other words: *in ongoing action, the acting I symbolizes the intended movement in (the form of, HRW) traversed space. And this in the same manner in which memory, by “remembering,” executes the symbolization of the quality experience of the apperceptive image in the meaning image.* The flow of the movement, the manifestation of life by the acting I pure and simple can be experienced only in memory-endowed duration.

We now turn to the symbol function of the acting I and the reinterpretation of the intended movement or the intended act of will in (the conceptions of, HRW) extended space.

## (16) THE SYMBOL FUNCTION OF THE ACTING I

Most of all: in the investigation of the symbol function of the acting I, we deal with a much more complicated symbol system than that of memory-endowed duration. In the latter, the symbol relation concerned merely apperceptive images and meaning images. In the sphere of the acting I, we have a dual relation. As in the case of memory-endowed duration and its neat separation from pure duration, an exact definition of the acting I is of greatest significance for establishing the appropriate symbol relations.

Our earlier investigation of the form of awareness of our body has shown that we “experience” our body in most diverse ways. The following is an attempt at giving a short summary of these events of consciousness:

- (I) Forms of experience of the body which belong directly to memory-endowed duration:
  - (a) Body as experience of quality, or else of the apperception of one sense, notably the sense of vision and touch: I look at my hand. I touch my hair. Such experiences are not different from other sensory quality experiences. They enter memory-endowed duration, where they are symbolized yet do not give the experience of the body a privileged position. Special case: pain as particular sensory experience of touch.
  - (b) Body as “constant” quality experience of the sense of touch; actually, “constant” experience of the “medium” surrounding my body: “boundaries of my body.” This experience stands out from other quality experience in that it is “constant.” That means, it belongs to every Now and Thus of memory-endowed duration. However, on account of continual manifoldness, it is not experienced as constant. Thus, it too does not acquire a privileged position.
  - (c) Sensual and visual experience of bodily movement: my finger slides over a piece of paper. The finger, which I see in movement, does not in itself entitle

me to conclude that the finger seen is my finger—the quality of experience of the somatic feeling of life does (see below under [II]). Therefore, this form of experience, also, does not warrant a privileged position. In itself, the experience of movement during its course is common to every movement, not only that of my body. This is so because the ongoing movements belong exclusively to memory-endowed duration. But, for this sphere, it is irrelevant whether I move my finger across the paper or whether the paper is moved across my finger.

(II) The form of life belonging to the somatic feeling of life which enters memory-endowed duration only mediately. The body as functional context; namely:

(a) The body moved involuntarily:

- (A) Without parallel experience of an “impulse”: breathing, heartbeat.
- (B) With “simultaneous,” that is parallel, experience of an impulse: reflection of light which blinds my eyes.
- (C) The body moved by an “external” force: the finger on the pendulum.

(b) The body moved deliberately.

All forms of experience of the body, mentioned under (II), enjoy a privileged position among all quality experiences. They, and only they, own the somatic feeling of life in immediate experience. The “moving” body alone conveys to me a specific awareness of belonging-to-me; it is immediately “given” in my experience. It does not need proof; yet, it is as original as any apperceptual image of inner duration.

Which of these forms of consciousness is characteristic for our “acting” I?

Obviously, none mentioned under (I). They are not specific; they were investigated only in order to demonstrate the effect of the acting I upon memory-endowed duration.

Even a superficial glance at the experiences, which we named under (II), shows that, in the course of the investigation thus far, we have drawn two events together under the title, “acting I.” First, the involuntary movement, which nevertheless is accessible to the somatic feeling of life; second, the deliberate movement, which alone constitutes the concept of “action” in linguistic usage.

The difference between the two groups ought to be clear: both have in common the somatic experience of the given functional context; therefore, both share the symbolization of this functional context as something extended, expanded, as space or, what amounts to the same: not with regard to somatic feeling of life but in respect to the quality experience in memory-endowed duration, they share the symbolization of the ongoing movement into the passed-away movement.

In future, we shall designate by the term “acting I”<sup>53</sup> those experiences which language calls “action” pure and simple (IIb) in contrast to the first group of the

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<sup>53</sup> AS: Up to now, we have used the term “acting I” for both groups without further discrimination. This will have to be justified.



“moved I.” Beyond this, in these experiences inheres a specific characteristic: the act of will.

Its content is the “conception,” the “project,” the “plan” of the future movement. Its nature awaits investigation. As specific symbol relation, the “intended movement” belongs exclusively to it. Therefore, this symbol relation must be connected both with the symbol function of the “finished movement” common to the “moved” as well as the “acting” I and with expansion, with space.

First, we turn to the less-complicated experience, the moved I. What constitutes the symbol relation has been repeatedly stated and demonstrated. But we must again emphatically refer to the dual function of this relation. One or the other comes into play according to whether one focuses on that which is specific for the higher life form or for the primitive life form.

- (A) With regard to the specific mode of the moved “I” (that form of consciousness which separates this I from memory-endowed duration) and thus with regard to the somatic feeling of life, the moved I symbolizes the experience of the functional context into an experience of extension, of space.
- (B) With regard to the more primitive life form of memory-endowed duration, the moved I symbolizes as finished movement the ongoing movement, the movement going on exclusively in memory-endowed duration.<sup>54</sup>

## **(17) INSERT: LIFE FORMS, METHODOLOGICAL A PRIORI, IDEAL TYPES**

According to our theory of life forms and of the symbol relations which alone constitute the former, every life form, on the one hand, must be reducible to the more primitive one. On the other hand, one specific characteristic must be added in order to change the more primitive into the higher life form. In our sphere, this specific characteristic is the somatic feeling of life. Our symbol theory is confirmed only if its five propositions fit the symbol structures of the moved and the acting I.

These major propositions, most of all, treat the relation between higher and lower life form. Nevertheless, they will have to be applied to the present context. In unchanged form, according to their essence, they apply only to the relation of the symbol to memory-endowed duration, that is, to the reinterpretation of the ongoing movement as passed-away movement. Should one feel compelled, for any reason whatever, to exclude memory-endowed duration from consideration, one would have to derive the validity of these propositions within the life form of the moved I as the more primitive one. It is easy to see that, here too, they could be deduced from the parallel position of somatic feeling of life and pure simple duration and of the

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<sup>54</sup> HRW: Here follows a footnote by Schutz, numbered 28. It covers about six pages of the original MS. I have converted it into a regular section of the English version, marking it as an insert.



parallel position of moving I and memory-endowed duration—both without reference to quality experiences.

It should be possible to demonstrate that, in the more primitive life form (= somatic feeling of life), the symbol (= extension, space) is identical with that which it symbolizes (= functional context). In the higher life form (= the moved I), symbol and symbolized are discrepant. This results from a simple consideration.

However, we are not forced to exclude either pure or memory-endowed duration from our investigation. On the contrary, it is our problem to reduce all experiences of our being and our world to memory-endowed duration, to let them originate in it. Thus, we will attempt to prove that our major propositions pertain to the reinterpretation of the ongoing movement as finished movement. This completely suffices for the purpose of our investigation. According to our conception, the phenomenon of the somatic feeling of life can be introduced in the sphere of the moved I as constituting factor. This includes the positing of the ongoing movement as experience of my body in a functional context: a new fact which constitutes the sphere of the moved I.

Even in memory-endowed duration, I do not start from every ongoing movement whatever, but solely from the ongoing movement of my *body* as substratum of the symbol relation. My somatic feeling of life selects from among all ongoing movements which I experience. Due to this, the functional context is included in memory-endowed duration. It is easy to recognize that the “finished” movement, if not *signifying*, *presupposes* extension and discontinuum, the quantifiable and the homogeneous: in short, *space*. When starting from memory-endowed duration and explaining the transformation of its experiences by the moved I (ongoing into finished movement), we will have explained the symbol relation. In the sphere of the somatic feeling of life, it will have to be shown as a specific characteristic of the moved I. However, not only for the sake of completeness but for reasons of principle, we had to point out that the asserted symbol function of the moved I can be formulated in dual fashion. This depends on whether the investigation reaches into the next lower form of life or whether it is executed immanently. On this occasion, I may be permitted to offer a short remark about the method of these investigations.

From the above considerations result important consequences for the theory of the symbol; in every respect, they justify the tenets established so far. The relativity of all life forms manifests itself clearly; it is the primary starting point of any kind of considerations which have as their object the symbol or other structural analyses. This is sufficiently justified already by the pragmatic character which inheres in the “life forms” as ideal-typical concepts formed for this purpose: Yet, serious consideration is warranted by a demand which can be derived from this methodological position: every Apriori must be viewed as relative as long as it does not penetrate into the most primitive life form in which symbols can be found at all and, thus, are accessible to our cognition. That means memory-endowed duration.

Otherwise, to assert an Apriori in any kind of context does not say anything but that the aprioristic form is not discoverable (that is symbolically not explainable or interpretable) in that life form which, in the given case, is investigated. In such factualities, when accepted as a priori, manifests itself most clearly the boundary at

which philosophical, epistemological, or logical systems stop their investigations in order to fall into metaphysics, religion, or methodological syncretism. Of course, no objection can be raised against positing such an Apriori for practical reasons. More, it is absolutely necessary to do so when one does not want to or cannot continue certain investigations beyond a given sphere (we would say: beyond the actual life form). But one ought to realize that nothing more is stated with the assertion of the apriority or aposteriority of a phenomenon.

We deliberately decided to work with “pre-scientific” materials and believe that we have avoided the main disadvantages of any Apriori because we accepted the world as experience, not as object of cognition. Yet, we too encounter certain phenomena which we have to recognize as given data, as fundamental presuppositions of our “experiencing,” in short: as Apriori of experience. However, these Apriorities are found long before (much prior to, HRW) the Apriorities of cognition: they motivate the latter and make them deducible. It cannot be denied that our method, too, has forced us to accept at least apparently aprioristically givens (*Tatbestände*), such as: “inner duration,” “memory,” “somatic feeling of life,” “consociate” (Thou). They remain as unexplainable residues. Nevertheless, it appears to me that these “Apriori” are basically different from the cognitive “Apriori.” The a priori of experience admits merely the incommunicability of everything lying before it, but not its non-immediacy.<sup>55</sup>

Further reduction is not communicable. This results from the fact that we cannot go beyond the sphere of memory-endowed duration: we are symbol-bound by our cognition, thinking, speaking, acting, remembering. Our ultimate possibility of communication exists in the ability to irradiate the symbol cover, not to break through it. Such a break-through can appear only in the most primitive, most original devotion to ones most personal, most primitive, most original life. Now, everyone may check whether it may be just this devotion to his own life which makes evident that memory, inner duration, somatic feeling of life, etc., are merely mediacies (*Mittelbarkeiten*) of experience. Behind them is the mystery, which is solved by every one of our changes of breath but by none of our thoughts.

Maybe this leads really into that metaphysics of which the general considerations of this book have already been accused from many quarters.<sup>56</sup> One accusation, however, will have to be accepted as justified without fear and perhaps with some pride provided one means by metaphysics that truly transcendental method which finds the precondition of cognition not in cognition but in experience, as far as the latter is recognizable. This pride finds its justification in the self-liquidation of relativism. The latter occurs here in a similar way as in Einstein’s physics regardless of the great difference in the range and significance (*Tragweite*) of the respective investigations.

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<sup>55</sup> HRW: In the German text, the two key terms (“incommunicability” and “non-immediacy”) present a word play: “*Nichtmittelbarkeit*” and “*Nichtmittelbarkeit*.”

<sup>56</sup> HRW: This statement may be a hint at private discussions with some of Schutz’s friends who were members of the circles of the *Geistkreis* and the Mises Seminar.

The Apriori may be limited by this or that life form: the symbol or meaning relations exist rightfully as derivations from that life form which was selected as basis. The same goes for anything which constitutes the typification of these relations. However, we grant freely that we do not deal with categories when we deal with life forms and derive apriorities from them; we simply deal with ideal types. Certainly, these ideal types are cognitively and therefore categorically defined. This, too, has to be freely admitted.

It follows that the limit of the ideal type, thus defined, is given in its usefulness exclusively for cognition but not for experience. Essentially, the latter is non-rational and beyond all typification, as long as it is experienced and not considered in retrospective reflection. Secondly, the limits of the ideal type result from the self-imposed limitations of the characteristic realm of our thinking. All this will have to be treated more thoroughly, at the end of the first part, after the conclusion of the investigation of the theory of the life forms.<sup>57</sup>

## (18) CONTINUATION: THE SYMBOL FUNCTION OF THE ACTING I

To (A): The conceptually thinking person lives in time and space; he is accustomed to the process of reinterpretation which occurs with the symbolization of life as the functional context of the body seen as something extended, as object, as substance. This is practically taken for granted. For our investigation, we have to refer to such habituation because we deal with the origin of these habits of thought. To the thinking person in the space-time world, the relations between functional context and substance become most of all evident on the grounds of a logical conclusion: with the concept of function itself, a substance which functions is posited.<sup>58</sup> However, no “substance” exists for the somatic feeling of life as datum, as something given. Substance, as something extensive, as thing, as something prevailing, is solely the product of a symbol transformation, executed in and through the somatic feeling of life.

Earlier, we demonstrated that the somatic feeling of life experiences the body in functional context. Within the feeling of life, the body which does not function does not become evident. However, at best, the assumption of a body which does not function is admissible for pedagogical reasons. For the living and conscious person, a “position of absolute rest” is always assumption, never experience. An “absolute state of rest” is reached only with the disappearance of any consciousness and thus

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<sup>57</sup> HRW: Schutz did not finish the first part of this project; the announced continuation of this topical investigation was not carried out.

<sup>58</sup> AS: In this context, we refer to Ernst Cassirer’s investigation of the “concept of substance and function.” (HRW: Cassirer published this study in 1910 under the title *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*. [*Substance and Function* (combined with Einstein’s Theory of Relativity) Chicago: Open Court, 1923]).

also of specifically somatic experiences: that is, in death. As long as I breathe and am aware of my breathing, as long as my heart beats, as long as—beyond all memory-endowed quality experiences—I am aware of the position of my sitting, standing, lying body, I cannot speak of a “position of absolute rest.” On account of this, the somatic feeling of life obtains a character of perpetuity and continuity which is closely related to inner duration and is often confused with it.<sup>59</sup>

No moment of our life passes in which somatic feelings of life would not be active; that is, in which our body does not function. Therefore, we cannot speak of a rest position but only of perpetual change. In the sphere of the somatic feeling of life, this change is experienced as change in muscle tension. But it is interpreted as awareness of the extension of our body. In an important respect this change is different from the change which is the criterion of memory-endowed duration: although perpetual, it does not change constantly; it is not manifold. In the act of breathing, I always experience somatically the same muscles in tension and relaxation. In principle, they are and have to be different, for instance, from the movement of my hand (that is, from changes in the states of tension of the muscles of my hand or finger) or of my foot. The similarities (of somatic experiences of muscular movements, HRW) disappear immediately when one steps out of the sphere of pure somatic feeling of life into the sphere of memory-endowed duration, even though the latter is indirectly affected by somatic experiences.

Earlier, we posed the question as to how this “sameness” of somatic experiences can be recognized in the somatic, memory-free sphere. The question is justified. The answer can and must be that the “sameness” is not experienced in the somatic sphere itself; the moved I constitutes it symbolically in the somatic sphere. That the pure somatic life form, in the experience of the functional context of the body, admits of groups of similar experiences is an inference from the experiences of the “moved” I. The latter does not solely belong to the somatic sphere; simultaneously, it flows along (*dauert*). Therefore, it symbolizes not only the functional context into substance but also the ongoing movement into passed-away movement.

If our hypothesis of the symbol function of the acting, or else the moved, I is correct—at best, every symbol theory can only produce hypotheses—our body is experienced in the pure somatic sphere, although *in* a functional context but not as functional context. Rather, thanks to the moved I, it is experienced as something extended. For instance, somatically I experience my hand only when I move it. On the basis of my anatomical and physiological knowledge (saying that my hand is moved only by specific muscles and that such movement manifests itself in a certain state of tension and relaxation of these muscles), I have so far assumed that

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<sup>59</sup> AS: This assertion is not at all contradicted by the phenomenon of sleep. It even seems that, exactly in sleep, the somatic feeling of life remains in invariable awareness. By contrast, the experience of memory-endowed duration suffers a certain change; mostly because the apperceptive images which offer themselves to consciousness in the state of awakeness as “main cause” of continual manifoldness yield to memory or meaning images. The meaning images, stored in memory, therefore come to the fore in the world of dreams. Every interpretation of dreams, psychoanalytical or not, will have to put its main emphasis on the interpretation of these symbols.

I experience, in pure somatic feeling of life, only the changes of the tensions in my hand. This is a complicated natural-scientific conclusion drawn from a context of experience. I am entitled to assert that I “experience” my hand only when a change in the tension of my hand muscles occurs. But, then, I do not experience it as change of muscle tension but as hand; that is, as (presently still unknown) organ of my body, which I can move: I can shift its “position” in an extended medium *outside of me*, without thereby changing the “self-awareness” of my hand, the awareness that it belongs to me. The positional change in an outside medium specifically constitutes the experience of my hand as an extended object, as thing. With reference to the sphere of the pure somatic feeling of life, the most important thing remains the unitary reference to something remaining unchangingly similar. I may lift, raise, move to left or right, and turn my hand; I may constantly change its “position” in the outer medium. Nevertheless, for my somatic feeling of life, it is my *right* and not my left hand which I moved: it is a not-yet-named organ which, in the higher life form of the speaking I, I will give the name “right hand.”

It seems to me that this somatic unity relation is the main proof for the statement that, purely somatically, the body becomes something extended just through movement which is reinterpreted by the functional context. Ultimately, the position of our body in space can be experienced only somatically. The terms “right,” “left,” “before,” “behind,” “above,” “below” are definitely of somatic origin. They explain themselves, in the pure feeling of life, through the experience of the “position” of our body. This, however, becomes only possible through the discussed transformation of something functioning into something extended.

It remains to investigate whether this transformation can indeed claim symbol character. Do the five major propositions of the symbol relation, as formulated, apply to this relation? As already explained,<sup>60</sup> this proof can easily be furnished, if one parallels the relation of somatic feeling of life to the moved I with the relation of pure duration to the memory-endowed I. Here, we shall refrain from carrying out this comparison in greater detail in order to prevent a further swelling of these unavoidably inflated expositions of the acting I.

But we will shortly point to the reinforcement and self-clarification to which this experience is subjected in the somatic sphere of the moved I: experiences of a sensual, and especially of a visual and tactile nature. They issue from memory-endowed duration yet join the experiences of the moved I.

- (1) The somatically experienced shift of the body in space is also sensually experienced through the stimulation of the sense of touch, which evokes an awareness of the “boundaries of the body.”
- (2) The somatic change of position is visible. That means, the initiated change of the tension of my hand muscles, which is somatically experienced as “hand movement,” I regularly evokes (through memory) certain changes in the given visual quality experience of the coordinated Now and Thus.

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<sup>60</sup> HRW: Here Schutz referred to his footnote 28, which I integrated into the text under the title: (17) Insert: life forms, methodological a priori, ideal types.

(3) The somatic change of position is ascertainable by touch. The initiated movement in the tension of the flexor of my little finger, which I experience as “bending the little finger,” brings about a change in the quality experience in the given Now and Thus, which corresponds to the sense of touch. These experiences are of dual nature:

- (a) Tactile experience of the touched hand.
- (b) Tactile experience of the touching little finger.<sup>61</sup>

It may be noted that the experience under (1) constantly coincides with the somatic feeling of life of the moved I. Experiences (2) and (3) occur only when the “movement” of my bodily organs actually falls, or is brought, within the “field” of my sense of vision or touch. A still other experience partakes in the perpetuality of the “touch sensation of my body,” namely,

(4) The experiences of the ongoing movement which symbolizes itself in finished movement through the moved or the acting I.

Of all these parallels between somatic and sensual experiences, as described above, only those mentioned under (1) and (4) are relevant for the moved I. (2) and (3) are not relevant for the reinterpretation of the symbol but attain highest significance for the coordination of the constructed symbol with the space-time world of the unitary I. They offer extremely important information for the theory of the fields of touch and vision.

Most of all, the fourth of these parallels between somatic and sensual experiencing demands greatest attention. In it manifests itself the symbol function of the moved I, offering the reinterpretation of the ongoing movement into finished movement. However, before we turn to this symbol function, a few explanations of the concept of the extended are in order; we recognized it, in the somatic sphere, as symbol of the bodily functional context.

## (19) EXTENSION

Generally, common sense comprehends as extended that which can be touched. This issues from the preponderance of touch experiences. Before all other experiences, they are connected with the apperception of that which is expanded. This linguistic usage may appear to be philosophically justified. Indeed, as

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<sup>61</sup> AS: We remark at this occasion that touching a body organ at rest, which thus is not somatically activated, leads to a “dual touch experience.” Only in this case the touch experience of the touched organ belongs exclusively to duration; the experience of the touching hand, as organ moved, is also somatically experienced. For this reason, the “touchability of the body”—in the sense of being touched—cannot be viewed as “proof” of the extension of the body, but only in the sense of an active possibility of touch inhering in each of my organs. Anything else is implication, based on the proposition, “what is extended is touchable.” However, in this form, the proposition does not apply to our investigation.

repeatedly stated, in the experience of space the sense of touch occupies an especially privileged position.

However, what, in the sense of our previous considerations, is the extensive and what are its specific characteristics?

In preparation of the answer, let us recapitulate that, by contrast, we understood by the intensive that which belongs to all experiences in duration.

The major characteristic of the intensive was its purely qualitative feature ... It entered completely into pure duration. Consequently, it was subjected to all rules of the flow of duration, but only to these. Nothing in the flow of duration allows me to infer an external from which I obtain my experiences or by which I am affected. My experience is completely in me. As long as I remain in the sphere of my duration, I cannot in the least establish whether there exists something which releases or causes this experience. I am not even provoked to look for a cause of experience or for an inducement of being-affected. I receive quality images without as yet knowing from where they come or how I receive them, or whether I produce them myself. They are well ordered in themselves; and this already for the reason that they belong to me, the I which experiences his duration. They enter residueless into the given Now and Thus of my duration.

In memory-endowed duration, these experiences are grouped differently. My memory, which directly constitutes the manifoldness of my duration, coordinates individually received quality experiences into new symbol series. Now, they belong to me in two respects: first as series of apperceptive images, second as successions of meaning images. This arrangement is determined by my given Now and Thus and the direction of the flow of my duration. Otherwise, it occurs independent of me according to the principles of symbol contexts. In this respect, my quality experiences have no life of their own. They are not constant; they lack the features of similarity and closure, of homogeneity and independence. In reverse: the manifoldness and continuity of my memory allows me to experience my experiences as continuous and manifold. Further, their intensive character is connected with the fact that experiences are not "things," that is, objects closed in themselves; they are images, that is, apperceptions enclosed in my experiences of duration.

By contrast, the world of the extensive is characterized by the comprehension of qualities as quantities. Quality "experiences," having been images in inner duration, are now considered characteristics of such substances (*Wesenheiten*), seen as self-sufficient (*autark*). Necessarily, the self-sufficiency of things presupposes their removal from the flow of duration. They are transposed into externality. Thereby, they lose most of all the character of manifoldness typical for the flow of duration. Individual quality experiences are no longer constituents of my Now and Thus. Rather, they are qualities of things which are in themselves closed and independent. They are chosen and put together according to selective criteria of relative similarity. These objects—and this is important—would be there and have their particular form of existence even if I did not experience them.

What had been quality experience of my sense of touch becomes now a dimension of things which would exist and persist, even if I do not touch anything. What had been visual quality experience in my duration, becomes color and shape, existing



independently of my eyes. And more: all those forms and colors belong to a single object, to an individual thing as such. It is divisible and measurable and characteristic for this particular object. No flowing-together-and-apart ... exists in the realm of objects. Every object is delimited in itself and exists independently of me; it changes independently of my duration. Nay, it has its own duration, inaccessible and incomprehensible to me, and follows its own laws. The multitudinous appearance of objects, also, no longer obeys (the rules of, HRW) the contexts established by my I, which is affected by these objects. Scattered over the whole discontinuous yet homogeneous space, every one of these objects leads its own self-sufficient existence. As a thinking being who also lives in the sphere of concepts and Science, I know of relations between objects, for instance, cause and effect. Such relations must be thought of as primitive, as self-sufficient as the things themselves and without relation to me and to my duration. A relation to me may occur only when I, no longer acting, face objects in space cognitively. But, in this case, they are related to me not as subjects of experience of my acting I, but as subjects of cognition. The identity of such a subject of cognition with me cannot be recognized without ado.

This is a preliminary characterization of objects, still incomplete and in need of further elaboration. All these characteristics of objects can be reduced to the fact that things do not exist within me. Rather, because and while they are extended, they exist in space. All their other characteristics can be deduced from spatiality, from dimension as such. If I fill the conception or the experience of space even with only one single object, it necessarily follows that the qualities, which are experience, are also objectified and materialized in this newly created space. The latter, it will be shown, is unlimited. I have discovered a form of the existence of things which is different and independent of my existence. For me, this space is no longer a confusing agglomeration of color patches or other visual apperceptions, which it was in the experience of space in my memory-endowed duration. It now is filled space, filled with things which have (their independent, HRW) characteristics and dimensions. I can convince myself of their existence any time by stepping toward things or bring them close to me and allow my body, as carrier of my apperceptions, to be affected by them.

From this follows that, with the spatiality of *one* thing, the spatiality of all other things has been discovered and given. And more: with space itself—wherever this conception may have originated—a world is constituted which is basically different from non-dimensional inner duration.

Thereby, one question has been answered which may have forced itself upon the reader of this characterization of the extensive: the experience of my own body, of something extensive, occurs in my moved or acting I; how could it affect such a basic change in the whole world?

The answer to this question results from the following considerations. In its effects, the discovery of space cannot be limited to the object which led to it. When I observe the characteristics of the spatial and the extended on my body, I have not only discovered the dimensions of my body but the dimensional world itself. When I discover an “outside” in the sense of not-belonging-to-me—and this discovery occurs with the somatic awareness of my moving in what necessarily is an outside—



it becomes possible also to project quality experiences into a sphere outside-of-me. An acting I, just by its acting, is in fact forced to establish a coincidence between his somatic—better, his acting—experiences with the flowing-along of certain quality experiences in his inner duration. If I am permitted to say so, I act toward things. Formerly, they yielded only quality experiences; now I pull them into the realm of my sphere of action. And while I make them into objectives or means of my own bodily movements, they become corporeal things. They acquire object character through contact with my body. I establish that they have in common with my body a space-filling quality: extension.

This can be established only by my moved, by my acting or else I. I alone can experience similarity in a homogeneous discontinuum instead of manifoldness in the continuum of duration. Nay, more: the reinterpretation of ongoing into finished movement, which occurs in and through the acting I, destroys inner duration. It breaks through it and simultaneously renews it in a different and higher sense. Thus, the acting I brings a dualism into the world, which has not yet been overcome, and never will be. The passed-away movement, as traversed road and traveled distance, is conditioned spatially and temporarily. It is fundamentally different from ongoing movement; through its dimensionality, it constitutes space in the same manner as the body in its somatic activity in itself.

Next, we will shortly investigate how this symbolization occurs. More, too, will have to be said about the experience of space itself, about its consequences, and especially about its retroactive effects on the formation of the world of qualities in the context of duration.

## **(20) MOVEMENT INTO SYMBOL**

To (B): We still remember the results of our earlier investigation of various kinds of movement. For a start, our thesis says that the moved I reinterprets the ongoing movement which, according to our presupposition, belongs exclusively to memory-endowed duration. It transforms it into a new form of movement by way of the symbol relation. To prove this will be the easier as we already have collected the necessary materials for it in earlier investigations. By way of a short reminder, we will reiterate what differentiates the ongoing movement in memory-endowed duration from all other movement in progress: the somatic component entering into my duration.

I am holding a pen in my hand and put it on this sheet of paper. By an external force, the paper is drawn along under my unmoving hand. A line ... occurs on the paper. In my inner duration, I can exactly follow the movement of the sheet. However, this movement is not specific, not privileged before any other movement apperceived by me, for instance, as the swings of the pendulum of a clock which I see. Like any other movement, it consists of a constant change of quality images. The line which appeared on the sheet is merely another quality experience. I conclude that it originated through movement, but I do not experience this. In itself, it has as yet nothing to do with the movement.

How different (is this experience, HRW), when the paper is not pulled along under my hand but when, through an external force, my hand is pulled across the sheet, or when I myself guide my hand over it.<sup>62</sup>

Here, the somatic feeling of life, as quality experience, is included in the flow of duration. It constitutes the new life form of the moved I.<sup>63</sup> The ongoing movement still exists, but only for the subordinated life form of memory-endowed duration. Thanks to the moved I, only the finished movement can be experienced in the actual life form.

[[While my hand moves a certain distance, my inner duration moves accordingly. At any given Now and Thus, my quality experiences in inner duration find an image of the hand at the corresponding point. Every Now and Thus simultaneously contains, next to the specific apperceptive image of the hand, also the memory or symbol images of previous moments. This effects a steady continuity of quality experiences. The latter is evoked by the constant reference of the given Now and Thus to the flow of duration and the symbol structure of earlier moments.]]

*In accordance with the nature of duration, I experience the ongoing movement as continually becoming movement.* [[Extensive mathematical expositions show that]] the movement will ever be experienced as becoming, as flowing in the direction of duration. [[Turning to the algebraic illustration of this flow in its significance for the moved I, the following must be realized:]] (... it is no more possible to dress this event into words than any other event in inner duration. The preceding exposition will have to be accepted as an attempt at "translating" the immediate experience of duration into words.)

*For the moved I, experience is not the becoming movement but movement as far as it has passed away.*<sup>64</sup>

[[In the sphere of memory-endowed duration, a quality image of the hand had been coordinated with a series of meaning images of the hand at earlier moments. Originally, these meaning images were quality images of somatic quality sensations. Thus, they were identical with the experience of the moved I passing through points in space. The original identity of quality image and meaning image and the fact of their subsequent separation may be viewed as contradiction.]]

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<sup>62</sup> HRW: Here follows the heading "Figure 8." Six double-spaced lines have been left open for the planned diagram. It has not been drawn into the MS. The next four pages of the original MS contain numerous algebraic notations which refer to the missing diagram.

<sup>63</sup> HRW: Schutz's term is *bewegtes Ich*. My translation, moved I, sounds contrived, but was the best I could do. In German language, the term suggests emotion (as in: I am moved to tears) rather than bodily movement. Schutz used the term in the unusual second sense in order to express the notion of a given person (a living body of which an ego is aware as his "own") which, as a whole or in parts of its external organs, is in motion without deliberate decision to move.

<sup>64</sup> HRW: The subsequent text brings further elaborate algebraic illustrations for this statement. They lead to the formulation of several equations. Referring to "travelled distance," they display "an exact geometrical character" and state that travelled distance can be added up.

However, this is no objection but merely a confirmation of the symbol character which must be ascribed to the passed-away movement, in the life form of the acting (moved) I, in contrast to the ongoing movement. In content, the apparent objection is nothing else but our *first major thesis about the symbol*. Applied to our life forms, it says:

(1) *The nature of the replacement of the ongoing movement by the symbol of the passed-away movement is rooted in the identity of the space traversed (as symbol) with the ongoing movement (as that which is symbolized) in memory-endowed duration (as the more primitive sphere of the I) on the one hand. On the other hand, it is rooted in the discrepancy between space traversed (as symbol) and ongoing movement (as that which is symbolized) in the life form of the acting (moved I) (as actual life form).*

By dividing this dual thesis, we obtain:

(1a) *Traversed space and ongoing movement are one in memory-endowed duration as form of consciousness which precedes the acting I.*

(b) *Traversed space and ongoing movement are discrepant already by virtue of the points which are coordinated to them in the flow of duration and in the acting (moved) I. The ongoing movement passes into traversed space in the same manner as becoming passes into passing-away.*

Possibly, this proposition is in need of a small correction. The two experiences, points of which are coordinated either to the symbolized or to the symbol, are actually not located in the flow of duration but in the element of time which is characteristic and specific to the moved (acting) I. This is to be understood only in the following sense: the reinterpretation of duration as time comes about only by interpolating the concept of space, by projecting the intensive givenness (Element) of duration into the homogeneous medium of space. We will demonstrate this later.<sup>65</sup> Proposition (1b) would have to be formulated differently, according to whether one derives the symbol relation on the basis of memory-endowed duration or whether one uses the relevance system of the medium of time, as constituted by the moved (acting) I. The proposition is justified in both cases.

[[The distance covered by a movement becomes traversed space not only when seen from the vantage point of the passed-away movement; but also when seen from the perspective of a becoming movement.]]

What has been said above leads effortlessly to the formulation of the *second major proposition* of symbol relation, when applied to our case:

(2) *The ongoing movement can be experienced as becoming and passing away only in memory-endowed duration. As present movement of the acting (moved) I, it is passed-away movement. Thus, it can be experienced only as existent (by itself, HRW). Space exists independent of our duration.*

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<sup>65</sup> HRW: The demonstration of this statement was re-announced in the first paragraph of the next section of this MS. The latter came to an end half a page later. The constitution of time by interpolation of space, there, belongs to the themes of the first part of the project of the life forms, which Schutz did not treat.

The comparison of (the formulation of, HRW) this proposition with that given on occasion (of the exposition, HRW) of the analogous symbol relation of apperceptive image and meaning image shows several deviations. They are rooted in the nature of the two different life forms which are involved in each case. We should remember here what we said about the earlier thesis concerning the positing of the symbol of the apperceptive image in pure duration and its transposition into a “meaning image” in memory-endowed duration.

At that time, we confronted actual and potential experiences. By actual experience of that which is symbolized, we meant that it can be experienced as phenomenon which passes away. This is clear with regard to the apperceptive image in pure duration. ... Only, one must remember that the relation of becoming and passing away ... represents a provisional auxiliary construction, made for didactic reasons. In the same life form exists nothing passed away in itself or (if it did, HRW) I would not know about it. For this reason, we said that what becomes of that which has passed-away becomes visible to us in the perspective of the higher life form. That it is something passed away in a lower life form I know only because I symbolized it in a higher life form. Only what has passed away allows itself to be symbolized. The relation between that which is symbolized and the symbol is embodied in the tension which our experiencing suffers, on account of the disparate points in inner duration (or else, as will be shown, in time) to which the symbolized and the symbol are coordinated. We called this tension between life forms “meaning.” The meaning character of memory-endowed duration, most of all, manifests itself in (the fact, HRW) that the apperceptive image did definitely pass away but, time and again, *becomes* anew as meaning image. We called this constant becoming the potential experienceability of the symbol.

While this form of consideration can claim much general significance, in derivation and form it is too much adapted to the relation between pure and memory-endowed duration. For this reason, we had to resort to the auxiliary construction of becoming and passing-away. However, in the symbol sphere of the acting I ... pure duration with its—merely apparent—becoming and passing away is pierced through. The acting I constitutes its own adequate form of consciousness: the world of space and time. Through “attention,” through a change of the direction of our view, duration has been “arrested.” Duration is ever and ever again suspended through the experience of anything extended be it derived from a passed-away movement and thus by way of memory, or else from the functional context of the body and thus somatically. It has no place in the world of the acting (moving) I in which exists only space-time.<sup>66</sup>

It is necessary to clarify this circumstance sufficiently in order to make understandable the meaning of our second major proposition ... Therefore, we feel

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<sup>66</sup> AS: Language created two words for this—here still unitary—concept. This is explained by the fact that language finds a given substratum for its symbol relations in form of the world constructed by the symbol-forming medium of the Thou, I relation. In it, a clean separation of time and space obtains.

obliged to insert here an intermediary consideration, concerning the nature of the experience of time. (Yet, we remain aware that, HRW) this nature can be completely determined only in the over-all description of that world which offers itself to our acting (moving) I.

## (21) THE EXPERIENCE OF TWO LIFE FORMS

Earlier, we attempted a characterization of the world of space. As discontinuum, space is filled with objects, that is, with extensities (*Ausgedehntheiten*). They are homogeneous, independent of me, endowed with specific qualities, and self-sufficient. In the concepts of the extended and the homogeneous, we have denied everything which we established as essential for our image of objects in pure duration, for our quality experiences. We did the same when we stated that things are self-sufficient, that is, exist in themselves without having been apriorily related to me. At this point, we are solely concerned with designing an articulated picture of the space-time world as such and contrast it to the world of our memory-endowed duration. Thus, it cannot now be our task to investigate the relations between the world of our duration and the space-time world. This must be reserved for later, after we have solved all questions concerning the symbol relation (obtaining, HRW) between duration and acting I.<sup>67</sup>

For now, we ask permission to assume that our I does not live simultaneously in all life forms—even though this is the case by virtue of the oneness of our consciousness. Contrary to fact, we will for the time being admit that an imaginary I, which never existed, lives separately and successively, within the space-time world, in the two life forms of memory-endowed duration and of the acting I.

This imaginary I, suddenly, would find itself torn out of the world of memory-endowed duration and dropped into the world of space and time.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> HRW: This is the last of a number of announcements of additional themes which were to be treated in the sections of the MS which Schutz did not execute.

<sup>68</sup> HRW: The text continues with the words, "It would most of all..." They complete the last page of the MS. The left margin of the first page bears the handwritten title and a note: "166 pages. Last page or pages missing." It is unlikely that Schutz carried the investigation for the first part of this project much beyond the point at which the available MS ends.

## Part II

# Theory of the Structure of the Objectification of Meaning

Alfred Schutz

### Editor's note

By Helmut Wagner

The second part of Schutz's project of 1925–1927 remained unexecuted. In his “main overview,” Schutz gave a four-point outline for this part. Its translation is offered as the first item of this part. As indicated in the “Editor's Introduction,” the manuscripts UM 1925 (on language), UM 1925–26 (on literary art forms), and UM 1924–25 (on drama and opera) will be presented as independent pieces which, by virtue of their topics and their theoretical contents, belong in the thematic realm of the second main part of the Bergson project.

The three contributions to this part are preceded by a short outline. Although the substantive topics of the three manuscripts appear to be incidental to the overall theme of Part II, they are very much concerned with the “objectification of meaning.” Language is the extreme form of such an objectification. Literary art forms play a pronounced role in the linguistic mediation between the meaning meant by speaker, writer, author and the meaning understood by the listener or reader. The performance of a drama draws the spectator, as witness and vicarious participant, into dialogue and action on the stage, that is, into a stream of inter subjective communication in which objective language becomes a vehicle of an optimal mediation between the meaning meant by the author, the meanings expressed by the actors, and the meaning understood by the spectator. Finally, in the form of the opera, where drama is projected into the additional dimension of a musical performance, the chance for intersubjective understanding reaches its maximum. This chance results from the basically quadrangular but further differentiated relationship between composer, orchestra (director and musicians), actor/singer or actress/singer with his or her counterpart, and the listener and spectator who is in turn indirectly involved with other members of the audience. This is brought about by the unique combination of the medium of an interactive dramatic language with the medium of intersubjective musical expression: the emotional fringes of the meaning of the

dramatic dialogue surrounded and enveloped by the emotional fringes of meaning of the music-in-performance.

Schutz announced the second part of his planned study as an exposition of "meaning contexts without visible Thou." This, indeed, applies significantly to the treatment of language as means of communication and carrier and evoker of meanings. It also applies to the literary means of expression in so far as they are read in silence: the poem or the tale and novel read. But, already on this level, Schutz's exclusion of the "visible Thou" cannot be completely maintained. Poetry readings are not at all uncommon, and sometimes an author reads from his prose pieces or another person assumes the role of the oral narrator of a literary creation which, after all, originated in oral narration; the latter has remained the form of artistic narration: the tale written cannot be kept separated from the tale told.

But, at least the separation remains a possibility. This is not the case as far as the dramatic or the operatic art forms are concerned. Their "consummation" occurs in their "enactment"; they are interactional and intersubjective art forms by definition. To read a drama or an operatic score—if one has the gift to do the latter—means to reduce them to something they are not meant to be, to change them from forms of collective experience to forms of solitary absorption.

As the first main part of Schutz's project shows; his decision to confine himself analytically to the treatment of strictly individualistic aspects of consciousness and experience broke down ever so often. In the same manner, only more so, his decision to treat the "objectification of meaning" consistently "without visible Thou" could not be maintained. Indications of his entering the spheres of interaction and intersubjectivity can be found already in his study of linguistic forms; they become central features of his expositions about several forms of the literal and musical arts.

Yet, there is one sense in which objectified meaning can be viewed without its interactive framework. Its strictly analytical treatment becomes possible—as preliminary operation or as a limited objective—in the service of the attempt of creating a purely formal theory of the media and styles or modes of the fixation of meaning: the grammatical and syntactical rules of language, formal theories of narration, of the dramatic dialogue, of the forms and variations of composition, etc. But, in his outline for Part II, Schutz expressly provided for an effective correction of the main flaw of such formalism: the temptation, to which many "experts" had yielded—of converting the rules distilled in such theories of expressive and communicative forms into "meaning-immanent laws." He intended to devote the whole second chapter to the refutation of this error which beset almost the whole of the corresponding literature on language, literature, and other forms of art. By contrast, the first chapter was to deal with the "positing of meaning" on the part of the speaker, writer, author, and the "interpretation of meaning" by his or her counterpart: the listener and reader. The formalism involved, here, is somewhat similar to that which governed Simmel's earlier treatment of forms of human interaction, notably the dyad and triad. It is offering a scheme within it becomes possible to offer interpretations of individual cases of interaction and theoretically generalize about some of their recurrent features.

The third chapter was to deal with “Origin and analysis of ‘values.’” It would take a particular scrutiny of the existent texts for this as well as the first parts of the project in order to find out whether a tentative line for the treatment of this topic could be ascertained. At face value, it seems to be completely open.

The title of the fourth and last projected chapter, finally, aims at “Origin and analysis of ‘collectives.’” It makes clear that the reference to meaning contexts “without visible Thou,” expressed in the subtitle of Part II, does not exclude the treatment of meaning contexts of indirect social or collective connotations. The whole part, then, is not based on a preliminary solipsism as, for instance, much of Husserl’s *Ideas I*. It was to move toward the forms of social relations of an indirect nature, as implied by, or hidden behind, all concepts which refer to a multiplicity of persons, ranging from family and group to association and society. Hints which can be found at various points of the manuscripts presented in this book leave no doubt that this, too, would have been a partially critical chapter, refuting the hypostatization of concepts standing for collectives, that is, their treatment as if they were denoting individuals instead of serving as convenient abbreviations for complex interactional wholes—quite useful and necessary in their place and, indeed, achievements of abstraction which tremendously facilitate communication and transfer of meanings under the proper situational conditions. But, as Schutz indicated occasionally here and would stress emphatically in his later writings, their acceptance into his own theoretical framework hinged crucially on the condition of their being at any time reducible to the concrete interactional networks of relationships among concrete persons which they socially present. It suggests, then, that this fourth chapter of the second part would have become a prominently sociological chapter.

## Outline for Main Part II

Theory of the structure of the objectification of Meaning: meaning contexts without visible Thou

- 1 Formal laws of the interpretation of meaning: reflections about the positing of meaning
- 2 Apparent meaning-immanent laws: grammatical, aesthetic, juridical, theory of harmony, etc.; the Refutation of these laws
- 3 Origin and analysis of “values”
- 4 Origin and analysis of “collectives.” The achievement and the necessity of this concept.



# Meaning Structures of Language

Alfred Schutz

## Editor's Note

By Helmut Wagner

There are two reasons why the present fragment has been chosen as the opening piece of Part II. First of all, its topic is everyday language, the ordinary and universal means of communication. As such, it is the foundation of all other uses of language, be they scientific or philosophical, or else—as in the case of the other two pieces of this part—artistically expressive, narrative, and dramatic. The second reason is that of continuity. Speaking roughly, it picks up the discussion of the life forms at about the point it broke off in the unfinished first part. After a few general considerations about his approach, Schutz gave initially a repetition and continuity of his considerations of the acting I. Next, he introduces the Thou within the framework of the life form of the speaking I—the first of the last two life forms not treated in the first part. Finally, he introduces the other and last one: the life form of conceptual thinking. In this fashion, then, the theory of the life forms is finished at least in its basic outlines.

These considerations fill nearly one quarter of the manuscript. The rest is taken up by the consideration of the basic structural elements of language. However, of the main forms noun, adjective, verb, only the first two are treated. Even so, the development of Schutz's ideas about grammar catch our attention for the way in which he links grammatical forms to experience and intercommunicative requirements, laying the groundwork for what had the making of a phenomenology of grammatical forms.

Subdivisions and subtitles have been provided by the editor.

## LIFE FORMS AND THOU

By Alfred Schutz

Any consideration [of any spiritual complex, of social man] can be undertaken from two completely different points of view. Most of all, one can carry out a conceptual inspection and establish a methodological order of the objects which are encountered and arrange them into a system. This leads to the formulation of a series of empirical propositions. The sum of these propositions concerning a given subject matter (*Objekt*) forms the body of a given science. This procedure, considered the only proper one for the natural sciences, was up to recent times also respected by the so-called *Geisteswissenschaften*.<sup>1</sup> But another way, which is completely opposite to this method, allows a series of phenomena to be brought into a context of understanding yet can justifiably claim to be scientific. It is an approach which grasps the world neither as a concept nor as an idea which only has to be systematically ordered with the help of experience. Rather, it accepts experience itself as understandable and capable of being integrated in the course of life as a whole according to the same laws which govern the latter. Such a philosophy will be transcendent in the truest sense. Of course, it does not claim to postulate propositions beyond all experience; yet, it will deliberately go beyond experience by way of the intuitive inclusion of metaphysical elements into the sphere of experience.

However, this approach will not apply to all “objects of cognition,” but only to those phenomena which can be experienced and thus are understandable. In particular, it concerns a comprehension of the meaning of the world which is unapproachable by, and different from, the ordinary empirical facts which are unquestionably accepted as [already] endowed with meaning, as given. [Presupposing such a meaning within the context of their data,] (empirical sciences, HRW) never can, nor intend to, come closer (to the investigation of the positing of meaning, HRW).

After putting aside the conceptual temporal-spatial notions, which have become usage and necessity for our thinking in the social world, one may attempt to *accept the world as experience*. If one makes the effort to investigate the spheres of experience of the I in their strata and the relations among them, one discovers a curious structure of these experiences. They reciprocally relate to one another in a very complicated manner; linguistically and conceptually, the latter is very difficult to comprehend. I have tried elsewhere<sup>2</sup> to order and integrate these experiences of the

<sup>1</sup> HRW: Literally, the term *Geisteswissenschaften* means sciences of the spirit—a choice only explainable in terms of the German philosophical-idealist tradition. It is, by the way, hardly stranger than the classical British choice of “moral science” as designation of social-science fields in accordance with the pragmatic-religious tradition of Scottish Protestantism. Interestingly, in both cases political economists played a conspicuous role if not in introducing then in propagating and popularizing the respective labels. The German term has been variously translated, for example as cultural sciences: term occasionally used by Schutz. Basically, it resists translation; I prefer to render it in its German form. The *Geisteswissenschaften* comprise fields of inquiry other than those of the natural sciences but only in so far as they are treated not in natural-science fashion but take cognizance of the human uniqueness of their subject matter and consider both human cognition and human volition as essential factors in their inquiries.

<sup>2</sup> HRW: In the first major part of the project of 1924–27, published above under the title, “Life Forms and Meaning Structure.”

indivisible I through the construction of a series of auxiliary hypotheses, which I called “life forms.” This yielded a very peculiar result.

It turned out that the last possible life form which can be grasped in our thinking is *pure duration*. In it, all experiences follow each other; they are connected with one another by nothing but the insight of the experiencing I and they are separated from each other by nothing but the discrepancies between each particular Now and Thus which is coordinated with each particular experience (and each other Now and Thus, HRW). Only memory brings some order into the abundance of the contents of experience: it preserves them, reshapes them; for instance, by adding to preserved memory images apparently similar or completely new actual experiences. Thereby, it secures the manifoldness of duration which, up to now, was experienced as mere continuity in the sphere of pure duration.

The phenomenon of *memory-endowed duration*, upon close inspection, turns out to be symbol relation, mediating between apperceived perceptual experience and the apperceived image (*Vorstellungsbild*) of the individual experience, which is stored in memory. Still, up to this point, the experiences of memory-endowed duration lack extensity. They are timeless and spaceless; they unroll internally, and they are continuous and manifold. Nothing exists; everything merely becomes and fades away without *being*. There is no thing, nothing delimited, since both time and space are missing. I am unable to say whether there is something external to, or within, this sphere. What is given to me is solely a series of intensities, of qualities into which enter extensive qualities only as intensive qualities.

*I arrive at knowledge of the world outside of my duration only through a new symbolization; it is executed by the acting I.* The latter doubly realizes itself: both as imagery of meaning-endowed duration and as seat of somatic feelings. It experiences itself as extensive-spatial. Only the movement of the body, through action, reshapes the acting I's intensive magnitudes into extensive quantities, and experiences space by projecting its duration into time. It dissolves the ongoing succession, which had been continuous and manifold, into a discontinuous and homogeneous side-by-side. The symbol interpretation, which occurs here, occurs on two levels. On the one hand, it exists in experiencing the ongoing body movement, which belongs exclusively to memory-endowed duration, as traversed space and thus something located “outside.” On the other hand, the body itself was originally conceived in memory-endowed duration as something extended in movement, in short, as thing. Now, by fiat of action, it enters into a relation to other delimited things. Only here the world begins to be filled out with things in time and space which are sharply separated from each other. They relate to parts of my experiences which I project as *characteristics* of things.

Among the things thus created, a series distinguish themselves which are related to my body in still another manner than merely by superficial and external similarity, that is, by extension in space and time. In outline and movement these objects are similar to my body and thus awaken special attention. Most of all, they stand out because they can be compared to the memory images of my own past I. Toward them, I assume the same most specific stance which I assume toward my own past I. In one word, they are *consociates* about whom I possess a quite primary knowledge.

And now, a new *symbol relation* realizes itself, *the third*. I experience the Thou as if it too experiences a duration which in course and direction is similar to, nay, simultaneous with, mine; as if it possesses a memory which executes similar or maybe the same functions as mine. (I witness, HRW) its movement as if it is not merely movement like that of any other similar thing aside from me, but action, that is, movement which is accompanied by the characteristic phenomena of will and imagination which occur together with my specific bodily movements. Still more: I interpret the symbol which I impute to this object called “Thou” as if its and my duration display a kind of parallelity, nay, as if the contents of experience in its duration enter into mine. The Thou stands at the intersection of two durations, two memories, two courses of action: mine, of which I have primary knowledge, and those which I interpret as my experiences of him.<sup>3</sup>

This symbol relation leads me to presuppose that the same experience which I have of the Thou the Thou has of me. I accept the Thou as being understandable by me and as being able to understand me and my life. Thus, I assume that I can posit actions which have a chance not only to be observed but also interpreted by the Thou. And I assume that I am able to comprehend movements of the Thou as his actions which, in turn, I can interpret in the manner in which I interpret my own actions. In this way, the space-time world, apparently created by my acting I, has been significantly changed and animated.

Up to now, I myself have imposed order upon the chaos of the “images”; I have established the meaning-context of the phenomena. Now, from the outside I am offered not only experience but experience already related to meaning which it is necessary to interpret. The act of positing meaning by the Thou—the meaning interpretation by my I—this is the final enrichment of my world. Yet, it is merely the starting point for all my relations with Thou and thing, with world and surrounding. Up to now, the I has accepted the things of the outer world indifferently (*leiden-schaftslos*) as given or as objects of action. Now, the I has gained access to the inclusion of the Thou into duration, and most of all to the rich world of feelings (*Affekte*) which are immediately released by the Thou or indirectly ascribed to him. Through this, the I and eventually also the things receive a new meaning context: a context which is alien to my loneliness. This, however, compels me to inform your Thou about all events in my life: first, in order to posit the meanings of an action which is deliberately oriented upon a Thou, which is left to him to interpret; second, in order to check the “correctness” of an executed interpretation of a meaning posited by the Thou; finally, due to affectual conditions, to refrain from acting against the Thou or through him. (However, for this purpose, my world has to undergo another alteration.)

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<sup>3</sup>HRW: This passage (and its continuation in the following paragraphs) is remarkable because it is a first extensive formulation of the conception of intersubjectivity which Schutz, in 1932, should express in his “General Thesis of the Alter Ego” (in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, Wien: Springer, 1932: 106ff.)

## SPEAKING I, THINKING I, AND LANGUAGE

I have created the Thou in space and time already in the life form of the acting I. However, it will not exist as long as I confirm its existence only out (of the perspective, HRW) of my own life and not also out of the course of the life of the Thou. Therefore, I will have to delineate and determine it unambiguously in the intersection of both durations—unambiguously for the I as well as the Thou—in that I establish its existence, through the witness of my gesture or my glance, or because I name it by the word. It seems that there is only a difference of degree between gesture and word. However, I think that I have to assign the gesture completely to the sphere of the acting I in the Thou relation; with the word, a new life form begins: the life *form of the speaking I*.

The world, again and considerably, changes with name-giving and, further, with verbal communication. Up to now, only my consciousness was open to experiences from the outside, be they things, actions, or Thou. Now, I am facing the pre-given word as something which corresponds to neither of these three categories yet comprises all of them. In principle, it does not make a difference whether the word which penetrates my consciousness is spoken, read, or written. These are differences of degree.<sup>4</sup> It is more than amazing to find that almost all philosophers of language saw their main problem in the coordination of acoustical or optical phenomena with conceptual characteristics. I am convinced that, in this the *fourth positing of symbol experiences*, one is exclusively concerned with a relation which no longer occurs within the unity of the I, which is indestructible throughout all life forms. It occurs just in the intersection of the courses of two lives. Basically, these intersecting lives determine, after the birth of the word, that there is no experience which simply belongs to me and not also to you and you and you: this already through the power of the word—if only potentially, only imagined and not experienced, not actually heard. The miracle is not that visual or acoustic experiences are brought in relation to experiences of another kind. Rather, it is that, through the symbol of the word, the symbolized experience is basically changed; that is, it is necessarily placed into the Thou relationship. The power of this change is so strong that the word effects are formation of the world. Behind its principles disappear all other experiences as if covered by veils. Now, the word governs the world by schematizing and re-forming it in a manner which is inaccessible to all other life forms.

The thing and its character, the affects and its intensity, the action and its course—all are given names and thereby completely removed from the sphere of my specific experiences. Since the word belongs immediately to the Thou sphere, it can designate what is common to me and you. I find my personal experiences only in that

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<sup>4</sup> HRW: In his American period, Schutz spoke of the “relative irrelevance of the vehicle.” The stress, here, is on the reservations: “differences of degree” in the present text and “relative” in the later formulation. For purposes of inter-subjective communication, as Schutz emphasized already in the present study, gestures and facial expressions may be more important for conveying meaning than the words which are spoken.

sphere into which the word does not descend. The word cannot grasp that this world belongs to me; it has distributed it to all. It does not know how to preserve anything unique, particular, unrepeatable. From now on, I do no longer live in a world of my experiences but in the language world which is filled with plain experiences, with the experiences of everybody. The word places itself before that which is experienced and removes it from experience. Now, there are only things named, only groups of things which are subsumed under one and the same word.

Language allows the comparison of experiences, the grouping-together of the most heterogeneous phenomena. The latter are necessarily heterogeneous already for the reason that, what the word—one word—designates, becomes real experience for different egos. This is the first [and most incisive] de-divinization of the world, the [most penetrating even though most primary] occasion of the disenchantment of life. In language, I do not encounter experiences but solely formulae, patterns which, in their manner, can make my experiences communicable. Instead of the abundance of images, which my life forms offered me thus far, I find a world composed of words (*Vokabeln*). Each of them is for me simultaneously suitable and unsuitable; alas, all must remain far apart from everything alive. For the first time, the word has brought death into my world of the experiencing I. But it has also actually filled this world, which belongs not only to me but also to the Thou, with life, however, a strange and terrible life. Its ghostliness demonstrates itself in this: the language-endowed world is the world neither of mine nor of thine nor of anybody's experiences; it is a truly unreal world.

The tragical in the experience of language[—every poet is witness to this with all his work—] rests in the impossibility of catching the world of inner experience in the net of language. [The nature of fantasy is limitation, prudent selection of the mediate from the infinity of the I: Pious belief that the listener could reach his own most original experience through complete surrender to the word.] This aim of (poetic, HRW) language, however, is and remains unrealizable. The yield of every literary work is a value approximating a purely formal and schematic world.

## THE LIFE FORM OF CONCEPTUAL THINKING

If the word separates Man from his experience, it also connects things, in a truly miraculous manner, and creates a new world out of the ruins of experience. It is illuminated by the light of *cognition*; it is the world of *concepts*: the highest *life-form* accessible to us, that of *linguistic-conceptual thinking*. It is not necessary here to investigate closely its symbolic relation to the sphere of speech. [Since the onset of philosophy,] since the discovery of the concept by Socrates, all of formal logic represents nothing but the attempt to seize this symbol relation with no residue. The theories of conceptual content and concept delineation, of the logical relation between subject and predicate, of judgment and conclusion, the invention of the concept of experience, the subjugation of empirical propositions under categories, the deduction of categories from the transcendental schematism; all these, in mere

appearance, are the attempt at linking sensory impressions and perceptions to rationality and reason, or whatever name shall be given to the mechanism of the cognitive apparatus. In reality, the struggle concerns not experience but the word. For 2,000 years, the problem of Philosophy has been not “How do I know the things of the outer world?” but “what is the relation of the concept to that which I have designated with and also apperceived in a word?” And further “what word-bound propositions can be deduced from this concept?” And finally “what means are used by my consciousness in order to carry out this deduction?”

One should openly admit that this problem formulation of all modern philosophy has no longer anything to do with *experience*. Here the case is exclusively this: cognition is possible in spite of the world of words, yet just through it. This precondition is definitely necessary but not at all self-understood. On it rests the colossal structure of the Platonic-Kantian system, the Newtonian physics and, in general, anything which up to now has been understood as science. Our question was completely different: we looked for the experience behind the word, and we found our limitations in language. The validity of the conceptual sciences remains uncontested. But, possibly, the attempted contemplation of the world of experience by circumventing language can yield results of some evidence.

Language separates experience from the concept and thus from Science. Therefore [in its own element] it must itself participate in both. It must make possible, for each of the aforementioned subjective life forms, a transformation into the objective realm of the conceptual sphere. How this takes place thanks to its own character, is to be shown in the investigations which follow.

## LANGUAGE AND LIFE FORMS

On the following pages, we will attempt to establish the relation of language to the other life forms and their symbols on hand of basic considerations concerning the theory of the (basic grammatical, HRW) form of European languages. This is done in recognition of the most problematic value of such an undertaking. In no way do we intend to offer here a methodological philosophy of language, like Cassirer recently in his beautiful book, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*,<sup>5</sup> or a general grammar, a task to which Husserl devoted one of his “Logical Investigations.”<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the following investigations should in no way be construed as being directed to the forming of historical types of grammar in spite of the mode of representation which may unavoidably and often invite such a misunderstanding.

The principle of the theory of life forms states that real man necessarily lives in all life forms simultaneously and that the establishment of individual life forms

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<sup>5</sup> HRW: See Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen: Die Sprache*. Berlin: Cassirer, 1921.

<sup>6</sup> HRW: See Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*. 2 vols. Halle: Niemeyer, 1900-1.



merely constitutes auxiliary hypotheses of ideal-typical character; their purpose is merely heuristic. In a similar manner, it is a principle of the following considerations that language is given to us in its totality. It is only in the symbol sphere of the word that we may risk establishing relations between a theory of grammatical forms and the ideal types of life forms, interpreting the latter by the former. Of course, in this undertaking we do not abandon the hope that, by way of such a reciprocal reference, some light may fall upon the logical and metaphysical preconditions of the forms of language.<sup>7</sup>

[[If it were possible at all meaningfully to imagine language in memory-endowed duration, it would solely consist of words which designate a quality which is object of my present experience. In this sphere exists neither body nor thing, be it internally or externally; there are only perceptual images and memory images of qualitative experiences—and, moreover, of experiences which are linked to one another through the continuum of duration. They either remain undistinguishable or flow manifoldly into each other only with the help of my memory. I could not even assert that I am able to form words for individual states of my experience. There is not yet a “state” which would be a mode of being in my memory-endowed duration; there is only a becoming and passing away of images which are strung along in my inner duration. The assumption, however, that an imagined language of memory-endowed duration would consist of adjectives is also completely wrong. There is not yet a substance, a thing, whose characteristics could be stated. There is no “substantive” which would need an “adjective.” Further, the assumption that individual quality images could be presented as qualities of my ego, too, contradicts the basic assertion that I-consciousness is already given thanks to the immediate evidence of the unrepeatable stream of duration, but that the quality images of this stream will be interpreted as independent qualities only through our linguistic and space-time conceptual thinking. These considerations lead us to conclude that the initially formulated hypothesis is of inherently contradictory character. It is not “possible to imagine ... a language in memory-endowed duration” which “would consist only of words designating a quality.” Only a single experience is evident in this sphere; the self-experience of the I. Therefore, only one single word would be thinkable in this sphere; namely, the personal pronoun of the first person singular, the word “I.”]]

Above, we sketched briefly the changes to which the world is subjected through the acting I. Suddenly, it becomes temporal-spatial and is filled with objects which exist independent of me and my duration. I interpret the quality experiences, which are connected with them, as their characteristics. By acting, I myself bring about changes in this space-time world. Everything, however, is related to me; I am still the only living being in this realm of dead objects. Yet, objects are situated in discontinuous space and are distinguishable from each other. In these objects inhere various characteristics; they can be counted, measured, weighted; they become simultaneously visible and touchable. In one word, they *fill* space and *exist*

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<sup>7</sup>HRW: Here follows a whole page of text which was set in brackets and crossed out. I maintained it in this translation, placing it in square brackets.



independently of the becoming and passing-away of the flow of my own life. This accounts for the fact that I can give names to these objects. They become nomina attached to which is the character of a noun, of objectness. Now, I can interpret my quality images of objects as their characteristics; however, I am also able to consider these characteristics, by way of the now possible comparison of objects, as being independent of any concrete thing and to compare them among themselves. This allows me to impute to the nouns of objects specific characteristics, which can be named (adjectives). Finally, I move and act, and act in particular toward objects: I change my body in a specific way which affects my somatic feeling of life and which is accompanied by a very characteristic inner experience, the phenomenon of will. These bodily movements are typical; their having-happened is also comparable in terms of traversed space. Eventually, as consequences, there are changes not only within the boundaries of my ego but in the whole world of things within my reach. All this makes it possible for me to give names to these movements, these actions of my ego (verbs).

The three main elements of every language—noun, adjective, verb—have their theoretical place in the sphere of the acting I. The sphere of the Thou relation, in grammatical forms, adds only the pronouns of the second and third persons. Yet, what changes this circumstance entails is not revealed at first glance. One has to consider that, in this life form too, a language would suffice completely if it consisted only of roots, *r* that is, without declensions and forms of conjugation. With the help of examples, which are to follow, it will be demonstrated for each word category that the development of variations of the roots can be interpreted in terms of their relations to the space-time sphere and to the Thou.

## SUBSTANTIVES (NOMINA)<sup>8</sup>

### (a) *Numerus*

As mentioned before, the origin of the substantive is tied to giving names to things which are grasped in time-space. What, up to now, was changing experience of quality in my duration is now moved outside; it is formed, expanded, endowed with characteristics. But it is exclusively one object which is sensed

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<sup>8</sup> HRW:—This sectional title, like all those which follow and are marked by Roman or Arabic numerals, and subsection headings marked by letters, has been provided by Schutz. Next to the present title, he pencilled the mark “\*S 26.” An asterisk without any further reference is found on p. 26 of the handwritten MS, clearly referring to the subsection labelled “*b. Kasus*.” I concluded that the mark after “I. Substantives” does not refer to this heading but to that of the subheading on the next line: “*a. Numerus*.” This may be interpreted as a note Schutz wrote to himself, expressing the intention to switch the position of the two subsections, taking “*Kasus*” first and “*Numerus*” second. Since this (a) is not certain and (b) could not be done without textual changes, I have maintained the original order of these subsections.

(*affiziert*) by my consciousness. A plurality of things, too, would be unrecognizable as plurality. The totality of quality experiences, which issue from these things, would still be unitarily apperceived and interpreted. To single out the individual, the unit, as segment of the total visual field of my experience is one of the most complicated functions of the faculty of experiencing. This function depends only partly on the fact that my sensory perceptions and my actions establish the spatial continuity between a number of objects which are experienced and apperceived as unity—so of a number of trees—and to establish the autonomy of each individuality called “tree.”

I do not believe I am guilty of an inadmissible psychologism when I assert that the *experience* of a group of trees which, for instance, offers itself at first visually to me from some distance, is thoroughly different from the experience of a single tree under similar conditions. The experience, “tree group,” is not at all an addition of individually experienced trees. I walk toward this tree group, which looks like a unity, and walk into it. Moving around each single tree, I discover to my astonishment that the tree group, (from afar, HRW) experienced as completely homogeneous, is not at all spatially autonomous. It shows clear differentiations, it is discontinuous. As far as my sensory experiences go, it falls apart into separate spatial continua, into “things.” If I had microscopic eyes, I would not even be satisfied with the individual tree as a spatially limited continuum. Yet, I am also not satisfied with my sensory experience which results from moving around this spatially limited thing. *Originally and under all circumstances, the experience is that of a singularity.* If, for the purposes of speaking, I had at my service no other means of interpretation than my experiences, language would still consist of nothing but singular words—so of the singulars “tree” and “tree group.” The relationship (of the two terms) to the same root should not mislead us to ignore the completely heterogeneous factualities (which they designate, HRW).

Indeed, language stops often at the formation of such singular subjectives which, actually, designate a sum of singulars. This occurs in spite of all experience (to the contrary, HRW) because the primary unity experience cannot be dissolved into the addition of singular experiences. The singularity of the experienced “thing” has to be linguistically expressed in the singular. Here, I think of nouns which designate a collective, so “forest.”<sup>9</sup> The singular, “forest,” is in no way dissolvable into a plurality of “Tree,” even though doubtlessly the forest consists of trees. “Forest,” likewise, is not at all a specific arrangement of trees, like a “nursery.”<sup>10</sup> Further, the nature of

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<sup>9</sup> HRW: German = *Wald*. On occasions, the English language expresses a collective in the plural. So, the proper translation of *Wald* would be “woods.” I had to choose “forest” the equivalent of the German word, *Forst*, that is, woods which are carefully planted and kept. In addition, English contains singular nouns which stand for pluralities in which the pronouns assigned to them are singular if a plurality of objects, but plural if a plurality of people are to be designated (the forest = it, the crowd = they).

<sup>10</sup> HRW: But the German word, *Forst*, would be.

the forest is not determined by the addition of certain characteristics, for instance, a floor of moss, or low thicket. Simply, the experience, "forest," is an experience *sui generis*; it is not dissolvable. Correctly, a German proverb alludes to a person without fantasy and of narrow-mindedness as to someone "who does not see the forest for 'the trees.'" I believe that the only possible explanation of this phenomenon is the reduction of the collective noun to a unitarily apperceived basic experience. This will be stated here in the face of the great difficulties which the collective concept has created for formal logic. Here we have one of the cases in which the formation of concepts follows the linguistic example of "naming." "Naming" can be grouped with the delineation and constitution of the individual concept—even if the latter, as demonstrated by our example, is a collective combination. The step leading from a unitary experience to a unitary (singularized) word is smaller than that leading from a singular word to an individual concept. The latter, in any case, can be nothing else but a sum total (*Inbegriff*) of certain individual concepts which have been established long ago.

Many other examples could be mentioned in support of our assertion that the language of pure experience can only consist of singular concepts. However, we should not deny that the constitution of that which is spatially limited in the word, which names the former and lends it permanence, occurs through the stance of the *attention* which we devote to a segment of our field of vision. This stance will be conditioned by two factors: first by the degree of significance which the thing to be interpreted, the complex of experiences, has or may have for our lives, and, second, by the degree of significance it has, or may have, for the lives of other minds (*Intelligenzen*) who are related to us in the Thou relation. From this originates the purposiveness of any "terminology."

However, one should in no way assume that this terminological differentiation (by attentional relevance, HRW), in spite of its teleological character, could be traced back to a purposive-genetical formation of, concepts. That would mean that it would occur in a sphere which already rests upon the linguistic world of symbols. Above, I indicated that the so-called naming, which occurs in the linguistic sphere, already determines content and scope of the concept. The fact that both content and scope of concepts are ambiguous stems from entirely different reasons, namely, the discrepancy between the subjective meaning of the speaker and the objective meaning of the listener. Here, this is of no concern for us.

Logic determines a concept, according to content and scope, by definition. Thereby, it in no way continues the work of language itself. On the contrary, it acts against Language. Logic is forced to its activity only because language, in the act of naming, has already unambiguously and in great consistency fixed the "thing" as a substratum of the concept. The theory of the formation of concepts, in logic, is completely different from naming in language. In formal logic this is consistently overlooked; thus, it has led to a great confusion in the theory of definition. The terminological difference, as described by us, is not of a logical nature. Most of all, it is of linguistic nature and can be reduced to most elementary (primitive) experiences. According to its importance for my or your life (at the moment, HRW), the attention directed at the "tree" will emphasize the "trunk," the "branch," "the leaf,"

in order to constitute it as a “thing,” as something “existing in itself,” “complete in itself.”<sup>11</sup> It does this simply by giving it its own name.<sup>12</sup>

One still would not have to speak of “branches” or “leaves.” If need be, however, specific names would have to be sought for these experiences. Thus, new singularized substantives would follow, so “branch tangle” (*Astgewirr*), “foliage.” At first, then, language consists only of nouns in the singular. One may wish to think theoretically of a language in which there actually exists no plural because the needed plurals are formed through singulars of other roots.

What are the preconditions for the origin of the plural? Most of all, (the plural stems from the need for, HRW) comparability and countability of specific singulars. However, only in the space-time world is it possible to compare multiple things. There, it is possible through concept formation and (practical, HRW) experience. Mere experience, always tied to duration, cannot establish that one thing is like the other. This is so because duration is necessarily manifold and thus, in its own stream, perceives two successive spontaneous experiences as different. Only conscious experience, that is, conceptually typifying experience, measures, counts, and weighs. It alone can construct “sameness” which, for the experience itself, must remain an approximate value. That there can and does exist a multiplicity of objects is a product of conscious experience, a statement belonging to the conceptual-logical sphere.

However, this is tied to certain preconditions which have their roots in more elementary life forms: (1) the first is the existence of the Thou, since conscious experience can only be meaningful when your experience can be fully equated to mine. Conscious experience is not merely the sum of my logically processed experiences but the sum of the logically processed experiences of all minds who are equi-directed with me, provided that conscious experience intends to claim general validity. (2) Establishing the manifoldedness of like objects is tied to the constitution of the individual object, that is, to its naming and delimiting in the language sphere. As stated, the establishment of the plurality of singular (objects and names for them, HRW) belongs exclusively to the logical-conceptual sphere. But it would be wrong to conclude from this fact that the plural formations of language are solely practical forms for the use of conceptually thinking Man, and that here a process occurs which is the opposite of that of the forming of collective nouns. In the latter

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<sup>11</sup> HRW: As it stands, the sentence about attention to parts of the tree as attention to the tree is misleading; at the least, it would demand explanation. At face value, attention to the “trunk” would lead to the term “trunk.” I doubt that Schutz would have introduced the idea of attention to specific parts of an object if, at the time, the incipient work of the Gestalt psychologists had been available to him and which made clear later that, at least in perception, attention moves from the whole to details and not from details to the whole.

<sup>12</sup> HRW: The next passage in the original text is marked at its beginning and its end by an inverted T, preceded by the abbreviation, “Anm.” (*Anmerkung*). I take this as an instruction to separate it from the text and bring it as footnote.

HRW: AS: Note. For instance, with the introduction of the microscopic technique in the natural sciences, it became necessary to formulate a series of names for things which, up to then, were sufficiently characterized by a common name.

case, we found that only the unity of the language-experience leads to the invention of the collective *concept*.

As it turns out, the establishment of a multiplicity of individual things, undertaken in conceptual experience, brings the introduction of numerals (definite or indefinite). But it does not at all necessitate the forming of specific plural forms, as known to us through all those European languages which we have chosen as examples. By way of (practical, HRW) experience, one may establish that several experiences inhere in my experience "tree group." Each of them has "tree" as its object. Should language wish to express this empirical factuality, it can be imagined that it does this through expressions like "five tree," "many tree." Nothing would demand the forming of the plural "trees." According to our theory, it would occur only when the *experience* "tree" suffers a change by comparison with, or adding of, another *experience* "tree."

This is indeed the case. One should not forget that our life forms are ideal-typical auxiliary hypotheses; in reality, we live simultaneously in all life forms. If we claim that these auxiliary hypotheses are valid and serve their heuristic purpose, we cannot merely offer an interpretation of phenomena of the more elementary life forms through the higher ones. It must also be concluded that every experience of higher life forms effects a thorough change of experiences in the more elementary ones. Otherwise, the ideal-typical precondition of the whole theory of life forms would be contradictory in itself; it would negate its own precondition, the indivisible unity of the experiencing I.

This is the case with our problem. We recognize here that there is a content of experience (tree) which is equal to another content of experience (tree). The experiences of both contents may be apperceived (separately, HRW). But this makes not yet for the additivity of both contents ("two tree"). On the contrary, the new experience which comprises the contents of the two experiences which formerly had been isolated, changes each of these. Formerly, I had experienced "tree" (a) and "tree" (b). If I preliminarily designate the new experience (c) as "two tree," experiences (a) as well as (b) transform themselves, in my retrospective memory, at the moment at which the new experience (c) "two tree" enters my life by way of my conceptual-logical sphere. What I had experienced as experience (a) (tree) changes now in my memory into the experience a ("one of two tree") and the experience (b) in to the experience b ("one of two tree," maybe also "second of two tree"). The tree, experienced as (a), is no longer the same when I know that it is part of another experience. Therefore, I feel compelled to look for a specific linguistic expression for the old as well as the new experiences. With this expression, I say linguistically that the original experience has been altered. This is the secret of plural formation. Of course, the expression, "two tree," was only a theoretical assumption which we adduced from the pure sphere of experience. For the cognitive scheme, "two *trees*" is the only correct and adequate expression. Seen from the perspective of the cognitive sphere, too, the original experience, "a tree," is no longer completely adequate. The correct linguistic expressions would be "one of two trees" and "second of two trees."

Here results a most paradoxical fact: for immediate experience, only the forming of singulars is possible; however, for the experience which has passed through cognition, only plurals can be formed.

The paradox dissolves itself in the miracle of language. Language remains ever close to experience. Whenever the grammatical form does not satisfy a cognitive proposition, one can assume that the contents of experience and of cognition are not congruent. With the security of a sleepwalker, a poet knows whether he means as content of experience “a tree” or “one of the trees,” “one human” or “one of the humans.” Both expressions are linguistically and programmatically possible; both designate concretely the same “object”: the same tree, the same human. Yet, both experiences are separated by a world, a language world as well as a cognitive, world. “A tree” is the content of the experience of one tree, without residue, which stands in front of me and delimits my horizon. There exists nothing else except me and the tree; it fills my duration and thus exhausts my word. “One of the trees” is the content of my experience comprising not only the tree about which I intend to say something; it comprises also other trees which I see and to which it is similar in some if not in all respects. Maybe (the expression, HRW) comprises not only the trees which I see but also others of which I have only heard, which have long since disappeared or which will grow in the future: trees which exist somewhere, someplace, which existed, which will or may exist.

Here comes to light how close the singular is to experience, and how concept-bound the plural. But, thanks to the mystery of language, concept and experience enter into the unity of plural formation, which cannot be dissolved: *Idem—sed non hodem modo* (the same itself at present not alone). Thus, the language world separates itself from the world of concepts as well as that of experience and forms its own curious and miraculous realm: a truly third realm in which all contradictions are dissolved. Because they all originated in it.<sup>13</sup>

The considerations of the meaning of the linguistic formation of plurals will be concluded with two short remarks.

One concerns the casualness of the representation offered. It was chosen so as to avoid further complications of an already complicated and cumbersome exposition. (As a consequence, some considerations were oversimplified. HRW.) Thus, it was imprecise to characterize naming in the sphere of experience as a language of experience consisting of “singulars of nomina.” Correctly, we should have stated that, here, such a language consists exclusively of pronouns. Every experience is unique; the same expression for the “same” experience occurred only on basis of the postulation of sameness. So, for instance, in geography we have nothing but proper names: every village, simply, is non-comparable to all others. However, one should not forget that the nature of the world exists in the possible application of the same singular term upon several individualities. It is explained by the fact that our experience in the

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<sup>13</sup> AS: Note. Certain words in certain languages have the same form in plural and singular. It is self-understood that this is no objection to these basic considerations; (the occasional identity of plural and singular, HRW) merely points to (accidental, HRW) phenomena in the histories of these languages.

language world is just not the experience in duration but in time-space and in Thou relations. This problem, too, belongs to the theory of the symbolic function of language and the sphere of concepts; here, both flow here imperceptibly into each other. But this has not much to do with the question which occupies us here.

A more interesting question is posed with our second remark. However, it will be solved only partially in this study.

So far, we have discussed the constitution of the object and its naming by a substantive only from the view points of the I and of space. Should a discrepancy of time not also lead to forming the plural? And why does one assume that the concrete, tree, X, which I see, is the same concrete tree, X, which is seen by you and not a tree, X, whose appearance in my experience would lead to a plurality?

The relation of the substantive to time will occupy us later in these investigations. The question can only be mentioned here; it can only be answered after the study of the verb forms.<sup>14</sup>

Why, in my experience, does the tree seen by you become identical with the tree seen by me, and [why] can [it] thus be linguistically designated as the same tree? This—very important—problem goes far beyond the framework of this study. It belongs to a structural analysis of the Thou relation. Here, we will only mention that the Thou stands at the intersection of two durations and that, therefore, the parallelity if not identity of the contents of both experiences represents the precondition of the symbol relation which is basic for the Thou relation.<sup>15</sup>

### ***(b) Casus***

The substantive, whose formation we have pursued in the last section, is first of all the cause of certain experiences of quality which we are ready to interpret as characteristics of the object and of which we can postulate a certain state comparable to our duration. Namely, things are, they exist. This is the first and main statement which we can make about every object and substance. That we can do this results from the character of our experience of time and space, in which alone can be constituted the concept of the thing.

Linguistically, this experience is expressed by the grammatical subject-predicate relation. These two main ingredients are connected by the “conjunction” (copula). Von Lask<sup>16</sup> clearly demonstrated that this grammatical form does not fall together with the logical form of the sentence. In linguistic form, we would say. “subject is predicate.” The logical form suggests: “subject-predicate *is*,” “subject-predicate *is in*

<sup>14</sup> HRW: Schutz abandoned this MS before he turned to the study of this topic.

<sup>15</sup> HRW: Schutz inserted here the following remark.

AS: (To add: Note about the dial). (I assume “dial” stands for dialect, HRW.)

<sup>16</sup> HRW: It is a safe assumption that Schutz referred to the neoKantian philosopher Emil Lask.



the *modus essendi*." Therefore, logically the predicate presents itself as attribute of the subject. The subject, closer described by the merely attributive predicate, is integrated into the mode of existence.

Example: the proposition, "the rose is red," would become in logical formulation, "rose red *is*" or maybe more precisely, "red-rose is." What is said about the rose concerns primarily its existence, not at all its being red. This being red is contained already in the rose perceived as subject; it is therefore attributively included in the idea of the "red-rose." (From, a strictly logical point of view, Lask's theory seems uncontestable; and this the more since it has proved itself thoroughly in his system.) But what creates here the—not only by Lask—established discrepancy between language and concept? What forces language to establish a symbolization which does not correspond to the higher conceptual life form? Or, in reverse, is it a reduction from the conceptual sphere, as we encountered it in the character of the formation of the plural?

Possibly this problem is the most difficult and most decisive for the kind of consideration of language which we attempt here. It forces me to a longer digression about the adjectival predicate. To treat it, at this point, can only be justified by (the results of, HR W) its application.

In the life forms which precede the language sphere, the thing is simply and concretely given without any conceptual generalization. The latter, as shown, necessarily begins with naming. Doubtlessly, the content of my experience is primarily not rose with the characteristic of being red, perceived only in a second and later experience. Rather, it is "this rose there" now before me. The formulation, "this *rose* there," while using a name, is already drawn into the language sphere. Thereby, it turned abstract. In exactly the same fashion, I could experience merely a "this-here" which I have seized through the specific experiences of my visual, auditory, and tactile senses. Nay, in inner duration as such, it would not be possible to execute the concretization of a "this there." In this life form, there exist only images of qualitative experiences which hang together merely through the stream of my inner duration. However (pretending that, HRW) I could express my experiences here, I could speak of "smelling this-there," a "soft this-there," a "red this-there." But I would not at all be in a position to state that each of these experiences is grounded in the existence of one and the same object. At the least, the experience of one and the same sub-stratum of all these perceived images of qualities is a space-time matter. It originates only in the movement of the acting I who gets acquainted with the "object" as spatially autonomous and observes that, with a corresponding movement away or toward the object, all these quality experiences disappear or return. So far, we have believed that these experiences belong exclusively to our inner duration. It is thus that we interpret these quality experiences as "characteristics" of the object, co-given with the existence and co-postulated with its concrete apperception. By positing a substantive, we are already co-positing a series of adjectives—at first in experience. This experience is that of qualities in the concretization of the thing; giving it a name is an apparently accidental act: one of the many miracles



of language. At times, the incomprehensibility of these miracles makes us shudder and leaves us astonished. As a poem of Rainer Maria Rilke says:

I fear myself the word of humans;  
they say everything so clear.  
This is called dog and this house,  
and the good is here and the bad is there.<sup>17</sup>

When Juliet faces the inconceivable and incomprehensible evidence of the erotic experience of the Thou, Shakespeare lets her realize that “name is empty noise and smoke”<sup>18</sup>; “That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.”<sup>19</sup> To “smell as lovely” is the primary knowledge about the thing; it is incomparably closer to the experience whose name, more or less accidental, is “rose.”<sup>20</sup>

Now, one has to realize that language has a place in a life form which already contains the Thou. (Here, it cannot be explained in detail how) the life form of the I in Thou relation produces in two ways the foundations of every experience. First, as a structural analysis of the I-relationship shows, the thing (already interpreted in an earlier life form and spatially-temporally constituted with specific characteristics for my acting I) is grasped not only by my own I but also by a Thou; in the same manner as by my I, that is, in the same temporal-spatial delimitation and by the same adjectival qualities. For the first time, the thing here acquires an “objective meaning.” Now, the subjective formations and positions of meaning, issuing from my ego, are separated from my personal acts of endowing and positing meaning. They are valid not only for me but, at least according to my assumption, also for you. (This objectification of subjective meaning, which alone definitely separates the thing from my durational experiences, carries extremely far-reaching consequences. Most of all, it makes experience possible: through and in the Thou relation, it creates the objective chance of the apperception by a Thou. On the one hand, through it my apperceptions can be interpreted as accessible to your experience; on the other hand, that which is apperceived by

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<sup>17</sup> HRW: I apologize for this poetically poor translation of Rilke’s poem. Schutz rendered the original text as follows:

*Ich fuerchte mich so vor der Menschen Wort,  
Sie sprechen alles so deutlich aus.*

*Dieses heisst Hund und dieses heisst Haus und das Gute liegt hier und das boese dort.*

<sup>18</sup> HRW: “Name ist Schall und Rauch”—a popular expression taken from Goethe’s *Faust*.

<sup>19</sup> HRW: “Romeo and Juliet,” Act II, scene ii.

<sup>20</sup> On top of the next paragraph, Schutz wrote in pencil: \* S 34. A line links it to the second sentence of this paragraph, which starts with a square bracket. An asterisk is found on p. 34 of the original MS, followed by a short remark which was crossed out and is not readable on my xerox copy of the MS. Another lone asterisk is found near the bottom of p. 37. It is possible that Schutz intended to place the first passage marked (on p. 28) to p. 34 and then to p. 37. The whole paragraph on p. 28 begins with a double square bracket. However, various shorter passages in this long paragraph are also set in square brackets. It is practically impossible to ascertain how much of the paragraph Schutz intended to transfer to a later place. Omitting the initial dual square bracket, I maintained the whole paragraph as originally written, converting the other square brackets into parentheses, in agreement with the here adopted method of indicating passages set off by Schutz.

you can be accepted by me as something I at any time can re-experience. Due to the first reason, I am able to convey my experiences to you as being real also for you and can hope that you will understand them. Due to the second reason, I can limit myself (*begnugen*), after the fulfillment of certain technical conditions, to learn (*erfahren*) about all of your experiences; I am sure to experience the same as you.)

At the least, my real experiences had become possible experiences for you in the same fashion in which, at the least, your real experiences are possible for me. Only this context creates the foundations of trans-personal experience. It alone makes possible (the integration of a meaning context into) the objective chance of experiencing by the Thou. Therewith, the final separation of the thing from I and actual experience in duration has been executed.

Since the object, no longer experienced by me, can nevertheless be experienced by you, it and all its qualities must lead an independent existence, separate from my duration. It must persist in a form which in its continuity is similar to my duration; but it is also different from it due to the lack of manifoldness and the consciousness of the thing which is not accessible to me. This form of the existence of the object, for which I cannot imagine a becoming and passing away, I call the existence of the object, its *being*. This being, while resembling my duration through persistence and continuity, belongs completely to the space-time world, in which it also undergoes changes. Thus, we can say that the objective chance of experience is given only with the *being* of the thing. This being is always being-in-itself; every being-in-itself of the thing signifies inclusion in mine as well as your duration. Paradoxical as this may sound, only with this inclusion does there occur the complete separation of the object from any kind of duration and its integration into time. This is the first fundamental fact created by the Thou relation as precondition of all experience.

The second elementary effect of the integration of the word into the Thou problem seems to present exactly the opposite of the first thesis, as set down above.<sup>21</sup> The same object will be experienced by the Thou unchanged and in the same way as by the I; this is nothing else but a symbol function of the Thou relation. This assumption may be taken for granted. It states nothing but that this function, like all others, must actually dissolve itself in the tensions between the individual life forms, that means, in the psychophysical I which lives and acts simultaneously in all life forms. Actually, however, the experience of the same object by the Thou is in no way identical with experience of the object by the I. This assumption, conditioned by the structure of the Thou relation, applies solely to the pure relation, imagined in isolation. (Applicable and here also necessary is the symbolization of the world.)

We demonstrated above that this symbol function of the Thou creates the actual objectivity and autarchy of the thing. But, because it is merely a matter of

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<sup>21</sup> HRW: After this sentence, Schutz inserted a closing square bracket and an asterisk. Possibly, this marked the end of the whole segment (covering almost two MS pages) which he wanted to transfer to a later place.

symbolization, the tension between symbol and symbolized (object, HRW) remains. The thing, now, exists independently of me and you; it is now separated from your and my experience in time. As soon as it is experienced by me, it can also be experienced by you. However, up to now, nothing has been or could have been said about the identity of this experience.

Because: at the same moment at which it turns from a possible experience of the Thou to its actual experience, the object will be integrated into life and continuous duration of the Thou. Within this Thou, it will be subjected to a similar symbolization as within the I. Now, the investigation of this process has shown to what degree the construction of this symbol is conditioned by the actually given Now and Thus of the I. The life of the Thou took a completely different course than that of the I. Otherwise the Thou would be identical with the I; this, however, is not the case. Rather, the course of the life of the Thou and the course of the life of the I “intersect,” in order to use an image repeatedly invoked.<sup>22</sup> The occurring construction of the symbol of .a possibly similar experience takes place in a Now and a Thus which is different from the Now and Thus of the experience of the I. It follows that the (subjective) meaning of my experience (which I, as objective meaning, hypostatize as the subjective meaning of your experience) is always the meaning meant by me but never the meaning as understood by you. Thus, a discrepancy results between meaning intended and meaning understood, meaning posited and meaning interpreted. Or, as one says since Max Weber’s basic investigations, between objective and subjective meaning—a formulation which unfortunately has been often misunderstood.

By subjective meaning, we understand here the meaning posited by the I which confronts the Thou as objective meaning, already posited and now in need of interpretation. This tension between subjective and objective is the second main proposition of experience as trans-personal experience as such. It alone yields the criterion for the logical-conceptual validity of a sentence because, here, the problem of truth is posed and decided for the first time. Now, without the assumption of an objective positing of meaning, the question of truth and validity of a sentence is logically meaningless. To assume an objective meaning content means to presuppose its positing by a subject and its interpretability by a Thou.

To summarize, things gain existence, their being-separated from all duration, in the life form of the Thou. But just this objective being must be meaningfully re-interpreted by the Thou and from (the view-point of, HRW) every life. The first proposition is a further development of the experience of the acting I; the second belongs to the sphere of the Thou relation. Both are transformed by conceptual experience, which constitutes them in the first place, and anew experienced in this life form. But, between the Thou and the concept stands the word. (It has to participate in both, and both functions of the Thou must find their solution in it.)

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<sup>22</sup> HRW: It is of interest to see that Schutz already here expressed the idea which he should later discuss as the “biographically determined situation” of the individual [see, for instance, “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 14 (1953): 6].

As I have said repeatedly, thanks to the act of naming, the word—we think here at first about the noun—belongs to both life forms. It gives the object its own existence; it separates it from the duration of the speaker and hands it over to the duration of the listener for interpretation. Therefore, the word as such, namely, as objective meaning content, is always logically inexact. As imaginary object, it leads its own life in the twilight of the subjective positing of meaning and the—again subjective—meaning interpretation. It is surrounded by a penumbra which the concept penetrates only with great effort. In this context, James coined the brilliant term, “fringes of the word.” Such fringes result from every formation of concepts. No word exists which would be unambiguous, and no word which is only ambiguous. Word and concept are discrepant just for this reason; it takes the whole complicated apparatus of the activity of reason in order to distil the concept from the word and to force the concept thus gained into a formula of convenience, the technical term. The technical term is nothing but the formula of the chemist, the exact designation of a point in a system of coordinates, the fixation of a tone, a musical notation according to height, strength, duration, timbre. (However, our considerations have nothing to do with these artificial constructions, these “formulae” which become meaningful only when they are integrated into a prescribed scheme of meaning-positing and interpretation.)

The word, not yet turned into a concept, has through naming not only pinned down the thing but also its characteristics, even though the latter exist primarily in experience.<sup>23</sup> To formulate these characteristics, especially to impute them to those substantives which originated from the naming of objects, would not be at all necessary if the substantive were always a proper noun which designates only a single individual thing. However, this is not the case. The giving of a name already amounts to a comparison with other similar objects. Thanks to the conceptual-symbolic function of language, the experience is typified and generalized. And this in a dual manner: on the one hand because the experience of the I is necessarily coordinated to the experience of the Thou and thereby with that of everybody; on the other hand because—within my duration as well as within the duration of everyone else—it can be coordinated with the same thing-experience, which it means objectively. Thereby, the word gains trans-temporality, trans-spatiality, trans-individuality. It remains the same even though the symbolized time-and-space-bound object changes.

What is actually persisting in a word? *Rose*: the rose which stands before me; the rose which I saw this morning; the rose of which you spoke; the rose which he gave to her; the rose in my garden; the rose in the park of Shirah; the rose which will bloom on the stock next year. What is common to all these experiences of the I and the Thou: actual, potential, past, present, future experiences? What is common to the things whose experiences are symbolized (by the word, rose, HRW)? What entitles

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<sup>23</sup> HRW: Here follows an unfinished sentence, heavily crossedout: “Conceptually, of course, results an unbridgeable difference between substance and quality—so that all concepts are synthetical ...”

language to use one word for all these series of experiences and things? One rose is red, the other yellow; one I have seen, of the other I have been told. This one was here, the other is there, this third one is not yet. This one smells, that one does not; this I can touch, that one not. What are the *characteristics* which make all these things into roses? What are the essential qualities of the rose? When does the thing start to be a rose, when can one no longer call it so?

It is not essential to answer this group of questions but it is essential to investigate whether this group of questions belongs to the life form of conceptual thinking or that of the Thou relation. By posing these questions, we are like a man who passes through a gallery of parallel mirrors. He perceives all objects in great manifoldness; one wall throws the mirror image of the other back into itself with its own image. There seems to be no doubt that our questions aim at the purely conceptual-logical function of the word. They are questions of definition, appeal to conscious experience. Indeed, they could all be answered by Linnée's system or any definition of botany. This goes far beyond the act of mere naming or the elementary experience of Juliet: "That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet." But it does not excuse us from asking about what actually makes the definition meaningful, and through what auxiliary means may one establish such a definition. A hint is given by the old rule: definition determined by the proper genus and specific differentiations (*definitio fiat per genus proximum et differentias específicas*). Logic asks for *characteristics*, constructs a scheme of essentials; it determines according to qualities. But, are these qualities identical with the characteristics which are co-posit-ed by naming? This is not at all the case. Without ado, language allows the possibility of placing contradictions together (*contradictio in adjecto*, sideroxylon). Propositions, which logically connect what falls into "spheres of incompatibility," are linguistically correct and grammatically possible. In the language world, Liechtenberg's "knife without handle but with a missing blade"<sup>24</sup> has its place and existence. Which, then, are those "qualities" which are fixated by the word; and what distinguishes them from the "characteristics" of logic?

Obviously, the qualities which are labeled by naming are in no way logical characteristics. On the contrary, they designate primary qualities of experience. One may guess that, with naming, only those qualities are pinned down which logicians are inclined to call *essential* qualities: for instance, in the case of the word "triangle," the three sides, the three angles, the closed figure on one plane, the 180° sum of the angles. If one of these qualities is missing, the designation "triangle" is false. To apply this obvious assumption to the language sphere would be a fundamental error. These qualities are not co-posit-ed with the designation of a flat figure as "triangle." They are not essential to the word "triangle" and also not to the concrete experience which I name thus; they are essential for the concept, triangle. Kant, who saw in geometric propositions synthetic judgments a priori, has shown better than anyone that this concept, as such, is not yet endowed with those essential characteristics

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<sup>24</sup> HRW: I assume that the name was inadvertently misspelled and that Schutz referred to Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (174299), the German essayist who is best known for his aphorisms.

named above. Their deduction, their realization is already an act of aprioristic synthesis. That means, the necessary “characteristics,” which have resulted from a general definition of the *concept* “triangle,” are not basic for the word triangle or the concrete experience (it designates, HRW). I can very well imagine the experience of a spatial figure, which is not determined by straight lines but by three curves and to which, consequently, the essential characteristics of the concept “triangle” cannot apply. Only logicians or mathematicians could assert that such a figure is no “triangle.” Language itself would wrong them; it feels justified in calling a triangle anything which has three corners. The essential qualities, eminently necessary for definition and concept formation, are in no way the same as those which have already been posited by naming.

On the contrary, our example of the rose leads us to assume that, just in the qualities which are constituted by naming, the essential characteristics of the future concept are preformed; like the future plant in the seed. Naming co-posit, even if only potentially, all those qualities which, in future, can be said or not be said about the thing named and about its meaning. Translated into the linguistic sphere, this in principle does not mean that all adjectives could be imputed to every substantive. The formulation chosen above will only demonstrate that that which is *logically* and linguistically meaningful is thoroughly heterogeneous. In other words: the “spheres of incompatibility” in the language world are completely different from those in the concept world.

In linguistic-historical sight, the word “rose” means a rose of a specific, namely, a reddish, color. Were this meaning accepted today by us, a “yellow rose” would linguistically be felt to be nonsense. How could this meaning get lost, even though it (originally, HRW) inhered in the word “rose”? What makes possible the “change of significance” of a word? What changed: the linguistic meaning, the relation of the word to the experience, or the logical sense, which alters the relation of the word to the concept?

In my opinion, this question is identical with that posed above.

## FROM QUALITIES TO ADJECTIVES

*In the language sphere, everything depends exclusively on what qualities are meaningfully connected with the experience as such—but meaningful with regard to the integration into their own stream of duration without falling into contradiction with the series of actual images of perception, of experienced images of memory, of imagined images of fantasy.* This means in no way that the incompatibility of logical conceptions is grounded in the language sphere. The recognition of this incompatibility calls for the total conceptual experience, and sometimes even for the sum total of all scientific propositions. What is a linguistic metaphor, in its essence, if not a possibility of uniting in the language world what is logically disparate? Could one logically meaningfully assert of a theory that it is grey? Logically, this is as nonsensical as the statement that a triangle is virtuous. Nevertheless, to state that “Grey,

dear friend, is all theory,”<sup>25</sup> is linguistically meaningful. Nay, miracle on top of a miracle, it is meaningful not only linguistically but also in the deepest sense of experience. This “word phrase” contains a content of truth for which an example is produced by any “logical proposition.”

To repeat: earlier, I have asserted that all qualities are coposited with naming and, in all future, can be said to be linked with the thing, whether this is logically meaningful or not. This does mean not that, in the language world, all adjectives can be imputed to every substantive. The unity of meaning (*Sinneinheit*) does not rest in the subsumption under concepts but in the inclusion into the sphere of experience. This also explains a phenomenon which is logically and psychologically almost unexplainable: that certain concepts of daily life refuse to fit into any definition, for example, the word “table” with the exception of a purely teleological definition.<sup>26</sup> When I pronounce the word, “table,” I think about a four-cornered table with four wooden legs, but you think about a round stone table with a support in the center. Starting from the piece of furniture, imagined by the enunciation of the word “table,” it takes a certain act of reflection to comprehend that the “table” imagined and described by you too is a table. Anybody who learns a foreign language, and also the child who learns originally to speak, will find that he or she uses one and the same word for heterogeneous objects. Only later does he or she recognize that each of these objects has been equipped with another name and *therefore* with other co-intended qualities.

The justification<sup>27</sup> of the difference between logical and linguistic meaning relevances rests mostly on the completely different character of qualities as experienced and as conceptual features. As soon as the adjective is lifted out of the language sphere and is brought into a relation to the logical concept, it loses its dependence and is no longer relying on the existence of a thing: a substantive. By contrast, in the sphere of logic, every adjective in principle is convertible into a substantive.

*Within the Thou relation*, the act of naming effects nothing but the separation of the thing experience, with all its corresponding actual and potential characteristics, from the duration of the speaker and its integration into the duration of the listener.

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<sup>25</sup> HRW: In his *Faust*, Goethe lets Mephistopheles give this as advice to a student, crowning it with the mixed metaphor, “Green is the golden tree of life.”

<sup>26</sup> HRW: Lacking expertise in theory and history of logic, I am at a loss to pinpoint meaning and origin of the term, teleological definition. According to the comments Schutz wrote after mentioning this term, it seems that he had in mind identification by description; the latter cannot serve as definition because it makes it impossible to separate accidental from essential features (so, a square or round shape of the surface of a table). In the back of his mind may have been the overcoming of this hindrance to defining “table” by resorting to the collection of purposes for which tables of all shapes, materials, and sizes have been built. This, again, fails to satisfy the rigid requirements of logicians, although there is no question that such a purposive-teleological “definition” is quite useful in practical life and, in fact, typical of it.

<sup>27</sup> HRW: The first sentences of the paragraph repeat the formulations of a slightly differently worded and unfinished paragraph which was crossed out in the original text. With this reformulation, the MS switches from handwritten to typed pages. The latter run from MS page 39–49. The last two text pages (50 and 51) are again handwritten.



By contrast, the conceptual formulation of that which has been *named* offers the latter for interpretation as something completely objective without reference to the act of positing meaning and to that which is subjectively meant. The named object, in its individual delimitation in space and time, is here transformed into a class while the qualities of the object, which are accessible to experience, become criteria of the concept. In this sphere of absolute being, not only things but also their qualities become comparable with one another. It takes only a small step to grant substance character to conceptual attributes and to sever their ties to substantives. Such substantified qualities lack the criterion of perspicuity (*Anschaulichkeit*). With this expression, logic means hardly more than being capable of being experienced in a lower life form. However, substantified qualities do not lack the ability to be thought of as existing, like things, in the *modus essendi*. Duration will treat such criteria as if they were things.

As seen, in the mere realm of language, the origin of the adjective occurs differently. The incompatibility spheres of logic are valid in the linguistic sphere. All actual and potential qualities, in so far as they can be experienced at all, are co-positing in the act of naming. Thus, the generation of the adjective has two roots of completely different origin.

### 1 *The adjective as attribute*

One can speak of mere experiences of the qualities of things, which are placed in the Thou relation and which have been named, solely, either in regard to the speaker or the listener. The intended, unexplained, meaning of the experience of the speaker transforms itself, through the symbolic structure of the word, into the meaning of the experience of the listener—set externally, understandably, and now to be interpreted. To bring the word closer to experience, to lessen the difference between intended and posited meaning, to offer a scheme for the interpretation by the listener which is as adequate as possible to the actual object-experience—this leads to the origin of the attributive adjective.

This assertion will be explained with an example.

Peter says to Paul<sup>28</sup>: “In my garden is a rose.” Paul, however, has seen many roses. He also knows the meaning of the word “rose” and Peter does not doubt that Paul will understand him. The readiness of Paul to understand Peter rests exclusively in the circumstance that Paul lives in the symbol sphere of the word. He accepts Peter’s experience as if he had experienced it himself. Therefore, he does not doubt that, if entering Peter’s garden, he, Paul, would have the same experience as Peter. Therefore, he could assert that there is a rose in Peter’s garden. Now, Paul has not only seen many roses, he also has a specific idea of “rose” as such. This is so, because he simultaneously thinks, that is lives, in conceptual schemes. He has a specific idea of “rose” as such. He knows that there are red and yellow roses, some which smell and some which don’t. He has also seen roses with many and with few

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<sup>28</sup> HRW: Peter and Paul are figures populating some of Bergson’s writings. Schutz met them there. However, they seem to be of long ancestry in Western Philosophy of the Christian era.



petals and knows, from his own experience, that no one rose is like the other. This experience may be completely trans-personal; for instance, it may be based on his reading of several logical investigations about the nature of sameness. But it will do when Paul establishes discrepancies when comparing his memory images of his experiences of roses. [As shown above,] when the word “rose” is mentioned, Paul will recall (*vorstellen*) a very specific rose, that is, one which was especially important to him. (A specific intensity of a quality experience, an especially pregnant memory image, an object of an intended or executed action, an integration into an affectually motivated complex.)

Paul has the task of understanding Peter, that is, to reconstruct the latter’s experience of himself by interpreting Peter’s experience. Therefore, it will be of highest importance for him to recheck whether the ideal type “rose,” which he, Paul, constructed for his life, agrees with the experience of Peter (or what the deviations of this type are from the experience of Peter). Thus, he will appreciate learning what characteristics are displayed by the rose, seen by Peter, in contrast to that imagined by him, Paul. For instance, he will ask: “What is the color of the rose in your garden?” Peter can give two answers: “The rose in my garden is red,” or: “In my garden is a red rose.” Is there a difference between the two statements of Peter and, if so, what?

With Paul, the reader will feel that Peter’s answer, “In my garden is a red rose,” is not an adequate answer to Paul’s question. The only adequate answer to his question would be: “The rose in my garden is red.” However, with Paul one would feel it agreeable if Peter had originally formulated his experience in the words: “In my garden is a red rose.” In this case, Paul would not have had to pose his question about the color of the rose. What, now, is the difference between Peter’s speaking immediately of the red rose in his garden, and the apparently inadequate answer to Paul’s question? In other words: when will Peter speak of a quality experience “red rose,” and when will he make the assertion about the quality experience “rose” which displays the characteristics of “redness.”

Let us first investigate the case of the statement: “In my garden is a red rose.”<sup>29</sup> The question as to what caused Peter to speak just about a red rose is the more difficult to answer as Peter alone may give information about it. He could render it only with the help of a conceptual analysis of all those “motives” which induced him to speak just of a red rose- and not of a smelling or a long-stemmed rose. Possibly, he would be uncertain why he spoke, from the start, of a red rose and thereby stressed its “redness.” It stands to reason that he did it because his ideal type of rose does not contain redness but only other characteristics of rose.<sup>30</sup> In this case, Peter used his statement already as one to be interpreted, actually as objective meaning. He proceeded in the manner which he expected from Paul. This does not mean that

<sup>29</sup> HRW: This sentence was written by hand on the left margin.

<sup>30</sup> AS: If, as before, we speak here of ideal types of an experience, we mean thereby no conceptual type at all but exclusively the sum of several elements of those memory images which—in spite of all manifoldness and determination by duration—display an invariable character. Just they make it possible for Peter to reinterpret, as names, quality experiences in the sphere of the acting I and in the sphere of the speaking I.

Peter's ideal type of rose would be, for instance, a yellow rose, or else that this type would comprise all elements (that is, elements of experience, not conceptual criteria) of rose except color. *It means nothing else but that he considers it desirable, for some reason, to accentuate redness also for the Thou whom he addresses.*

The experience, which is at the bottom of the word, is completely unitary. Adding the adjective "red" to the substantive "rose" constitutes no enrichment whatsoever of the original subjective experience. It changes nothing on the given factuality of the rose seen, which happened to be red. It is merely a concession to language if two words, namely "red" and "rose," are used to designate a unitary experience: a concession which is [exclusively] occasioned by the circumstance that [the word adheres not only to the Thou relation but also to every other life form or sphere; so that, therefore,] language is not merely for speaking but also for repeating.<sup>31</sup> Peter finds given word materials and formulae for (describing, HRW) his experiences; he must use them in order to express his experience as long as he hopes to be understood by someone listening to him. (Unless he is a poet,) he is not allowed to find a new word for his experience, lest he sacrifices his chance to be understood. If Peter did not encounter language as already existing material which he now has to draw into his own scheme of interpretation, he would look for an expression which, in the unity of the word, would be adequate to the unitary experience. For example, he would say: "In my garden is a 'redrose.'" With this statement, he would have said nothing more than with the sentence: "In my garden is a red rose."

Here,<sup>32</sup> the act of meaning depositing is completely unitary. The addition of the attributive adjective does not occur in order to complement the act of meaning positing; it occurs only in order to anticipate a question of Paul; that is, in order to complement the scheme of interpretation.

Paul, the listener of Peter, would also ascribe an objective unitary meaning content to the word, "redrose," if he hears it. He may only ask himself what may have caused Peter to stress just the "redness" of the seen rose, of which he could say thousands and thousands of things. He will arrive at the answer: either "redness" is of special significance for Peter's ideal experience, or Peter knows that Paul's ideal type is in need of contemplation by stressing color.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> HRW: Schutz wrote on the margin of the passage which he crossed out (given here in square brackets): *Vorwelt!* (world of predecessors). The meaning of this note, which Schutz addressed to himself, becomes clear in the next sentence. He obviously intended here to write more explicitly about the historical fact of formation and structuring of any language, its historical g'iveness, its creation as achievement of untold generations of linguistic ancestors.

<sup>32</sup> HRW: This paragraph was handwritten on the lower margin of the MS. A line on the left margin linked it to the middle of the preceding paragraph. This indicates that he intended to integrate it into this paragraph. However, he made a question mark next to the connecting line. Thus, he had second thoughts about the transfer. Its integration in the earlier paragraph, in addition, would have demanded a reformulation of parts of both paragraphs.

<sup>33</sup> HRW: In the original MS, this paragraph is followed by another one which covers two-thirds of the page (45). It is crossed out. In the midst of it is a mark referring to the marginal note, *Zettel* (separate sheet). This indicates that the content of the handwritten sheet is to be inserted at the point marked. However, its content is a reformulation of the original paragraph; it has been placed here in its stead.

If Peter spoke only of a rose ..., and if Paul's ideal type ... in fact -needs complementation by color, ... Paul must indeed feel the need for an (additional, HRW) statement of Peter, expanding the meaning he meant. Paul faces an incomplete act of meaning positing by Peter; with the question about color, he asks for complementation. Factually and linguistically, Peter can no longer answer Paul's question correctly by the attributive statement: a red rose or redrose; but only by the predicative statement: "The rose in my garden is red." In contrast to the statement, "in my garden is a red rose," this sentence represents a new statement—not a new statement about his, Peter's—experience, which remains unitary and undivided, but a new statement about the meaning of the experience: a new act of meaning positing.

Herewith, we believe to have arrived at the main difference between attributive and predicative adjectives. The attributive adjective signifies a complementation of the act of positing meaning. The speaker desires to prevent an incomplete interpretation of the meaning which he fears would be fostered by the mere naming of the substantive. By contrast, the predicative adjective signifies a complementation of the act of positing meaning.<sup>34</sup>

## 2 The predicative adjective

On occasion of the theory of the substantive, we said that, most of all, it calls for an act of our attention in order to make the selection of that which is named out of the indivisible Now and Thus of the experiencing I. We have demonstrated that this selective activity of our attention is already at work in the act of naming. Thus, we call one and the same visual factuality now tree, now bundle of branches, now leaves. And, as said above, we would have to invent new names, if we had microscopic eyes and were able to experience perceptually the unity and delimitation of things in space on the level of cells.

When stating this example, we realized that we had already transgressed the boundary of the pure language sphere: the apparent act of attention represents itself as a result of all experiences of conceptually thinking Man. In this aspect of the language world, which is turned toward the concept, selectivity occurs no longer according to determinants of experience, but according to valuation, most of all logical valuation. Relevant for naming is no longer suitability for my life, no longer the inclusion into the stream of my duration, but the suitability not of the experienced but of the recognized object for the totality of my empirical propositions (*Erfahrungssätze*),<sup>35</sup> Bergson asserts that even memory seizes only those experiences of qualities which some time later become important for the acting I. The truer is the assertion that the word, subjugated under the primacy of the concept, merely cuts out of the world of experience such factual complexes which are

<sup>34</sup> HRW: An incomplete sentence followed, crossed out by Schutz:

AS: [As can be clearly seen in the example above and will become still clearer when we now occupy ourselves with the analyses of the predicative adjective].

<sup>35</sup> HRW: That means, their suitability for comparison with, evaluation by, integration in, and correction or rejection by the ensemble of ideas about the realities of a person's spheres of life by way of commonsense conclusions rather than (scientific) empirical propositions.

relevant for the (given, HRW) conceptual-logical context and which have logical or cognitive value (within this context, HRW).<sup>36</sup>

If we apply this theory of the substantive to the formation of adjectives, we find that the accentuation of specific qualities of the substance is not at all necessitated by the phenomenon of experience but only by logical necessity. Thereby, they become criteria of the object but not of quality experiences. Because, in the sphere of conceptual thinking, the thing leads its own life: *it neither belongs to my nor to your durations; it simply exists*. Its qualities can be established neither through my nor through your experiences. In the dead and unanimated world of things, quantities accrue to substance. They assume the same form of the essential mode as the thing itself. Taking this logically, they are essential not for the concept but for the word.

Here start the theories of definition and of formalistic logic with their specification the similarity of genus and differentiation by specifics, with the theories of essential and accidental qualities. Only here begin, in a true sense, those incompatibility spheres of concepts which, as stressed above, are basically different from the incomparability spheres of the pure world of language; they originate in the incongruence between the spoken (word, HRW) and the I as experience in the stream of duration.

The word, which became concept, has a scope and content which can be unequivocally established; it knows very specific and essential criteria. The omission of even one of these criteria would render it logically meaningless. Through addition of another word, its scope would be restricted, its content enlarged. This reciprocal relation between content and scope of the concept shows clearly that we deal here not with one and the same factual complex of experience. Rather, we deal with a phenomenon which has been included in the world of objective meaning. The latter, necessarily, will be altered by the addition of another concept (accentuation of a specific criterion). This is the essential meaning of the predicative adjective. It changes the conceptual content and scope of the substantive. It was never one with its substantive; it is not connected with it through experience but merely through the intentional inclusion of both into the essential mode. This impersonality, which necessarily inheres in every predicative adjective, makes it unsuitable for completing the act of meaning information. Yet, it enables the predicative adjective to contribute to the sharpening of the act of positing meaning. Since the predicate has the power to withhold from duration the thing-turned-concept, it reinforces the objective character of the posited meaning. By removing the experience of the speaker from duration, the predicative adjective limits, for the interpreting listener, the meaning; it offers him a complex of interpretation which, for the most part, contains objective elements which are independent of the positing of meaning.

The attributive adjective is rooted in that aspect of the word which is turned toward the pure Thou relation; it anticipates the interpretation of the positive meaning by the Thou. It has nothing to do with the experience of the thing, which

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<sup>36</sup> HRW: The central part of this paragraph has been emphasized by a vertical pencil line on the left margin, and its last line by a triple-lined cross. The meaning of these marks remains unclear.

ever remains unitary, but only with the listener to whom the word is offered for interpretation. It has something to say to him but not to the speaker. Most of all, therefore, it has its place in those literary works, which serve communication and in particular narration. So in the epos, but not in lyrical poetry which, as solitary art of expression, shuns the attributive adjective as artistic means. It is also missing in the purest form of strictly logical-conceptual structures of language, in propositions containing conclusions which ever—at the risk of fallacy—are forced to convert attributive into predicative adjectives. It is capable of being connected with every form of the substantive, even the oblique one, without thereby changing its function in any way. It belongs to duration and, as anticipated meaning *interpretation*, is never purely objective meaning. It is ever mixed up with subjective meaning not that of the speaker, but with the subjective meaning expected by the listener.

By contrast, the predicative adjective is a pure act of positing meaning; it rises from the need of the speaker, not that of the listener. It does not participate in the thing experienced but in the concept. As completed act of positing meaning, it is purely objective meaning. It is reality. Therefore, it demands the copulative conjunction as expression of the essential mode. It does not form a unity with the substantive; it is freely movable and can itself governing a predicate; every case—including the oblique one may receive an attribute.

How is this result related to the metagrammatical theory of the sentence?<sup>37</sup> Does there not exist here too an unsolvable paradox? Our investigation has shown that the logical function is carried by the predicative adjective. Yet, the metagrammatical theory of the sentence assigns this role to the attributive adjective; it tends to ascribe to the copula<sup>38</sup> alone the character of a logical predicate. But the paradox dissolves itself if one compares the opposite aspects of both investigations with one another. The logician, just from his standpoint, considers the adjective inessential because it qualitatively belongs to the *concept* of subject. For him, the essential of each sentence—not the *spoken* sentence but the logical proposition—is the mode, the existential form, the validity. Everything else—quality, time, form, numeral—finds its place in the concept, which is diametrically opposed to experience. By definition, and in order to be *correct*, the concept must comprise all possible logically meaningful statements.

We did not start with the thinking I but the I who speaks, who expresses his *experiences* or communicates them. Thus, for us, subject matter of consideration is not the proposition which has been developed out of concepts but the spoken sentence, bound to experience and Thou. It is impossible for us to accept the content of experience as existent without simultaneously to establish by what means this existence manifests itself. We posit the meaning into which, in deeper spheres, we have formed our experiences. Thus, we see the essential form of the appearance of

<sup>37</sup> HRW: Abbreviated to “mgr Sth” in the original.

<sup>38</sup> HRW: A verb form connecting subject and predicate in a “weak” manner, such as “seem,” “appear.”

‘reality not in logical correctness but in adequacy with the stream of our duration. However, in the mystery of language, concept and experience enter into an insoluble unity. Language is carried in the I stream of the real duration of the world of experience; and it is I carrier of the world of concepts. It forms its own curious (*seltsam*) realm, a truly third realm, in which all contradictions dissolve themselves because they all originate in it.<sup>39</sup>

## NOTE<sup>40</sup>

Concerning the theory of logical and linguistic qualities (characteristics)—theory of marks (*Kennzeichen*) by Husserl.

But most of all: synthetic, analytic judgments. There Kant’s error. Linguistic signification of the adjective; still more an intermixture of a priori and a posteriori. Every analytical judgment necessarily and simultaneously a priori and a posteriori.

*Synthetic* a priori not *possible* but *judgments* necessary as *experiences*—this permeates the whole of Kant.

Even antinomies of pure reason are reducible to phenomena of time and duration.

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<sup>39</sup> HRW: The last three sentences (two in the original) consist of a partially changed rendering of the passages which fill the first six lines of p. 24 of the handwritten MS. They are the conclusion of the existing text of Schutz’s Language MS. This MS is obviously incomplete. A consideration of the “basic grammatical forms” of European languages, at a minimum, would comprise not only noun and adjective but also the verb forms. But their treatment is missing.

<sup>40</sup> HRW: This note was written on a separate sheet. It was not numbered; it was found at the end of the Language MS. The page itself carries one word of text (“*Morphismus*”) on its top line. A comparison with the extant pages of the MS shows that this word is not a continuation of the text of any of them. A date given at the end of the note (29!VII 25) is identical with the last date occurring in the written part of the MS. Thus, it can be assumed that Schutz jotted the note down at the very end of the vacation period in which he drafted the Language MS, thus indicating the topic for a continuation of the work he had to interrupt. The stray word at the top of the page indicates that Schutz had written at least one other page which he either discarded or which did get lost. The note itself abounds in word abbreviations. In the translation, I have of course restored these words to their full lengths.

# Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms

Alfred Schutz

## Editor's Note

By Helmut Wagner

The original title of this unfinished manuscript is "Goethe Novella." However, Schutz abandoned it before he reached this topic. What he wrote was to serve as an extensive introduction, offering general considerations of the three major art forms which share the medium of language with one another: literary narration, drama, and poetry. For this reason, I have changed the title of this piece to the wording given above; in its changed form, it reflects the actual content of the unfinished text,

The German overall term for the literary art forms is *Dichtung*; a *Dichter* is the writer of stories and novels, plays, and, poems, and possibly all three. Yet, in the narrow sense, *Dichtung* stands for poetry. It was thus necessary to vary the translation of these terms according to the actual connotation they gain in the context in which they appear.

The novella mentioned in the title is a designation for a narrative story which is inserted into a novel. It is self-contained yet related to the novel for which it has allegorical significance. Goethe used such inserted stories in his novel, *Wilhelm Meister's Years of Travel*. The present manuscript breaks off before the central topic of the novella was reached. However, it contains one reference to it; it shows that Schutz had planned to concern himself with only one of these novellas, the story of a traveling animal show. Schutz returned to the topic of Goethe's novella in the context of an unpublished manuscript of 1948, dealing with Wilhelm Meister's *Wanderjahre*.

The Novella is a specific form of the narrative tale. When Schutz spoke of the latter in general, he referred back to the Greek epos, the poetic account of the exploits of ancient Greek heroes, and to its analysis by Aristotle. Within Western culture, the epos is the archetype of the narrative tale, and Schutz saw it as such,

In my translation, I have maintained its Greek label in order to underline the archetypical significance of the term.

Likewise, I have maintained the Greek term, *mythos*, in its original form. Here, the reason is technical. While the term, myth, is reserved for any specific mythical tale, *mythos* designates the treasure of mythical accounts, the ensemble of the myths of a specific age and culture, and the common spirit which pervades all of them.

This manuscript, like the preceding one, is linked to the manuscript of the first main part by another reiteration of the life form of the speaking I. Thus, it deals once more—in clear fashion with the positing and the interpretation of meaning, that is, with the speaker and the listener. These considerations, in turn, serve to characterize the three literary art forms: the differences among them, basically, are differences in the relationship between speaker and listener governed by the kind of intention the literary artist carries out, the kind of meaning he posits, when writing poetry, narrating a story or novel, and authoring a play.

The draft of this essay was written without sub-divisions. I have divided it into major sub-themes and added the corresponding subtitles,

## DIFFICULTIES OF LITERARY ANALYSIS

By Alfred Schutz

In these considerations, I will try to trace the transformation and meaning interpretation of primary facts of experience in the art form of the prose tale (*Erzaehlung*). The attempt will be made dealing with the example of Goethe's "Novella." For various reasons, it has to be limited to mere hints. This is so because, first, every work of art is essentially irrational. Thanks to its specific symbolic characteristics, it can never be completely reduced to other systems of symbols—in this case logical ones. Second and most of all, a work of the literary arts can never be interpreted by means which themselves are language-bound. Language analysis itself has to use the linguistic symbol system. Thereby, it begs the question.<sup>1</sup> Third, in language, the purely technical means of representation form symbol systems which in themselves are so highly complex that they plainly prevent the reduction of the meaning of the spiritual world, as given in a literary work of art, to the original facts of experience.

Such difficulties occur in the investigation of any literary work; in the case of scrutiny of narrative prose, its unique relations to the word make for additional confusion. Since Aristotle, many attempts have been made to differentiate the individual kinds of literary form (*Dichtungsarten*) from each other. But all these attempts addressed themselves either to the suitability of specific themes (*Sujets*) for presentation in epos or drama, or to the characteristic technical preconditions of these art forms. Yet, the difference seems to be much deeper and more essential: it consists

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<sup>1</sup> AS: This is different when, in another symbol series, one repostulates the meaning of the same factualities with its characteristic means; for instance, musically in song or opera.



of a basic difference in the representative materials. The latter belong to language here as well as there; in epos, as well as drama, they consist of “words.” But, the characteristics of the meaning contexts into which the different literary creations are placed (they are the same only when seen from the viewpoint of grammar) lead to differences in “materials” which are as great as those prevailing between, say, tone and color.

A more detailed elaboration of this idea leads to the center of the present investigation.

## THE LIFE FORM OF THE SPEAKING I: SPEAKER AND LISTENER

The sphere of language is a life form of Man who lives in space, time, and Thou-relation. In it, occurs the highest transformation and symbolization of that which is experienced in pure duration. The world of the speaking I has already passed through the life forms of memory and of the acting I, which constructed ever new symbol series, and through the meaning positing and meaning interpretation of the I in the Thou relation. Thus, it is quite remote from the original experience of pure duration.<sup>2</sup> It has become a space-time world, a world filled with consociates, with things named, with actions which can be expressed (linguistically, HRW). Language itself is a precipitate form of all these changing formations. It no longer solely belongs to me or to you, it is common to all of us. It comprises all objects which you and I can apperceive simply by naming them. For every [Schutz is missing a word here] of our present, past, or future actions, it contains a sign, a symbol. In short, within the language-permeated reality there is no event which language would not be able to seize—more, which could have been preformed in the word. In this sense, language and word themselves, being objectively endowed with meaning, have become an experience which is *interpreted* according to the same laws and symbol systems as any other experience seized by the word. They become an *objective meaning context* which it is necessary to subjectivize, positing a new meaning, a new meaning interpretation, through that complicated event which contains both elements and occurs in every conversation—and thus in the social sphere or in every piece of writing—thus in an apparently solitary sphere. There is a difference between the just-mentioned stances of the individual to the given objective meaning sphere of the context of language. This difference becomes completely clear when one follows some of the transformations to which an only apparently identical word

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<sup>2</sup>HRW: This passage alludes to Schutz’s theory of the life forms; it has found its elaborate treatment in the main essay of this book: *Life Forms and Meaning Structure*. The present discussion of literary symbolization may be considered an expansion of the theory of individual life forms, which was not completed in the main essay.

element is subjected in the consciousness of the speaking, the listening, and the thinking I. The speaker selects from the given meaning content of language, which, he presupposes, is also given for the person addressed, those elements which he considers adequate to the conception of meaning which he intends to express and which he assumes will induce the person addressed to reproduce them.<sup>3</sup> He posits a new meaning context among the elements selected from the general context of the language as well as between these elements and the total context of the language itself.

For the speaker, the act of positing meaning is typical.<sup>4</sup> Through it, he executes the subjectivation of the word. He appropriates it in order to communicate it to others. However, with this appropriation, the word acquires a special, unique, a new meaning for the speaker. It is the intention of every "communication" to convey, to the person addressed, this new meaning of the word. [This meaning results from (1) the relationship to the existing objectively meaning-endowed material of the language as such, and (2) its integration into the subjectively meaning-endowed context of speech.]

It is different with the listener.<sup>5</sup> First of all, he relates to the objective material of the language what has been communicated to him. This means that, first, he executes a process of meaning interpretation according to the scheme of language which he has attitudinally adopted and which is familiar to him. This is the same process as that followed by the speaker, only in reverse. The speaker selects and thereby posits a subjective meaning. The listener integrates that which has been communicated to him and, therefore, interprets it in terms of the objective meaning context of the given language material. From here, he pursues the context of the speech he has heard; that is, he tries to understand the meaning which the speaker meant. However, he can do this merely by means of integration (of the words heard, HRW) into the objective context of the language; that means only in so far as the speaker was successful in establishing the "right" connection between the objective meaning context of the language and the elements which he selected, on the one hand, and between these "appropriated" and "communicated" elements, on the other. Therefore: only when the speaker spoke "correctly" (and posited the correct meaning context) and the listener heard correctly (and correctly interpreted the meaning

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<sup>3</sup> HRW: The last two sentences (which are one in the original text) were written on the top of the left-hand margin of p. 4 of the manuscript. They replace a corresponding passage which was rendered partially unreadable in the typescript. Additional text was crossed out diagonally. But passages which were obviously needed for maintaining the meaning of the whole paragraph have been included in the translation.

<sup>4</sup> AS: In this context, we ignore that this act is likewise and necessarily yet secondarily combined with an act of meaning interpretation on the part of the speaker.

<sup>5</sup> AS: For the sake of the simplification of this exposition, I will refrain from referring either to the I who thinks in words (and thereby in concepts) and who is similar to the speaking I, or to the speaking I who corresponds to the listener. This is the more justified as the word, in every work of the literary arts, has most of all to be seen—not only from the viewpoint of an aesthetical appraisal—as tonal creation, as combination of sounds and as combination of letters.

context which was set by the speaker), there exists a chance that that which was meant will be subjectively interpreted by the listener as thus and nothing else.

Of what kind is the assumed subjectification of the objective meaning context of the (understanding) listener? No doubt: The positing of meaning on the part of the listener which occurs in the act of meaning interpretation, is completely different from the positing of meaning by the speaker which occurs in the act positing meaning. The listener does mean nothing; he does not want to provide a new meaning. Thus, he is not aware that his meaning interpretation implicitly comprises subjectification, because only from the point of view of the third observer—this is essential for the whole investigation which follows—is the act of listening a subjectification of the objective meaning context of language. For the listener himself, the word heard is and remains an objective meaning which is integrated into the objective meaning context of language, and vice versa. Not the listener, only the speaker *means* something with the word; not the speaker, only the listener interprets it. However, the listener interprets it at first as he would interpret it if it had not been spoken by the speaker, namely, the speaker in this context. For the third observer, this kind of understanding may also represent a subjective positing of meaning on the part of the listener. For him, the listener, the word keeps its objective meaning, that is: a meaning not to be posited but to be interpreted by him.

In the following exposition, “subjective meaning” shall always be taken as the intended meaning (thus of the speaker) and “objective meaning” as the meaning to be interpreted (thus by the listener). In order to simplify both terminology and investigation, the subjective positing of meaning, which inheres in all understanding, will be neglected; so the act of meaning interpretation which must precede every act of meaning positing—because it is part of the character of language as objective meaning context that every word had to be heard and understood in the past, before it could be meant and enunciated in the present.<sup>6</sup>

Yet, it should not be forgotten that, for everyone in any kind of language, each word is colored differently and surrounded by a specific aura of significance and meaning content. Simply, this aura is unique; for instance, it makes for the characteristics of style. The cause of this phenomenon is simple: the speaker is never only speaker but also listener. Therefore, it can be asserted that, in the linguistic sphere alone, a complete understanding of a meaning context posited by the speaker (subjective meaning) cannot be established in the meaning interpretation carried out by the listener (objective meaning). Within language alone, understanding remains an approximation, between subjective and objective meaning, between intended and interpreted meaning. This approximation is asymptotic (that is, the two kinds of meaning, even in the most favorable case, cannot become identical, HRW).

The many misunderstandings of daily life aside, sufficient proof for this exists in the unending possibilities of interpretation of every literary work, for instance, a single verse. The reduction of the distance between subjective and objective

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<sup>6</sup> HRW: In his later work, Schutz seems not to have reiterated *this* conception of the difference between objective and subjective meaning.

meaning is enhanced by elements which, in themselves, have nothing to do with the linguistic sphere: so through the logical context in which words are put, through the tone in which they are spoken, through facial expressions and gestures which accompany them. All are means of expression which help to divest language as expression (subjective meaning) of its mere "character of communication."

It follows that the character of words is very variable, according to whether it is spoken or heard. The form of the word is the same, the word meaning necessarily a different one. (Approximately, this corresponds to the deep distinction between word as communication and word as expression, which is postulated by the phenomenological school.)<sup>7</sup>

## POETRY, DRAMA AND NARRATIVE PROSE

The material of a literary work of art presents itself, formally uniform, as objective linguistic meaning context. This circumstance tempts us to assume the essential identity of the word in lyrical poetry, drama, and narrative prose. However, according to meaning context and structure, there exists that deep-reaching basic difference between posited and interpreted meaning which just has been considered.

In the lyrical work of art, the word is expression as such. It springs from the subjective stance which the poet assumes toward language, and it exhausts itself in this function. In its essence, the word of the lyricist does not direct itself to the listener, except the author himself. The Lyrical does not want to communicate; it wants merely to express. It "means" no meaning contexts which could gain their full meaning only in the interpretation of the listener. It posits contexts as such; they are meaningful already because they have been posited, and they are not in need of consideration in the form of meaning interpretation.

Therefore, poetry is a solitary art. It does not depend on the Thou, on the listener, as interpreter and completer of meaning. In this, most of all, it is related to music, the most solitary of all arts. In no other work of art is language allowed as much leeway as in the lyrical poem. Here, the word alone follows its own law. *The individual I stands face-to-face with language, forming himself out of it.* The listener is not essential for the existence of the lyrical work of art; but he has two ways for gaining access to the meaning of the lyrical poem: the path through the person of the poet or through the linguistic configuration. The poet can be understood by pure integration into the Thou relationship. Here, the listener, so to speak, reproduces the literary work of art as one which is still to be created. Thus, he repeats the subjective positing of meaning by the author. It is this co-experience of the creative forming of the medium of language, of the transformation of the experience through the symbol series of all life forms up to the word, which renders original and close-to-life all true poetry.

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<sup>7</sup>HRW: Most likely, Schutz referred here to Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*.

The other path leads through the configuration of language as already posited and given. But, here too, the attempt is not made to transform the subjective meaning context of language as such into a subjective interpretation of meaning by the listener. In this kind of linguistic consideration, too, the listener stops short of the exploration of the objective language formation—provided that he knows how to listen to poetry, that is, provided that he is aware of the irrelevance of his own person for the existence of the poem. He will attempt to interpret the outer and inner regularities of this linguistic form out of its immanent meaning. Never does the listener to the poem feel that he has been addressed. He has been permitted to witness the self-presentation of an I in language. He may approach the literary work of art by way of the language configuration or through the act of its creation. But the subjective interpretation of the word, by necessity, is denied him because the word, in poetry, lives only in and through the positing of meaning. Every attempt at interpreting its meaning, on the part of the listener, would rob it of its most, essential character; it would transform it into prose, something it can never become as long as poetry remains true to its essential character.

This also explains why poetry knows rhythm in the sense of the time-beat of the tones of language (metrical foot) and rhyme. The rhythm of the lyrical poem is an element of linguistic creation. It is related to musical rhythm in so far as it represents the purest projection of inner duration into time: the most noble and primary positing of meaning which is granted to the creating I. The rhyme is an element of the creation of language-art. It is enclosed in that realm of language which blocks any meaning interpretation by the listener. It is accessible solely to meaning positing by the speaker; for the rest, it is subjected to its own idiosyncratic and irrational law.

(Exponents of, HRW) a philosophy of the rhyme arrive at a mystique of language in which they try to decipher contexts in the unfathomable independent life of language—independent of speaker and listener—as a hypostasis of its immanent meaning. Or else they establish an exclusive relation between the positing and the configuration of language forms, but never between linguistic-art configuration and interpretation. To hear a rhyme can never become object of a meaning interpretation; it even never can be object of a solely aesthetic evaluation. To form a rhyme is highest fulfillment of the self-representation of the I through and in language.

The word of the poet is only posited meaning. It does not need a listener; nay, it does not let him come close. It is pure spoken word.

[[Here, it has to be inserted that, according to the whole orientation of these considerations, the differentiation between the art forms within language can be nothing but completely superficial characterizations of their essentials. They claim neither completeness nor classificatory significance. Here, too, one speaks only about the lyrical, the epic, the dramatic. Of course, a “novel” may be purely lyrical; a tragedy purely epic, a poem (ballad) purely dramatic.]]

The word of the dramatist is completely different: the dramatic dialogue consists of communications; the word is spoken, and that means spoken to another person. It is intended to be heard, understood, and interpreted. And this not only by the audience as the ideal observer but also by the co-player: the consociate, or better, the

actor as symbol of the consociate who finds himself on stage simultaneously with the speaker. Thus, as communication the word of the dramatist depends on a listener, if not already on the audience as listener, so on the antagonist (on the stage, HRW). The audience participates in the acts of positing and interpreting meanings. But only when they identify themselves with the acting persons on the stage can they grasp the word, which now they have to interpret, as expression of the author beyond the mere communication between protagonist and antagonist.

Here, we must refrain from investigating the complicated manner in which these derivated acts of positing and integrating meanings occur. However, from the hints given it follows clearly enough that the word has a very different function in the tragedy and yields a totally different material for creative expression than it does in the lyrical poem.

On this occasion, we may look at the difference in the relations of the poet and of the dramatist to their respective works. The lyrical work of art disappears completely behind the personality of the poet; the reader is always dominated by the feeling that he is in the presence of the subjective expression of an individual personality. By contrast, to be successful, the work of the dramatist demands the complete retreat of the personality of the author behind his work. The meaning of the drama is to bring the tragical action before the eyes of the spectator as if he would really co-experience it from beginning to end. An interpretation of the dramatic action by the dramatist is completely unimaginable, in so far as it would be directed at the spectator—that is, to speak with Nietzsche, at Dionysian man.<sup>8</sup> The spectator can conclude that the dramatist equipped this or that figure with these or those traits only in contemplative considerations, that is, only after the curtain came down.

What is the position of the representing prose writer in comparison with these relations between playwright and work? It may be easier to answer this question if we consider first the role of the reader or listener of a tale. There is no art form in which so little is left to the fantasy of the reader as in the tale. The listener of the drama enjoys the fascination of following the dialogue and, therefore, of simultaneously interpreting the subjective meaning of the speaker and the objective meaning of the addressed hero. Thus, under all conditions, he is better than any of the acting figures on the stage informed about all circumstances of the fate which this meaning undergoes in the dialogue. This state of tension is eliminated, let's say, in a dialogue which is reproduced in narrative form, since the narrator always offers it in the form of a meaning interpretation. What the spectator in the theatre has himself to deduce from gesture and tone, the reader receives from the narrator in form of directorial annotations. The audience is free to imagine the arena of the actions, according to their own fantasy, on the basis of the hints given

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<sup>8</sup>HRW: This typological dichotomy was set up by Friedrich Nietzsche in his book on *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). Apollonian Man is the artist, thinker, and actor of “measured constraint,” of calm meditation, of sober rationality. Dionysian Man, by contrast, is the ecstatic enthusiast, the person of emotional exuberance, and the impulsive actor.

with the scenery. But the prose author predesigns the arena of events for the reader—down to the smallest detail. The spectator of a drama can treat time in the auditorium at will during a change of scenes on the stage or with the lowering of the curtain. He is able, without transition, to step at any moment into the midst of the presently most important event. The reader of a narrative is forced to accept the course of time as imposed by the writer. In its way, this time represents a kind of continuum which can be interrupted only on the basis of specific reasons or with the help of specific technical tricks. In one word, the reader of a narration is completely dependent on the author; the spectator of the drama stands free in juxtaposition to the action and its exponents.

It follows that, in narration, the author plays the role of the audience in the theatre or, more exactly, pretends to see what is played. It is not the reader but the author who is omniscient. Goethe's definition of the novella as an unprecedented event which took place, is in need of the complementation, "which the narrator claims to have witnessed."<sup>9</sup>

If the comparison is admissible, the ideal of a narrator is the theatrical spectator who went home and reported the course of the dramatic action. He will never occur in the tale of his visit to the theater; he wants to relate solely the events on the stage but not his appraisal of them. However, it is a presupposition for his account that he saw the drama to the end. Only seen from the last act does the first one become so understandable to the narrator that his account can create a clear picture of the course of action (presented in the drama, HRW).

Both the poet and the dramatist receive the raw materials for their artistic creations from the sphere of real experiences. The poet does not presuppose a reader when he forms his material. By contrast, the narrator receives the precipitate of his creative activity, so to speak, in an already preformed state. The narration, as presented to the reader, is a practically finished product; nothing in it changes during its presentation. The reader has one single task: to listen. He is excluded from artistic collaboration and participation, as far as the forming of the material is concerned. However, since the narration is a work of art, he has the task to interpret this work of art as presented in its inner meaning and symbol (content, HRW).

## EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION

The conception presented finds support in the purely temporal relation of the reader to the work of art. As pure expression, poetry is apperceived by the always accidental reader in a sphere which transcends all time; it belongs solely to pure duration. For the spectator in the theater, the time conception of the event on the stage is necessarily

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<sup>9</sup> AS: For the time being, we speak here only of the purely narrative account. For reasons to be explained later, narrations in I-form, among them letters and diaries, do not fit into these considerations.



that of the present. With good reasons, the author of a narrative work directs the reader to accept the content of the story as something (which happened in the, HRW) past. This alone makes it impossible for the reader to interfere with the course of the tale even empathetically. What is told has been, is finished and unchangeable. Therefore, it does not reach the present of the reader. This is the main reason for the fact, that narration, in all languages, normally assumes the form of the past tense.<sup>10</sup> This form may be abandoned in certain passages, only for very specific reasons. About these technical tricks, more will have to be said later.<sup>11</sup>

The need to make sure that the action has taken place and is finished and to exclude the reader from any direct participation leads to extraordinary precautions: A narrated dialogue is offered as being quoted by the narrator: "He said ...," "He answered ...."

To summarize, it must be said that the bridge between narrator and reader is indirect.<sup>12</sup> The narrator remains hidden behind his work only for the reader. In reality, he stands above the action; he knows its complete course before the reader learns about it. As said before, the role of the reader is reduced to the sole task of listening.

As listener, the reader receives the words of the narrator. Thus, he faces an objective language context which he has to interpret. The connection with the subjective meaning of the narrator has almost completely been lost by him. For the reader, the narrator is always anonymous. The word in a tale, so to speak, shows the reverse of the word in poetry. In poetry, it belongs to the speaker as pure expression; the word of narration is necessarily directed at the listener. Through the word, the poet forms his own self: in language; the narrator anticipates in his language-work the subjective meaning interpretation of the listener. Poetry is always forming of language; narration is always formed language.<sup>13</sup>

In narration, the word presents itself to the listener as objective meaning context which has to be interpreted; according to its structure, it is decisively the word heard. Thereby, it is not asserted that the literary representation of prose has the character of communication. On the contrary, narration is essentially, different from mere "communication," if conversation in daily life is accepted as basic type of the latter.

In contrast to narration, most of all, communication is essentially social oriented. The communicator does not merely presuppose, as does the narrator, the existence

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<sup>10</sup> HRW: Schutz, here, spoke of the "Praeteritum" in agreement with his preference for grammatical terms in Latin.

<sup>11</sup> HRW: The existing text of this unfinished manuscript does not contain a specific discussion of such literary devices as changing the tenses in the course of a narration.

<sup>12</sup> HRW: This sentence and the preceding short paragraph were written by hand on the left margin of p. 17 of the original MS. It replaced and in part repeated a crossed-out passage of five lines of plain text and seven lines on which different words were typed on top of each other. This, obviously, was due to an error of the typist. The content of the text of the crossed-out passage, as originally typed, is literally contained in the next paragraph of the MS.

<sup>13</sup> HRW: It follows an unfinished sentence which breaks off with the end of the MS page. But it does not connect with the next page, which begins with a new sentence. Either the typist left a gap in the text here, or Schutz omitted to cross out the unfinished sentence.



of consociates who understand him. Rather, he expects through his communication to induce the person addressed to take some kind of position, to resort to a conduct which is oriented on his communication and is therefore social. He does not merely expect understanding but a conduct which is conditioned by this understanding and oriented toward it. Such conduct may occur in the form of an action: maybe in an answer or in inner conduct, maybe in a motivational change of the affectual situation of the person addressed on the basis of his interpretation of the facts offered to him. Communication is always purposive-rational; it always expects to release a specific effect in the addressed person. Therefore, it is directed to, one or several addressed persons who, in the opinion of the speaker, offer a chance to release the conduct which he intended by his communication. Even the speaker at a rally considers the given "mass" whom he addresses and expects from them a specific reaction to his "communication."

Not so the novelist as narrator. He directs himself to a listener whose existence he presupposes as much as the chance to be understood by him. But he does not expect social conduct from his listener. His story is not purposive-rational; he does not "want" to achieve an immediate effect through it—except the aesthetic effect produced by any work of art. The listener, whose existence is presupposed, may thus remain anonymous without thereby doing damage to the story. As work of art, the story neither in content nor in intention makes a selection among the circle of all possible readers. It directs itself neither to an individual nor a social group; it merely addresses the listener, whoever he may be. This is contrary to the character of communication. The latter, both in content and form, is always oriented toward, the individual situation of the person addressed and wants to release a specific conduct.

From this follows the second difference between narration as work of art and communication. Since the narrator does not direct himself to a specific listener, he alone decides about the subject matter of the story, and that in the widest possible sense. He alone selects from all possible contents those which appear to him worthwhile to be told. The person of the listener does not influence the decision. Therefore, the unity of the narration is consistently preserved: The narrator always pays attention to the existence of the listener but never to his orientation.

In contrast to "expression" and "communication," the typical character of the word in narration will be called "representation" (*Darstellung*). It has to be stressed that "representation" is a generic concept. To it belongs, next to narration, a whole series of linguistic objectifications carrying representative character, most of all didactic representations of scientific investigations. But we are not concerned with all types of linguistic forms and abstain from investigating the related forms of representation. Decisive for all of them, ultimately, is the character of the symbol system which is shaped in representation. For instance, in scientific representation the system is that of knowledge, respectively of the particular categories of thinking. Generally what manifests itself in literary narration is the symbol system of the work of art, and more specifically the symbol series of poetry as such. A possible definition of "epos" is the following: linguistic representation which is subordinated to general poetic laws.

## RULES OF UNITY AND UNFOLDING

According to Goethe's and Schiller's essay, "Concerning Epic and Dramatic Literature," the "general poetic laws" are most of all the laws of unity and unfolding. Their effect on the species "narration" will subsequently be studied with Goethe's "Novella."<sup>14</sup> It will be demonstrated that that which is essentially epic can always be reduced to the specific character of the word in the epos. All distinctions between poetry and drama can be located in the completely different structures of the word material which is the foundation of these species in the sense of the above investigations.

According to Goethe and Schiller, the laws of unity and unfolding dominate the epic as well as the dramatic forms. What is the essential content of these laws? But, first of all, what does it mean to pose the question of laws in a form of art?

On the surface, it appears that a law of art is nothing more than a mere, pragmatic formula of craftsmanship. It seems to have been found in a purely empirical way providing, so to speak, a recipe for satisfying one aesthetical postulate or other. Partly, this view is not unwarranted: this is so because what is generally claimed to be a law of art is of quite heterogeneous nature. Sometimes, "laws of art" are simply ideal-typical constructions of a specific style period. As examples may serve the laws of a triangular, respectively pyramidal, composite structure of works of the fine arts in the Renaissance and Baroque periods, but also Boileau's poetry. Characteristically, this group of laws of art is valid only for a specific, historically limited, realm of style. We do not assert that such laws are merely superimposed upon the respective works of art by later art analysts. It is also completely irrelevant whether such laws originated in the striving for repeating that which had proven itself as being of beautiful or pleasant effect, or whether a specific creative will of an artistic individuality or a dominant school gave rise to their formulation and development. Essentially it is only that we deal here not with general laws of art but with rules which are particular for a specific group of works of art. Other works of art follow other laws. We will call this group of laws or art style-immanent laws.

Another group of laws produces exclusively formal crafts-rules; to follow them allows the production of effects, which have been intended beforehand, on and through given materials. Such laws, too, are valid only within limited periods and areas. However, they span several style periods: in them, the traditional moment is much more prominent than in style-immanent laws. They also unite geographically larger areas.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> HRW: The quotation marks do not indicate a title but specify a literary device. See the introductory note to this essay. When Schutz broke off his work on this essay, he had not yet reached its main topic.

<sup>15</sup> AS: Note: In these considerations, we can neglect the purely technical rules, for instance, of the correct treatment of the palette or the theory of the possibilities for the use of instruments in an orchestra (however not the theory of their harmony). This is merely a matter of rules of everyday experience which are related to art only in a very indirect context.

In painting such laws are the laws of perspective which are valid for Western paintings since the fifteenth century. In music, such laws are the laws of the theory of harmony (in so far as it is not concerned with leading singing voices—*Stimmungsfuerung*); they apply only to our occidental rationalized system of sharps and flats in its present form. It is not valid for any other system, for example, the five-tone or the quarter-tone systems. We shall call this group material-rational laws. Such laws are limited to specific materials and display distinctively purposive character. A whole series of other such laws could be mentioned. Essentially, the achievement of the customary history of art, literature, and music consists in nothing else but the postulation of such laws limited to periods and areas. In contrast to them, a group of essential laws of every species of art exist which can be demonstrated to be valid for any work of art beyond all limitations of period and area.

These laws are essential because they contain the categories of the understanding of any work as such. They transcend its time-space objectification and contain the presuppositions for the acts of positing meaning by the artist and for the acts of meaning interpretation by the viewer (listener, reader, HRW) both within the symbol series characteristic of the specific artistic material (in which the artists work HRW).

We call these laws the *meaning* laws of the arts. For example, to them belong, in architecture, all those laws which are concerned with the symbolic interpretation of space itself (theory of the relations of dimensions) and, in music, those laws which deal with the symbolic reduction of time sequences in their relation to duration (e.g., theory of melody or of rhythm).

With regard to works of the literary arts, only those laws can be called laws of meaning<sup>16</sup> which reduce the objective meaning content of the linguistic context to the linguistically formed and posited meaning of the writer as well as the meaning interpretation of the linguistic form by the reader. Therefore, they bring both into one single and necessary context. A law which is applicable only to the acts of meaning posited by the writer would be a law of literary fantasy; it would have to be immanent in the consciousness of the writer. Here belong, for instance, all the rules about literary subjects which have been postulated by Goethe. A law treating only the act of meaning interpretation could only state something about the character of the understandability of a literary object; that is, so to speak, it is a rule for the interpretation of literary meanings in the consciousness of the reader. Here belong all rules concerning “effect” and consequences of a work of art.

One cannot call the two groups ‘laws of meaning’ because they remain ever immanent in consciousness. They would belong to the real duration either of the writer or the listener; it is out of these durations that the linguistic creation is objectified. And, in reverse, these durations enter into the literary form as subjective

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<sup>16</sup> AS: If we speak of meaning laws of language, it should never be forgotten that it is always a matter of laws of art which, within the literary work of art, understand the transformation of the artistic language symbol from the positing of meaning by the writer to the meaning interpretation by the listener. They belong to a completely different complex of problems as the mere meaning laws of language whose basic types are the propositions of grammar.

elements. The laws of meaning of literary creations transcend these two subjective and thereby real durations. They belong neither solely to the consciousness of the writer nor exclusively to that of the listener but to the objective context of language. For this reason, they are accessible to the act of positing meaning as well as that of interpreting meaning; thus, they belong to the consciousness of both. As in the case of all meaning contexts which transcend individual consciousness, these laws result in ambivalences. The writer views the law of meaning only in the specific conscious attitude of the reader toward the objective linguistic context, as it takes place in the act of understanding and thus in meaning interpretation. The reader cannot possibly see anything else in the law of meaning than the embodiment of the conscious processes of the writer which make the literary creation possible.

This dual aspect is made possible by the fact that, in literature, each law of meaning<sup>17</sup> [contains the possibility of an objective linguistic context and with it of language formation and language form as such. Therefore, every law of meaning concerning the literary work] postulates a connection between duration and the space-time existence of the objective language context. This connection is characteristic of the literary symbol series. Only the phenomenon of duration is common to the consciousness of both listener and writer. In its essence, each law of meaning will be anchored in the Thou relation even though it externally establishes a connection not between two consciousnesses in duration but only between one such consciousness (of the writer or the reader) and the spatial-temporal objective language context. In other words: the laws of meaning of the literary work of art are neither normative ought-rules nor empirical propositions. They are of a purely genetic-explanative nature. They typify the preconditions for the transformation of literary conceptions, experienced in the duration of the writer, into the space-time language material which is endowed with objective meaning. But it does the same also for the possibility of experiencing the objective space-time language context as a symbol context in the duration of the reader.

Speaking schematically, the following steps result: original experience in duration of the writer, symbolization in the symbol series by the writer, act of positing meaning in the linguistic creation, objective linguistic context (language form), meaning interpretation of the linguistic form by the reader, reinterpretation of the literary material through reduction to the generally essential (de-symbolization), reinterpretation in pure experience of duration by the reader. The true meaning law of language has to bring all the mentioned events into a necessary, uninterchangeable, specific, and conscious context which offers their genetic explication.

The laws of unity and unfolding are such laws of meaning. The former aims at the symbolization of duration in a purely spatial-temporal and objective linguistic context. The latter aims at the reinterpretation of the manifold successions of the stream of consciousness into a coexistence which is arranged in a certain way.

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<sup>17</sup> HRW: Here, the manuscript contains a crossed-out passage; I have restored it to the text, setting it between brackets.

According to Schiller and Goethe, the laws of unity and of unfolding are general literary laws. Therefore, they must be valid for every kind of literary creation. This, again, means that the Goethe-Schiller law of unity must be based on another concept than that of the three units of drama: place, time, and action—as postulated by Aristotle, misunderstood and banalized in French poetry, and modified in more recent German but most of all English literature. Yet, as revealed by closer inspection, the law of unity in literature, as law of meaning of the literary work of art, is merely that general proposition of which the three units of the drama are specific applications.

Every artistic creation is a closed symbol system. As such, it tends to interpret primary facts of experience and to endow them with meanings which are specific to the artistic symbol series. It can achieve this only when it is able to contain the basic elements of every experience, even though transformed. Seen from this angle, the conflict between realism and symbolism, which dominates all artistic tendencies of all places and times, is not limited to aesthetic evaluations. The general value problem is at its root: what should be achieved by a value system as such? Is the transformation of the content of experience, which occurs in and through the symbol and creates a larger or smaller distance between symbol and symbolized, at all possible without becoming unexperientiable, that is, absolutely irrational?

If one accepts this formulation, realism would mean bringing the literary symbol series closer to the symbol series of our external real life. Symbolism would mean the opposite. But neither artistic realism nor symbolism has ever theoretically or practically denied that the basic facts of our experience of our truly real inner world present the sole foundation for artistic symbolization. Our daily life in the outer world presents itself as a highly complex symbol system which transforms the material of our inner world. Therefore, the postulate of artistic realism signifies only an approximation of the artistic symbol system to the symbol system of our daily life. We are more familiar with the latter than with all other symbol systems, because we act in it, live in it with our consociates, speak and think in it. Therefore, it appears to be privileged. Consequently, the postulate of realism, aiming at the approximation of the artistic symbol series to that of daily life, is only a style-immanent law. The true relation between the meaning of art and the meaning of life must lie elsewhere. The laws, which deal with this relation, have to be common to all styles and all periods. They cannot be subjected to evaluations; therefore, they cannot be concretized, to various degrees, in material works of art. They have to be absolute because their origin lies where the symbol series of art and of daily life spring from the basic experience of the inner world, which is common to both.

What has been explained in the immediately preceding passage applies to all kinds of art. In the literary work, it becomes difficult because language itself is a symbol series of daily life as well as of artistic creation. At the beginning of these considerations, it has been explained to what degree the word of daily speech can be identified with the word of the literary writer. We deal here not with the material of the given symbol but with the meaning of the symbol series itself. Namely, if life and poem are said to issue from a common basic experience, it must be possible, in an act of self-contemplation, to reduce both symbol systems to one original

experience. In spite of all transformations, the meaning of the final symbolic formulation must be identical with that of the original experience. Otherwise, no possibility would remain for meaningfully integrating these symbol series themselves, as experiences, into the stream of our consciousness. A fundamental law of all symbolic creation postulates that the symbol must be experientiable just as meaningfully as that which it symbolizes. A poem, which would not satisfy this postulate, would be meaningless in itself as soon as it has gained its finished form. We may say that it would occur in a language we do not understand, even though we may have understood it when the poem emerged. Thus, we can risk asserting that the laws of unity in poetry mean nothing else than the postulate of the identity of the poetic object with the original experience of our inner world which, in turn, becomes the foundation of poetic creation.

This thesis seems simple but is exposed to great misunderstandings as soon as one attempts to lift the original experience out of our familiar symbol series of daily life in order to integrate it into the symbol series of artistic creation. Again and again the fatal attempt has been made to form poetic symbol series in the same fashion in which symbol series of daily life enter into the course of the latter.

The theory of the three units of the drama may be mentioned as a typical example of such a misunderstanding, particularly in the interpretation of French writers. Lessing already realized that, for the ancient thinkers, the original law was that of the unity of action. Other unities resulted from it without difficulties, like that of place and of time. Unity of action means nothing other than a meaningful course of the dramatic event—meaningful because it occurs according to the same laws which govern the successive development of the original experience in our duration. But already here, in this main law of unity, occurs a stupendous misunderstanding.

Within inner duration, the development of our basic experiences occurs in a most variegated manner. We cannot account for it, either in language or in thought, when we try to break through the symbol series of our outer world and to retreat intuitively into the inner world. We may mention the dream as an example. Its apparent meaninglessness can only consist in the fact that succession and unfolding of the dream events occur not according to the categories of the outer world. Thus, they are linguistically not comprehensible. When a writer like Strindberg attempts dramatically to recreate dream events, he apparently destroys the “unity of action” in the sense of French literature. Yet, he does not violate this basic law. French literary theory demands that the poet establish the unity of action in his poem with the same means with which a thinking person in the outer world of his daily life tends to recreate the unity of his basic experience: conceptual and *motivational*.

Thus, it happens that, according to the theory of Boileau and Corneille, unity of action is confused with sufficient motivation—a view which is so deep-rooted that even a mind like Lessing shared it. Like no other writer of his time, he recognized the insufficient and confused conception of the basic laws of drama as displayed by the French dramatists. Yet, he felt he had to defend his Shakespeare against the reproach of insufficient motivation; he attempted to show that real motivational reasons (for Shakespeare’s dramatic characters, HRW) can be assumed as possible and are therefore admissible.

Of course, the possibility of confusing the unity of action with the continuity of motivation in the conceptual-linguistic sense exists because “motivation” is a specific category of the literary symbol function. Yet, it has nothing to do with the conceptual—logical motivation of daily life. If both are identified with one another, it is on the basis of the impossible notion that the relations between literary creations can be exchanged with the relations in our external life, and this without any adaptation.

This basic misunderstanding also explains the truly curious forms which the postulates of the unity of time and the unity of space have assumed in the course of the history of literature. The unity of the stream of duration represents an irreversible unambiguous relation between our immediate experiences. In outer life, the symbol of this unity of duration is the unity of real time. The latter is nothing else but a projection of duration into space. Nobody has ever thoroughly investigated the transformation of duration in the artistic, and especially the time-bound literary symbol systems of poetry (and other literary art forms, HRW). Erroneously, one has conceived the time concept of daily life as a category of the literary symbol system. Here, Lessing achieved something important. In the 45th piece of his “Hamburg Dramaturgy,” he denounced as superstition the notion that dramatic action has to take place within the physical time of a single day, countering it by the demand that one has to consider the unity of moral time—which has nothing to do with physical time. This was to mean that the stage events occur in irreal, imaginary time, not experienced by anyone. This time is neither like our duration nor like physical time; it is the projection of duration into the linguistic-literary symbol series (in contrast to the linguistic-conceptual one).

It will not be necessary analogously to demonstrate the same for the unity of place. Here, too, the need for spatial fixation of the basic experience within the literary symbol series is attempted with a means which belongs not to the latter but to the outer world. How much the postulates of the unity of place and of time depend on the already-formulated law of the unity of action, has been shown in the example of the drama. However, since it is a law of meaning, all kinds of literary creation are subject to it. This is only possible if one sees, in the law of the unity of action, nothing more than the metaphorical expression of the unity of the primary experience.

In this sense, Aristotle’s definition of the unity of action, as given in his *Poetics*,<sup>18</sup> is only a special case. It pertains to epos and drama, but can also be applied to poetry, provided that action, in the broadest sense, is understood as original experience. The Aristotelian definition of the unity of time,<sup>19</sup> too, is only a special application of his law of the unity of action to the factualities of epos and drama. Therefore, in the

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<sup>18</sup> AS: In all recreating arts, recreation has to present *one* object; the plot of the drama, as recreation, also has to present *one* action, and this one in its totality. Its parts have to cohere in such a way that, if one of them is changed or removed, the whole itself suffers alteration and transformation (*Poetics*, chapter 6).

<sup>19</sup> AS: The tragedy, as far as possible (limits) its action to one day, or goes as little as possible beyond it. The epos, however, is not tied to any time limits (*Poetics*, chapter 4).



sense of Goethe and Schiller, our task remains to demonstrate the law of meaning of every form of literature and, within individual kinds of literature—poetry, epos, drama—to reduce it to the meaning structure of the word material as expression, communication, and representation.

We have stated earlier that, in the literary work of art, the law of meaning displays a peculiar ambivalence. The reader will always presuppose the meaning law within the literary conception, the writer always presupposes the interpretative process of the reader. Actually, both conceptions are deceptive. The essence of the law of meaning transcends consciousness. Therefore, it cannot be anchored in duration but only in the objective reality of language. Applied to the law of unity, this means that, for the reader, the unity seems to be given in the literary conception. Aristotle thought of something similar when he spoke of the action of the poem, whose parts have to cohere in such a fashion that the whole suffers change and transformation even if only one single part is altered or removed. Obviously, this notion refers to the act of poetic conception.

The reconstructing reader may ask himself how the composition would be changed if this or that part had been formed differently. Obviously, this question aims at the creative process of the writer. Yet, it is always presupposed that he, the reader, would subject a thus imaginarily changed literary piece to a specific but different interpretation. For instance, such a task is executed by the philologist who scrutinizes variations of the same poem with regard to their aesthetic value.

In reverse, the writer apperceives the unity of the object not as unity of the creative act of its conception. To him, all possibilities of selection among the experiences on hand are still open. However, only he can change or correct a poem without violating the law of unity. He certainly will make such corrections in order to satisfy this law. This is so because, by unity of the original experience, the writer understands the unity of the experience in the interpretation of the reader.

After finishing his "Novella," Goethe posed the question to Eckermann whether the owner of the animal show, together with wife and child, should already appear in the exposition.<sup>20</sup> He rejected this plan for reasons not so much taken from the law of unity as the law of unfolding. He limited himself to let the lion roar when the princess and her entourage pass the cages; he makes these changes with the clear intention to evoke a specific effect in the reader. This specific effect consists in the adaptation of the fundamental stratum of the literary symbol series to the original experience of the reader, which he intends to evoke.

The ambivalence of the meaning laws of literature comprises acts of positing meanings and of interpreting meanings, or so it seems. This leads to the assumption that the essence of the word, as it reveals itself to naive considerations in the objective reality of language, must be the carrier of the law of meaning. This notion is as imprecise as it is incorrect, if one means by objective reality of language the word as such. The latter could as well be object of grammar, of conversation in daily life,

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<sup>20</sup> HRW: That is, whether it should be made a part of the continuously narrated action, as unfolded in the novel itself.



as of artistic creation. However, if we take the initially asserted structural change of the word in each of its material functions, the law of meaning can very well be transposed into the reality of objective language. In the sphere of the word as material of literary creation, the law of unity would assert nothing else than the adequacy of the word to the original experience of inner duration. The postulate of the identity of the word with the original experience would be completely unverifiable. Between that which is symbolized and the symbol exists not the relation of identity but only the relation of adequacy. Seen from this angle, the differentiation of the meaning structures of poetry, epos, and drama—which was offered at the start of this investigation—appears in a new light. It turns out that these structural differences issue from the capacity of objective linguistic materials as such to be adequate to experiences.

However, expression, communication, and representation are not only functions of language; they also designate a specific quality of the original experiences itself. It follows that some themes are considered unsuitable for one or the other literary art form. The basic experiences, to which these themes refer, display specific affectual tones which push toward one of the given means of literary creation. If one intends to achieve the adequacy of the word in objective linguistic reality to the affectually colored original experience, the word will have to be formed as expression, communication, or representation. Consequently, its form must be the lyrical poem, the drama, or the epic. All three forms are linguistic functions subjugated under literary laws of meaning. Thus, they are all subordinated to the law of unity, because this law is already the foundation of the material which, in its structural differentiation, leads to the origin of the individual species of literature. To discuss in what manner each literary form, with its specific material, satisfies the law of unity and how it modifies it, is a task which goes far beyond the framework of the present investigation. On occasion of the analysis of the “Novella,” something will have to be said about this in connection with comparative references to poetry and drama.<sup>21</sup>

From our expositions thus far, one may erroneously conclude that the apparently literary meaning law of unity is either a general law of language, or else that it amounts to no more than a tautology: within literature, the objective language material is reduced to its structural form. By way of a *petition principii*, the general literary law of meaning is deduced from this reduction. As to the first objection: we do not at all deny the possibility of the existence of an analogous law of meaning of language in other than the literary symbol forms; so in the logical-conceptual sphere. It is merely excluded from consideration here. As to the second objection: the paradox is (based on the assumption, HRW) that one makes into a characteristic of the objective meaning context in poetry what is “poetic” from the outset. This (erroneous assumption) can be traced back to the transposition of the factual configuration into the linguistic-conceptual sphere.

The experiencing I lives in all systems and thus also in that of the symbol series and no less in the system of facts which are to be symbolized. For it, such a paradox cannot appear. However, the latter must occur in the ideal-typical abstractions of

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<sup>21</sup> HRW: This intention was not carried out.

independent symbol series if one does not assume that the symbol function is exhausted in the act of transforming that which is symbolized into the symbol. The symbol, too, enters as experience into the stream of consciousness in no other way than the original experiences which are the ground for the event of symbolization.

A basic experience, which enters into the symbol forms of language and further into those of literature, does thereby not dissolve itself into symbols. It remains effective and mixes itself with newly added experiences of formed symbols; it becomes a new and third experience. The experience, which is literarily transformed, does not enter memory loosely and unconnected with the literary symbol series: it mixes itself with it. Within unitary consciousness, it thereby becomes itself literary. Thus, the tautology is fictitious.<sup>22</sup> At first, the law of unity is a law of the literary transformation of the basic experience into the symbol form of the poem. Since the poem, in turn, becomes experience, this law becomes later a law of the original literary experience as such.

Having concluded the investigation of the literary law of unity and demonstrated its meaning structure, we can treat the law of unfolding in shorter form. This law of meaning, too, concerns the essential linkage between the streams of consciousness of the writer and the reader (on the one hand, HR W), and the objective.

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<sup>22</sup> HRW: Schutz, obviously, refers here to what he earlier called begging the question and a paradox: the untenable assumption that objective literary concepts are constructed from literature and not from language itself.

# Meaning Structures of Drama and Opera

Alfred Schutz

## Editor's Note

By Helmut Wagner

This manuscript, if not written before all the other studies united in this volume or at least conceived and outlined before them, has been placed last. This is dictated by its content. Its theme both links it to and places it after the *Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms*. Dealing with the art form of the drama, it reiterates and expands the discussion of one of the literary art forms analyzed before. However, the drama, here, occurs as a kind of substratum and point of origin of the art form of the musical drama and the opera proper. The latter occurs as a transforming combination of the forms of dramatic stage performance and that of music, yielding a synthesis which presents itself as an art form in its own rights.

Again, this thematic expansion gave Schutz the occasion to apply to the operatic art form the insights presented in the preceding piece: the objectification of the meaning posited by the artist, the subjective meaning interpretation of the operatic work by the viewer/listener, and the dramatic treatment of the Thou problem.

Schutz placed these central themes within a historical framework and the framework of a comparative analysis of various operatic forms and styles. Although these considerations are necessarily sketchy, they betray his quite thorough knowledge both of the history of the musical art forms and of their structural variations.

## ART FORMS AND FORMS OF THE OPERA

By Alfred Schutz

It is necessary to keep the question of the meaning of an art form separate from the question of the meaning of a work of art. A work of art may be considered a social product; that is, it can be studied in its particular relations to the Thou-problem of

which it is a part both with regard to its intention and its effect. The mere material form of a work of art lends itself to a dual interpretation of its meaning. On the one hand, an interpretation of the objectified concrete work of art refers to the meaning posited by its creator. On the other hand, its meaning interpretation finds its problematics and its limitations in the objective meaning content in which the work of art presents itself to the art appreciator. [To distinguish these two forms of interpretation should be the main task of every aesthetics; up to now, theories of the latter have unfortunately been permeated with the contradiction between the work of art to be created and the created work of art.]

With regard to the genus of an art or, if you wish, the art form, this duality of interpretation is absent. To both the artist and the art appreciator, it presents a completely objective type which has to be filled with a new meaning content. It is difficult to decide whether a sharply articulated art form is meaningful in itself, or whether every art form receives its meaning only from the content with which it is filled and from the specifically given idea which it concretely presents. However, it seems to me that this problem issues exclusively from an equivocation of the term “meaning.” On the one hand, the term signifies the reversal of attention from the posited symbol to the symbol to be interpreted; on the other hand, it is used as expression of the inherent necessity (*eigene Gesetzmäßigkeit*) of anything spiritual (*geistig*). If one wants to take the term “meaning” in the first sense, he encounters no objective units of meaning as such. He finds only such which had been created before and which, in their given shape, had been placed into the spatial-temporal world and which, afterwards, had to be interpreted by another being endowed with the ability of interpreting and positing meanings. It is always possible to demonstrate the processes of positing and interpreting meanings on hand of any single work of art. To inquire merely about the art form means to neglect the act of positing meaning or, rather, to blend it with the act of interpretation: the art form is taken to be something which persists in objective unchangeability; it is not accessible to the subjective positing of meaning. While it can be filled with most different contents, it remains invariable and constant in itself.

To take the art form of the drama as example: it is certain that one cannot draw parallels between a drama by Euripides<sup>1</sup> and a modern drama, say one by Strindberg,<sup>2</sup> if one concerns oneself with the ideas expressed as well as the style in which the meaning content is brought into the form. Yet, the technical task characteristic of the drama remains the same in both cases: to present to the spectator, immediately and without interpretation, relations between humans through their acting and speaking within a specific spatial-temporal frame. Among all art forms, only the play can

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<sup>1</sup> Euripides (c. 484–407 BC) is possibly the greatest of the Greek playwright who helped bringing Athenian culture to its unsurpassed heights.

<sup>2</sup> Johan August Strindberg (1849–1912), the Swedish playwright, pioneered European theatrical realism.

perform this task; it will be achieved in every drama. Therefore, certain preconditions are common to the whole art form. For instance, (a) the interpretability of speech or gesture of the individual actor who, again, is symbol for the hero whom he presents to the audience as well to an interpreter; (b) the understandability of all relations among all persons who constitute the substance of the drama; (c) the possibility of vicariously experiencing the spatial-temporal development of the acting on the stage; finally (d) the possibility that all the factors mentioned can be thought of as means of expression or as symbols of that idea which determines the specific character of a given drama.

All these preconditions are demands on the spectator. As said before, they are made by every drama but only by the drama. A particular theme (*sujet*) can be seized upon and treated by the most different art forms; it can serve as theme (*Vorwurf*) not only for the verbal but all other art forms. Almost every myth has been object not only for epic, lyric, and dramatic literature; it has found its concretization also in painting and sculpture and sometimes even in music. However, what difference does exist between the statue of Laocoon and the account Virgil<sup>3</sup> wrote of his destruction? Lessing<sup>4</sup> used this example in order to establish the boundaries of painting and poetry. He wished to ascribe development to literature as adequate expressive content, and state (*Zustand*) to sculpture. Certainly, he showed strikingly that both art forms have to emphasize and transform other aspects of their theme as essential for themselves, lest they will contradict the form which alone is adequate to them. We do not learn from a concrete work of art what the proper mode of an art form is; we learn this only through reflections about the meaning of that which can be presented in the given art form itself.

These general considerations about the actual meaning of an art form allow us to proceed to the problem of our interest, that of the opera. At the outset, it must be stated that, in our investigations, we aim at that form of the opera which had been developed since the middle of the eighteenth century, most of all in Germany. No attempt will be made to write the history of opera. However, one has to point shortly to the historical tendencies which converged in order to bring about what we call opera today.

The place of birth of the opera was Florence, Italy. About 1600, it was created suddenly by a circle of well-known humanists who, at first for the sake of the social life of nobility, wanted to revive the antique tragedy. Thanks to the tremendous influence of Monteverdi,<sup>5</sup> the first opera house was dedicated in Venice. Soon, the opera became general property; it lost its original function as performance at festivities of the nobility. It became cruder and fell under the influence of a peculiar kind of virtuosi; eventually, it became nothing for them but an occasion to display

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<sup>3</sup> Virgil (70–19 BC), well-known Roman poet.

<sup>4</sup> Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81), German thinker, critic, and dramatist. In 1766, he wrote his famous art critical—aesthetical essay about “*Lakoon oder die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie*.”

<sup>5</sup> Claudio Monteverdi (1567–1643) the first composer of the Italian Renaissance.

their virtuosity. The original intention of reviving the antique tragedy was more and more forgotten. Even the chorus, at the beginning the most important exponent of operatic action, disappeared gradually in order to make more and more room for the artful soloists.

This fate of the serious opera (*opera seria*) was not shared by the comic opera (*opera buffa*). The latter was not rooted in the artistic speculations of the circles of nobility but in the comedy of the common people, the *commedia dell' arte*. Like all popular art forms, in contrast to the serious opera, it always managed to preserve a refreshing diversity: in the libretto through the continuation of the typifications which were popular in Italian comedies and in the musical score through the inclusion of dance forms and folksongs. Thus, in comparison with the serious opera, it gained more and mere importance. Not only did the comic opera absorb the specific characters of the comedy; from the outset, it provided a home for the lyrical pair of lovers. The latter was given more and more room; eventually, it became necessary to accept into the comic opera all those aspects of the serious opera which had maintained their value.

The relationship between these two kinds of opera may be compared to the attempt at continuing the tragedy according to the antique three laws of unity (*Einheitsgesetze*). The heroic character of the serious opera, soon, yielded to boring and empty schematization; the products of this art form became more and more identical and typical; the situations resembled each other as much as the plots (almost every composer of serious operas composed an Orpheus and an Alceste). Finally, the whole art form was frozen into a barren formula. One may contrast this with the development of the English theater up to Shakespeare's time: a development from the original folk comedy (*Ruepelspiel*)<sup>6</sup> to "Hamlet" or "King Lear." Here, any schematization had already been prevented by the inclusion of ever new popular aspects. It can be clearly seen how the living popular play gradually pulled the art drama with its best elements into its sphere. Thus, contrary to the so-to-speak retrogressive development of the art drama, it brought about that tragedy which, possibly, the initiators of the art drama had in mind.

But the serious opera did not perish without having found successors outside of Italy. According to the different social and spiritual cultures into which the serious opera had been transplanted, these successors developed their own characteristics. Most of all, France has to be named here, where the serious opera was converted into the lyrical tragedy through Lully,<sup>7</sup> Rameau,<sup>8</sup> and eventually Jean-Jacques Rousseau.<sup>9</sup> It found its revivor in Gluck,<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile, the more popular

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<sup>6</sup> "Ruepelspiel", literally "play of the louts." is a short and coarse comedy. It was brought to its most popular form by Hans Sachs (1494–1576), the Nuremberg shoemaker and poet. Shakespeare integrated an English version of the Ruepelspiel into his "A Midsummer Night's Dream" in form of the play within the play, which Bottom the Weaver and his friends perform for the Duke and his guests.

<sup>7</sup> Jean Lully (1632–87) another of the early Italian composers.

<sup>8</sup> Jean Rameau (1683–1764), French composer.

<sup>9</sup> Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), the Swiss-French exponent of the philosophy of enlightenment.

<sup>10</sup> Christoph Willibald von Gluck (1714–87), Bavarian composer.

successor of the comic opera accepted the nationally formed stamp of the French comedy merely by replacing the figures of the Italian comedy by the types of the French comedy. Only the great reform work of Gluck, whose significance is fully recognized today, created the musical drama out of the lyrical tragedy. The struggle between the so-called Piccinists and Gluckists is music-historically known and has often been described.<sup>11</sup> In it occurs the actual birth of the modern opera, the development from the lyrical but contentless stories of Metastasio<sup>12</sup> to the real tragedies of Gluck's librettists. Mozart came to Paris<sup>13</sup> during the time of the first struggle between the two camps; it was eventually lost by the Piccinists. He knew how to combine these forms with the musical play (*Singspiel*), which had followed the short spring time of the opera after Heinrich Schutz.<sup>14</sup> Mozart now created that kind of opera whose interpretation shall be subsequently attempted. [First, we shall try to understand the opera as means of expression. Secondly, with Mozart's and Wagner's operas, we shall show the possibilities which this (operatic, HRW) form can do justice to and what changes it undergoes due to most different meaning contents.]

## THE DRAMA

Possibly, it will be useful preliminarily to subject the drama alone to a minimum of consideration, thus following the procedure which Richard Wagner adopted in his main theoretical work on "Opel" und "Drama."<sup>15</sup>

What means of expression are at the disposal of the drama? Most of all, the word, the word, however, not as the expression of a single person, of an I who objectivizes his experiences in the symbol series of language; rather, the word spoken to someone and understood by him. Language itself presupposes the Thou; [concepts cannot be formed without the Thou relationship]. If one ignores this and accepts the word simply as given material, one could rightfully consider the word of the poet as pure expression: it is meaningful in itself without having to be heard or understood by somebody else. Poetry is an art form which satisfies itself. Maybe, aside from absolute music, it is the loveliest of all art forms. The word of the dramatist is of a completely different character. It is not the statement of an experiencing I who articulates his experiences to himself. Rather and always, it is communication, word

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<sup>11</sup> The Piccinnists were followers of the Italian composer Niccolò Piccinni (1728–1800) who was called, in 1776, to the French court. In Paris, he was made the center of a raging controversy with the followers of Gluck.

<sup>12</sup> Metastasio was the assumed name of Pietro Trapassi (1698–1782), Italian poet and writer of plays which were partially set to music.

<sup>13</sup> Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–91) lived in Paris during the years of 1778–9.

<sup>14</sup> Heinrich Schutz (1585–1672) was the first of the German composers of lasting significance.

<sup>15</sup> Richard Wagner (1813–83) wrote the study on "Opel" und "Drama" during his exile in Switzerland (1849–59).

spoken to someone else, word destined to be heard, understood, and interpreted: to be interpreted not only by the audience but also by the co-actor, the consociate (*Nebenmensch*), or better the actor as symbol of the consociate who finds himself simultaneously on the stage. (Here, the monologue is ignored. We refrain from inquiring whether this factor actually belongs to the art form of the poet. In any case, the positing of the Thou has been nowhere better achieved than in the dramatic monologue. In the monologue, too, speaks one human to another for whose understanding he hopes. But he speaks in order to gain clarity about himself, he reflects on actions done or actions planned and, thus, fills his loneliness with his own past or future.)

An essential, nay, the most important precondition of the drama is the Thou-relationship. Certainly, it is the Thou-relationship merely made concrete or, if you wish, symbolized in the social acting first of the heroes and then in the roles (*Masken*) of the actors. This, too, is an essential difference from poetry and epos. The ideal listener of a poem or a tale must needs depend on the word material offered. He has to limit himself to perceiving the idea of the work of art, to interpreting immediately the subjective meaning of the author. If it is permissible to say so, he has to deal with a linguistic reality. The spectator of a drama sees before him two actors who speak with one another, although not as actor A and actor B, but as Hamlet and Horatio. The scene of the actors is merely a symbol for the scene which occurred between Hamlet and Horatio; it is the symbol of the scene which occurred or, better, could have occurred somewhere sometime between someone called Hamlet and someone called Horatio.

In other words: the Thou problem as such is presented by two humans speaking with one another, but not as their real psychophysical egos would speak with one another, but as symbolization of any kind of Thou relationship at any time. The existence of such a Thou relationship, which can be clearly understood, is an essential precondition of the drama. If, in an epos, a novel, or a poem a Thou relationship is described, it of course presupposes the objective chance of the understandability of such a relationship. But these presentations are basically solitary; the relationship does not become clearly visible. Description merely offers mediate knowledge. In the drama, nobody speaks actually about the Thou relationship. It is neither described nor told—which already would be an appeal to interpret it subjectively. Rather, it is placed before the spectator without any further hint for its interpretation. The precondition for this is immediate evidence: both figures on the stage understand each other reciprocally in a similar fashion in which the spectator understands them. The partner of the actor cannot perceive the player in a fashion different from that in which we, the onlookers, could understand him. Both are humans and consociates, intelligent beings who resemble us, who use the same symbol series we use. While the writers of an epos and even the poets supply us with part of the interpretation, the dramatist leaves the interpretation completely to us. This is the more so as we not only hear the two actors speak, we also see them acting. It is not that two heroes act in their bodily existence; but two temporal-spatial physical persons act as we would act ourselves with the same understandable gestures and bodily expressions. Actually, the drama is made possible by the silent conclusion that actor A and actor B act and move before our eyes as Hamlet and Horatio acted and moved. In the



novel, Hamlet and Horatio would be integrated into the meaning relationship of the writer. He would *tell* about their gestures and movements, their appearances and their expressions. The dramatist presents them through the medium of the actors, who themselves are only symbols of the heroes. He leaves to us the task of grasping the symbols of the acting heroes in the symbols of the acting players. Since gesture and word, in the drama, belong originally and in a basic sense together, we have already established two essential means of expression in this art form. Both are based on the Thou-relationship and serve one and the same task.

The art form of the drama is a sole unity in duality (*en dia dyoin*). It takes place in the space-time world in which we live and places acting persons before our eyes. They breathe the same air as we: living persons who speak the same language and understand each other as we understand one another. It is our life which is lived and presented to us on the stage; it is the same Thou relation in which we live which is used, by the drama, as means of expression. The basic precondition of the drama is that this life, this time, this space, the Thou, the gesture, the word are generally authentic because generally understandable. The drama *symbolizes* living persons, presents them to us through other psychophysical unities, and takes place not in a one-dimensional but the spatial-temporal sphere. Nevertheless, it is the ultimate and most artistic illustration of inner duration which we can achieve: in every one of its elements, its form contains in itself pure duration as an understandable precondition of every interpretation. To clarify this idea completely is of greatest importance for the considerations which follow.

The symbolization of inner duration is made solely possible by this transplantation into the world of space and time. No other art form can bring it so vividly before our consciousness as the drama—even though its means are apparently the extreme opposite of pure duration; they are of purely spatial-temporal and conceptual nature. Reasons for this phenomenon are: the living movements and actions of the actor, which we understand; the inclusion of the spectator into the Thou relationship with the hero; and the ability to understand action and life in sympathetic introspection.

What constitutes the meaning of an actual drama depends on the external (*fremde*) material which enters into or, better, is seized by this art form.<sup>16</sup> This material itself is already endowed with meaning. The same plot could also be the material for a novel or a poem. But only the drama can present it in *this* fashion: in the particular duality of the relationship between heroes, actors, and audience on the one hand, and the meaningful pre-artistic material, the author, and the stage-setting on the other.

However, one could object that the drama does not represent *our* reality; it merely shows slices of time, space, and Thou relationship: slices which can serve as symbols in the sense of the action (outlined in the dramatic plot, HRW). In the world of our real life, no curtain falls over a scene in order to be lifted for a new one. In our

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<sup>16</sup> By material Schutz means here the dramatic plot, the story to be dramatized; usually pre-existing as legend, as story, as historical report, or at least provisionally outlined by the author before writing the drama.

world (usually, HRW) the arena of our life does not change suddenly. Our experience of space is continuous. When we leave our room and enter the street, it occurs in a continuous transition not, as in the theater, in a (sudden complete, HRW) change of scenery. In our world unexplainable events do not occur, events not subordinated to the law of causality, as they may occur on the stage, for instance, in a magical or a mystery play. Even our affects, our passions, our feelings occur differently, develop differently, display transitions, and do not have the characteristic high points which the drama exclusively presents. We live continuously; we live in our duration. Even though we are placed into time and space, we are conscious of the identity of our experiencing I in every Now and Thus.

Certainly, the dramatic happenings which we witness as spectators are different from all other happenings. They are devoid of that duration which would be ours. The time and space world of the theater may be very similar to our temporal-spatial world. Yet, the event of the stage, in all efforts to be a true symbol of our experience, remains a symbol. In every history of literature occur periods in which, characteristically, these connections have been forgotten: periods of naturalism or of an artificial classicism which attempts to make the difference between our life and the life on the stage disappear by either offering a truthful picture of reality or else by certain theatrical tricks. The well-known three laws of Aristotle<sup>17</sup> or those of Boileau,<sup>18</sup> concerning the unity of space and action in the tragedy, find their explanation here. The law of the unity of space is supposed to help us—deceptively—to overcome the misgivings which occur with the realization that our duration, when placed into space, cannot change the place of action without transition while, by contrast, this is possible in the world of the stage. In a compromise, the law of the unity of time demands that the stage action occur without interruption, at least, within the course of one day. The time spent on the stage should be close to the time of our duration, otherwise the listener would conclude that our life and our duration flow more slowly than that of the acting hero. Finally, the law of the unity of action aims at the consistency of affects and demands, at their presentation in gradual separation and integration (*auseinander und ineinander*), thereby postulating the identity between our own actual experiencing and that on the stage.

The three laws (were and, HRW) remained a genial error; more than anything else they contributed to making the form of the classical tragedy superficial. Necessarily, the drama moves toward selected high points. It establishes an ideal

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<sup>17</sup> In his *Poetics*, Aristotle (348–322 B.C.) postulated the “unity of the plot” as the crucial criterion of a good tragedy. His main requirement is that the tragedy “must represent an action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of anyone of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole” (*De Poetica* 8: 1451a). W.D. Ross (ed.), *The Student’s Oxford Aristotle*, vol. VI. London: Oxford University Press. The *Poetics* contains no explicit “law” of the “unity of space and time.” As one old but most reliable source informs us, it is “very doubtful” that Aristotle ever spoke of such a combined law; but if so, “rather as an observance than a strict law.” Johann Eduard Erdmann. *A History of Philosophy* (London: Swan, 1893), vol. 1: 176. The law, then, seems to be the product of later Aristotelians.

<sup>18</sup> Nicolas Boileau-Despreaux (1636–1711), an outstanding French writer of his period, published his *L’Art poétique* in 1674. In its third book, he dealt with tragic and epic poetry.

continuity, which is not our own. It jumps, so to speak, from positing meaning to positing meaning without showing all the intermediate stages. But the latter are the essentials of our life, of our ego. Certainly, we would all be capable of the same affects, the same feelings, the same actions and words, as those presented on the stage. However, one affect would relieve the other, one action would emerge from the other, and one, word would gain its meaning only from that word which was spoken before. The time in which the drama takes place is not our time; it is not duration. It is an imaginary time, as Bergson called the time which can be experienced neither by me, nor by you, nor by anybody else. The persons on the stage live *in* duration, but it is not our duration but an imaginary one: a duration in which, we assume, the other lives. But nobody lives through it, not even the actor who seems to live in it. For him, the drama no more signifies a continuity than it does for us. These statements about time and drama are of extraordinary importance for our theme; *it* is just this aspect which, through the introduction of music, makes the opera possible. We will speak about this later.

The manifoldness of the criteria of the dramatic form is almost inexhaustible. To add something characteristic to it, one has to keep in mind that not only man and consociate but also their spatial-temporal surroundings are theatrically symbolized. The stage may be as simple as in Greece or in Shakespeare's England. The palace, in which the action takes place, is not at all a palace, does not even try to be one. Never could a castle look like this; it is a *place beyond all reality which can symbolize reality only because the actor, that is the hero, pretends to experience it as real*. This curious relativity shows that, what the hero *assumes* as real, impresses and surrounds us in the same manner as our own surroundings. We accept the latter as real; maybe, a spectator of the play whose actors we are could doubt it as much as we doubt the reality of the stage. In so far as spatial surroundings influence our life and our actions, they do so to no greater degree than the stage scenery influences the actor. Essential for both is not being-real but being-taken-for-real. This alone creates the possibilities for all action and sensory impression. Whether the room exists, or whether the acting person assumes it to exist, makes no difference: the room becomes surrounding, place of action, object of my acting, cause of my sensory impressions.

But this typification is not exhausted by time, space, and causality. The Thou-relation itself and the individual oriented toward it are typified; thereby, they become more general yet more individual. In his conclusion to "Miss Julie," Strindberg<sup>19</sup> ingeniously contrasted his own manner of bringing individuals on the stage with that of Moliere<sup>20</sup> and other writers of older comedies. Harpagon is presented to us as a miser, and displays no other traits. Aside from his avarice, he might have been a good merchant, a tender father, a caring son. All this is irrelevant for the character comedy. The personification of one trait demands a one-sided illumination out of the perspective of this single trait. Strindberg, by contrast, insists that the dramatic

<sup>19</sup> Strindberg wrote "Froeken Julie" in 1888. This drama is considered the prototype of the realistic tragedy.

<sup>20</sup> Jean Baptiste Poquelin (1622–73) became famous under the assumed name, Moliere. An actor of wide experience, he became one of the greatest playwrights of Europe.

author make an effort to present the variability of every single possibility (of character, HRW). With this rule, Strindberg believes he has become a naturalist in a true and higher sense. Is this correct? I believe that every hero of the drama necessarily becomes a type; essentially, it, makes no difference at which point one ceases the approach to real, life and turns away from the acting, speaking, and thinking human being who simultaneously abandons himself to his sensory impressions. This is particularly well demonstrated in those manifestations of life which issue exclusively from Thou: the life of emotions, the affections, the passions and, therefore, the word. Up to now, we have not sufficiently stressed that this word is not written; it is heard and spoken. It is the word in which the tone of voice reveals more about the inner state of the speaker than the underlying term. Or the affectual word immediately emerges from the Thou relationship, whose conceptual content and signification comes much later to our attention than its effects upon the consociate and ourselves. This characteristic of the word makes it possible to use rhymes and verses in dramas without making them appear unnatural [provided one wants to discover a contradiction in the experience of the existence of heroes and villains with exaggerated one-sided characteristics, which we do not encounter in life even though we never doubt the possibility of seeing them, in the next moment, before us as living realities].

But the drama brings not merely persons on the stage; it also shows the collective, the masses, the people and—most of all in the antique drama—the chorus. The role of the chorus in Greek tragedy has been subject of many investigations and has caused the greatest differences of opinion. Well-known is Schlegel's<sup>21</sup> idea of the chorus as the ideal spectator. Nietzsche<sup>22</sup> objected correctly that a spectator never conducted himself as the chorus does. He leaned toward the view of Schiller<sup>23</sup> that the chorus, so to speak, forms a wall which separates the spectator from the stage. Thereby, it erects a barrier between the apparent reality of stage action and the reality of the spectator. There seems to be no basic contradiction between these two opinions. The chorus is spectator in so far as it accompanies the actions on the stage with reflections; for itself, it clearly speaks about the inclusion of the Thou into the events on the stage. Thus, it urges the actual spectator affectually to follow the stage action in the same manner. And it thereby separates the stage events from real life.

If, in order to use Nietzsche's expression, the actor alone is the true Dionysian man, the chorus alone makes possible the Apollonian stance. It presents to us a mass which is one with us, the audience, yet belongs to the sphere of the stage; it illustratively presents to us that effect which the actual action of the tragedy is supposed to

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<sup>21</sup> Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829), one of the main exponents of German literary Romantic, published a two-volume *History of Ancient and Modern Literature* in 1815.

<sup>22</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was the first German thinker in existential revolt against philosophical rationalism. His first book, written in 1872, was entitled *The Birth of the Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*. It gave rise to violent controversies.

<sup>23</sup> Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805). Next to Goethe, he was the main figure of the classical period of German literature. Like Goethe, he was involved with the theater in Weimar. In 1803, he wrote an essay about "The Use of the Chorus in Tragedy."

evoke in us. A new interpretation of meaning results from our seeing in the chorus our own reflection and a model for ourselves; through it, we are forced to interpret the stage events in a new manner which, however, is related to us. We welcome this the more because, in addition, the chorus indicates to us one single motivation for otherwise disjointed events. Frequently, it becomes active just when the supernatural and the miracle call for translation into human terms (*Vermenschlichung*). Every miracle creates such realities and strongly demands motivation. The “realistic” drama, too, no longer manages without miracle. According to Goethe,<sup>24</sup> the actual dramatic conflict may be rooted in the struggle of man against fate, as in the Greek tragedy; or it may issue in the entanglement with one’s own guilt brought about by one’s own will, as in Shakespeare. The actually mythical, all guilt and atonement, the conflict with heavenly or mundane law, the struggle against fate, destiny, and doom—all are in need of motivation. Therefore, French tragedy sought a way out by replacing the chorus with a series of characters: servants, friends, or persons trusted by the hero; their sole task is to be witness of his life and, thus, to explain to us the stages of his life, to show where the tragic conflict started and over which stages it led to the final catastrophe.

In these few points we have tried to develop some of the essential characteristics of the drama, upon which the actual possibility of the opera depends. It is solely the integration of drama and music, being based on completely different preconditions, which yields the meaning of that art form which we call opera.

## MUSIC, LYRICS, DIALOGUE

This self-determined world of the stage and the dramatic event enters into a relationship with a world which, likewise, is self-determined and stands in sharpest contradiction to our life in space and time: the world of music, bringing about the art form of the opera. Music is linked to the two main characteristics of the drama: the word and the gesture. Each of these categories can enter individually into a relationship with music. Song and dance are the two poles of this unification. [Since its earliest beginnings, the operatic action proper—as operatic drama—was tied to both; and it will remain tied to them. Most important (of the two, HRW), it seems to us, is the possibility of setting words to music. Yet, in recent times, in the works of Schoenberg, Stravinsky, and Alban Berg,<sup>25</sup> the opera has moved in the direction of a predominance of the gesture, be it in the form of ballet or the mimical drama.]

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<sup>24</sup> Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) wrote various notes on the drama; notably “On Epic and Dramatic Poetry” (1797) and “Supplements to Aristotle’s Poetics” (1827).

<sup>25</sup> The Viennese composer Arnold Schoenberg (1874–1951) opened up the era of “modern” music with the introduction of the twelve-tone scale. Among his earlier works is the musical drama, “The Lucky Hand” (1913). The Russian composer, Igor Stravinsky (1882–1971), is best known for his ballet scores. He produced a “lyrical tale in three acts” (“The Nightingale”) in 1914, a “Cantata Ballet” (“The Marriage”) in 1917, and a comical opera (“Mavra”) in 1922. Alban Berg (1885–1935), another Austrian composer, wrote the opera “Wozzeck” in 1921.

Before dealing with the possibility of setting to music first the word and then the action, it must be established which place music occupies in the layers of our experiences. All philosophers who occupied themselves with this problem agree that music is an event in our inner world which takes its course independent of the events of our life. According to Schopenhauer,<sup>26</sup> music is will, not idea. But, added Nietzsche, will is object of music but not its origin; what we call feeling and what is brought to us, beyond all ideas, is only object of music in so far as it is not permeated with, and saturated by, conscious or unconscious ideas. According to him, music originated not at all in the will; it is beyond all individuation. All affects yield only ideas of manifestations of the will. Affects are schemes of interpretation which we impose upon music. [These schemes represent the symbolized world of affects;] through them, the listener interprets the music which deals with affects. (He does this, HRW) in the calmness of Apollonian reflection and bare of all affects.<sup>27</sup>

Richard Wagner occupied himself repeatedly with this problem, most impressively in his essay about Beethoven, written in 1870. He stands completely on the ground of Schopenhauer's philosophy. For him, too, music was universal will. It is melodious world-idea in Schopenhauer's sense, and it seizes that side of consciousness which is not directed upon the perception of other things but upon the own self. This consciousness alone has the ability to see as clearly on the inside as perceptual cognition will manage when seizing ideas directed toward the outside. One is curiously touched by Wagner's likening of the effects of music to those of the world of dreams. He justifies this by saying that our relations with the forms of outside cognition, of space and time, do not apply to either music or dream. Music is the highest excitement of the will, while all spatial arts are the deepest calming of it. Only the state of working is able to surpass the wide-awakeness (*Hellsichtigkeit*) of the musician in an ever-returning state of individual awareness. Only religion and church lift the individual above the whole state of individuality; this is the reason for the fact that music has always been granted churchly functions. It is the task of the musician to grasp the innermost dream image. His attempt to communicate it forces upon him the notion of time. He keeps the notion of space under an opaque veil; its removal would immediately make unrecognizable the dream image which he has envisioned. Wagner says literally:

The harmony of sounds, which belongs neither to space nor time, remains the most essential aspect of music. But the creative musician, so to speak, offers his hand to the changing world of phenomena through the rhythmic time sequence of his manifestations. He does this in the same fashion in which the allegoric dream fastens on the habitual ideas of the individual: the wide-awake awareness, turned toward the outer world, can hold on to the dream image even though it immediately recognizes the great difference of this image from

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<sup>26</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), the German philosopher generally labeled as philosopher of pessimism, broke with the prevailing Kantian and Hegelian traditions. Centering his philosophy on The Will, he called his major work *The World as Will and Idea* (1819). In its third volume, he developed his theory of music, which greatly influenced Richard Wagner.

<sup>27</sup> Nietzsche's critical response to Schopenhauer's theory of music is contained in a fragment, "About Music and Word," which he wrote in 1871.

the event in daily life. The musician, through the rhythmic order of his sounds, makes contact with the clearly articulated world, and this by virtue of a similar kind of law as that according to which the movement of visible bodies manifests itself understandably to our perception.

In the dance,<sup>28</sup> the human gesture tries to make itself understandable through impressive (*anschauungsvolle*) regular movements. It seems to be for music what bodies are for light; the latter too would not shine were it not broken by objects. We can say *that, without rhythm, music would not be perceivable by us*.

This conception of music also explains Wagner's conception of melody. In his book *Opera and Drama*, he says that harmony and rhythm are organs of forming music, but melody truly forms music itself. Harmony and rhythm are like blood, nerves, and bones with all inner organs, which remain hidden to the onlooker when he sees the finished living human being. By contrast, melody is like this full human being as he presents himself to our eyes. Melody is the most definite, most convincing, manifestation of the life of the real, living, inner organism of music. In every music is inherent the will to ever greater clarity, to ever greater manifestation of the actual ideal intention. In its need for greater clarity, music reaches for language, the medium which is higher and clearer because it is more closely related to our world of perception and ideas. For this reason, in his Ninth Symphony, Beethoven inserted the word after the stirring recitative. The whole meaning and content of the work can be summed up, through Beethoven's genius, in the words of Schiller's poem.<sup>29</sup> The ideal creator of operas simultaneously has to be poet and musician; he has the task of putting the unity of word and melody into the place of the infinite melody, as found in pure (absolute) music. This unity is rooted both in meaning and content of the word and in its sound, in the combination of consonants and vowels. The origin of language itself is to be explained in terms of assonances and acoustic reproductions. The other dramatic element, expressive movement and gesture, is acquired from music itself. The actual dramatic design (*Vorwurf*) has to manifest itself in the element of the word: over and over again and in ultimate intention, it has to accomplish anew the forming of the myth. This is the highest achievable idea of poetry as such.

Long before Nietzsche turned against Wagner ... he raised important objections against this conception of Wagner. However, in order not to insult his friend, he did not include them in his first publication, *The Birth of Tragedy*. Nietzsche contests the primacy of the word. He wants to see the origin of all lyrics in a basic musical feeling; and he points to Schiller who insisted that he had observed this in his own processes of lyrical creation. When we listen to the last movement of Beethoven's (Ninth, HRW) Symphony, we in no way hear Schiller's poem. Nietzsche says: only for him who sings along there is a text, there exist word and verse. For the listener, only the music exists; it is the creator, the mother of all lyrics. Music can never become a means; even the worst forces the best text under its spell. Therefore, for the *listener*, a '*drama*' within the opera is impossible. The listener forgets it.

<sup>28</sup> This paragraph was written by hand on the left margin of the MS.

<sup>29</sup> This poem is Schiller's "*An die Freude*," a rhapsodic praise of joy.



He awakens to it only after the Dionysian magic leaves him. Dramatic music is thinkable only as music of excitement in the guise of a symbolics which is purely conventional. For music, drama exists only in so far as it is action but not as literary work (*Dichtung*). In this case, a kind of pre-established harmony rules between true tragedy and true music. The tragedy absorbs music into itself. Thereby, it brings music to perfection; it places a sublime allegory, the mythos, between the, universal validity of its music and the Dionysian receptive listener. It awakens the illusion in the latter, that music is merely the highest means of the presentation of the animated, articulated world of the mythos. Music, in appreciation, offers a reciprocal present to the mythos of the tragedy: a metaphysical significance, as impressive and convincing as that which word and picture may achieve without any help. Nietzsche's notions of the unconditional primacy of music and of the dissolving of the contrast between word, action, meaning, and mythos is supported by a well-known statement by Mozart. In a letter to his father, he wrote: The word, at all times, has to be the obedient servant of music. [A whole world separates this conception of Nietzsche and Mozart from the notion of Wagner.]

Now, we will try to delineate, in a few words, the true place of music *as experience*. The viewpoint found thereby shall give us the occasion to demonstrate the most different attempts at a solution of this problem on hand of the operas of Mozart and Wagner.

Thanks to its spacelessness and its continuity, the melody is more closely related to our duration than any other phenomenon of our inner and outer experiences. Whenever Bergson tries to present the nature of inner duration as an allegory, he by necessity falls back upon the example of the melody. It is continuous and manifold, even if its manifoldness is limited. It does not know of things appearing side-by-side and in succession; it becomes and passes away like something genuinely alive without being forced to objectify itself in space and time. Harmony and polyphony, too, do not break through the limitations of our inner duration. As said before, music is the most lonely art. It does not call for a Thou because it does not call for interpretation. But inner duration is the most primitive and original experience of man; he can go beyond it only because, by being aware of his body as something extended, he arrives at the establishment of space and time. The latter, again, are necessary preconditions for Thou, language, and concept. Therefore, every higher stratum of consciousness which is built upon inner duration<sup>30</sup> can come in contact with melody which lives solely in inner duration: the acting I in dance, expressive movement, and gesture; the speaking I in song; the conceptually-thinking I in those great symbolizations which are musically known to us as incidental music (*Programmusik*). However, the truly original experience remains rooted in inner duration: the word can be set to music only in so far as its elements, in their deepest meaning relation, reach into inner duration.

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<sup>30</sup> The strata of consciousness, to which Schutz alludes here, are identical with the life forms which he treated at length in the main part of his projected study. (See "Part I" and the early sections of the first two pieces of "Part II.")



Nevertheless, music is vividly evident (*anschaulich*); it necessarily leaves the realm of inner duration. It possesses rhythm; it knows repetitions and even specific repetitions which become forming elements. Thus, so to speak, it knows things side-by-side and things being simultaneous. It is completely clear that the phenomena of inner duration are intuitively recognizable by us only in an act of self-reflection but have to be abandoned in every objectification. Our own self steps out of the realm of inner duration by acting, by moving, by the extensivity of its body. Thereby, it also creates space and time for itself; time being nothing but duration projected into space. Movement, through continuity and manifoldness, belongs to inner duration but the path traveled belongs to space and time. Music belongs to inner duration through melody, harmony, and harmonizing, interweaving voices (*Stimmführung*), but it belongs to outer time through rhythm.

However, how does rhythm come about? Obviously, it is nothing but the distribution of a melody over space-time. The precondition of rhythm is a melody which became and passes away. Something melodic becomes so only in comparison to something melodic which already passed away. The earlier cited sentence of Wagner hits the essential point: without rhythm, music could not be recognized by us. One should not forget that, when hearing a musical work which we already know, we assume an entirely different stance than when we hear everything, for the first time, as something becoming.

We may, so to speak, move within a piece of music from the first to the last tone without burdening ourselves with extra-musical processes of consciousness, memory, and associatively grasped ideas and concepts; we may simply enter the musical stream and thus ... experience music as something becoming. If the piece is purely musical, and not dramatically accompanied by gestures, bodily movements, there does not occur the idea of rhythm. The power of music to immediately excite feelings, to agitate the will, stems predominantly from the possibility of apperceiving any melody, like our duration, as something continuously growing and becoming. Music is not forced to abandon the direction in which our duration leads. We can speak of rhythm only when we, amidst this onrushing stream, stand still and stop, and direct our attention no longer upon the streaming music but upon that which has elapsed, upon the music passed away. It is rhythmical in so far as it has passed away, like movement becomes space only after it has ceased. Thus, we see that, for us Apollonian listeners, the rhythmical element comes only into view when the melody has faded away. For Apollonian man, remembered music is rhythmical. For Dionysian man—for the acting, dancing person who moves to music, who experiences the rhythm also in his body—this difference becomes blurred. The temporal-spatial element, alien and hostile to true duration, actually does not enter his consciousness by way of the music but most of all through his body. The latter is extended; its position in space and its movement remain in consciousness, it is manifest any time, and creates space only through its finished movement.

It cannot be the purpose of these investigations to pursue this difficult question to its final points. We have to be satisfied to state that no revelation of our being is so closely related to our true inner duration as music. Even rhythm, when it is felt and becomes conscious, offers only the idea of time but not the idea of space. However,

it must be emphasized that, here, we speak exclusively of musical rhythm and not of the rhythm of a poem or the rhythm of the word. The word is most deeply rooted in the spatial-temporal sphere, nay, more, in a sphere which is populated with similar intelligent beings, with consociates, with a Thou. Rhythmic arrangement must coincide with meaningful arrangement. The word, rhythm, is truly corporeal. Rhythm divides space into sequences of verse—a space which is traversed by the walking or speaking person. Rhythm, here, is actually external; it issues from time and enters into space. Characteristically, it is impossible to sing a song in which this external rhythm is not destroyed and subjugated to that true inner rhythm of music in which alone occurs the inclusion of the outer world into the realm of our duration.

In this sense, lyrics are always subjugation of the word to music. This also explains the form of the verse song in which one and the same melody does justice to the most different contents of the words. This applies to most folk songs. Now, as mentioned before, language is dually determined: first, through the meaning which conceptually inheres in the word; and, second, through the tone of voice of the speaker. The latter alone mediates and makes understandable the affect which is expressed in words. Generally accepted theory states that any musical symbolic procures its meaning content from the world of poetic moods. This cannot mean anything else but: either music has its conceptive origin in the meaning content of the word, in the affect which is expressed in the context of the word; or, if one accepts Nietzsche's view of the relationship between word and tone, the effort is made to grasp the basic mood which preceded the creation of the lyrics by a poet.

What actually is composed in a song? This question is one of the most difficult ones; it is hardly answerable. Let us look at one and the same poem, maybe Goethe's Mignon songs, in the composition of different masters like Schubert,<sup>31</sup> Beethoven, and Hugo Wolf.<sup>32</sup> In itself, each composition would be perfect. But each illuminates only certain aspects of Goethe's poem. One understands the complaint of Hugo Wolf that really good and perfect poetry simply cannot be set to music. The particularity of the process of musical creation shows itself (in a dual manner, HRW): the sound accentuations of speech, of recitation, enter into the music; simultaneously, this music itself is occasioned or improvised by the meaning content of the word or of a line of poetry. This can be especially observed in the early period of musical lyrics, so by Bach.<sup>33</sup> Albert Schweitzer undertook highly pertinent investigations of this.<sup>34</sup> He shows, with Bach's cantatas,<sup>35</sup> that a composer often receives a rhythmic or melodic inspiration from a single word. For the earlier times of the opera and even for Mozart, we can establish that the

<sup>31</sup> Franz Schubert (1797–1828), the Austrian composer, set various poems of Goethe to music.

<sup>32</sup> Hugo Wolf (1860–1903), also Austrian, wrote the music for more than fifty poems of Goethe.

<sup>33</sup> Johann Sebastian Bach (1685–1750), the greatest German composer of the Baroque period, brought polyphonic techniques to perfection.

<sup>34</sup> Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965) wrote a two-volume study, *Johann Sebastian Bach*, which, in 1938, appeared in English translation (New York: Macmillan).

<sup>35</sup> Cantatas are vocal compositions including arias, duets, recitatives, and choir presentations.

basic musical form had been derived not only from the spiritual meaning content and not merely from the outer and inner rhythms of the word sequence, but often simply from a specific metaphor. This type of allegoric aria, as it is called, can be demonstrated in many examples. In part, this phenomenon may be explained in terms of the fact that nature itself produces acoustic phenomena; maybe, in her rhythms, one can find melody. Therefore, spatial-temporal appearances can be integrated into the musical realm [which belongs to inner duration but can never be completely divested of its spatial-temporal character]. This problem has occupied theorists for a long time; it is generally known in the form of a question about the acceptability of musical accompaniment.

From earliest times, the attempt has been made to describe individual events musically. One tries musically to imitate actions, movements, events of acoustic or visual nature. A continuous line leads from there to Bach's capriccio about the departure of his brother and to Beethoven's Pastoral Symphony. In modern music, (the line reaches, HRW) from the great program-musical tone poems of Liszt and Richard Strauss<sup>36</sup> to Stravinski's "Firebird"<sup>37</sup> and so on. The essence of this music consists in the attempt to strip music of its melodic function, of its belonging to inner duration. This unheard-of process of rationalization took place and spread; in it, associative events of the outer world were imputed to the phenomenon of music. Elements which belong to the outer world are treated as if they would belong to inner duration and the lines of melody. For the old masters, this was "still more feeling than painting," as Beethoven said about his Pastoral Symphony. In the new tendency, it has already become total illustration and something actually alien to music. This is especially so because everything programmatic takes place in the realm of absolute music; it finds its solution neither in word nor gesture. Yet, here also lies the origin of the great innovation of (the form of, HR W) the opera, which Richard Wagner initiated: the *Leitmotiv*.<sup>38</sup> To be sure, this is connected with the whole transformation of the meaning of the art form of the opera, which Richard Wagner intended and carried out.

However, before we discuss this in detail, we have to try to inspect the individual categories of the drama, which we enumerated earlier, with regard to their relationship to the true essence of music so as to establish the possibilities which offer themselves for the art form of the opera pure and simple.

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<sup>36</sup> Franz Liszt (1811–86), Hungarian composer and pianist, wrote various compositions which are classified as "symphonic poems" or "tone poems." Richard Strauss (1864–1949), the German composer, created his own operatic form. Among his earlier works are a "Don Juan" (1888) and a "Till Eulenspiegel" (1894), prime examples of the symphonic poem.

<sup>37</sup> In Schutz's MS, the title of this score was given as "Fireworks." There are indications that, at the time, he disliked Stravinsky's program music more than that of any other composer.

<sup>38</sup> One of the most characteristic operatic innovations of Wagner, a *Leitmotiv* is a short musical theme standing for a character or object fraught with symbolic significance. It is introduced in the overture and appears throughout the opera whenever the action brings the character on the stage or refers to the symbolic object.

## OPERA AS DRAMA AND MUSIC

Our basic presupposition of the drama was that it symbolizes the Thou problem and presents it. In the spatial-temporal world of the stage, the illusion of true duration is achieved because our life in duration—even though interpretatively transferred into the spatial-temporal sphere—precisely assumes the character of continuity which it already seemed to have surrendered to objectification. If music is added to the played, spoken, and acted stage dialogue, two functions may be served. First, music could assume the function which corresponds to the composition of the song. In the spoken drama, verse occurs not as unnatural and contrary to the meaning of this art form; on the contrary, it most clearly fathoms the spatial-temporal world in contrast to inner duration, which is more understandable for us. Similarly, rhythmic speech (*gebundene Rede*) could be expanded into the song which is sung. It would be possible to interweave songs as high points of lyrical nature, supported by gestures, enlivened by actions. The actually spatial-temporal moment would emerge from rhythm and expressive movement, while inner duration is preserved in melody. Or, the opera could find the fulfillment of its meaning in the emphasis on those elements of spoken words in ordinary speech which are brought close to us in affects, in the tone of voice, and the context of words and sentences. They all remain closely related to musical experience.

The first form makes understandable the origin of the aria; the second explains the so-called recitative. The main achievement of the old opera, most of all of the comic opera, was the transition of the spoken word into the—at first unaccompanied—secco recitative,<sup>39</sup> the elevation of the secco recitative into the recitative accompanied by instruments, the development of the latter into the arioso,<sup>40</sup> and in conclusion the aria proper. This articulation can be of great help for a clever stage director.

The development (from recitative to aria, HRW) becomes still more visible if we choose the structure of, say, a Passion by Bach.<sup>41</sup>

Up to Mozart, the actual dramatic part occurred mainly in recitatives. Arias were monologues or addresses of a more lyrical nature. Through them, the hero expressed his real affects. The music had a relationship to action only in so far as it was mundane, only in so far as soldiers marched or peasant girls danced to it. Here, significant stylistic elements for the whole development of the opera reveal themselves. Various kinds of operas differ from another not so much in the treatment of the word; they are distinguished by the elements of dramatic action which are mobilized in their compositions.

<sup>39</sup> The secco recitative is recited in irregular rhythmic patterns and delivered in deliberately inexpressive manner (secco = dry).

<sup>40</sup> Arioso is a recitative of pronounced lyrical expressiveness.

<sup>41</sup> This statement occurs in the original MS in the midst of a very long paragraph (which I have divided into several sections). Yet, it does not precede a discussion of a Passion by Bach; it is merely a hint at the possibility of such an illustration. When Schutz, later in the essay, returned to the topic announced here, he chose Handel, not Bach, as model.

Beyond this, the opera is not solely borne by singing voices; the continuity of the music is secured by the accompaniment of instruments, even if the latter, as in the secco recitative, is reduced to a most modest form. In one important respect, the role of the orchestra makes the opera really into a successor of the Greek tragedy. As pointed out earlier, the role of the ancient Greek chorus consists in separating our world from the world on the stage and making the events of the actual tragedy more understandable for us. If the chorus is not the ideal spectator it is the ideal interpreter of the stage events. Thereby, it both separates us from the stage and links us with it. The orchestra is the actual expressive means of pure absolute music, and the latter belongs completely to our duration. The orchestra accompanies the events on the stage in a dual sense. It interprets the gesture of the actor and it links the song to that element of inner duration access to which is denied to the spoken word. [From this angle, we gain a perspective on the possibility of composing the song. The unaccompanied song, even the recitative, remains still captured by, and limited to, space-time.]

Pure duration is introduced into the stage events exclusively by the orchestra. A triple complex of symbol and interpretation is offered to the opera audience: the visible actor, whose gesture can be understood; the words of the actors which we have to interpret linguistically and conceptually; their speech and inflexion which allows us to understand their affects and motives. The orchestra, however, seizes all three complexes of interpretation. It preforms the gesture and alludes to its origin in events within the stream of our duration. It strips the word of its conceptual character and reduces it to an expression of the will to a Thou, which is rooted in inner duration. It relates all events of feeling, life, tone modulation and tone intensity to the unitary interpretative scheme of the melody.

Here, also, the necessity of an overture which intends to be more than a preparation for the events on the stage reveals itself: musical sounds before the first gesture is made and before the first word enters into our consciousness. Through it, we are urged into a state of submersion into our inner life; it enables us to sympathetically experience (*nacherleben*) in our duration all other events in the spatial-temporal world (placed before us on the stage, HRW). Where the orchestra transcends this task, where it programmatically imitates the actual musical-dramatic happenings, the word of Nietzsche applies: in the real drama, music actually seizes only the acting but not the lyrical work. Here, music functions secondarily and solely as music of excitement. Essentially, music does no lyrical work. It sorts out those elements which belong to the space-time world; it allows them to disappear and limits itself to the pursuit of the true inner meaning in the continuity of pure duration for which all poetry is only a superstructure.

During our analysis of the drama, we established that meaning is conveyed to it only by the Thou relation: the monologue is an exception since it presupposes the doubling of the I, representing a special case of the Thou problem.<sup>42</sup> The Thou

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<sup>42</sup> Here, Schutz aimed at the fact that, in a monologue, a person (actor) addresses himself as if he were two persons. This "doubling of the I," of course, is nothing but an incipient form of the juxtaposition of the "I" and the "Me" in the sense in which Schutz should later encounter it in the writings of William James and George Herbert Mead.

problem, too, is contained in pure duration. It is, so-to-speak, a symbolization of affectual experiences and of actions which are oriented upon consociates. Consequently, it should be possible to grasp it in the melody, which is related to inner duration. More: music offers, beyond the word of Shakespeare, a simultaneity, a side-by-side, and a together which the word could never reach. This makes for the creation of the ensemble which, it seems to me, owes its existence not to musical reasons but exclusively to the, compulsion issuing from the meaning of the opera (as art form, HRW). Thus, we have established, even though only sketchily, what the inclusion of music into basically dramatic phenomena may offer to (the art form of, HRW) the opera.

These theoretical assertions will become clearer when we [now try to explain the meaning of two styles, namely, the styles of Mozart's and Wagner's operas, on hand of the tenet we have postulated. First, however, we shall] say a few words about the oratorium: that art form in which seem to be unified almost all of the elements which we before called characteristics of the opera. Thereby, we will make clear the differences between the essence of dramatic and of epic music. So far, music history has not been successful in establishing a tenable criterion for differentiating between opera and oratorio. The last attempt was made by the Viennese music historian Adler<sup>43</sup>; it does not penetrate below the surface. Adler sees the main difference in the place of the chorus, which is dominant in the oratorio. In fact, an opera by Handel<sup>44</sup> is hardly distinguishable from an oratorio by Handel. For a modern audience, the difference rests solely in the recognition that his operas found a scenic structure under all circumstances, his oratorio only occasionally. It appears to me that the place of the chorus is completely irrelevant for the epic character of both. Essential is the deep difference in the stance of the audience.

The oratorio is without gesture and representation of action. It tells about actions, but nobody acts in it. Usually, it entrusts the narrating part to a specific person in the testa.<sup>45</sup> It compels the listener to follow the narration by the insertion of lyrical and dramatical illustrations. Each of them, however, interrupts the continuity. The audience is not immediately included in the Thou relation which unrolls among the persons on stage on the one hand, and between each of them and the audience on the other. The listeners<sup>46</sup> do not face the subjective but an objective meaning content. They participate in the act of meaning interpretation but not that of positing meaning;

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<sup>43</sup> In 1923, Guido Adler published his lectures about Richard Wagner, which he offered the University of Vienna. He wrote various historical essays about composers and musical styles, among them "heterophony." His main work was the *Handbook of Music*, the first edition of which appeared in 1924.

<sup>44</sup> Georg Friedrich Handel (1685–1759), another outstanding German composer of the German Baroque period, wrote mostly church music. His oratorio "The Messiah" (1741) is his most famous work.

<sup>45</sup> The testa is presented by a testo, that is, a singer who narrates the story of the oratorio.

<sup>46</sup> In the original MS, the reference to the audience (das *Publikum*), here, is erroneously given with the masculine pronoun for the third person singular (er); in the next sentence, the correct German neuter pronoun (es) is used. I have replaced 'Publikum' by 'listeners,' setting the whole statement in the plural.

the latter is undertaken by the storyteller or the stage character who anticipates it singingly.

By contrast, it is the essence of the opera to place the Thou relation before my eyes and to interpret it before my eyes. This occurs in an unheard-of complicated manner in which the word is attached to meaning content, the gesture to the understandable space-time world, the music to inner duration. Thus, as spectator, I can understand what actor A means when addressing actor B; I can follow how actor B accepts this address; and I can observe how a meaning content grows between A and B which can be interpreted only by me. Always, the audience must know more than the actors: this is an old rule of French dramatic theory. That it actually knows more, in an opera, comes to pass because the orchestra betrays to me a specific scheme of interpretation which must needs be hidden from (the stage figures, HRW) A and B. The dominant role of the orchestra in opera goes back to the implicit (*unbedingte*) inclusion of the apperceived space-time world into my inner duration. In addition, the physical-psychic impressions of the actors which are optically and acoustically perceived by me, are also symbols of the true meaning content. This is of greatest importance for my attitude (toward the opera, HRW).

It is common to say: this actor is so brilliant, one almost forgets that one is in the theater. Truly understood, this means nothing but that understandability has reached an optimum of evidence; it has evoked an illusion of reality in which the space-time world; in which our life occurs, and the fictive unreal space-time world of the stage which cannot be experienced, have come together as close as possible. However, this mediating power is at all times inherent in music. It ties the ribbon of its melodies, of inner duration, around actors and speakers on the one hand, and the listeners on the other. This ribbon is common to all, understandable by all; it is fundamentally evident.

While the opera demands this trifold complex of symbol interpretation, the oratorio stops with mere reporting. The singer in the oratorio, even if the role of the hero has been assigned to him, first of all remains a singer. We do not see the hero living before us. In order to grasp the meaning (he has been assigned in the oratorio, HRW) it suffices for us to know that he could have lived, worked, acted, and spoken. In any case, we are satisfied with the objective chance (of his existence, HRW). We are never urged to develop the illusion of a real event from an unlivable fictitious reality. This, of course, does not prevent the understanding of the events of this unreal world; they are and remain understandable.

## THE MEANING CONTENT OF THE OPERA

The character of the opera has been indicated by differentiating it from the oratorio. Now, its meaning content can be filled with diversified contents. Thoroughly different, also, are the elements which are mobilized for reaching this goal. (In this respect, HRW) some of the characteristic differences between Mozart and Wagner (shall be discussed in order to, HRW) bring to greater clarity what has been said before.



(1) *Subject matter*

Mozart relied on other librettists. For his operas, he pulled together the most differentiated subject matters ranging from the lighthearted comedy action of “Die Entführung” (“Il Seraglio”: “The abduction from the harm”) to the actually tragic “Don Juan” (“Don Giovanni”). Hermann Cohen devoted a nice essay to the subject matter of Mozart’s operas.<sup>47</sup> He said, apparently correctly, that Mozart composed love. All his operatic subject matters deal with it. The milieu may be oriental, as in “Die Entführung”; Spanish, as in “Don Juan”; the world of contemporary nobility, as in “Figaro”; or imaginary as in “The Magic Flute.” But the composer, more than the librettist, is interested in placing living, natural persons on the stage instead of historical masks. What is of interest on the fate and the happenings of these heroes is certainly not given in the librettist’s themes. With the exception of “The Magic Flute” and the ending of “Don Juan”—actually unimportant for the meaning content (of Mozart’s score, HRW)—it is the fates of the figures of the comic operas which could occur to everyone of us. [Music, however, can occupy itself only with the extraordinary with its in one or other respect superior climax.] However, it so happens that Mozart, amidst the most ridiculous situations, develops the meaning of the whole scene far beyond the milieu and the framework of the plot, aiming at the generally important. In the midst of an act of “Figaro,” which is filled with conventional intrigue, the chambermaid Susanna sings the well-known aria of the roses. One forgets that it is a chambermaid who sings; one forgets the cheerfulness and subtlety she displayed in earlier acts: one knows only that it is an evening in spring on which a young girl waits for her lover. Papageno, the farcical figure of “The Magic Flute,” plays a scene with the Moor in the good old tradition of the harlequinade only in order to join Pamina in a duet which is the most moving expression of erotic communion. It betrays a feeling which is adequate [neither to his prior nor] to his [subsequent] completely comical and funny role. But precisely these moments, in which Mozart completely reverses the lyrical action, are the truly touching ones in his operas. Obviously, Mozart did not compose figures or characters; no action and, therefore, no drama. He composed situations in spite of all individualization which he granted his figures within *one* scene, *one* situation. In his operas, these situations are interchangeable. Arias like that of the roses could be sung as well by Zerlina or Pamina as by Susanna.

By contrast, Wagner’s ideal is the true tragedy. In his librettos something miraculous occurs; it is just this miracle which he composes. Captivated by Schopenhauer’s philosophy, he saw the meaning of his work in the genuine salvation from the suffering of the world, the negation of the will to live, the turning-away from reality, and the belief in the miracle. Therefore, he started from mythos and ever again returned to it. The unique “Meistersinger,” who seem to assume a more earthly character, are still placed into a mythical context through the immense human

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<sup>47</sup> Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), the leading figure of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, published a book entitled *The Dramatical Idea in the Texts of Mozart’s Operas* (1916). Schutz discussed it, in some detail, in his American essay “Mozart and the Philosophers” (1956a). This essay is reprinted in *Collected Papers* 2.



deepening of the person of Hans Sachs, through the connection between work of art and creator amidst a protestant sanctification of work [by the mastercraftsman who is also an artist]. Wagner's figures are clearly delineated on the stage. Their fates are not destined in advance; they develop before our eyes. The tragedy of man, who is cursed in solitude, repeats itself time and again, often in the most cruel manner. With the exception of Erda in the "Ring of the Nibelungs," no female figure created by Wagner leaves the drama unbroken.

For this reason, Wagner composes the whole tragedy. Mozart, as stated, merely composes given dramatical situations. Wagner is the composer of the myth; he believes only in the miracle and drapes it in music. The miracle comes from the outside, from a meaning content which, in itself, could be familiar to the listener and which can be grasped solely by the listener, not by the hero. This is the reason that Wagner could rightfully say about himself that his works are to a high degree German and could be understood only by Germans. Mozart also knew of the miracle, but not that which comes from the outside. The emergence of human feelings was enough for him; it was these feelings which he composes. Everything else was accidental and secondary.

## (2) *Continuity*

Mozart's attitude toward his subject matter shows itself clearly in its musical treatment. He uses music at high points. For the secondary work, the recitative suffices; often only the spoken word. Wagner, not incorrectly, demanded and carried out the completely composed opera: an opera in which, (at least in principle,) exists nothing but music. His whole conception of the development of the tragedy is responsible for the fact that he never omits its inclusion into the (musical, HRW) realm of duration. Mozart does not reach beyond the Now and Thus which rings out over a given scene. He does know neither a before nor an after because the action, for him, is only an inducement for giving his heroes an occasion to express what just moves their hearts.

By Wagner, the orchestra gains a dominant position because it brings a running commentary to the dramatic happenings. It does not only reach beyond a given scene but spans several complete acts, and sometimes several complete tragedies, as in the "Ring of the Nibelungs." This is the meaning of Wagner's so-called technique of the *Leitmotiv*. With it, a completely extraordinary unity of meaning is created. Originally it is based on extraordinary associative and cognitive functions. Through the reduction of one situation to another one, it gains a kind of fateful significance. The latter provides the rigid and solid background for the actual theme of Wagner's operatic lyrics: the miracle. It is, so to speak, a revival of the antique idea of fate.

A *Leitmotiv* belongs not only to persons or individual fates, to props like the sword of Siegfried or the ring of the Nibelungs; whole situations, experiences, happenings will be compressed into a musical theme. *Leitmotives* replace reports about the motives and significances which, otherwise, would have to be dramatically presented by auxiliary characters.

Wagner introduces individuality into the opera; Mozart knows only characters. The typical in Wagner's figures, which bestows general validity upon them, is their general human tie to fate. The typical which brings Mozart's figures close to us in

their relation to their own spontaneity, the relation of their lives to their surroundings, their knowing about their feelings, their actions, their words. Therefore, Mozart does not know the pathos which is typically Wagnerian: a pathos which is permanently imputed to speakers and actors. Mostly, Mozart's pathos is limited to instrumental interludes or else to the rare moments in which actual, real life allows, nay, demands it. Mozart is realist to an incomparably higher degree than Wagner, even though his technique—the number opera<sup>48</sup>—seems to create the actually operatic (components of his work, HRW), the unbelievable and incredible. For realistic reasons, Mozart adopts the inflexion of conversation in his recitatives. The gestures, which he demands from his singers, are the natural movements of persons who are moved by passion. By contrast, the main thing by Wagner is declamation, that is, the adaptation of musical modulation to the meaning content of the sentence. His gestures are rhythmically conditioned by passionately exalted states of his heroes which are constantly increased.

### (3) *Thou problem*

The world of Mozart, which actually seems to unravel reality, is nothing else but the elementary and innermost experience of our surrounding's. It seizes the Thou to a degree which Wagner never strove to reach and which he never reached. Earlier, we saw the nature of the drama in the Thou relationship, which is the most important precondition of every dramatic event. Concerning Mozart, we can assert that he derived his dramatic inspiration, and formed it musically, out of the actual existence of two persons in space and time. Thus, he reached his greatest achievements in the ensemble, in the simultaneous singing and acting of several persons who express their different attitudes toward the same situation.

In his grandiose finales occur the final solutions of the conflicts (of his operatic characters, HRW). In these finales, Mozart uses in unsurpassable mastery the old elements of the finale-technique for new dramatic effects. He does this merely by completely exhausting the in-each-other, the against-each-other, and the together-with-one-another of the individual characters. By Wagner, we find only an after-another—with the exception of the "Meistersinger" quintet and the duet in the second act of "Tristan and Isolde." (In his operas, HRW) it simply does not happen that several persons simultaneously experience the same: by the mere fact that one person has spoken, the world has changed in the lives of the others. Thus, Wagner cannot develop an ensemble technique; more, he rejects it. (Even the exception of the "Meistersinger" could be explained in this way.) Alone in "Tristan" did the true

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<sup>48</sup> "*Nummernoper*" is a generic designation of the early operatic style which consisted largely of a succession of disconnected pieces (arias, duets, songs for chorus, recitatives) written for and presented by different singers. As Schutz pointed out with regard to the early Italian operas, this style amounted to what I am tempted to call a kind of musical variety show in which individual singers offered their "numbers" for the benefit of the display of their vocal virtuosity. Mozart's operas, of course, are not of this extreme type. But they preserved something of the number style in the alternation of what Schutz called operatic high points and musically unemphasized passages (recitatives or spoken dialogues) but also in his treatment of individual scenes as musical unities in themselves.

and deep devotion to the Thou force the composer to contradict the theorist: it is the only genuine duet in Wagner's work.

Summing up, we could say that, by Mozart, the dramatic conflict issues always from the original source of the drama: from the fact that a Thou exists, that we live in a social world, that we depend on consociates and orient ourselves toward them. Nothing special occurs by him, but everything occurs in our world in the truest sense. It is not the world in which we live, act, and think; it is that world which is simultaneous with our duration. Mozart makes us aware, in a touching and for everyday-man rare clarity, of the Thou-relationship. The subject matter of Mozart's compositions is not love but the knowledge of a Thou. In it is included the true acceptance of life, the modest renunciation of events occurring outside of this world, the marvelous naturalness and self-evidence of his tonal language. Wagner, on his part, places us outside this world and into a world of struggles and of the fate of miracle and salvation. He forgoes the immediate evidence of the Thou relationship; he appeals to the reason of the listener for cooperation; he demands that he, the listener, never forgets that he too has suffered and suffers and knows about symbol relations which belong to the mythos and, thus, are alien to stage and music.

The opera can serve both goals. It can do this because it accepts from drama the illusion of the identity of our space-time world with the space-time world of the stage. It does not kill the meaning content of the word; it heightens the effect of the word through music. On the other hand, it finds in music a medium which makes understandable, capable of being experienced, and evident the original experiences of pure duration and the Thou relationship in a manner which cannot be achieved by any other form of art.

## **Part III**

# **Object and Methods of the Social Sciences**

**Alfred Schutz**

### **Editor's note**

**By Helmut Wagner**

Aside from a seven-point outline, Schutz left no documents whatever whose content would correspond to the topic of the planned third and final part of his Bergson project. There exist three short outline-collections, which originated after 1927 but before 1932; they deal with: Pragmatism and Sociology, Understanding and Action, and Relevance. Parts of each of them seem to be related to the topics of Part III. However, they do no longer properly belong to Schutz's Bergson period and thus cannot find consideration here.

### **Outline for Main Part III**

Object and method of the social sciences especially of the sociology of understanding

1. Theory of the social person; collectives and duration
2. Meaning interpretation and meaning positing; understanding objective chance and adequate causation
3. Social action and its kinds, especially rational action
4. Concerning the understandability of meaning contexts without visible Thou

5. The intimate person of the individual and of the collective limits of understanding
6. Race, nation, and historism<sup>1</sup>  
Sex differentiation
7. The historical individual<sup>2</sup> and the historical event.

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<sup>1</sup> The term seems to be unknown in the English language. In contrast to “historicism,” which refers to a theory of the teleologically predetermined course of history as a whole, “historism” denotes theories which assume that larger social events are sufficiently explained by an analysis of the historical circumstances and contexts in which they appear.

<sup>2</sup> The meaning of this term is not clear. It was seldom if ever again used by Schutz. In the German text, it reads “historisches Individuum.” This is an expression used by Max Weber *not* as a label for a person playing a role in history or seen in historical perspective, but as a combination of a multiplicity of spiritual-evaluative traits shared by many and being effective in the shaping of the course of history. In its uniqueness, it may appear in different social settings and reappear in different historical periods. The prime example of a “historical individuum” is Weber’s famous ideal-typical concept of the Protestant Ethic. Even though there can be no doubt that Schutz accepted the term from Weber together with other conceptions which determined the topics of some points of the present outline [notably (2) and (3)], it is not a foregone conclusion that he intended to use it in its Weberian sense. He may have wished to set up the ideal type of a social actor in historical context and as maker of or contributor to historical events. This possibility must be raised in view of the fact that Schutz never displayed a genuine interest in the analysis of large-scale historical events, which was a trade mark of much of Weber’s work.

# The Problem of Personality in the Social World

Alfred Schutz

**The Problem of Personality in the Social World  
1936, 1937**

**By Alfred Schutz**

**Translated from the German as edited with introduction and notes by Martin  
Endress and Ilja Srubar by Fred Kersten**

## **Translators' Preface**

Of the translation of the Bible he commissioned, King James said that “it was loved in its doing, beautifully done, to be cherished forever.” This translation of two manuscripts of Alfred Schutz’s “The Problem of Personality in the Social World” was certainly “loved in its doing.” Whether it is “beautifully done,” or whether it will be “cherished forever,” are not questions to be decided by the translators.

Translations, of course, are never finished. They are always ongoing for each generation of readers which has its own “doing”. It is appropriate, then, that the translators of the present work remain anonymous, leaving room for other generations, other “doings.”

Alfred Schutz wrote the two manuscripts in the Summers of 1936 and 1937. The translation is made from the manuscripts *as edited and published* in Alfred Schutz, *Werkausgabe*, Volume V.I, *Theorie der Lebenswelt*, edited by Martin Endress and Ilja Srubar, Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003.<sup>1</sup> It has not been the purpose of the translators, however, to provide in English a variorum or critical edition of the German original of Schutz, which was the task of the German editors. Instead it was the task of the translators to provide a complete reading, and readable text in English of Schutz’s 1936 and 1937 manuscripts.

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<sup>1</sup> The general editors of the *Werkausgabe* are Richard Grathoff, Hans-Georg Soeffner and Ilja Srubar, and is to be published in 9 volumes (12 half-volumes). The edition was to be completed in 2008.

The two manuscripts are quite different in tone, style, and content. The 1936 manuscript was written by Schutz chiefly for himself and provides us with a valuable glimpse into Schutz at work in the seclusion of his workshop. Consisting of notes, outlines, lists of topics to be studied, and ideas to be developed under their headings, it seeks the eventual arrangement of it all into a systematic order of inquiry. By the end of the manuscript he seems to have been able to pick up where he left off in *Sinnhafte Aufbau* some 4 years earlier and to successfully incorporate into the train of his thought much of the reading and thinking he had done since then.

In contrast, the 1937 manuscript, with that of the previous summer in mind, tentative though it is, is written for, and already invites, a readership of scientific literature. Accordingly, the tone and style are quite different. It is a first draft, we may say, of the thought developed and presentable to others rather than just to Schutz himself. We begin to see the shape of the finished product emerge and, in places, start to take on a life of its own. The 1937 manuscript, then, is much more than simply the process of filling in the outlines and sketches of the 1936 manuscript.

Yet despite the difference in content, tone, and orientation of the manuscripts, they belong together. The 1936 manuscript launches the line of thought of the 1937 manuscript. Both manuscripts are unfinished, but in different ways. The first is unfinished in the sense that Schutz had left himself with incomplete sketches of topics, outlines, and the placement of material. Otherwise it is finished in the sense that he had now laid out the task he had set for himself. Apart from internal evidence and the fragmentary form of the manuscript, there is the fact that the second is unfinished in a different way: Schutz ran out of time to complete the writing of it, perhaps due to the circumstances that affected his life at the time. He only came back to the material of the second manuscript in the late 1940's and the early 1950's, when he used some of it for essays published for specific occasions. By the late 1950's he had already moved onto a new and more ambitious project, the *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*.

A few remarks are in order concerning the translation. Page numbers in bold face in square brackets are the numbers, first, of Schutz's original manuscript, and second of the archival pagination. Thus [1/7103] = p. 1 of Schutz's original 1937 manuscript; and p. 7103 the archival page number. *All internal references are to this pagination in bold face.* Most of the indented paragraphs in the original manuscript are set off by one or more vertical lines. Unless otherwise indicated, all the footnotes are translations or adaptations of those of the editors of the German edition. However, some footnotes of the German edition have been shortened or omitted because deemed not relevant to the text in English. Still other footnotes have been added relevant to the text in English.

Where they are available to the translators, references to the English editions of works cited in the editors' footnotes have been added. In many cases, only the original work is cited, and in such a way that reference to an English translation can easily be made. For instance, *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §47, is the same section in its English translation, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. In other cases the pagination of the original language edition is found in the margins of the English translation. For instance, the pagination of the German text of Husserl's *Formale*

*und transzendente Logik* is found in the margin of the English translation, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Or, in the case of manuscripts in German, such as “*Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur*,” only the manuscript pages are referred to because they are found in the margin of both the German edition and the English translation, *Life Forms and Meaning Structure*. Where such citation is not possible, the pagination of English translations, or their editions, where available, has also been given. Unpublished archival material of Alfred Schutz is referred to by archival numbers.

As a rule, only the original title of a work is given in the footnotes and in the bibliography where any edition of a text will do. Thus, for example, the dialogues of Plato referred to in the notes are simply listed in the bibliography. On the other hand, where specific editions are referred to in the notes, they are listed in full. In cases where the editors cite German translations of works in other languages, possible equivalent translations in English are substituted. Thus, for instance, the works of Bergson are referred to in the English, rather than the German, translations.

The full title of works cited is given only the first time, shortened or abbreviated titles thereafter. For reference, a bibliography of works cited is included. In addition, there are a few abbreviations. For instance, the volumes of Schutz’s *Collected Papers* are abbreviated *CP I*, or *CPII*, or *CP III*, or *CPIV*.

In some cases of the translation, the translators have tried to preserve Schutz’s later English expression of his thought. Thus “finite provinces of meaning” for “*geschlossener Sinnstruktur*,” “self” for “*Ich*,” “probability” (or “likelihood”) for “*Chance*” and so forth. For the most part, Latin and Greek words and phrases are left as Schutz used them in his text, their meanings being obvious to readers accustomed to scientific literature. For purposes of reference, a glossary of Greek and Latin terms is included. Occasionally the translators have sought to smooth the rather telegraphic nature of some parts of the manuscripts to make them more readable for a general public. Very long paragraphs and sentences have, on occasion, been broken up into shorter ones. As a result, some sentences and paragraphs, while expressing Schutz’s thought, we believe, are not Schutz’s. Finally, glosses of the German editors, or German words in the original text, are in plain, square brackets, [ ]; glosses of the translators are either in angle brackets, < >, or in smart brackets, { }

Where there are questions about the translation and the text, the reader is referred to the edited German original. For the genesis of the original text, and for the means by which it was assembled and edited, the reader is referred to the Editors’ Introduction to the German edition of Volume V.I of the *Werkausgabe*. We wish to note here two brief, but very fine, introductions in English to the two manuscripts translated, and on which the translators have relied. The first is by Helmut R. Wagner, in *Alfred Schutz. An Intellectual Biography*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 52 ff.; and the second by Michael D. Barber, in *The Participating Citizen. A Biography of Alfred Schutz*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004, pp. 63 ff. The translators also wish to express their gratitude to the editors of the German edition for making it available in advance of publication, and to Professor Lester E. Embree for his help, patience and encouragement of the translation.



Some years before his untimely death, Helmut Wagner collated the 1936 and 1937 manuscripts with the intention of carving out a “complete,” coherent text expressing Schutz’s views on the problem of personality. His project was left unfinished, however, and had not progressed sufficiently for it to be completed by others. It is fitting, accordingly, that the translators dedicate this translation of Alfred Schutz to the memory of Helmut Wagner. Perhaps more than anyone else, Wagner’s work on Schutz “was loved in its doing.”

## THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY

### IN THE SOCIAL WORLD

1936

a[I. 7060]

### THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY

### IN THE SOCIAL WORLD

<1936>

#### Introduction

- I. General Account of the Unity of the Person.
- II. The Genesis of the Social Person in the Solitary Self.<sup>2</sup>
- III. The Social Person and the Thou-problem
- IV. The Social *Individuum* and the Social *Collectivum*.

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<sup>2</sup>In this text Schutz follows the general “architecture” of all of his writings by beginning with the “solitary self,” or with the description of phenomena from the perspective of the single person in order to proceed to sociality. He is well aware that even the “world of the solitary self” is already constituted and structured intersubjectively. This conscious abstraction of his egological formulation is explicitly stated by Schutz in the Introduction to the manuscript on “The Problem of Personality” of 1937: “Accordingly, we have to carry out painstaking investigations of the world of the solitary self, of its nature, of the problems comprised under the heading of personality, and of the forms of self-consciousness. <Those investigations have to be carried out, moreover,> before we can enter into further and difficult questions about which modifications and consequences arise such that the conception of a solitary self is only an arbitrary abstraction, that the self in the world always presupposes being with others and that these other alter egos are human beings like me whose self in its being in the world shows a world that is natural like mine and in principle of the same constitution as my own self.” (22/7126). Cf. also the references to the problem in the present draft, pp. 14/7083 and 15/7084 as well as in the first version of 1937, p. 82/7173. See also the corresponding indications in the published essay, “On Multiple Realities,” *Collected Papers*, Volume I, Edited and Introduced, by Maurice Natanson, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, pp. 208 f. [(hereinafter *CP I*)] as well as the observation of Schutz in his letter to Aron Gurwitsch of 20 April, 1952; [see *Philosophers In Exile. The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch 1939–1959*. Edited by Richard Grathoff. Translated by J. Claude Evans. Foreword by Maurice Natanson (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 175 ff.]

## V. Methodological Consequences.

VI. The Problem of Personality and the Praxis of the Social Sciences. Conclusion:  
The Prospect of a Universal Theory of Relevance.<sup>3</sup>

Weitlaubrunn, July 28, 1936

[II/7061]

[Table of Contents]<sup>4</sup>

Introduction (A/7063)

- A. Summary of the Chief Results of the *Sinnhafte Aufbau* [A/7063]
- B. On the Necessity of the Philosophical Foundation of the Problems of the Social Personality [A/7063]
- C. Account of the Problem of Foundation [B/7064]
- D. On the Practical Consequences of a Full-fledged Theory of Personality in the Social World for Problems of the Object and Method of the Social Sciences in general [B/7064]
- E. The Plan of the Book (The Course of Further Investigation) [B/7064].
  - I. The General Account of the Problem of the Unity of the Person [1/7065]
    - a) Delimitation of the self from the *alter ego* [1/7065]
      - 1) Problem of the social person as the problem of activity and passivity
      - 2) *Cogitare* and *agere*
      - 3) Mnemonic paradoxes
      - 4) Paralogisms of attention
      - 5) On the unity of monads and the entelechy of the *ego agens*.
    - b) The role of the body [3/7067]
    - c) On the *me ipsum* that belongs to the facts of consciousness [5/7069]
    - d) On the most personal facts of consciousness pertaining to the *alter ego*. [5/7069]
    - e) On the difference of my experiencing of thou and of my social person [5/7069]
    - [f] Transition to Chapter II: Simile of counterpoint] [6/7070]
  - II. Genesis of the Social Person in the Solitary Self [6a/7070]

<sup>3</sup> The consequences for a “universal theory of relevance” resulting from the treatment of problems of personality are more fully suggested by Schutz in his manuscripts from 1947 and 1951 such as the posthumously published *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, edited, annotated, and with an Introduction by Richard M. Zaner, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. This work was reprinted in *Collected Papers V*. Schutz had already emphasized the necessity for developing a theory of relevance at the end of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie*, 1931. (English translation with an Introduction by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, 1967), §50.

<sup>4</sup> Departing from our editorial principles of chronological order, these pages are placed here as a better “table of contents.” Schutz had placed them at the end of his phase of work in 1936. We retain his page numbering.

- A. General positing of the *ego ipse* and its modifications in the natural world-view [6 a/7071]
- B. Problems of temporality [7/7075]
  - I. Problems of constitution [7/7075]
  - II. Constituted immanence as the constituting moment for the stratification of the social person [8/7076]
  - III. Tempora of the self and its perspectival articulation [8/7076]
    - a. My self now [*Ich im Jetzt*]
    - b. My self before now [*Ich vordem*]
    - c. My self later than now [*Ichfortan*]
  - IV. The *ego agens* and the hierarchy of projects [10/7078] [III./7062]
- C. Problems of pragmatic interpretation [11/7079]
  - 1. Primacy of the acting self [11/7079]
    - [a)] *Physis*
    - [b)] *Nomos*
  - 2. Centering of all other personalities around the *ego agens* [11/7079]
  - 3. Further investigations of the pragmatic principle [12/7080]
  - 4. The pragmatic principle as constituent of forms of personality conceived as co-existing or as co-succeeding. [15/7084]
    - a) Primacy of the pragma in the vivid present [*reinen aktuellen Pragmas*] and the full reality constituted by it. (15/7084)
    - b) Modifications of the world of working [*Wirklichkeit*]<sup>5</sup> by means of alterations in the *attention à la vie* [16/7085]
      - 1. Preface
      - 2. The world of phantasy
      - 3. The world of dreams
      - 4. The theoretical world of contemplative observation
    - (c) Summary [20/7089]
- D. Central and peripheral levels of the person. [21/7090]
  - 1. Emergence of the self as subject of the different forms of the self as phenomenon [21/7090]
  - 2. Theory of the intimate person [21/7090]

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<sup>5</sup>By “world of working” Schutz denotes the daily world in which we work and operate, into which we are geared, and for which we are pragmatically geared to bring about changes and effects, and in which we affectively deal with others in social action. Thus in addition to a narrower meaning distinguishing it from the surrounding world, “world of working” has a very broad meaning of a sort that makes it difficult to find a single equivalent in English. It also has the connotation of a world in which things and events happen “naturally” as well. And, as Helmut Wagner once noted, in his later writings in English, Schutz himself simply used the term, “world of working,” to comprise this very broad meaning and to express the etymological proximity of “*wirken*” and “*werken*.” See, for instance, “On Multiple Realities,” *CP I*, pp. 211 f.}.

3. Proximity of levels belonging to the intimate person [22/7091]
    - a) The vital sphere.
    - b) Sexuality.
  4. The *ego cogitans* and the *ego agens* [22/7091]
  5. Incorporation of the external world [22/7091]
  6. The full development of the process of anonymization in the social world [23/7092]
- E. Actuality of personal levels and of their variations. [24/7093]
1. Active and passive attention as the phenomena constituting the actuality of the personal levels [24/7093]
  2. "Secularization" of attention in daily life [24/7093]
  3. Constancy and change of attention à la vie (phenomena of transition)—the origin of morality [25/7094]
  4. Conflicts of interest and their resolution. [26/7095]
  5. Application of these viewpoints to the problems of culture in general and its history. [26/7095]
- F. Summary of the results of the foregoing investigation. [26/7095]

Weitlaubrunn, 21/22 August 1936

### III. Social Person and You-Problem

[A/7063] **Introduction**<sup>6</sup>

#### A. Summary presentation of the chief results of the *Sinnhafte Aufbau*.

- a) Starting from the full givenness of the *alter ego* in the surrounding world we proceed to the *alter ego* in the contemporary world, then to the types of the greatest anonymity and least fullness of content.
- b) Starting from subjective meaning, from the individuality of the self, referring to its division into social persons (into the self *qua pater familias*, into the self *qua civis Romanus*, etc.)
- c) Starting from the general positing of the *alter ego* in which its division into social persons is co-positd.
- d) Starting from the social relationship: Between which social persons does it occur?
- e) Starting from social formations of a higher order: What makes up this unification? To what extent do they function as regulative for the in-order-to-motives and the because-motives?
- f) Starting from the problems of method in the social sciences: Which social persons are present to the observer? Why are "rational ideal types" privileged? Which social persons are typifiable? Which enjoy an "environment of relevance" [*Relevanzumgebung*] by virtue of the fundamental line of inquiry (conditioned by the choice of types) a) in the social sciences generally, and b) in individual social sciences?

<sup>6</sup>The beginning of the idea for an Introduction that follows was developed in a first version in the continuation of this manuscript in the summer of 1937; cf. below, pp. 1/703-29/7133.

## B. On the necessity of a philosophical foundation of the problem of social personality.<sup>7</sup>

The unity of consciousness—self-consciousness—  
 my self now and my self before—my self tomorrow—  
 On this substratum, the emergence of personality  
 —as the fulcrum of ethical accountability (Scheler)  
 —as theological (creature) (Kierkegaard)  
 —applied Platonically, as the fulcrum of accountability of *anamnesis*  
 —Spinoza  
 —Leibniz's monadology  
 —Kant's theory of the consciousness of the ego "that must be able to accompany"  
 all thinking.  
 —Fichte's ego and non-ego  
 —Husserl's primordial, transcendental and phenomenologizing ego  
 —Bergson's conception of the constituting of the self by the duration [*durée*]<sup>8</sup>

Problems of any anthropology which will be able to come forth as science—

More recent investigations.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup>The divisions among arrangements of catchwords and references in sections B), C), and D) of the Table of Contents are added by the editors. In the original manuscript they are numbered consecutively.

<sup>8</sup>In this connection, see Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus* (1913/16), in *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 2, edited by Maria Scheler/Manfred Frings, Bern/München, 1980, especially pp. 469ff, 477ff; {English translation by Manfred Frings and Roger L. Funk, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values*, pp. 459 ff., 467 ff.;} Søren Kierkegaard, *Die Krankheit zum Tode. Eine christlich-psychologische Entwicklung zur Erbauung und Envekkung van Anti-Climacus* (1849), *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by Emanuel Hirsch, Gutersloh: Mohn, 1992, esp. Part II, A, Chapter 1 (*The Sickness Unto Death*, translated by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941); Plato, *Phaedrus*, 72e ff.; Spinoza, *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata* (1677); Leibniz, *Monadologie* (1714); Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781/87), especially B 131 ff.; (English translation by Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1953, pp. 153ff.); Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, Part I, §§1-3; (edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970, pp. 93 ff.); Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1913), *Husserliana* III/1; (English translation by Fred Kersten, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge* (1931), *Husserliana* I, §§8 ff., 30 ff., 55; (English translation by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960); Henri Bergson, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (1889), Chapter 2; (Authorized translation by F.L. Pogson, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960 [1910], *Time and Free Will*, pp. 75 ff.); Cf. below, p. 21/7124.

<sup>9</sup>For the general discussion of the anthropological literature up to the middle 1930s, see especially the following: Max Scheler, *Die Idee des Menschen* (1914) and *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (1928) (English translation with an Introduction, by Hans Meyerhoff, New York: The Noonday Press, 1961); Helmut Plessner, *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie* (1928) as well as *Macht und menschliche Natur* (1931); Otto Schwarz, *Medizinische Anthropologie* (1929); Karl Löwith, *Die Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen* (1928); Joachim Wach, *Typen religiöser Anthropologie* (1932); Albert Huth, *Abriss der pädagogischen Anthropologie* (1932); Paul Ludwig Landsberg, *Einführung in die philosophische Anthropologie* (1934); Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Das neue Bild des Menschen und die anthropologische Aufgabe* (1934); Georg Kuhlmann, *Theologische Anthropologie* (1935).

[B/7064]

**C. [Development of the Fundamental Problem]<sup>10</sup>**

The fundamental problem is not how the social person arises—for the social person is *pros hemas*—but instead how the unity of the person is clarified as the unitary *hypokeimenon* founding all social articulation of the person belonging to the self. Above all, whether the person is *constituted* by a demonstrable production of intentionality—and, if so, whose? Only an assurance about this starting point can make an analysis of the social person fruitful—let alone make it possible.

**D. On the practical consequences of a fullfledged theory of the personality in the social world for the problems of the object and method in the social sciences in general.**

References of importance for specific problems:

*Homo oeconomicus* and *zoonpolitikon*, but also:

Entrepreneur, consumer—producer; prosecutor—accused; media [*Organ*]; charismatic figure (leader—follower); public opinion;

the meaning of a true theory of association and education;

the meaning of Sombart's "three national economies;"<sup>11</sup>

consequences for the problems of history;

"the great man;"<sup>12</sup> and

problems of style in art:

the Gothic man with his reflective sense of building; the "true pianist" of Carl Philip Emmanuel Bach, etc., etc. (philological situation: drama and audience); universal theory of art; problems of the theory of form,<sup>13</sup>

but also applied to philosophy itself: *homo mathematicus*;

the *human* being in physics and the observer;

<sup>10</sup> Added from the Table of Contents; see above, p. 11/7061.

<sup>11</sup> For Leopold von Wiese's so-called theory of relations of working of, see especially *System der Allgemeinen Soziologie* (1924–28), Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,<sup>3</sup> 1955, as well as Werner Sombart, *Die Drei Nationalökonomien. Geschichte und System der Lehre von der Wirtschaft*, München/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1930.

<sup>12</sup> In this connection, see Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp.494 ff., 505 ff. {English translation, pp. 485f,495 f.}

<sup>13</sup> See Hermann Schmitz, *Die Gotik im deutschen Kunst- und Geistesleben*, Berlin: Verlag für Kunstwissenschaft, 1921; Heinrich G. Lempertz, *Wesen der Gotik*, Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1926. For J.S. Bach's son, Carl Philipp Emanuel, see the latter's *Versuch itber die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen*, published in two parts, Berlin 1753 or 1762, later Leipzig: Schwickert,<sup>3</sup> 1780 or 1797. For the discussion of the problem of style in art, see Max Dvorak, *Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei*, Berlin: Oldenbourg 1908; (English translation with Notes and Bibliography by Randolph I. Klawiter. Preface by Karl Maria Swoboda. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967); and the same author's *Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte*, München: Piper, 1924. This last volume is in Schutz's private library. "Style" turned out to be one of the great themes in the 1920's; cf. especially Carl E. Osthaus, *Grundzüge der Stilentwicklung*, Hagen: Folkwang, 1919.

Pierre et Paul, “Le voyage en boulet” [“The Journey in the Projectile”]<sup>14</sup>  
(Bergson).

the *human* being in biology;

the *human* being in philosophy;

the great turning to “disinterestedness” (Husserl’s Prague lectures).<sup>15</sup>

E. Plan of the book (the [further]<sup>16</sup> course of the investigation).

Weitlaubrunn, 7/28/1936

[1/7065]

## CHAPTER ONE

### General Exposition of the Problems

#### Of the Unity of Person

According to Leibniz’s fully developed principle of continuity,<sup>17</sup> the series going from the highest level of anonymity in the world of contemporaries to the intimate, immediate having of itself belonging to the *alter ego* in the surrounding world must also be continued within the sphere of the self. Scheler’s theory of the relative and absolute intimate person (the person-center with peripheral levels of personality) is only a first step in this direction.<sup>18</sup> A whole series of levels of problems immediately arise:

#### A) Delimitation of the self with respect to the *alter ego*.

Leibniz: “Die Erfahrung, dass wir etwas Besonderes für uns sind, das denkt, Selbstbewusstsein hat und will, und dass wir von einem anderen, der etwas anderes

<sup>14</sup> The reference is to Henri Bergson, *Durée et Simultanité. A Propos de la théorie d’Einstein*. 4th ed., Paris, Librairie Felix Alcan, 1929. The 4th edition is basically the same as the 2nd edition which differs from the first by containing the three appendices added to the second, and which are reproduced in the fourth edition. Schutz’s reference is to the first appendix, “The Journey in the Projectile” (see English translation by Leon Jacobson, The Library of Liberal Arts (Bobbs-Merrill Co) Indianapolis, 1965, pp. 163–172, pp. 174 f.) Bergson’s paradox of the separation and reuniting of Peter and Paul contains the physical refutation of the theory of relativity in terms of what is called “The Clock Paradox,” and the problem of “asymmetrical aging.” Do we age together simultaneously, the “same,” or asymmetrically? See also Schutz’s reference in “Don Quijote and the Problem of Reality,” *CP* II, p. 139.

<sup>15</sup> See Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie* (1936), in *Husserliana*, Bd VI, hg. Walter Biemel, Den Haag: Nijhoff<sup>2</sup> 1962, §§1–27; (English translation by David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.) Husserl gave several lectures at the Deutschen und der Tschechischen Universität in Prague in middle of November, 1935. With their friend Felix Kaufmann, Use and Alfred Schutz attended these lectures. See Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik. Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls*, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, p. 468 ff.

<sup>16</sup> Addition based on the Table of Contents, above, 11/7061.

<sup>17</sup> For the texts of Leibniz referred to by Schutz, see Leibniz, *Philosophische Werke*, edited by Ernst Cassirer (Hamburg: Meiner, 1903 [1966]), Vol I. Chapter VIII, pp. 84–93; Vol. II, Chapter XXII, pp. 74–78.

<sup>18</sup> In this connection, see Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 533 ff.)



denkt, etwas anderes will, verschieden sind”[“For us what is quite peculiar is the experiencing that thinks, that has self-consciousness and will, and that we distinguish from another who thinks something different, who wills something different”] (Vol. II, “Die Lehre von einem einigen, allumfassenden Geistes,” p. 60). (There we find the important citations of “action of matter” and, p. 61, of the “active principles” and the mutually contrasting kinds of doings and sufferings which cannot be ascribed to one and the same subject.)<sup>19</sup> Spinoza’s pantheism<sup>20</sup> and Bayle’s objections.<sup>21</sup>

The true meaning of Averroes’ *intellectus agens* and *intellectus patiens*.<sup>22</sup>

1) The problem of the social person (in the self) as the problem of activity and passivity.

a) of the pure *cogitare*

b) [of the pure]<sup>23</sup> *agere*

In the *cogitatio* directed to it, the *alter ego* is a self with the distinct modification of “*aliud cogitans, aliud volens, aliud agens*.” It is further included in the heterogeneous (!) course of duration.<sup>24</sup> A general positing “of my **acting** self”<sup>25</sup> corresponds to the general positing of the *alter ego* (which is a general positing of the *alter ego cogitans*). This is the origin of the pure pragma.

[Its relationship to duration is a problem that requires a very sophisticated and subtle phenomenological investigation. The key to the problem is that the self founded in duration *acts* in the external world and accordingly gears into world-time. *Actio* as a series of experiencings in duration, *actio* as working (pragma) in world-time. Here, in this split of temporality, we already find the original experiencing of the social person.]

The “self *per se*” is a *pragmatic* unification: *ego agens et semper idem agens (volens)*. In this context, *agens as self* contains as well, to be sure, the relevant index to the social person (*ego qua pater familias, qua civis Romanus, (N)philosophus, etc.*). As a consequence, all of these modifications are shown to be precisely modifications

<sup>19</sup> The text in parentheses is in square brackets in the original mss, after which Schutz refers to Leibniz, *op. cit.*, Vol II, Chapter XX, pp. 48–62. (The German editors cite the full text referred to by Schutz, and which is omitted here.)

<sup>20</sup> In the original Schutz uses the neologism, “Panentheismus.”

<sup>21</sup> For Spinoza, see *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata* (1677); for Pierre Bayle, see his essay “Averroes” and “Spinoza” in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1695/97). (English translation of the entry on Spinoza in Bayle, *Historical and Critical Dictionary. Selections*. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by Richard H. Popkin. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965, pp. 288–338.) Spinoza, Bayle, and Averroes are mentioned in the text of Leibniz, *be. cit.*, “Betrachtungen über die Lehre von einem einigen, allumfassenden Geistes,” pp. 48 ff., especially p. 60, note 322.

<sup>22</sup> See Averroes (Averrois Cordubensis, 1126–1198), *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros* (1562); edited by F. Stuart Grawford in *Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristotelem*, Vol. VI, Cambridge/Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1953, especially pp. 409ff, 576.

<sup>23</sup> In the original, ditto marks for the same expression.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Bergson’s distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous time in *Time and Free Will*, pp. 95ff, 109 ff.

<sup>25</sup> See below, p. 12/7080, where Schutz speaks of the “general positing of action.”



of the one *ego ipse agens* (volens) (appearing in the general positing of the *ego agens* as *origo* of pure pragma). In other words, the “self-consciousness” of the *ego agens* is made evident in the domain of pure activity (spontaneity) [2/7066] as *idem volens*, *agens* and also *cogitans*. Here we first view the attitude of the *ego cogitans* (thus prior to executing the general positing of the *ego agens*) in the domain of pure passivity which leads to the phenomenological finding of a multiplicity of social persons that, (somewhat like electrons around the atomic nucleus) “revolve” around a “nucleus of the self (of the intimate person? of the transcendental or even phenomenologizing ego? of the enduring self with a demonstrably homogeneous (!) structure of duration?)”

However—and this is the first thing to note—all of these social persons do not belong to an *alter ego*. Instead, as modifications of my *ego ipse* they refer back to my “primordially” as modifications of my own *cogitare* (the origin of Husserl’s antithesis of noema-noesis is particularly fruitful here).<sup>26</sup> With respect to their genesis, however, these modifications are open to question, and the constituting production of their intentionalities will have to be capable of demonstration. To each of these modifications there now corresponds a specific *attention à la vie* that is describable in some manner or other. More about this later on.

## 2) [*cogitare* and *agere*]<sup>27</sup>

Immediately we are faced with significant difficulties: First of all, every *cogitare* is also an *agere* and therefore cannot belong to pure passivity. (Not because Kant’s represented dollars are equivalent to actual dollars,<sup>28</sup> but because the action is preorganized in its project and the *spontaneity* of being able to project action is uniquely rooted in *cogitare*. —Even here it would seem that the important category of “fiat” intrudes, evaded as much by the *Sinnhafte Aufbau* as by all of phenomenology.)<sup>29</sup> We might say to this objection that, just to the extent that *cogitare* is spontaneity, namely, noesis, the unity of the *ego agens qua cogitans* is accepted as unchanged—just this

<sup>26</sup> See Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* [1912] Neu herausgegeben von Karl Schuhmann. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, §§87-96. {Hereinafter, *Ideen*, I.}

<sup>27</sup> Added on the basis of the table of contents; see above, p. II./7061.

<sup>28</sup> See Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781/87), B. 627. Kant of course speaks of “*Talem*.”

<sup>29</sup> Presumably Schutz borrowed this concept from William James; see James, *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), Vol. II, Chapter XXVI. Schutz had already referred to James’ category in *Sinnhafte Aufbau* (§11). The concept also arises in Bergson; cf. *Matière et Memoire* [*Matter and Memory*, Authorized translation by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (1908) New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959, p. 180.] See also Max Scheler, “Die Formen des Wissens und the Bildung” (1929); in Schutz’s copy of this essay the concept is emphatically underlined. See also the continuation in the 1937 manuscript, below pp. 69/7160-73/7164, as well as the distinction between inner deed (thinking) and external deed (working) in *Sinnhaften Aufbau*, §§8 ff., and the corresponding development by Thomas Luckmann in Schutz/Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt* II, Frankfurt am Main: Ausgabe Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984, Chapter V. This latter work has been translated as *Structures of the Life-World*, vol. 2, translated by David Parent and Richard Zaner (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1983).

makes possible the general positing of the self in the first place as transcendental or phenomenologizing *ego*.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, we have to show that activity and passivity are only helpful constructions required by the exchange of the two levels of time (prior to the position of the general positing of the acting self): in pure duration I, myself, am taken up unchanged at a stage in which the *ego agens* is already geared into world-time, or, geared into world-time, after the position of the general positing the self is projected back into a stage in which the series of experiences of action was a series of *cogitationes* immanent to the duration (free of working). Again, we find here the double play of *attention à la vie* as regulative of the general positing.<sup>31</sup>

### 3) [Mnemonic paradoxes]<sup>32</sup>

Belonging here are the different paradoxes of memory: e.g., Is the general positing of the acting self conditioned by the simultaneity of the different [3/7067] social persons—would they all be posited as present or at least be co-present as “open horizons,”<sup>33</sup> or do they remain preserved as a succession, in part, of retained, in part of reproduced, “mnemoic data” belonging to this person? Here we have to add the theory of essentially actual experiencings<sup>34</sup> that are to fulfill a major part of the new system—they alone make possible at all, in the first place, the general positing or “constitution” of the transcendental ego. In this connection, cf. Leibniz’s theory of the great number of like and mutually equal *petites perceptions* that cannot be remembered (Cassirer ed., II, pp. 56f, also p. 59).

### 4) [Paralogisms of Attention]<sup>35</sup>

We come next to the paralogisms of attention (*attention à la vie*). I am simply living straightforwardly in the stream <of my experiencings,> but directed to my working in world-time, acting as a unity without explicitly carrying out the general positing. Indeed, I cannot even effect that positing. However, if I do carry out the general positing, then my *attention à la vie* is a changed one, and, more particularly, of a diminished tension no longer allowing for working in the external world. (Perhaps here we immediately find the basic reason for Bergson’s distinction

<sup>30</sup> In contrast to the manuscripts of the 1920’s, here the difference between self and *alter ego* results not only from the essential non-identity of two *durees*, but also from the experience of belongingness of acts to me.

<sup>31</sup> In this connection see Schutz’s early allusion to the “symbolic function of the acting self,” i.e., to the conception of the symbolic relation and its meaning-constituting aspects, in “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur” (1927), pp. 25 ff., 46ff, 129 ff. (*Life Forms and Meaning Structure*, translated, Introduced and Annotated by Helmut Wagner, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982; after 1982; reprinted in Alfred Schutz, *Literature and Literary Relationships* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), pp. 33ff. 52ff., 125ff..) The pagination of the original manuscript is found in the margins of the English translation. Henceforth, the German edition will be referenced, with the pagination of the original manuscript.

<sup>32</sup> Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. 11/7061.

<sup>33</sup> In the original this insertion is enclosed by vertical lines.

<sup>34</sup> Schutz first introduced the concept of essentially actual experiencings in *Sinnhaften Aufbau*, §7.

<sup>35</sup> Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. II./7061.

between instinct and intellect.<sup>36</sup>) To no less extent the lines of relevance must allow of being shown. In a certain way they are equal hypsographical contour lines of relevance [*Isohypsen*] of the *attention à la vie* that then define the relief of the landscape of the sociological persons centered around the pole of the self.<sup>37</sup> And even the genesis of these lines of relevance have to be heeded as to their constitution. This problem is of significant practical importance for a description of the concrete problems such as those of a topology of the types of social person.

5) On the unity of monads and the attendant entelechy of the *ego agens* and *cogitans* (More precise considerations can follow only on the basis of further studies of Leibniz.)<sup>38</sup>

#### B) [The role of the body]<sup>39</sup>

The role of the unity of body in the set of problems of the self and *alter ego*. In the primordial sphere my body is made evident as a unity and in contradistinction to the *alter ego*.<sup>40</sup>

- 1) as pole of the *hic*, where thy body remains a pole of the *illic*.
- 2) consciousness of boundaries of my body that can accompany all my acting.<sup>41</sup>
- 3) my body as in motion governed by me (motor) and as organ of perception (*kat' exochen*) according to which all perceptions bear the index "my perceptions."<sup>42</sup>  
[4/7068]
- 4) my body as the gate into world-temporality, namely, as utensil of my—and always only my—working.

<sup>36</sup> See Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, authorized translation by Arthur Mitchell, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911, pp. 137 ff.

<sup>37</sup> Here Schutz puns on Leibniz's image of "veins in marble; see the subsequent note to 11/7079 below. The cartographical concept of "isohypses" or "hypsographical contour lines of relevance." *Isohypsen* is introduced by Schutz in his published work for the first time in "The Stranger," in Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers*, Volume II, Edited and Introduced by Arvid Brodersen, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, p. 93. The expression, "pole of the self," is Husserl's in the heading of *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §31: "*Das Ich als identischer Pol der Erlbenisse*."

<sup>38</sup> This reference is a further indication of the meaning Schutz ascribed to his Leibniz studies begun shortly after finishing the *Sinnhafte Aufbau*. In this connection also see the example within the frame of the continuation of work on this manuscript in the Summer of 1937, below p. 47/7138.

<sup>39</sup> Addition on the basis of the Table of Contents, above p. II./7061. This section of the first chapter was developed in a first draft in the following Summer of 1937.

<sup>40</sup> See Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§50ff

<sup>41</sup> In the original the subdivisions 1) and 2) are grouped together with a bracket in the left margin of the page under the concept of "space constitution." In that connection see *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §20, 114, note 1 with the reference to *Cartesianische Meditationen*, pp. 151 f. Also see the letter of Aron Gurwitsch to Schutz of 27 July, 1950 (*Correspondence*, pp. 116 ff.)

<sup>42</sup> In this connection see Schutz's earlier study, "Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur," pp. 19 ff, 88 ff., 113 ff., as well as Husserl, *op. cit.*, especially §53.

- 5) my body as spatial experience from within and from without and thereby of the irruption into the domain of the extended to which alone thy body belongs, and, more particularly, does so from the beginning.<sup>43</sup>
- 6) my body as the *origo* of the system of coordinates that defines the surrounding world and world of contemporaries—inanimate, animate and social.
- 7) my body as the object of my growing old.

### C) On the facts of consciousness belonging to the *me ipsum*

- 1) The unity of consciousness interrupted by enclaves:
  - a) Sleep
  - b) Dreams
  - c) Phantasy (play, children's play)
  - d) Day World, Night World
  - e) The world of jokes [Witzwelt]
 

n.b. Excursus concerning mental illnesses, in particular studies about schizophrenia.<sup>44</sup>
- 2) a) My growing older as the most personal, fundamental experiencing
  - b) My being toward death.<sup>45</sup>
  - c) my partial dying (sinking away of childhood, etc.)
 

n.b. Excursus on somatic ageing, and returning to b) in the light of problems recognized there (letter to Landsberg)<sup>46</sup>
- 3) The basic ethical (religious) problems *my* sins, *my* penitence, *my* anxiety, *my* moment, *my* repetition: all in Kierkegaard's sense.
- 4) The basic somatic facts
 

*my* pain, *my* sensual pleasure, *my* heartbeat, *my* digestion, *my* sexual impulses.

<sup>43</sup> For points 4) and 5), see Schutz, "Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur," pp. 114 f.

<sup>44</sup> A first attempt at dealing with this topic within the framework of Schutz's phenomenology is by Schutz's student, Maurice Natanson, "Philosophische Grundfragen der Psychiatrie I. Philosophic und Psychiatric," *Psychiatric der Gegenwart. Forschung und Praxis*, Vol. 1/2, 1963, pp. 903–925.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§49 ff.

<sup>46</sup> The letter to Landsberg was not found among Schutz's papers by the editors. There is, however, a stenographic draft of a letter to Landsberg by Schutz dated 24 May, 1936 (pp. 13361–13362). Schutz's private library contains a copy of Landsberg's *Einführung in die philosophische Anthropologie* of 1934 (1960) and the French translation of *Die Erfahrung des Todes* f 1936 (*Essai sur l'expérience de la mort* (1936)). [See Paul-Louis Landsberg, "The Experience of Death," in *Essays in Phenomenology*. Edited by Maurice Natanson, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 193–232.] For Landsberg, see Eduard Zwierlein, *Die Idee einer philosophischen Anthropologie bei Paul Ludwig Landsberg*, Wtirzburg: Konighausen & Neumann, 1989. Paul Ludwig Landsberg (Bern, 3 December 1901–2 April, 1944) was arrested by the Gestapo in France in February, 1943, and died in the concentration camp at Oranienburg in 1944. See Herbert Mitgang, *The New Yorker*, 2 August, 1982, pp. 51ff. for an account of the death of Landsberg and his family by the Nazis.]

## 5) The basic psychological facts

*my mood, my experiencing of the landscape, of nature, of music, but even perhaps my love for thee!* Consequence: dual grounding of the ineffable in the strict sense

- a) in the essentially actual and, therefore, unrepeatable nature of these experiencings,
- b) in the most personal nature of those experiencings limited just to *me ipsum*.

[5/7069]

**D) [On the most personal facts of consciousness related to the *alter ego*]<sup>47</sup>**

On the conscious experiencings directed to the *alter ego* that are nonetheless my most personal experiencings, yet that reveal the other as other:

1. Somatic: the child in the mother's love
  - my mother*
  - the sexual act*
2. Psychological: likewise those under 1), but correspondingly modified:
  - my childhood*
  - my having been born*
  - Eros* as my most personal phenomenon revealing the *alter ego*, but, centered around thee: "*Hand in Hand verpflichtet* (Goethe, *Brautigari*)"<sup>48</sup>
3. Excursus on the problem of rhythm (as the most personal somatic experiencing and as part of my duration, the most original kind of effecting [*Wirkung*] in the external world but which is *always* oriented toward the *alter ego*—the phenomena that can be experienced growing old in common *with* the *alter ego*: from soldiers marching together to dancing together to making music together)<sup>49</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Addition on the basis of the table of contents, p. II./7061.

<sup>48</sup> See the analysis of this example of "empathy" in Max Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1913), in *Gesammelte Werke* Bd. 7, edited by Manfred S. Frings, Bern/München: Francke, 1973, especially pp. 29 ff. (English translation, *The Nature of Sympathy*, translated by Peter Heath, with a General Introduction to Max Scheler's Work by W. Stark. Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1970, pp. 18 f.). See Johann von Goethe, *Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe*, edited by Erich Trunz, Bd. I: *Gedichte und Epen I*, München: Beck 1981, p. 386: "Der Brautigen." Schutz's recourse to Scheler's argument is of particular significance here because he accepts intentional acts the "fulfillment" of which necessarily requires the existence of others. As a result Schutz clearly deviates from Husserl's interpretation of the problem of intersubjectivity. See Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§43–50.

<sup>49</sup> See Schutz's later essay, "Making Music Together," (1951), *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 159–178; (and the posthumously published "Fragments Toward a Phenomenology of Music" (1944), *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, Edited by Helmut Wagner and George Psathas, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, Appendix, pp. 243–275.)

### E) [Concerning the differentiation of my experiencings of thee, and of my social persons]<sup>50</sup>

My experiencings of thee that reveal thee as *alter ego*, in contrast to those experiencings I impute to my social persons:

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<i>alter ego</i>	<i>me ipsum</i>
1) Thy thoughts, even if appropriated by me, are not traced back to the <i>origo</i> , nor subtend the same attentional modifications, as do my <i>cogitationes</i> standing in the same meaning-context. And they are always revealed with the index, “not originally constituted.” They are continually accompanied by distinctly distinguishable experiences of appropriation belonging only to me.	What I think as <i>civis Romanus</i> I can trace back to self-presentive consciousness, and redistribute the attentional modifications of experiencings in my meaning-context into experiencings qua <i>pater familias</i> . They always have the index, “originarily constituted.” They are continually accompanied by the awareness, “and yet it was I who thought this.” [6/7070]
2) Our working together [ <i>Wirken im Wir</i> ] in the external world is accompanied by the memory of thy acting body, which does not tire me. Descartes’s racers out of breath <sup>51</sup>	Accompanied by memory of my series of experiencings corresponding to <i>actio mea</i> that tire me.  No somatic coincidence.
3) Our growing older together [ <i>im Wir</i> ] is constituted by thy presence in the surrounding world, incorporated into thy duration such that it can only be fulfilled after the general positing of the <i>alter ego</i> .	A quasi-working together [ <i>im quasi-Wir</i> ], never possible in simultaneity but always only in succession. Of which my body is distinctly distinguishable, as it originarily points back to my growing older in the distinctly separable duration that is mine. The “common growing older” of the social person of my <i>me ipsum</i> is the chief problem of II. Chief problem of II

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### F) As transition to <Chapter> II: Simile of counterpoint

The voices above the *cantus firmus*: separated and yet unified, apprehended horizontally and vertically, the ear listening forwards and backwards, the modifications of *idem sed non eodem modo*.

The possibility of variation, of repeats, of augmenting, of diminishing, of the canon; homogeneity of timbre makes it possible to hear overtones; the meaning of overtones (possibility that all tones are only overtones)

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<sup>50</sup> Addition from the Table of Contents, p. II./7061.

<sup>51</sup> The reference to Descartes cannot be directly traced in his work; but for a thematizing of bodily movement see *Meditationes de prima philosophia* (1641), Meditation VI; *Passions de l’Ame* (1649), art. 46; and *Principia philosophiae* (1644), Part II. It is possible that Schutz’s note is related to the succinct exposition of the Cartesian position and its critique in part to Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 189 f.

Simile of four-handed playing; to which instrument are we attuned? and which master takes us in hand?

O sweet song!

Weitlaubrunn 7/37/1936

[6a7071]

## CHAPTER TWO

### Genesis of the Social Person in the Solitary Self.

A) The general positing of the *ego ipse* and its modifications in the natural world-view.

Whichever theory of the transcendental self be taken as point of departure (monads, the Kantian transcendental ego, Husserl's phenomenologizing self, Bergson's pure *durée*), all that we have within the natural world-view results from self-consciousness simpliciter and its development in the succession and co-existence of my experiencing *cogitationes*, *actiones* and indiscernible actual experiencings. In the natural world-view we do not ask about the subject of the *ego ipse* that self-reflective acts accomplish—it is simply the unity of self-consciousness taken for granted throughout all its positional acts, initiated as general positing. It follows that in the natural world-view just the *me ipsum* is meant by self-consciousness as Object [*Objekt*] to which reflective acts are related. To the extent that the *me ipsum* enters into the purview of reflection, it is (just now) the *me ipsum* past. The synthetic unity created by the *ego agens* seems dispersed as a result, and the *me ipsum*, shown continuously in *modo praeteriti* to the reflective regard, is presented at the same time as co-existence or co-succession of a series of partial-personalities [*Teilpersonalitäten*],<sup>52</sup> i.e., of a *me ipsum* that bears a specific index. This aspect—the first *pros hemas*—is, however, only mere seeming [*Scheinen*] and must be examined with respect to its originary constituents. In actuality, the polythetic syntheses of the totality of my experiencings break down into monothetic perspectives, the origin and direction of which are founded in their respective *attention à la vie* of my Now and Thus. They are therefore pragmatically conditioned (even though indirectly and only in the commonly understood meaning).

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<sup>52</sup> *Teilpersonalitäten*, *Teilpersonen*, and similar locutions, are borrowed from Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 523 ff. (English translation, pp. 519 ff.). The English edition translates the locutions as “individual personalities,” “individual persons,” i.e., as individuations of a collective person. Thus we speak of the American personality, or the Hispanic personality, etc. Schutz, however, seems to depart from Scheler in this respect, although not inconsistent with Scheler, because he has in mind the “specific index” of the *me ipsum*, i.e., the solitary self with which he begins articulated into partial persons or selves such as my different persons or selves as parent, as businessman, as neighbor, etc. See above, pp. 1/7065 f. In Schutz's case it would appear misleading to speak of the individual personalities of the individual or individual *me ipsum*. Thus we translate the locutions as “partial personalities,” “partial person.” The *me ipsum* itself, the individual me myself, is then a collective whole of “personalities,” past and present, each with its partial content (*Teilhalt*), belonging to a collective whole in Scheler's sense.



How does this discrepancy between seeming and being come about? It is always owing to a confusion of the spheres of inquiry resulting from failure to correctly analyze the temporal structure.

- 1) The “schizophrenic” aspect, that the one and unitary self-consciousness splits up into more or less unconnected partial contents occurs when the self (*me ipsum*) as *phenomenon* is viewed as though it were a transcendental ego or an actual self naively and straightforwardly living in its *durée*. Thus it is the self living straightforwardly [6b7072] and naively in its durational stream in self-consciousness (thus prior to undertaking the reflective turn), that naively identifies with the *phenomenon* of the self and its partial contents which first become visible in reflection. Now, it is precisely the reflective act, directed *modo praeteriti* to the unitary self, that, by its refraction in the prism of the *attention à la vie* in question, first of all splits up self-consciousness—unified by virtue of the general positing—into the spectrum of *phenomena* of partial persons [*Teilpersonen*]. However, these phenomena acquire an uncanny life. They only exist *nomo*, but not *physei*.

Just so with the ideal type. Indeed, one can very well call this act one of self-typifying. Excursus: Leibnizian monads interpreted as ideal types posited by God. Above all, compare “Adam” in <Leibniz’s> first letter to Arnauld <of 4/14 July, 1686.><sup>53</sup>

- 2) The semblance of unfragmented unity arises when the self, instituted in the general positing of the *ego ipse*, proceeds from the experiencing of naively acting and by working in world-time without giving a thought to the fact that just this acting, as it were, collects in a concave mirror the colors of the spectrum fragmented in the prism of reflection. The actor qua actor (already formulated in the language of modifications) is subject, substance, monad, but never Object—as one possessing action carried out [*gehandelt Habender*], it would then be at the same time: as this and that possessor of action carried out [*gehandelt Habender*]. It is not *ego cogito ergo sum*, but instead (Leibniz in his critique of Descartes) a manifold of affairs thought by me, thus I am in a manifold of situations.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> In the original the indented passage is set off by double vertical lines. Schutz refers here to Max Weber’s conception of the ideal type, as developed in Weber’s “Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis” (1904) (in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, edited by Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen: Mohr, 1988, pp. 146–214). (English translation in Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Translated and Edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, Glencoe, 111: The Free Press, 1949, pp. 50–112). In the reference to Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld with the catchword, “Adam-problem,” Leibniz deals with his thesis “that the individual concept of each person once and for all includes all that the individual will ever encounter.”

<sup>54</sup> Leibniz, “Bemerkungen zum allgemeinen Teil der Kartesischen Prinzipien” (1692). Schutz paraphrases Leibniz’s statement in Article 7 where Leibniz says that “Man kann somit die primitiven Tatsachenwahrheiten passend auf folgende zwei zurückführen: ‘ich denke’ und ‘Mannigfaches wird von mir gedacht.’ Hieraus folgt nicht nur, [dass] ich existiere, sondern auch, dass ich auf mannigfache Art bestimmt bin.” [“We can reduce the primitively true facts to the following two: ‘I think’ and a ‘manifold of things are thought by me.’ As a result it follows not only that I exist but that I am defined in a manifold way.”]



In this connection, and particularly in both of the cases, a) and b), that it is a case of seeming and not of self-presentive constitution, is solely revealed by the circumstance that the partial contents as well as the (seeming) totality of acting from the start proves to be a modification of a unitary self-consciousness—an axiom that ought never be left out of sight. In the fullness of my manifold, I can view the manifold, thought by me, in an isolating way in monothetic rays, although it is just only a manifold that is thought by *me*. [6c7073]

- 3) One consequence of what we have previously said is the resolution of the problem of whether the partial contents must be regarded as co-existent or as co-successive. Even here it is a matter of a seeming (for the question crops up only in the domain of phenomena by temporal confusion). Every monothetic synthesis of polythetic acts brings along a certain idealization. Even the partial contents, shown to be modifications of a single self, stand under the ideality of “and so forth” and of “one can always again...”<sup>55</sup> Precisely that makes up its similarity with the ideal type. At the most it is thus a matter of potentialities preserving the semblance of co-existing realities by means of idealizations. After all, the proposition holds that the social person has no historicity [*Geschichtlichkeit*], and that such historicity accrues exclusively to the person in its fullness (the monad). (More about this later on.)<sup>56</sup>
- 4) Accordingly, the further development of the problem is clearly predesignated.
  - a) First of all, we have to investigate how, in the solitary self, the genesis of the phenomenon of the partial person is grounded in an original way:<sup>57</sup> two major headings are generated:
  - b) Problems of temporality:<sup>58</sup> to be investigated is the constitution of modifying intentionalities, thus above all of *attention à la vie* in its living variants.
    - i) with respect to their predesignated structure in the inner duration (the problem of growing older, of duration and world-time, etc. = genuine problems of constitution).
    - ii) with respect to the phenomena of memory (remembering, expecting, retention, protention = genuine problems of attention).
    - iii) with respect to the kinds of nascent tempora of the self and its perspectives (I am now, I am before, I am henceforth = the genuine phenomenology of the self in the natural world-view)

<sup>55</sup> See Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik*, §74.

<sup>56</sup> See below, pp. 7/7075 and 9/7077. Presumably Schutz refers here to Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 530 ff.)

<sup>57</sup> See Scheler's concept of person as bearer of a member of a personality <e.g., of a race, nation, religion,> *Formalismus*, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 530 ff.)

<sup>58</sup> See below, pp. 7/7075 ff., following the thematic catalogue to Chapter Two, B and below, p. H./7061 the corresponding concluding outline of the contents of the manuscript of 1936, Chapter Two, B.

- c) Problems of pragmatic interpretation: or, of the constitution of attentional modifications themselves.<sup>59</sup>
  - i) on the primacy of the acting self in the *setting in place* of the general positing.
  - ii) on the “self-typifying function” of hierarchies of plans (with excursus on <Felix> Kaufmann’s axiological consequence).<sup>60</sup>
  - iii) on the pragmatic conditionedness of reflection
    - aa) in general
    - bb) its idealization (choice of monothetic perspective)
    - cc) its “*porte*”

[6d/7074]

- 5) Next we have to investigate how such kinds of constituting partial contents are presented in the natural world-view as a fully articulated hierarchy (the problem of continuity)<sup>61</sup>
  - a) from the anonymous [self] to the intimate person<sup>62</sup>
  - b) what makes up the actuality of the social person in question in the solitary self?
  - c) constancy and changeableness of the actual social person in question
  - d) causes of dislocation (from becoming eccentric to now becoming central)
  - e) the experiencings of transformation [Verwandlung]: limit-situations and the moment.

Weitlaubrunn, 14 August, 1936

[7/7075]

## **B) Problems of temporality**

### **I. The problems of constitution**

Inner duration and world-time<sup>63</sup>—growing older as being toward death—sinking into earlier life-forms—death as a solipsistic experience—the transcendence of life—growing up—specific situation of growing older: childhood, youth, growing up, old age—here the horizons are indicated by different measures of publicness.

The role of protentions that are not fulfilled for the constitution of apparent worlds—seeming and being—memorableness (reproducibleness)—fulfilled and unfulfilled horizons—situations—

<sup>59</sup> See below, pp. 1 I/7079ff following the thematic catalogue to Chapter Two, C, as well as the corresponding concluding outline for Chapter Two C, in the the 1936 manuscript, above, p. III./7062.

<sup>60</sup> See Felix Kaufmann, *Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften* (Vienna: Springer 1936), pp. 191f, 306.

<sup>61</sup> Following the thematic catalog to Chapter Two, D and E, below, pp. 21/7090 ff. as well as the corresponding outline to Chapter Two, D and E of the 1936 manuscript, above, p. III./7062.

<sup>62</sup> In this connection, see Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 511, 548, 552. (English translation, pp. 506, 530 ff.)

<sup>63</sup> See Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 130 f., 180.

Excursus on the problem of generations: fathers and sons—

Intrusion of retentions in the transition from one personal world to another—

The *attention à la vie and fil conducteur* for the construction of personal worlds and as criterium for reality—Once again seeming and being: the relativity of the real—transcendence in immanence—

The stratification of temporality—tension of the *élan vital*—life during the day—life at night—the world of phantasy—working in the external world as the constituting specifics of the world of daily life—<sup>64</sup>

The temporal structure of everyday life—the historically of the self in the first place as the history of its daily life—why the social person has no historicity in the genuine sense—the ideality of the immanent continuum—in contrast to the ideality of a unitary world-time—the compromise of public time as unifying moment—public time as solipsistically grounded in the rhythm of life (hunger, sleep, pulse, breathing, walking)—

Reciprocal relationship between the rhythm of the world (day—night, the seasons, tides—flood, moon, life of plants and animals) and solipsistic rhythm of life—

The pragmatic motive in the constituting of public time of everyday life—just on that account, however, a preformed type of personality corresponds to its persisting ideally in public time—[8/7076]—counter ideas: *homo religiosus*, particularly the mystic—but also the philosopher.

II. [The constituted immanence as constituting moment for the stratification of the social person]<sup>65</sup>

The subjective experiencing of temporality as constituting immanence is itself again the constituting moment for the stratification of social persons.<sup>66</sup>

The two basic experiencings: waiting (and, as correlate, expectation) and retrospect as the pole of tension: life—death, protention—reproduction, unfulfilled indecision—unchanging occurrence; the extent to which this tension is cancelled in

<sup>64</sup> For the whole section, see Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Chapter III, as well as *L'Énergie spirituelle* (1919) (English translation, *Mind-Energy*, by H. Wildon Carr, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920). See in addition pp. 15/7084ff, below as well as Schutz's later development in his essay "On Multiple Realities," CP I, pp. 226 ff. For the reference presumably to Simmel's formulation, "transcendence in immanence," see below, fn, 71.

<sup>65</sup> Addition on the basis of the table of contents, above, p. II./7061.

<sup>66</sup> Here there is a further development of Schutz's basic thesis in *Sinnhaften Aufbau* that the constituting of meaning and actuality are essentially tied to the problem of temporality, that "the problem of meaning is a problem of time," p. 9; (English translation, p. 11). In this section Schutz develops the concepts of time as intersection of subjective and world time which, in part, he discusses in the continuation of the manuscript of 1937 (see below, pp. 43/7134 ff.). These analyses concerning the temporal stratification of social actuality will become relevant for Schutz in his later works—for, among others, the analysis of communication as temporal event—and continue into his American years. The conception of pragmatic temporality and the tempora of the self are here the most elaborated parts in his work; cf. *Sinnhafter Aufbau*, §7, and the additions in Schutz/Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, I, Chapter II, section B, 4; translated as *Structures of the Life-World* by Richard Zaner and Tristram Engelhardt (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

simply living along and annihilated in the ideality of public time—the role of pragma in this context—

The life-forms of *modo futuri exacti* and *modo plusquam perfecti* as projections of this state of affairs in which public time—expectation and memory already constituted as a unity—is guided by interest and attention—

The stratification of the social person into my self now, my self before now, my self later on (tempora of the self), and their perspectives.

III. The tempora of the self and their perspectival articulation.<sup>67</sup>

a) My self now:

Characteristics of the Now as a controllable and foreseeable segment: the protentions are not empty and unfulfilled but are fulfilled with the maximum probability of *rebus sic stantibus*; moreover, the realization of the project can follow upon an extraordinarily small distance after the project; in this connection consciousness of the present resulting from

- i) constant somatic data (cf. Chapter 1, b)<sup>68</sup>
- ii) essentially actual experiencings, to a lesser extent in the equilibrium of currently undifferentiated perceptions.
- iii) incorporation into the rhythm of public time

The pragmatic motive of the Now—the Moment in Plato and Kierkegaard (Concept of Dread [*Angst*])<sup>69</sup>—also “Later” belongs together with Now, but not in the same sense as “Earlier,” from out of which the Now arises, apprehended from the extent of tension belonging to the project. [9/7077]

b) My earlier self (my self before now)

The pragmatic thrust to turn back is likewise requisite for *the portee* of the cone of rays of reproduction projected backwards—it seems that “my earlier self” is primarily given as my self *qua* social person, while “my self now” appears primarily as *ego ipse* in totality; thus in retrospect the unitary self today in the past is likewise split up into constituting partial persons: causes:

- i) only my self today lives in public time; still simply living in the stream, it enjoys somatic unity (old photographs)<sup>70</sup>
- ii) only my self today *works*, my earlier self *has* worked; only *actio* creates a unity of relations, *acta* are not to be ascribed to the unitary *ego ipse* but instead to partial social persons; in fact we may say right away that such ascribed *acta* constitute partial persons precisely in their sedimentation.—

<sup>67</sup> In the continuation in the 1937 manuscript Schutz develops the following sketch into a first draft; see below, pp. 43/7134–67/7158.

<sup>68</sup> According to the concluding Table of Contents of the work on the manuscript in 1936 (above, p. II./7061), Schutz refers here to the section, “The Role of the Body.”

<sup>69</sup> For Plato, see *Parmenides* 155e–157b; for Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, Chapter 3 as well as *Either/Or* for the “leap” as the “moment of resolve;” and *Philosophical Fragments*, Chapters 1 and 4.

<sup>70</sup> Schutz is referring to the circumstance that, when grown up, only with great effort are we able to recognize our own bodies in our childhood photos.

By “ascription” we mean here reproduction in specific, pragmatically conditioned attentional modifications.

Perspectival articulation of my earlier self demonstrable at the center by levels or strata:

- i) my still surviving earlier self (the social person *realiter* always demonstrable in my self now)
- ii) my earlier self still *potentially* reactivatable (the social person “can always again” be brought into play)
- iii) the (dead) life-forms of my earlier self, definitively sunk into the past, which can never return and can no longer be reactivated.

Excursus on historicity [*Historizität*]:<sup>71</sup>

- a) lines of relevance (isographs) always drawn from Now and Thus,
- b) the variability of perspective, however, is limited to the levels i) [and] ii),
- iii) is unchangeable, would then be in the very developed past perfect relation (looking back at a past i) or ii) in which a past iii) was still effective that is now definitely dead).

—Continuous dying off of earlier selves as the criterion of growing older—this principle of irreversibility of time (duration)-receding identical with the durational cessation of partial dying—the problem of dread (Kierkegaard) and [10/7078] of “thrownness” (Heidegger) turn back to partial dying—the metaphysical origin of the idea of immortality, of the theory of *anamnesis* and of the journey of the soul.<sup>72</sup>

Excursus on the unconscious (Freud)<sup>73</sup>

- c) My self later on

The increasing indefinability makes possible the production of the future *ego ipse* and/or its partial persons—the future is articulated perspectively into the immediately foreseeable, diminishing up to the wholly uncalculable—the sort of relief, characteristic of the future, receives this landscape of the future by means of isohypses of relevance, introducing pragmatically conditioned attentional modifications—origin of the concept of probability and with it introduction of a new concept of possibility—the future falls under the ideality of “always again” and “and so forth” and to that extent refers back to the past or to an actual stock of experiences—constant probabilities (or risks) also belong to this ideality; e.g., con-

<sup>71</sup> In the original the indented passage is set off by vertical lines.

<sup>72</sup> See Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*; for the concept of “thrownness,” see Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§29, 31, 38, 58, 68b; for Plato see *Meno*, 8ldff., and *Phaedrus*, 74df.

<sup>73</sup> The indented reference is set off in the original by vertical lines. See Freud, *Das Unbewusste*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 3 (Frankfurt/M: Fischer 1975), pp. 125–162. In *Sinnhafte Aufbau* Schutz refers in addition to Moritz Geiger, “Fragment über den Begriff des Unbewussten und die psychische Realität,” *Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 4, 1921, pp. 1–136.

stancy of the probability of my physical death. —Here we also find the origin of the possible Ideological interpretation of one's own life (entelechy of monads) and point of insertion of the idea of transparency (in which my earlier self is the origin of the idea of the individual "law according to which you take your place").<sup>74</sup>

[IV. The *ego agens* and the hierarchy of projects]<sup>75</sup>

On the hierarchy of projects: life-plans, professional (work) plans, calculation, work and free time (work day and evening after work), yearly budget and weekly allowance, hourly plan, etc. Reactions to the fundamental dread: *carpe diem*, *ataraxia*, *espérance*.<sup>76</sup>

Weitlaubrunn, July 28, 1936

[11/7079]

### C) Problems of pragmatic interpretation

#### 1) [The primacy of the acting self]<sup>77</sup>

The pragmatic interpretation (of waking, rational acting which is always a "gearing into" ["*Behandeln*"] reality, to dreaming)

The delimitation of spheres of relevance as a function of *attention à la vie*—that is itself pragmatically conditioned—and, more particularly, predesignated in the hierarchy of plans—waking consciousness and sleeping consciousness—

Bergson's "tensions" as continuous adumbrating of waking consciousness—Leibniz's theory of partial sleeping (*Nouveau Essais*, I, 14, p. 74)—attention and memory: as the constituting of the *individuum* (*ibid.*, I 12, p. 73)<sup>78</sup>—attention and protentions—the role of essentially actual experiencings and of indiscernible perceptions in the constitution of spheres of relevance—on their basis a new clarification of the difference between behavior and action—(*ibid.*, I, 15, p. 75)—the *continua* of *clara et distincta perception*:<sup>79</sup> confused perceptions, indiscernible perceptions in the equilibrium of perceptions, essentially actual experiences<sup>80</sup> (*verités de raison*: *lumen naturale*: instinct) have their correlate in the series: rational acting—acting without clearly distinct intermediate boundaries—behaving—simply living straightforwardly in the stream of duration.

Causes of the dominating role of the acting self:

<sup>74</sup> See Goethe, *Gedichte und Epen*, I, "Urwortes, p. 359: "Urworte. Orphische: Daimon, Dämon, Z, 1–4. "Wie an dem Tag, der dich der Welt verliehen. / Die sonne stand zum Grüße der Planeten./Bist alsobald und fort und fort gediehen. /Nach dem Gesetz, wonach du angetreten."

<sup>75</sup> Addition based on the table of contents, above p. II./7061.

<sup>76</sup> For the concept of "fundamental dread," see Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§40, 68b; for "*carpe diem*," see Horace, *Odes* (I, 11, 8). The attitude of "*ataraxia*" as a goal of life is at the center of the Stoic philosophy of Epicurus and Democritus.

<sup>77</sup> Added from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062. Schutz undertook a first draft of this section in the continuation of this manuscript in the summer of 1937. See below, pp. 68/7159-74/7165).

<sup>78</sup> Schutz's references are to the French edition of *Nouveaux essais*, Paris, Flammarion. The references to Book I are erroneous.

<sup>79</sup> See Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, §§30 ff., 41 ff.

<sup>80</sup> See Leibniz, *Discours de Metaphysique* (1686), §33, as well as *Nouveaux essais*, I, 2, §21; I, 2, §20.

- a) *Physei*: Only action enters into world-time—experiencing of movement from within—making possible displacement of the *origo* of the system of coordinates in space and along with change of perspective from *hinc* to *illinc*—making possible the experience of resistance of external matter and therewith its constituting as *reality*<sup>81</sup>—together with distinguishing being from seeming—earlier unified self (motive)—my self now (*ego agens*)—my self arriving from the future (extent of the project)—to the center of action, the *ego ipse agens*—makes possible the hierarchy of plans—creates “veins in marble” that are “preinscribed” [“*vorpunktiert*”]<sup>82</sup> and therefore create “pragmatic relevances”—constituting of habitualities and their automatisms.
- b) *Nomos*: motive and project rationally reconstructable by choice—arrangeable into categories of causes and goals—reality supposed as given and no longer a question of being and seeming—controllable as running its course in the external world—remains preserved in temporal variation, only the motive and extent of the project are adumbrated in experience, not however the *actio* itself—transformation of hypothesis of “psychophysical unity” into *thesis* about—<sup>83</sup>
- 2) [Orientation of all other personalities around the *ego agens*]<sup>84</sup> Orientation of all other experiencings around those of the acting ego— continuation of this series within the acting ego by articulation of the levels of relevance
  - a) single projects of plans
  - b) in-order-to-motive
  - c) because-motive
  - d) choice of means
  - e) acting by choice (this occurs as much between particular articulated levels of relevance as within <relevances> themselves).

Weitlaubrunn, August 13, 1936

[12/7080]

### 3) Further investigations into the pragmatic principle

The surrounding world (but *not* the social surrounding world) articulated into perspectives of the Near and the Far (cf. In this connection Leibniz’s discussions of

<sup>81</sup> In dealing with the pragmatic constitution of reality on the basis of the experience of resistance Schutz takes up an old pragmatic motive; see especially Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 151 ff. ; George Herbert Mead, *The Philosophy of Act* (1938), edited by Charles W. Morris, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972, Chapter III: “The Nature of Scientific Knowledge;” Max Scheler’s study of “*Erkenntnis und Arbeit*,” in *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 8: *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (1926), edited by Maria Scheler, Bern/ München: Francke, 1980, pp. 363 ff. (in connection with Dilthey). But also see Leibniz, *Nouveau essais*, 11/4, §§ 1 ff.

<sup>82</sup> For the metaphor of the marble, see Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais*, “Preface,” I, 1, §25; for the image of “preinscribed lines,” see Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 103 f. This image of preinscribed lines was used by Schutz since the time of his manuscript, “*Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur*,” also see below, pp. 14/7083 f., as well as the elaboration of 1937, p. 73/7164.

<sup>83</sup> Schutz probably refers to Max Scheler’s observation in *Formalismus*, pp. 157 ff. (English translation, pp. 135 ff.), as well as pp. 381 f., 386 ff. (English translation, pp. 370 ff.).

<sup>84</sup> Added from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.



spatial and temporal perspectives NE XXI, §62, p. 157).<sup>85</sup> Immediately a concrete real center of the surrounding world is given: things that lie in the range of vision, of hearing, of grasping, of reaching. The circuit of this circle is determined by the corporeality that constructs the *origo* of this system of coordinates.<sup>86</sup> It is to be noted that there are already differences here, e.g., in the sight world (with its optical perspectives) and in the world within reach. Except for the spontaneity included in all *cogitare*, a core of perceptual and apperceptual reality remains that does not yet presuppose on my part any “activity” in the sense of “grasping” in the external world, or of a “dealing with things” and therewith of an acting.

N.B. In this section we speak mainly of my unitary psychophysical *me ipsum*<sup>87</sup> as it is created by the general positing of action,<sup>88</sup> more particularly in the natural attitude. But by natural attitude we mean that I simply accept as facts the phenomena—including the phenomenon of *me ipsum*—and, as long as the harmony of experiencing does not disintegrate, that I do not distinguish between seeming and being. In a common sense we can say that also and just in the natural attitude a kind of *epoché*<sup>89</sup> is exercised which is certainly radically distinct in kind from the phenomenological *epoché*.<sup>90</sup>

This *external psychophysical* passivity in which I receive perceptions from the core of reality of the surrounding world (I almost might have said, this passivity in which, in the very narrowest sense, perceptions from the surrounding world befall me), however, is transformed out of mere perceptions into apperceptions by internal activity (spontaneity). The particular experiences constituted polythetically are “well marked off in the monothetic ray of regard. They are brought into harmony with the current stock of experiences. Belonging to this stock of experiences, however, is the memory of all modifications that have been experienced in previous cores of reality through an act of pragma (e.g., mere kinaesthesias): this table now

<sup>85</sup> The reference is to Schutz’s French edition of *Nouveaux essais*, 11.21, no doubt to §63.

<sup>86</sup> See Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §§27 f. For the structural elements of time and space for the life-world, see Schutz/Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, I, Chapter II, Part B.

<sup>87</sup> At issue here is the so-called psychophysical problem, thus the question of how the psychic (the soul) operates on the physical (the body), and conversely. So-called science by Gustav Theodor Fechner (*Elemente der Psychophysik*, Leipzig 1860, 1907, 1964) and developed by Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig (*Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, Leipzig: Engelmann, 1874, 1908/11). See the contemporary literature familiar to Schutz, Ernst Mach, *Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis der Physischen zum Psychischen* (1900); Karl Jaspers, *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* (1913); Robert Reininger, *Das psychophysische Problem* (1916), A. Wenzel, *Das Leib-Seele-Problem im Lichte der neueren Theorien der physischen und seelischen Wirklichkeit* (1933). Likewise see Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§44 f., 50 ff., 56.

<sup>88</sup> See above, p. 1/7065, where Schutz speaks of the “general positing of my acting self.”

<sup>89</sup> See Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §§31 f.; *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§11, 15; *Krisis*, §§17 f.

<sup>90</sup> This is the first version of the *epoché* which is the specific *epoché* of “bracketing doubt” in the mundane, relative natural attitude; see the first draft in elaboration of 1937, below pp. 76/7 167f., as well as in “On Multiple Realities,” *CP* I, p. 229.



looks like this and that. But when I stand on the other side, have gone around it, the table has a different set of looks. By virtue of the *pragmatic* idealization of "I can always again," I can go around the table again (standing back from it). [13/7081] I can transform again the *hinc* into an *illinc* and the *illinc* into a *hinc*. Thus in a certain way the cores of reality have been displaced. What previously was the *core* of reality has now become the relatively peripheral reality. *However, by virtue of the pragmatic idealization of "I can always again," all past reality has the characteristic of potentiality and, more particularly, is preserved in the specific form of probability.*

In the specific form of probability, because experience is underpinned by sub-rational [*sub-intelligierte*] *rebus sic stantibus* itself, the conclusiveness of which once again will be justified and corrected. There we find the probability-characteristic of probability [*Wahrscheinlichkeitscharakter der Chance*] that is calculable (not reckonable). I presume the repeatability, but by carrying out an idealization in consciousness that in such cases need not be legitimated to be in harmony with other experiences. Or, more precisely stated: that in every case and under all circumstances must become legitimated (since indeed *rebus sic stantibus* is only an idealization and we cannot step twice in the same stream) when proved after sufficient analysis and the living stream is not carried away by distinctions. In this context we have the great problem of repetition defined by Kierkegaard.<sup>91</sup>

Thus around the surrounding world's core of reality in the strict and proper sense, a core of reality *ex praeterito*, a potentiality *ex praesente*, or, better, reality in the specific modification of probability. (E.g., the spatial perspective: "Let's go over there and look at it more closely;" or "I'll take off my dark glasses again;" or "I'll come back after a year and convince myself"). Here it is already clear that the sedimented experience is a *pragma* (e.g., kinaesthesias) accomplished *by me*, in the memory of which this potentiality (reality in the mode of probability) proves to be an earlier core of reality: Once this *hinc*, now a "phenomenon of probability," was a reality for me, but a reality *illinc*. For by my *pragma* my earlier *hinc* has now become an *illinc*.

Cf. Here and to this whole section the pragmatistic theory of perception that Scheler provides at the end of *Erkenntnis und Arbeit*.<sup>92</sup>

[14/7083]

Now, contained in the idealization of "I always can again" there not only is the reiterableness of the same *pragma*, but also the realizableness of an analogous *pragma*. A second level of potentiality arises here, change in the broadest sense haloing the core of reality. Even though this level can still belong to the surrounding world it continually goes over into the contemporary world. I will travel to Pisa and see whether the tower is really leaning.

At this point the artificially abstract solipstic analyses arrive at difficulties because even the non-social contemporary world is founded on the social surrounding, contemporary and precedent worlds.

<sup>91</sup> For the reference to Kierkegaard, see *Repetition*.

<sup>92</sup> The reference is to Max Scheler, "Erkenntnis und Arbeit," *loc. cit.*, pp. 359 ff.

If I climb up that hill, with more or less probability I will see the great clock.

The genuine pragmatic turn is completed when Leibniz defines spontaneity in connection with striving to acquire other perceptions.<sup>93</sup> To acquire other perceptions means displacing the *origo* of my system of coordinates or to alter the actual core of reality of my surrounding world precisely by means of a pragma such as change of place: some phenomena or other by change brought “within reach” in a “potential surrounding world.” Because my pragma is, however, continually operative, I am never in an indifferent state where everything is of equal weight. Instead I am continuously shaken by the onslaught of confused perceptions that are indiscernible which Leibniz compared with the noise of waves breaking on the beach. In Bergson’s lingo these are just those experiences that define the tensions of my *attention*<sup>94</sup> (perchance even make them up), and that provide the first division of my surrounding world into its perspectives by just this pragma. My “attention” (i.e., the confused perceptions in their totality) link my regard to the “predelineated lines” (Bergson), to the “veins in the marble” (Leibniz), while they make “salient” those perceptions out of the breaking waves of confused, “unconscious” perceptions, namely <those that are> apperceived (and possibly raised to more distinct clarity in the optimal case: in-order-to-motives of a rational action)—perceptions that are pragmatically relevant for me, *ego ipse agens* (that I act upon and institute together with the general positing of my unitary world as well as the unity of my self)- To that extent, the pragmatic conception is well grounded.<sup>95</sup>

Concerning the whole foregoing problem of the core of reality, we have to observe that this articulation into perspectives is not only spatial but also temporal and, in general, is to be carried out with respect to situations.

Weitlaubrunn, August 16, 1936

[15/7084]

4) The pragmatic principle as constituent of forms of personality conceived of as co-existing or co-succeeding.

a) [Primacy of the purely actual pragma and the full reality constituted by it]<sup>96</sup>

Primacy of the purely actual pragma and the full reality of the surrounding world in the extent of its reach constituted by it: to which corresponds full *attention à la vie*—

<sup>93</sup> See Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais*, II, 21, §§9 and 72, as well as *Essais de Théodicée*, I, §§59,65, and III, §§290, 301.

<sup>94</sup> See Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 89 ff.

<sup>95</sup> The references are, again, to Schutz’s French edition of *Nouveaux essais*. For the whole development of the relation of Bergson and Leibniz, see Schutz, “Choosing Among Projects of Action,” *CP* II, pp. 85 ff. Cf. Leibniz’s theory of choice in acting (NE, pp. 130, 136 f., 138, 143 f., 147, 148, 152, 158 as well as 165 f.) with Bergson’s theory of choice in *Données immédiates de la conscience* (“Decisions fall like ripe fruit”).

<sup>96</sup> Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III/7062. In the continuation of this manuscript in the summer of 1937, Schutz developed a first draft of this section. See below, pp. 75/7166-87/7178.

This level gives evidence of open horizons, and particularly of a) levels of the first potentiality: the previously actual pragma that potentially is reiterable; the full reality of the surrounding world in the extent of its reach corresponds to the world of “phenomena of probability.” The *attention à la vie*, limited to my self now in the purely actual pragma, is extended to my self later on, however always related back to my previous self. Protentions procure their intentionalities from reproductions and retentions of pragmas that have receded into the past, b) Levels of the second potentiality: potential pragma—yet always stemming from the level of the *ego ipse*—the boundaries of which lie only in the compatibility and compossibility of the in-order-to motives, of the projects, of specific relations of ends or means with the whole experience, especially with respect to the experience of one’s own pragma, its practicability and “its own powers.” The reality of the surrounding world leads to the potentiality of the contemporary world, the world in the extent of its reach corresponds to the world in its reachableness.

Correspondingly, change grows out of the receding probability, the experience of risk, and thus directs *attention* to my self later on, freed from that reference back to my earlier self. Specific, basic attitudes result: courage, fear, awe, ataraxia, etc. Protentions are simply there and are completely unfulfilled.

N.B. Even here our analysis carried out in the solipsistic primordial sphere necessarily remains fragmentary. Significant levels of potentiality of one’s own pragmas are lacking, the analogue of an “of thee,” of the third person [*von dritten*], of anyone, of everyone are already accomplished. What thou (he, that one, one, whoever) can do, I can also. In this connection, the highly anonymous typical action for one’s own pragma is at most only probable, and thus prefigured as a very individually related action: *one* does thus and so; thou certainly, in your own special capacities... What one can do, I can also do, <but> in no case can I measure up to thee. The series of pragmatic anonymity flows in inverse relation to the theoretical with respect to “probability” (law of the paralogism of anonymous probability, basic for the problem of the orientation of social persons around the intimate person and to be more precisely considered there).

A.S. The sphere previously dealt with may be comprised under the heading of “*the world of working*.”<sup>97</sup> Its perspectival relevance-articulation is investigated in this connection on the basis of the pragmatic motive.

[16/7085]

[b)] Modifications of the world of working by variations in *attention à la vie*.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>97</sup> Here, for the first time, Schutz introduces the concept of the “world of working” [*Wirkwelt*]. For exposition of the world of working as the core of the life-world, see “On Multiple Realities” as well as the relevant passages in “Symbol, Reality and Society.” Both of these essays are reprinted in *Collected Papers* 1.

<sup>98</sup> Schutz develops a first draft of this section in the continuation of this manuscript in the Summer of 1937, below, pp. 88/7179-118/7210. For the examples of modifications into the worlds of phantasy, dream, and science, Schutz investigates the different cognitive styles central to the constitution of “multiple realities.” See the development of modifications of the world of working in “On Multiple Realities.” The present section lays the groundwork for this analysis of the modifications of the worlds of phantasy, dream, and scientific theory.

[1]] Preface<sup>99</sup>

No matter how the pragma, the *actio*, may refer to the prephantasied *acta modo futuri exacti* (i.e., founded on the project), and accordingly, on the other hand, to the whole stock of experience, the world of working is designated by the fact that, genetically explained, these moments are of great significance but that, together with the pragma, the “fiat” constitutes the unity of the self in the general positing of working in the world. The *project* finds its correlate in the purpose: the *purpose* contains the intending to the “fiat,” just as the *project* contains the intending to the *goal of action*. Thus the pragma is articulated as follows: a) the pragma without the purpose and project: mere reaction, mere behavior determined by indiscernible, confused sensations; b) the pragma with the purpose but without the project: affective behavior, traditional behavior, “empirical” behavior in the sense of Leibniz;<sup>100</sup> c) the pragma with the project and purpose: acting with distinctly intermediate goals: rational acting and d) the pragma with the project but without the purpose: phantasms (in any case, the project itself belongs here).<sup>101</sup> In the following we speak of d)

[2]] The World of Phantasy.<sup>102</sup>

Presupposition: Changing the tension of *attention à la vie* so that it is no longer directed to my self later on and to the potentiality of the surrounding world of the second level, but directed to the self as such (not *beyond* my time but to my self—in the *apparition* [*apparition*] of Now and Thus—continually posited, to my self all the time as well as to the potentiality of my self from now on). Afterwards a perspectival division of the world of phantasy also arises here depending on whether the compatibilities and compossibilities of “real” daily life are retained or whether they are “bracketed” level by level. End point: limitless (?) free will. Of course the world of phantasy knows projects with hierarchies of plans, but without the apertinent hierarchies of purposes. “Choice” and “election” [*Kür*] are themselves shown there, but not “will” and “free will” because as such no voluntary act with the intentionality of “fiat” has its own place there. The “reality,” transposed from the world of working, may in part or even wholly remain preserved. In a certain way “probability” is a “*conditio potestativa*.” As such, “potestativity” [*Potestativitat*]<sup>103</sup> is an essential of the world of phantasy in which—in the limiting case—the degrees of freedom of variation = infinity.

<sup>99</sup> From the table of contents, above, p. III./7062.

<sup>100</sup> See Leibniz, *Nouveau essais*, II, 1, §15; II, 21, §§72f; II, 22, §§10 f.; also *Théodicée*, §§290 ff., 323, 403.

<sup>101</sup> In this connection, see the development of 1937, below, pp. 71/7162f, as well as the systematization of this typology of acting in Schutz/Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, II, C.

<sup>102</sup> Here Schutz follows Husserl and Scheler for whom, even in different contexts, phantasy is a capacity of consciousness to be able to adopt different attitudes to a posited object; for Husserl see *Ideen*, I, §§97f; for Scheler, “Erkenntnis und Arbeit,” pp. 313 ff., 343 ff.

<sup>103</sup> *Conditio potestativus*, the condition of having power or authority, a condition within the power or authority of the self in the world of phantasy. The word, “potestativity,” is not in the OED.

We may say with Leibniz that those confused sensations that are indiscernibly contained in all future sensations can always be fully developed, fully unfolded in the world of phantasy and, so to speak, feigned as clear and distinct.<sup>104</sup>

Weitlaubrunn, 18 August, 1936

[17/7086]

A further criterion of the world of phantasy is liberation from the “*adequatio rei et intellectus*”<sup>105</sup> or from the harmony of experience. Not once within the different phantasy-experiences need harmony reign. Nevertheless, the laws of incompatibility produced by *logical* impossibilities<sup>106</sup> also hold for the world of phantasy, but not because of incompatibilities stemming from *factual* impossibility. I may be able to phantasy a *perpetuum mobile* (or a centaur), but not a decahedron—in that case I have to remain in an intuitively blind nomenclature just as I do in waking life.—It would seem that irreversibility of time also belongs to logical incompatibilities—although all other temporal moments can be cancelled in the world of phantasy. We can phantasy the magnification and acceleration of time, the reversal of motion (as in the comic film of swimmers jumping on a trampoline<sup>107</sup>), but not the reversibility of time itself. Even while phantasying and dreaming, I grow older. In this connection, of particular interest is how the phantasma of myself nevertheless always contains all moments of the *durée*.

All of these investigations are preeminently important for the problem of listening to a piece of music “forwards” or “backwards”, and for the foundation of a theory of musical form of artists and listeners. In addition, they provide a new basis for the theory of the “unconscious,” of the “Id.”<sup>108</sup> (N.B. Even the reversibility remains contained if the object of phantasying flows in the manner of the pluperfect, which must still necessarily lead to the proximity of the present.)

Within the worlds of phantasy we can produce different kinds of the world of phantasy a) according to the adherence to functions of one’s own body, b) according to the orientation of the *alter ego* transposed into the world of phantasy—i) according to the *alter ego*’s corporeality, ii) to the *alter ego*’s social function, iii) according to the the ego’s cooperation in legitimating and justifying the *alter ego*’s own experiencings of phantasma. We can phantasy alone, as in day dreams (or in dreams as such), but also collectively as in the case of children at play, or masses in religious ecstasy, etc. There is the Don Quijote type, or the Eulenspiegel type—the former a visionary [*Phantast*] facing realities, the latter a realist facing

<sup>104</sup> See Leibniz, *Principes de la Nature et de la Grace fondees en Raison*, §13; and *Monadologie*, §§22 ff.

<sup>105</sup> An allusion to the definition of the concept of truth by Aquinas; see *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, *Quaestio XVI*, *Art V*, 2.

<sup>106</sup> Schutz has *Inkompatibilitäten*, but we believe he means *Inkompossibilitäten*, and have accordingly so translated it.

<sup>107</sup> The reference cannot be identified.

<sup>108</sup> See Freud, *Das Unbewusste*, loc. cit.; and *Das Ich und das Es*, in *Gesammelte Schriften. Studienausgabe*, Vol. III, Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1969, pp. 282 ff.

a phantasma.<sup>109</sup> The world of poetry as much as the world of the drunkard belongs to the world of phantasy. Especially the structure of the world of jokes.<sup>110</sup>

[18/7087]

[3)] The dream world

Complete release of the tension of *attention à la vie* to which as such I am directed in the modification of my previous self. By no means freedom from perceptions, rather however freedom from apperceptions (in the world of phantasy in the genuine sense there is apperception, except that the interpretational schema is radically changed). Perfect and pluperfect experiencings are suggested, while *indiscernibilia* are made distinct, empty protentions filled, horizons laid out, anticipations “made past” [“*perfektisiert*”] and reproductions “made future” [“*futurisiert*”]. The categories of impossibility and of incompatibility are no longer valid. However—viewed subjectively—irreversibility is still preserved here. Only when you wake do you have the semblance of a reversibility while remembering. This conception would seem to be in extensive agreement with Freud’s interpretation of dreams. Psychoanalysis as the transformation formula of the dream-world and the waking-world.<sup>111</sup>

Characteristics of the dream world: Lack of potestateness. In default of apperceptions, there is obviously no speaking of *adequatio*. To a certain extent, in the world of dreams sedimented experiencings are unbound and reconstructed. The project is not potestative—although there are quasi-plans and quasi-hierarchies from pre-given sediments related to them—but the dreaming self would seem to act without purpose, without a voluntary “fiat.” With respect to semblance, dream-events are detached from all constituents in the *durée*—but only with respect to semblance: In actuality, mere severance from the (public) lifetime. Important: reproduction of dreaming: is it possible without change (self-interpretation) and how? A far-reaching difference seems to have taken place between retention and reproduction.

Dreaming is essentially solitary. If *alter egos* arise in the dream world they appear necessarily typified even when they seem to stand in the most intimate of relations in the surrounding world. There are *alter egos* by my grace. One cannot dream together; with their mirroring of the universe, the monad is in fact without windows even when it dreams.<sup>112</sup> The *alter ego* is always an object as subject of the world of dreams.

[19/7088]

[4)] The theoretical world of contemplative observation.

At the outset we have to note that even reflective (theorizing) acts are actions, but, so to speak, pragma-free actions. They are not bound to working in the external world. The *attention à la vie* thus experiences its own kind of modification such that the pre-given world is not governed as a world of work but instead should be recognized

<sup>109</sup> Schutz returns to this image in “On Multiple Realities,” *CP* I, pp 236f; in this connection, see also his “Don Quijote and the Problem of Reality,” *CP* II, pp. 139 f.

<sup>110</sup> See the material on the theme of “Witz” (Wit, Jokes) in Schutz’s *Nachlass*, microfilm 5, Division XLVI, no. 7036–7053.

<sup>111</sup> See Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

<sup>112</sup> For this image, see Leibniz, *Monadology*, §7.

as a theoretical world. Nevertheless the theoretical cosmos is a *universum* because even the world of working is wholly contained in it, except not as an object of volition. The theorizing self is conceived as detached from all realities other than its intentional acts, this being the true sense of the *epoché* (or “disinterestedness”).<sup>113</sup>

The temporal structure in its full extent, the living self with all its modifications, as my self now, before and later on, still obtain. Furthermore, consciousness of my own body, even of my own world of working, though only as a potentiality, still obtain. The working self is always only an object for theoretical observation, just as the flow of consciousness of the working self is an object of theoretical consciousness.

The single voluntary act of the theorizing self in which it is a subject in the genuine sense, is—as project—setting the problem, the purpose of which is tackling the solution of the problem. But even this is not working in the external world but pure analysis of findings already there.

The incompatibilities and impossibilities still wholly obtain without restriction, as does the irreversibility of time. However, in place of the pragmatic relevances we have theoretical interests=problems impartially selected by the theoretician from the pregiven cosmos. The degrees of freedom of possible variations are thus extremely limited so that we cannot speak of potestativeness, and the *adequatio* is rationally demonstrated step by step. Even here the confusion of indiscernibles remains a datum, the postulate still holds of explication by thinking clearly and distinctly so far as possible. That holds as well for the concept of the confused and indiscernible (the ineffable in the strict sense). E.g., the theoretician naturally is familiar with all the protentions and anticipations of the working self in their totality, with all of their omissions and chances of fulfillment, but he has no interest whatever whether they are fulfilled or not. As such, the theoretician is never in dread, nor courageous or ataraxic. The theoretician grows older—always “*qua*” theoretician—only to the extent that he changes his experiential purpose and new intentionalities [20/7089] are constituted and sedimented.

The relation to the *alter ego* develops in an entirely distinct way for the theoretician. Disregarding the fact that social life in its fullness obviously is an object for theoretical observation, the constitution of the *alter ego* in <my> self remains a theoretical problem. But even the theoretical world pregiven to me is thine and our world, and straightaway you are concerned to justify and account for my experiencing. Accordingly others are given in the theoretical world who can theorize at the same time and together with me, and about the same thing. The wonder of *sympphilosophiein* remains the ultimate inclusion of full humanity in the theoretical world.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>113</sup> See above, p. 12/7080.

<sup>114</sup> See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, IX, 12, 1172a. The idea that even science is an intersubjective system of knowledge within the life-world is formulated explicitly by Schutz for the first time in the present manuscript. See the almost identical concluding paragraph in “On Multiple Realities.” It is possible that Schutz adopted the formulation here from Husserl’s letter of 3 May, 1932. There Husserl thanks Schutz for the copy of *Sinnhafte Aufbau* Schutz sent him, and invites Schutz to visit him in Freiburg: “Kommen Sie also, ich werde mich für Sie frei machen. Es soll ein schön’s *sympphilosophiein* werden.” See *Husserliana Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, p. 483.



## [c) Summary]

Obviously we emphasize the fact that the divisions into worlds of working, of phantasy, of dreams and of theory is a solely constructive and typifying one, certainly not a taxonomical, descriptive one. We also emphasize that there are innumerable intermediate strata and that here as everywhere the law of continuity holds. Later on we shall provide more precise accounts of the problem of co-existence and (co-) succession of these “worlds” or basic attitudes. Similarly, we must emphasize more precisely why the world of working must be chosen as the archetype (on account of the general positing).

Weitlaubrun, 19 August, 1936

[21/7090]

**D. Central and peripheral levels of the person.**

- 1) The self as subject standing out from the different forms of the self as phenomenon.<sup>115</sup> The self as monad and entelechy—active proceeding to always new perceptions—spontaneous in the capacity to apperceive new perceptions—thinking many things but still not oneself thinking in many different situations—*multiplicem aut simplicem se sentiens* (Augustine, *Soliloquia*, II, 1; cf. Leibniz’s commentary, note 304)<sup>116</sup>—

Leibniz’s theory of self-apperception (NEII, 27 §9 ff., pp. 187–189)<sup>117</sup>—

Kantian counter thesis—Fichte—Schelling—Hegel—<sup>118</sup>

Husserl’s phenomenological reduction—the transcendental Ego—the primordial self—the phenomenologizing self.<sup>119</sup>

Simmel’s transcendence in immanence—Scheler’s theory of life-spheres—Freud’s Ego, Superego, and Id—<sup>120</sup>

<sup>115</sup> For earlier formulations of this problem, to which Schutz has recourse, see especially Kant’s distinction between the “self as subject of thinking” and “the self as object of perception,” in *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1798), I, §7.

<sup>116</sup> See Augustine, *Soliloquia*, II, 1. The reference to Leibniz is to *Nouveaux essais*, IV, 2, §1, note 304, which cites the relevant passage in Augustine. Schutz had already cited this reference to Augustine (though mistakenly to the *Confessiones*) in his manuscript, “Lebensformung und Sinnstruktur,” pp. 93 f.

<sup>117</sup> The references to *Nouveaux essais* are, again, to the French edition used by Schutz.

<sup>118</sup> Among the works to which Schutz may be referring are Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781/87); Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794); Schelling, *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur* (1797), and *System der transzendentalen Idealismus* (1800); Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807).

<sup>119</sup> Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, Meditations IV, V.

<sup>120</sup> Schutz refers here directly to Simmel’s typification [*Typik*] of the “male gender” in its “dual relationship” as the “continuous reaching over and beyond itself [*beständigen ‘Ober-sich-selbst-Hinausgreifen’*]. See Simmel, “Das Relative und das Absolute im Geschlechter-Problem,” in *Philosophische Kultur: Gesammelte Essays* (1911), reprinted in Simmel, *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 14: *Hauptprobleme der Philosophie: Philosophische Kultur*, edited by Rüdiger, Kramme/Otthein Rammstedt, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1966, pp. 219 ff. More particularly, Schutz refers to a formulation found only in the first edition of this volume (Leipzig: Werner Klinkhardt, 1911). There, at the conclusion of the exposition of the “indifference” of women to “proving <an argument>” [*gegen das Beweisen*], Simmel says that “the one refusal shows the immanent, the other the transcendent, formation of the female gender. Very schematically, and contrasting the object with



Heidegger's anthropological-ontogenetic principle<sup>121</sup>—Kierkegaard's stages—Jaspers' contributions to the problem.<sup>122</sup>

2) The theory of the intimate person

- a) The intimate and the ineffable—the role of essentially actual experiencings—experiencings that are not memorially continuous [*nicht erinnerungsbestandige Erlebnisse*]<sup>123</sup>—essentially indiscernible and confused experiencings—Bergson's conception of duration as pure reality—Kierkegaard's concept of dread—the addressee of the “*appel du heros*”—Heidegger's thrownness and care—(from the pure *durée* to plants endowed with memory to the perceptibility of animals and apperception of human beings).<sup>123</sup>
- b) What intimacy as such may be in the solitary self—absolute intimacy—that each is the most distant and yet the closest<sup>124</sup>—relative intimacy in social life—
- c) The intimate person as regulative of valuings—*joie et plaisir*—the meaning of the doctrine of *eudaimonia*—attitudes towards one's own valuings—Nietzsche on Epicurus<sup>125</sup>—new clarifications of acts of choosing on the part of the intimate person—but together with new clarifications of acts as such—and instituting hierarchies of plans—(infinite regress of motivations also belongs in this context).
- d) the anthropological-characterological side of the problem—the true meaning of spirit as the antagonist of the soul—instinct in Leibniz and Bergson<sup>126</sup>—Plato's attempt to solve the problem of the theory of *anamnesis*<sup>127</sup>—the *verites*

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the male gender as such most emphatically, we may formulate <the dual formation> by saying that its immanence is its transcendence.” The editors are indebted to Angela Rammstedt for this reference. See as well Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 155 ff., 287 ff. (English translation, pp. 135 ff., 275 f.), and for Freud, *Das Ich und das Es*. Last but not least we find the concept of “immanent transcendence” in Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*.

<sup>121</sup> Here Schutz interprets Heidegger's analyses neither as fundamental ontology, nor as existential philosophy. Instead he interprets Heidegger in philosophical-anthropological terms, i.e., as a contribution to the investigation into the structures and constitutive relationships of the *conditio humana*.

<sup>122</sup> Kierkegaard distinguishes the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages of human existence in *Either/Or*, and again in *Stages on Life's Way*. In the case of Jaspers, Schutz is referring to his *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (1919), Berlin: Springer,<sup>3</sup> 1925.

<sup>123</sup> The references are to Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 105 ff.; *Creative Evolution*, pp. 106 ff.; and for Bergson's general concept of reality, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 56ff, 144 ff.; to Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, and to Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (e.g., §§29, 38 ff., 57 f., 63 ff.).

<sup>124</sup> An allusion to Nietzsche's saying in the Preface to *The Genealogy of Morals*, translated by Francis Golffing, Doubleday Anchor Book: Garden City, New York, 1956, p. 149, that “we remain strangers to ourselves, we do not understand ourselves, we must mistake ourselves; for us the axiom, ‘we are each of us farthest from ourselves, we are no “knowers” of ourselves,’ will hold for all eternity.”

<sup>125</sup> For Nietzsche's observations on Epicurus, see *Human, All Too Human*, II.

<sup>126</sup> See Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais*; Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, pp. 133, 174 f.

<sup>127</sup> See Plato, *Meno* 81dff; *Phaedo*, 74dff.

*innees*<sup>128</sup>—applied psychologically: drive and disposition—“mood” as the form of expression of the intimate person—music’s relation to it—feelings of sympathy—emotions as such—the naive and sentimental human being<sup>129</sup>—the attitude of the religious—the emergence of the mystic as the metaphysical form of the intimate—intimacy and solipsism.

Excursus about the problem of fate and freedom, explained in Goethe’s “*Urworten*.”<sup>130</sup>

[22/7091]

3) The neighboring levels of the intimate person:

- a) The vital spheres. Phenomena of pain—sensations of desire—so-called sensualistic data—Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony—Bergson’s matter and memory—efforts toward a basic psycho-physical law—attitude toward the vital sphere.<sup>131</sup>
- b) Sexuality. Kierkegaard’s theory of sexuality—Diotima’s polemic against Aristophanes—Schopenhauer’s critique.<sup>132</sup>

4) The *ego cogitans* and the *ego agens*.

Their dependence on the intimate person—related to the previous problem of setting their goals—above all, of their purposes—the principle of indiscernibility and the *principium individuationis* as expression of this set of affairs in Leibniz.<sup>133</sup>

5) The incorporation of the external world.

Adaptation of this—the body as work-utensil for seizing space—subordination to temporal and spatial perspectives—overcoming the resistance of matter, the incorporation of space into the world of working, into cosmic and public time, having to wait—the expenditure of energy to reach a goal, the reference to work-utensil and utensil (thing-in-order-to), in short: the orientation toward *data*, finding givennesses and structures that do not stem from me, myself, but instead are pregiven from without,

<sup>128</sup> Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais*, I, 2, §§1-10; 1,3, §§18 f.

<sup>129</sup> For Heidegger, see *Sein und Zeit*, §§29 f., 40; for Scheler, see *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 29 ff. [English translation, pp. 14 ff.]; for Schiller, see *Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung* (1795), in *Werke. Nationalausgabe*, Bd XX: *Philosophische Schriften*, Erster Teil, edited by Benno von Wiese/Helmut Koopmann. Weimar: Böhlau, 1962, pp. 413–503.

<sup>130</sup> For Goethe, see *Gedichte und Epen*, I, *loc. cit.*, pp. 359 f.

<sup>131</sup> For Leibniz, see *Theodicy*, *loc. cit.*; for Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, *loc. cit.*; for Fechner, see *Elemente der Psychophysik*, *loc. cit.*. The concept of the vital sphere refers to Scheler’s distinction between the vital and spiritual spheres and their respective values; see Scheler, *Formalismus*, pp. 123 ff. (English translation, pp. 103 ff.); and *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 83 ff. (English translation, pp. 72 ff.).

<sup>132</sup> For Kierkegaard’s discussion of the sensual-eroticism in terms of the figure of Don Juan, see *Either/Or*; the reference to Diotima is to Plato, *Symposium* (201dff., 206bff); for Schopenhauer, see *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Vol. II, Chapter 44. In this connection, see also Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 120 f. (English translation, pp. 113 ff.).

<sup>133</sup> See Leibniz, *Nouveau essais*, II, 27, §1ff.; *Discours de Metaphysique*, §9.

forcing on me an attitude along with an *attention à la vie* coming from the things themselves but not from the sources of my *durée*, from my intimate person, and that are, so to speak, imposed upon me. Here we see the primacy of the whole pragma together with the conditioned interpretation itself for the phenomena of the central-peripheral articulation of the levels of the person.

Further development is relatively simple: The goals set define the essentially necessary means to reach them along with their beginning—the choice of means as well as of goals necessarily must be improved, more comfortably formed—legitimated purposes, rationale, define my interests and my *attention à la vie*—working back to the intimate levels—interdependence of goals and means—working back to acts of valuing and preferring—all of these attitudes, however, are not developed by me alone (with a certain latitude for variation dependent on my personal “inclinations”), but also by thee and everyone else who cares to achieve a like result in this world. [23/7092] It therefore follows that my attitudes become always less specifically colored by my self, that they always become more typical the more they accommodate those of everyone else, or, so to speak, become always more anonymous. At all levels we find a continuous transition from the absolutely intimate person to the highest anonymous behavior which, as it were, continues the tension: highest anonymous contemporary world—the embodied Thou having the surrounding world itself within the boundaries of one’s own self; all of this works back again to the central levels:

- a) because this is observed through the medium of the newly acquired typifying experiencings
- b) because goals reached influence goals set
- c) because the *attention à la vie* is fundamentally modified (for living in the world presupposes a minimum of “tension”).
- d) because turning toward the most intimate spheres themselves only “occurs” within the highest life-planes. (Problems of censorship and displacement find their clarification here)

All of this leads to a *self-typification* of the self.<sup>134</sup>

- 6) Full development of the processes of anonymization (depersonalization) in the social world.<sup>135</sup>
  - a) Here we begin by carrying forward the results from the “*Sinnhafte Aufbau*”<sup>136</sup> with respect to increasing anonymization (emptiness of content) and typification.

<sup>134</sup> A reference to the mechanism of typification and self-typification used by Schutz in *Sinnhafte Aufbau* to describe the constitution of stocks of knowledge in common.

<sup>135</sup> The theoretical part about the process of anonymity has two sources in Schutz: the one source is Bergson’s thesis of the person as the inauthentic cinematographic gestalt of the self in *Time and Free Will*, pp. 128 f. the other is Scheler’s development of the difference between the intimate and the social person in *Formalismus*, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 544 f.); and *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, Chapter C.

<sup>136</sup> See *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §§36 ff., especially §38.

- b) We will assume that supplementary typification enters because it is not I alone who carry out my own self-chosen plans in the world of working, but because I am working together with others and against others, also caring and setting goals not just for myself but also for others (family to humanity).
- c) We shall develop further the additional modification to *all* lower levels up to the intimate person, accrued by being in the social world
- d) Incorporation of experience of someone else, above all of equitable purposes
- e) Variation through language, etc.
- f) The law of the paralogism of anonymous probability (p. 15[/7084]) as point of departure for further considerations

Weitlaubrunn, 20 August, 1936

[24/7093]

### E. Actualities of the levels of personality and their variations

1. [Active and passive attention as the actuality of the phenomena constituting the levels of personality]<sup>137</sup>

The distribution of the indiscernible perceptions by attention makes up the actuality of the levels of person in question. The concept of attention is equivocal. There is the concept of attention springing from full activity, a being-directed of the act of *cogitare* to a certain in-order-to, but also to the distinct grasping of the interdependences, on the one hand, of this in-order-to with the means requisite to bringing it about, on the other hand with other systems of means and goals of action. This kind of conscious attention is essential for the constituting of the purpose (not so much for the project that arises from a so-called passive “interruption” [“*Einfall*”] and itself can only be a because-motive for the in-order-to of paying attention). In its spontaneous activity this “paying attention to” is itself a *cogitare* with precise, demonstrable intentionalities. It is however *constitutionally* the secondary (note: in the succession of the *histoire des nos découverts*; Leibniz NE pp. 359/60),<sup>138</sup> and is separated from the case of a primary “attention” included in the concept of the Bergsonian *attention à la vie* to which correspond the correlative tensions of consciousness. In activity is we most often sense this as the passive underground of attention (approaching the *pros hemas*), as the because-motive for the in-order-to motive of paying attention<sup>139</sup> (e.g., I will deal with this theme and direct my attention to thinking the complex through in the minutest detail. I pay attention with full effort of will. Why? Because I am interested. “Passive” attention most often offers itself as “interest” of interpretation.) The constitution of this *seemingly* passive attention has already been clarified on p. 15[/7084]. It gives rise to the confused,

<sup>137</sup> Addition from Table of Contents, p. III./7062.

<sup>138</sup> The reference, again, is to Schutz’s edition of the *Nouveaux Essais*; cf. IV, 7, §8.

<sup>139</sup> This issue here, consequently, concerns the problem of the “intrinsic” relevance by virtue of the pragma in contradistinction to the type of relevance “imposed.” The unity of both constitutes the social person for Schutz. Cf. Schutz, *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, reprinted in *Collected Papers* 5.

indiscernible experiencings that, in their totality, call forth “involuntary choice” while sorting out the pragmatically relevant experience from the confused, indiscernible experiences, i.e., making them distinct or going from perceptions to apperceptions. Here there is a new application of the pragmatic principle or, more precisely stated: the derivation of the results produced above, p. 22/7091) from a different set of problems.

2) [“Secularization” of attention in daily life.]<sup>140</sup>

A “secularization” of attention, so to speak, happens in daily life in so far as the attitudes of the *attention à la vie* are themselves rationalized and distributed into the hierarchy of plans: days for working and evenings for leisure, life during the day and life at night, etc., etc. hours for eating and for prayer. Not just the passive because-motive but also the active in-order-to motive of paying attention then appear as “taken for granted.” What the hierarchy of plans constitute in the first place appears to be incorporated in it. This is because practical hierarchies of plans arise with the claim of comprehending the totality of existence and the universality of all forms of personality, even though paradoxically themselves being only the consequence [25/7094] of a special attitude toward life (*attention à la vie*). It is then that the pragmatic origin of this “situation of interest” becomes almost completely hidden, and what itself stems from a pragma only seems to be the occasion and origin of new pragmata. The roles of habitualities also have to be investigated.<sup>141</sup>

3) [Constancy and change of *attention à la vie* (phenomena of transition). Origin of morality]<sup>142</sup>

If we consider the situation in its original fullness, then we see that the basic attitude of *attention à la vie* in the solitary self (later we shall have to speak of its deviations conditioned by sociality) successively increasingly makes visible the very different levels of the person in so far as they are not more or less rationalized, habitualized. It can be that *attention à la vie* is fixed on peripheral levels—this is the rule even in the case of vivaciously busy people in Goethe’s sense.<sup>143</sup> But whatever experiences can be, whether attitudes are now secularized or not, the bearing of attention immediately rules otherwise and brings about a reversal. The experiences provoking the reversal, however, are not in the secularized sphere such that stem from the intimate person (dread before death, insight into the irreversibility of duration, doubt of the effectiveness of the pragma (not being within our power).) The *effect* [*Effekt*], i.e., which attitude presumed in the first place is for the moment indifferent (examples: Thomas Buddenbrook reads Schopenhauer, “dem Taumel weih’ich mich”, etc., the religious turn, the “leap” in Kierkegaard—especially interesting

<sup>140</sup> Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.

<sup>141</sup> Schutz’s reference library contains a copy of Jean Gaspard Félix Ravaisson-Mollien, *De l’habitude* (1838), Paris: Alcan, 1933.

<sup>142</sup> Added from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.

<sup>143</sup> See especially Goethe, *Faust*, Act II: Laboratorium, lines 6885 ff.; *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, Chapter 6.

in *Repetition* is the transformation of the erotic person into Job, etc.).<sup>144</sup> In the secularized sphere attentional attitudes, however, themselves are objects of purposes and projects and distributed into the hierarchies of plans: “tomorrow is another day of work,” etc.

Through will, sociality, habituality, education (in a double sense) and culture an interdependence of “*attentions*” à la vie is formed, itself almost a hierarchy. <We find> here the “source of morality and religion” (Bergson), the cause of the “discontents of civilization” (Freud) and the polemical object of the “will to power.”<sup>145</sup> But also the foundation of Goethe’s ethics of the “demands of the day.”<sup>146</sup>

As such there appears here the setting of a problem with which we must deal in order to enter into all “ethics which will be able to come forth as science.”<sup>147</sup>

Obviously conflicts arise: typical case, “Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer/ The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,” etc.<sup>148</sup>

We can speak of becoming eccentric<sup>149</sup> from the levels of personality that until now were central. But even here, again, the potentialities of the first and second order (whether, namely, previously central levels that have now become eccentric can become central again or devolve into “partial death). This latter problem is especially important for defining the pathological.

[26/7095]

#### 4) [Conflicts of Interest and their resolution]<sup>150</sup>

Such conflicts are, in part consciously decided, in part defined by the *indiscernibilia*. Pyschopathology offers a variety of especially instructive material, particularly the sexual-pathological studies, because they concern, of course, habitualities, but a domain not accessible to rationalizations.<sup>151</sup> Very important: experiences of

<sup>144</sup> Thomas Mann, *Buddenbrooks. Verfall einer Familie* (1922), Part 10, Chapter 5; Kierkegaard, *Repetition*. Schutz refers here to accelerating hope of Constantine Constantius to engage a higher power through the reading of the Book of Job so as to bring about a change in order that the relation to the beloved might still succeed.

<sup>145</sup> Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Religion and Morality* (1932); Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930); Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* (1901).

<sup>146</sup> Goethe, *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* (“Was aber ist deine Pflicht? Die Forderung des Tages.”) There is an identical formulation in *Maximen und Reflexionen*, no. 1088.

<sup>147</sup> The allusion is to Kant’s *Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics Which Will Be Able to Come Forth as Science*.

<sup>148</sup> Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, ii, 2.

<sup>149</sup> Schutz refers to the category of “eccentricity” central to the philosophical anthropology of Helmut Plessner, *Die Stufen des Organischen. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie* (1928). (For an elaboration of Schutz’s thought in terms of Plessner’s category of becoming, see Fred Kersten, *Galileo and the “Invention” of Opera*, pp. 14 ff.).

<sup>150</sup> Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.

<sup>151</sup> Schutz may be referring to the work of Otto Schwarz, *Sexualpathologie*, Wien/Leipzig/Bern: Wiedmann, 1935. A copy of this volume is found in Schutz’s private library, bearing a dedication from the year 1935 so that Schutz may have been familiar with the book at the time of writing this manuscript.

religious conversion: Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Strindberg.<sup>152</sup> Particularly to be investigated: the experience of the “leap” and of the “moment” in Kierkegaard, and the “limit situations” strikingly described by Jaspers.<sup>153</sup> Also cf. the attempts at a solution in the Romantics, especially Novalis. Examples from the biography of Conrad Ferdinand Meyer. On the attempts to centralize heterogeneous levels of personality, instructive information in Rathenau, Schleich and Schweitzer.<sup>154</sup>

5) [Application of this mode of observation to the problems of general culture and its history]<sup>155</sup>

It would appear that this mode of observation can be applied to the whole of cultural content, indeed to historically given cultures themselves. Thus the task is set of explicating the implied *attention à la vie* which gives rise to the Renaissance, or to the cultural circle of Buddhism, or to the Gothic peoples, or to the polyphony of the Netherlands, or to the work of Giorgione, as well as to the political thinking of the Romantics and to the economic theory of liberalism.

#### **F) [Summary of the results of the foregoing investigation]**

The summary follows of the results achieved in the second chapter (Genesis of the Social Person in the solitary self) [in sections] A to E.

Weitlaubrunn, 22 August, 1936.

[7096]

<sup>152</sup> See Augustine, *Confessions*, Book IX; Pascal, *Pensées*; Kierkegaard, *Fear And Trembling*, Part IV; *Philosophical Fragments and Stages on Life's Way*; Strindberg, *Son of a Servant*, *Inferno*, *To Damascus*.

<sup>153</sup> With respect to books in his private library, Schutz no doubt studied the analysis of “limit situations” as found in Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, Chapter III; cf. also *Philosophie* Vol. 2, Chapter 7.

<sup>154</sup> For Walter Rathenau, *Zur Mechanik des Geistes* (1913), Berlin: Fischer<sup>18</sup>, 1921; Carl Ludwig Schleich, *Van der Seele. Essays* (1910), Berlin: Fischer,<sup>14</sup> 1922, especially the essay about “Schlaf und Traum,” as well as *Das Problem des Todes*, Berlin: Rowohlt, 1921; for Albert Schweitzer, two volumes are found in Schutz's private library: *Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur. Kulturphilosophie. Erster Teil*, München: Beck, 1923, and *Aus meinem Leben und Denken*, Leipzig: Meiner, 1932 (now in *Gesammelte Werke in fünf Bänden*, edited by Rudolfs Grabs, München: Beck, 1974, in volumes 2 and 1 respectively).

<sup>155</sup> Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.

# **The Problem of Personality in the Social World**



# Chapter Three

## The Social Person and the Thou-Problem\*

Alfred Schutz

### The Problem of Personality in the Social World

1937

[1/7103]

### The Problem of Personality in the Social World.

Fragments

1937

### [Introduction]<sup>1</sup>

By Alfred Schutz

Living naively and straightforwardly in the natural attitude toward the world, we find ourselves geared into a multiplicity of relations to the phenomena of the social world surrounding us. The social world appears to us as simply given. We simply accept it surrounded by the world of nature without asking about its constitution and without thinking much about how it really comes to pass that we live with others, affect them, are affected [see p 47] by them while carrying on our own lives. Heeding the demands of the day<sup>2</sup> we appropriate the organizations held in readiness by the social world, here and there actively gearing into <the social world,> thus moving in our own circle but still always, ourselves, at the service of others, friends or foes, in common work. Custom and culture, customary and self-imposed duties and rights, inclination and upbringing, prescribe certain of our attitudes toward our fellow human beings, our

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\*The manuscript breaks off here.

<sup>1</sup> Added from the Table of Contents placed at the end of the manuscript completed in the summer of 1936. See above, p. II./7061. This introduction was written by Schutz.

<sup>2</sup> Allusion to Goethe; see above, p. 25/7094.

personal choice and the external need assign us our place in this social cosmos with which we are satisfied or which we may strive to change. In all of these relations we, who simply live straightforwardly, are at the middle of events. Our daily life of work and leisure [2/7104] in planned continuity is, so to speak, the axis around which the social world is grouped in its multiple perspectives.

In multiple perspectives: there are those who belong to the same family. There are our friends, our colleagues, and others to whom differing communal interests are attached. In short, there are all those to whom we are bound daily or only occasionally, being together more or less intensively in common deeds, work, or association, work or play, <and> toward whom we feel love, hate, affection, antipathy or indifference. Included in this circle of close associates are others whose membership we likewise know in person: the neighbor whom we meet in the morning, the grocer on the corner, the mailman, the conductor on tramway, the man at the next table, then those people who as such seem to be stripped of all individuality such as the railway passenger, passers-by, coffee house customers. Even though we are accustomed to scarcely recognize these everyday statistics, basically they are still given in person and one day it can happen that [3/7105] we will notice a crying child, or a man with his arm in a sling, that we will address them and enter into a closer relationship. We want to call this circle of others given in person in daily life the circle of our social surrounding world and those who belong to it our contemporaries.

But not only such contemporaries are connected to us in everyday life. The circle of the surrounding world includes the contemporary world whose members are not in fact given in person and who interest us most immediately not as persons in their full humanity, but only more or less as anonymous bearers of specific functions—perchance we are interested in them to a greater degree as members of our peripheral surrounding world. The writer of the lead article in today's paper, the author whose book I read yesterday, the members of the English House of Commons whose debates I followed in the news, the<sup>3</sup> thousands of workers on strike at an American steel works, everyone, in short, of whom I only have indirect knowledge, however of whom I believe with good reason [4/7106] that they are also human beings like me, who live their daily lives as I do and are at the center of their social world—all these people are my collateral human beings [*Nebenmenschen*] and belong to my contemporary world. I myself am able to be connected to them as public author, as businessman soliciting consumers, as an outraged taxpayer appealing to the authorities. Yet another group of collateral human beings is designated by the fact that they are my fellow citizens, my fellow people, my fellow believers, members of my party, speaking my mother tongue, belonging to European culture or simply contemporaries, that they, like me, are contractors, or workers like my employees. And, finally, I am also tied to the anonymous producers of the appliances (in the broadest sense) that I use and those in the electric plants who, unknown to me, supervise the machines, who influence my woe and weal like the even more unknown

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<sup>3</sup> Crossed out in the original manuscript, "the ten thousand victims."

people who carry out the functions in the post office concerned that the letters put in the mail box actually arrive at the addresses.

Contemporaries in the surrounding world, collateral human beings in the world of contemporaries, all share the temporal present with me. [5/7107] My “today”—in the broader sense—is also theirs, they grow older as do I, they experience their duration as do I, and one day will die as will I. I can accept with good reason that they also project plans, prepare and carry out actions, and actively or passively live their future. It may be that an external catastrophe threatening me also endangers them, that some or all of them would suffer in the same way from such an event even afterwards whether it is a matter of a breaking water main on my street, whether a national disaster, a war, or a cosmic upheaval.

But to the full social world in which I live there belongs not only the social world of the present, with its unfolding into surrounding world and world of contemporaries, but also the world of predecessors no longer living, and the world of successors none of whom are yet my contemporaries. Belonging to the world of predecessors are my ancestors of whom I know by tradition and whose heritage defines my being without my knowing it. Also belonging to the world of predecessors are the dead poets and philosophers whose intellectual world I inherit by reading and who might even be more closely related to me than people in my surrounding world, as well as all those anonymous and not so anonymous path-breakers of the univocally given historical [6/7108] and cultural situation that forms the foundation of my daily life. The obviousness of the way in which the telephone serves me does not eliminate the fact that my deed presupposes the whole development of physics. The institutions of the state in which I live imply its entire precedent history. To be sure, that does not mean that, in social everyday life, the world of predecessors is in plain sight in simple, straightforward living. The world of predecessors, however, as background, as horizon, is always there and can always be questioned whenever interest demands. To the extent that this term presupposes a reciprocal influence on one another, the inhabitants of the world of predecessors do not stand in a social relation to me because they do not share a present with me. In principle, their thinking and working is excluded. But what was thought and effected has entered into my daily social life and the monuments of the past have become elements of my own intellectual being to which I am frequently oriented as a phenomenon of my surrounding world.

Similarly, although very blurred, the world of successors forms a horizon, to be sure, an open and essentially indeterminate one, of my social being. Many of my actions are posited with the thought of generations to come and [7/7109] to a greater or lesser degree I feel responsible for them.

All of these levels of the social world are interwoven with one another in many ways, and when separated out each has meaning only with respect to type. The surrounding world can always become the contemporary world, the contemporary world the surrounding world and, in the succession of ages, the world of the present changes into the world of predecessors while the world of successors becomes the world of the present.

I, who live straightforwardly in daily life, am the center of this social world. To that extent I am, from my standpoint, the center from which the social world is

articulated into the perspectives just described. I, the one unitary human being with continuous self-consciousness peculiar only to me, am the point of reference for all the threads that in multiple ways extend to the boundaries of this world.

But am I not being hasty designating myself as the one and unitary human being while observing myself as the point of reference of my social world? And, on the basis of my own peculiar self-consciousness, does not this assertion require painstaking demonstration?

Provisionally let us set aside the important circumstance [8/7110] that included in my knowing about the social world is the fact that, in the same way, each of the others—contemporaries, collaterals, members of the world of predecessors and of successors—is seen as center of the social world with the same claims on their part as on mine. <Moreover, each of the others is> viewed with the continuous self-consciousness peculiar to the other as a point of reference of the social world, and that the other, like me, is seen as the one and unitary human being. This difficult set of problems, genuinely fundamental for the social sciences, will become fully accessible to us only later on when thoroughly investigated. Indeed, it will be this investigation that first sheds full light on the reciprocity between one's own and someone else's life and consciousness, and many of the results that we have set out to achieve without reference to this set of problems will subsequently be shown to be preliminary and in need of being rectified.

Thus naively living straightforwardly in the world of everyday life, continuously conscious of myself, I am the point of reference for the social world surrounding me which presents itself to me in its own kind of perspectival articulation into [9/7111] surrounding world, contemporary world, world of predecessors and successors, with all of the abumbrations of near and far, of intimacy and strangeness [*Fremdheit*], of being present in person and being present anonymously.<sup>4</sup> More closely examined, I find that such designated perspectival articulation of the social world surrounding me, so to speak, is continuous with my self that I have just now designated as the one and unitary self-consciousness. It is immediately certain that each phenomenon of my social world finds a correlate in a specific attitude of my self so that to the cosmos of the social world, whose center I am, there corresponds a well-graduated hierarchy of social attitudes of my self, the origin of which I transfer to a core of my person which, lacking a better designation, I call "me, myself." These attitudes are graduated, above all, by virtue of the fact that I am able to include only my operative influence on the world of the present and, to a moderate extent, perhaps on the world of successors while still feeling the influence of the precedent world in the working of these worlds.

Furthermore, by virtue of the fact that, with full justification, and by no means only on the basis of vague emotions, I am able to come up with clear distinctions [10/7112] between what lies near to me and what lies far from me, between what is more or less interesting for me, between the familiar and strange. In these cases I am aware that this characteristic aims not only at the other, but also and above all at the attitudes toward them in which there is related an attitude rooted in more central or

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<sup>4</sup> See *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, trans. as *The Phenomenology of the Social World* §§29–41; and *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, translated as *Structures of the Life-World* I, Chapter 2, B.

more peripheral levels of my self. In my “*Angehörigen*”—already this beautiful German word says much more about our theme—I am interested in the full humanity of my friends, I am interested in the partners of the those communities of concern to me and in what they contribute. I am interested in the authors of books that I read, and in the creators of the works of art whose work I appreciate. But, on the other hand, I know very well that my kin [*Angehörigen*] and friends also turn to my full humanity, that a community of interest only peripherally concerns me, and that a particular, attentively deliberate attitude of concentration is needed in order to make that part of my being receptive to speak to the work of art, [11/7113] etc.<sup>5</sup> As a citizen of my community, as someone who belongs to my political party, as member of my church, over against these contemporary, more or less anonymous institutions, I take up attitudes that have their origin in quite distinctly anchored levels of my self.

We spoke before of stances, of attitudes [*von Einstellungen, von Attituden*]. But this way of speaking cannot fully comprehend the essence of the situation. As a rule it is not a matter of internal or external bearings adopted at will toward whatever phenomena of the social world such that at the next encounter with the same phenomena we can give them up at will or postpone them until another day. Instead it is rather a matter of a *system* of attitudes and stances reciprocally related to one another, frequently dependent on one another and founding one another in diverse ways. To clarify the kind of these connections and founding concatenations ongoing analyses are required. We shall be busied with these investigations in what follows in various ways. Here it is sufficient to indicate that, defined by our attitudes toward the different phenomena of the social world, it is a system of interconnections of motivations, [12/7114] although interconnections of motivations that, as such, are simply accepted by the naively straightforwardly living self as habitual, traditional or affective [*affektuelle*] givennesses. They are simply accepted when these systems are present as partial plans of a great life-plan—as professional plan, as the division of time into workday and evening of leisure, as program of study, etc. Of course I choose those people with whom I associate, of course—and also only under certain circumstances—I choose from among them those with whom I speak of “what I take to heart,” of course I decide whether and to what extent I will take part in the lives of political or religious communities. These conscious acts of choice, however, are not in question in our set of problems; instead, we are concerned with the motive and system of motives that not only ground the concrete acts of choice but the circumstance that here something is a matter of choice at all. For those attitudes toward the social world, as we said before, are also those that set decisions before me and influence the appropriate decision, but are themselves only seldomly seen in the naive straightforward living [13/7115]. At the most they are accepted as natural reactions, as self-evident givenness. To be sure we can also make them explicit and ask about their genesis, about their constitution. But in crisis

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<sup>5</sup> In the original, the following lines are crossed out: “All of this multiplicity of attitudes more or less depend on each other if only at a given moment. Thus attitudes rooted in relatively similar intimate levels exclude one another (—the presence of my child disturbs me when I practice music, music interferes with my philosophizing—) in part [11/7113] bringing to light their foundational relationships (e.g., the attitude toward my professional life with respect to the family).”

situations the naive person, pausing in reflection, does not ask, what should I do now and why should I do it? But instead, what forces me now to raise the question at all? And what is to be answered?

This question aims at what we can call the hierarchy of social attitudes, its interdependence and its articulation into the highest life-plan. But the single attitude or system of attitudes are only “given” in diverse ways in simple straightforward living. There is, first of all, the diversity of standardized or normative attitudes demanded of me at every step by living in the cultural world of daily life. If I am to travel by train, then I must conduct myself according to the prescriptions required when traveling by train; if I wish to enter a house of worship, then I must assume the demeanor prescribed by the religion in question; if I wish to attend a party in the evening, then I must wear the proper clothes, etc. [14/7116] appropriate to the “tone” of the home in question. The examples selected are indeed banal, yet it is just the banality of everyday life that in the most obvious ways always again imposes on us the specific attitudes in their standardization and normativeness that, although, or even because, they touch upon only a peripheral sphere of ourselves, we incorporate on the basis of our education, our inclinations, our settling on goals, without thinking too much about them. And yet the ultimate goals of our bearing on the great systems of the state, of the law, of the economy—in short, all of those phenomena of social being that form the specific object of the social sciences—are of an entirely similar nature. Fundamentally, does my bearing as economic subject or as subject to this legal order have more to do with full humanity than my bearing as a train passenger? Or is it not perhaps precisely the way peculiar to *all* social life that its actuaries [*Akteure*] are not human in the full sense of their humanity but instead bearers of typical roles, executors of typical actions, points of reckoning of typical attitudes? Here we find in a first and very undetermined outline that phenomenon of self-typification, [15/7117] the entire range of which can be clarified for the meaning of the social sciences, for its object and method, only after a great deal of preparation.<sup>6</sup>

On another level of the aforesaid state of affairs we find an explanation of daily life: I as husband, I as father, I as professional, I as citizen, I as believing Catholic,

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<sup>6</sup> The task sketched here by Schutz for the analysis of the social constitution of typical concatenations of motivations and attitudes of acting forms the previously hidden background of his discussion with Talcott Parsons. At the beginning of 1938 Schutz had already begun his work on a review of Parsons’s *The Structure of Social Action* which was the point of departure for the correspondence between Schutz and Parsons in the 1940/1941. At this time Schutz as well as Parsons were busy with the problem of the social person and its function within the order of social reality (Schutz in the text published here for the first time, Parsons in the study unpublished in his lifetime, *Actor, Situation and Normative Pattern* of 1939, which he sent to Schutz 10 January, 1940). However, while Parsons emphasized the role of norms and the social person for the systematic process of formation, Schutz insisted on the preliminary necessity of clarifying the constitution of norms and social identity. In this connection, see the references in *Sinnhafte Aufbau* to typification of the self and of the other, §§36ff, as well as in Parsons, *Actor, Situation, and Normative Patterns*. In addition see *The Theory of Social Action. The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons*, edited by Richard Grathoff. Foreword by Maurice Natanson. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978; after 1978, reprinted in *Collected Papers* 5.

have these and those rights or duties, claims or inclinations, convictions or wishes, goals and the means for reaching them. Are they simple hypostasizing of social attitudes, or are we not talking instead about a much deeper meaning? Occasionally it would seem that all of the sides of my self so characterized are independent persons with their own wishes and wills, themselves standing in quasi—social relations to each other even though they are still parts of my self. This is especially true in cases of conflict: As a father I can only observe many events with great sorrow that I accept as citizen, perchance even have to approve; as a professional person I have to posit many actions for which I cannot be responsible as a believing Catholic. The normal person already experiences similar conflicts, which he is accustomed to settle in monologic [16/7118] thinking as the struggle between two selves, the dialoguing one whereby the better self is sometimes victorious, <the other> frequently defeated. As we learn from the study of certain mental patients, above all schizophrenics, it belongs to the possibilities of the human spirit to develop such personality splits. While the bond of the unitary self is cut, the dialoguing partner becomes extroverted and is apprehended in hallucination as “spirit” or “voices.” For that reason we shall designate the conception dealing with the partial personalities of the self, in the aforementioned case, as the schizophrenic hypothesis of the self.<sup>7</sup>

In contrast, above all, in the daily life of anyone during the temporal course of a day in public, we find that in order to undertake a change in such attitudes we need a great and very different effort which is special, individual, and materially certain. At my place of work it is only with great difficulty that I bother myself with family affairs, at home or on vacation I will know nothing of myself as a professional, and should I have to do this then a great effort is required to take off, so to speak, [17/7119] ordinary dress and put on professional dress. We all more or less resemble the servant of Moliere’s miser who carefully takes off the kitchen apron and puts on the coachman’s coat when his master bids him to be a coachman instead of the cook, which he also is.<sup>8</sup>

Occasionally a certain paradox is even shown here in that, in a relatively peripheral attitude, I can feel the emergence of a phenomenon as an “interruption” belonging to the intimate sphere. My child “interrupts” me on occasion in a superficial conversation with an acquaintance, conversely a good friend “interrupts” me when he surprises me in play with my child. This fact of more or less forcible effort in the change of social attitudes is important and in need of clarification, showing, however, the untenability of the schizophrenic hypothesis of the self. Even when we do not accept this hypothesis, and refuse to treat as hypostases those social attitudes, as we previously called them, as partial personalities of ourselves, it still remains, as before, in need of clarification. In the same way, it is consistent with the unity and unification of self-consciousness [18/7120] that always other sides of ourselves, other moments of our personality, are put into play in our daily social life while other and perhaps more essential sides, where not entirely excluded, are thus still in

<sup>7</sup> In this connection, above, pp. 6a/7071 f.

<sup>8</sup> See Moliere, *The Miser. Comedy in Five Acts*.



such measure crowded in the background. Those in the background then remain visible more as a horizon of that field of vision at the center of which our social attitudes in question stand. And we even have to go a step further and ask whether the problem studied by us until now in the social life of the naive, straightforwardly living person, is in fact specific to this sphere, or whether in the solitary self in the natural attitude wholly similar articulated phenomena are discovered that we must invoke in order to carry our investigation into deeper levels.

Even a wholly superficial reflection already shows us that the latter presumption proves to be the case. I, the acting self (*ego agens*), I, in the widest sense, the reflecting self (*ego cogitans*), I, the creature of God (*homo religiosus*), I, the moral person: all of these are levels or attitudes of my self that, in my solitary world, become visible to me, the one who lives naively straightforwardly, as experiences, and more particularly as deeply founded experiences. [19/7121] And the diversity, change and succession of those experiences seem to fashion the problem in question of the cosmos of my social attitudes. [Insertion 19a/7122] Furthermore I know of myself as a somatic living being, of my body, that is not only a field of my perceptions, not only outfitted for pain and pleasure, but which is also my tool for intervening in world time and world space. I know moreover of my own self that is the bearer of my emotions, that is happy and sad, that is aware of growing older, that dreads death and feels “thrown” into this world. And then, although only vaguely, I feel a core of my being, a center of the person, of ultimate intimacy, unreachable by my reflection, the experiences of which are “essentially actual,” i.e., that cannot be remembered and therefore are already in principle “ineffable.” It is that center of the person of which Nietzsche speaks when observing that each of us is the farthest<sup>9</sup> from himself, and that yet seems to be what is most essential of myself to be understood. [Insertion ends]

[19/7121] But we still have not exhausted the circle of problems that belong here. How can I justify in fact the unity of my self-consciousness when, in my daily life, I am subject to the rhythmical change of sleeping and waking, with all the modifications belonging to them that I experience in higher or lesser wakefulness, in tense or relaxed attention, with intensive or extensive vitality? What can it mean in my daily life to speak of the unitary person when I, today in old age, in retrospect know of a self as infant, of a self as child and young man, and, anticipating in variable clarity, can speak of a self in later years, even of a self as a very old man even if also only in empty and always open anticipations? Because there belongs to my ordinary and primitive experience the fact that I grow older, that my being is being toward death, that the course of external time, like the course of my inner [20/7123] duration, is absolutely irreversible, I am equally conscious in an original way that this self, of which I candidly speak, bears and must bear the index of “my self now” or of “my self before,” or of “my self later on.” Thus “myself now” certainly does not mean a “moment” of my duration, nor the theoretical point of transition between past and future, but instead an explicable horizon more successfully circumscribed

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<sup>9</sup> See Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, Preface, § 1.



in the praxis of everyday life than in theory.<sup>10</sup> All of that undergoes the modifications that my self experiences by its stance taken toward the part of the world it posits as real in every case: my self in its bearing [*Haltung*] on the real world of ordinary public life, my phantasying self, my dreaming self, my playing self, my self in its attitudes toward the fiction of art.<sup>11</sup>

The present catalog obviously makes no claim to being complete, although it provides the headings of themes, the more or less thorough study of which is indispensable for acquiring a certain amount of clarity about the nature of self-consciousness. For it holds from the start that each of the previously designated attitudes of the self in the world is distinguished by the fact that they all are *my* attitudes in the world, that *I myself am* the one who shares in all these modifications in the world, that the famous Kantian formula of the consciousness of my self that can and must accompany all my thinking—all of these proteus-like transformations of my self that make up what, in the first place, we vaguely call our own “personality,” remain in undiminished acceptance.<sup>12</sup>

[**Insertion 21a/7125**] Here there is also a problem in need of clarification. How is it that this general positing of my self itself, from which all the modifications previously sketched are derived, is verified and remains preserved without contradiction throughout all my thinking and in all my deeds? How is it that none of the modifications of my self shows itself as *alter ego*, as Thou, but always only as belonging to my self itself, to my *ego ipse*. This question is especially legitimate because for me, who lives naively and straightforwardly, only a partial aspect of myself in these modifications (*ego qua civis Romanus, ego qua pater familias*) is in my field of regard at any one time. This partial aspect of my self is, so to speak, the

<sup>10</sup> The synthesis of the ideas of time of Husserl and Bergson, which Schutz had already put into operation in *Sinnhafte Aufbau* (§7), are especially distinct here: On the one hand, Bergson's dualism of time is overcome with the help of Husserl's conception of the field of presence; on the other hand, the *attention à la vie* is integrated into this concept of time as a modifying moment. See Husserl *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* §§10–30; Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. H7ff., 128 ff., *Matter and Memory*, pp. 123 ff. {For further on the integration of Bergson into Husserl's phenomenology, see Roman Ingarden, “Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson,” *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Bd. V, pp. 284–461. Schutz was thoroughly familiar with this work.

<sup>11</sup> For development of these modifications, see below pp. 88/7179–118/7210 for a first draft in the framework of the present manuscript, as well as the published draft in “On Multiple Realities,” *CP I*, pp. 212 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Although Kant's account of the consciousness of the accompanying “I think” excludes dreaming (cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, B132f.), Schutz reverses this connection when he says that consciousness of my self must be able to accompany my thinking. Schutz is drawn to this Kantian dictum because he understands “thinking” phenomenologically in Husserl's sense as a sense-bestowing [*sinnsetzende*] activity (to which dreaming thus belongs), while for Kant “thinking” always remains defined categorially. The genuine difference between dreaming and thinking for Schutz lies in the distinguishable degrees of pragmatic orientation. Thinking as “*cogito*” and its acts, the “*cogitationes*,” are projected acts and therefore always an action. See below, pp. 100/7192 ff.

*pros hemas* in which the “ego ipse” remains its *hypokeimenon*—but as *ego ipse*, not as *alter ego*, just as the partial aspects of my self not at the center of my field of regard are never shown as *alter ego* or its modification but always only shown and verified as modification of the *ego ipse*. In other words, what differentiates such partial aspects of my self from those partial aspects of thee pre-given to me? And why, on the other hand, does the schizophrenic hypothesis of the self have a semblance of truth?<sup>13</sup> [End of insertion]

[21/7124] It is important to emphasize that everything said so far relates to the mundane self, the self in the world, together with the natural attitude. Until now we have not spoken of the regress to the transcendental *ego cogitans* in Descartes’s familiar interpretation, nor of the self as monad according to Leibniz’s metaphysics, nor of the ego after exercise of the phenomenological reduction (Husserl), nor of the ego in its antithesis to the non-ego (Fichte).<sup>14</sup> In any case we are not spared from introducing the realm of the transcendental sphere, even though, as a result, our problem undergoes new complications. But this will happen only in so far as it is unavoidable for clarification of the most important fundamental questions and for the creation of a firm basis for further investigations. In principle the following investigations [22/7126] will move on the basis of mundanity in order to best serve the depth and clarification of the nature and meaning of the social sciences. In addition they will remain phenomenological in this sphere and not shy away from the reproach of psychologism. This reproach arises from a misunderstanding by not taking into consideration the fact that all genuine psychology is nothing else but phenomenology of the natural attitude.<sup>15</sup>

Accordingly, we have to carry out painstaking investigations of the world of the solitary self, of its nature, of the problems comprised under the heading of personality, and of the forms of self-consciousness. <Those investigations have to be carried out, moreover,> before we can enter into further and difficult questions about which modifications and consequences arise such that the conception of a solitary self is only an arbitrary abstraction, that the self in the world always presupposes being with others and that these other *alter egos* are human beings like me whose selves in their being in the world show a world that is natural like mine and in principle of

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<sup>13</sup> Here Schutz poses a question which is also relevant for solution to the problem of intersubjectivity for Husserl in the *Cartesian Meditations*. But while Husserl sees the evidence of the difference of self and other in the self-experiencing of one’s own organism in contrast to experience the other as mere body, Schutz—in addition to the organism—also locates it in experience of one’s own duration with its domains of the “ineffable” and the “intimate person.” See Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§50–54.

<sup>14</sup> See Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, Leibniz, *Monadologie*, §1; Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §§56; Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, §§1–3.

<sup>15</sup> As he had already indicated in *Sinnhafte Aufbau* (§6), Schutz once more seeks to develop a “constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude,” and to confine himself to the realm of “mundane sociality.” Schutz accordingly takes up a formulation of Husserl’s in his “Nachwort zu meinen ‘Ideen.’” It is “phenomenological psychology” that serves him as the connection to the “transcendental analyses” of Husserl.

the same constitution as my own self.<sup>16</sup> <Only then> shall we be in a position [23/7127] to draw from the results acquired consequences for the praxis of the social sciences, for their object, their nature and method.

Now, the reader who is willing to share the adventure of such investigations and whose patience has been severely tested by the preceding pages (which only superficially explicate the problem), especially by the program just developed, has the right to be assured in advance if the results expected<sup>17</sup> are in harmony with the expense of preparation of a philosophical kind: With justification, the reader will want to know why this difficult way was begun and what success can be expected for the problems of interest, namely the problems of the social sciences. In what follows we shall try to answer these questions to a certain extent but with the reservation arising from the fact that for every anticipation of a result of the investigation there must be a cogent falsification. [24/7128]

- 1) However we may circumscribe the object of the social sciences, we always find that they are grounded in human actions and, more particularly, in the final analysis in the actions of individuals. These actions are recognized by the fact that they are projective and motivated, and that the motives as well as the goals of action are mutually bound in well-planned, systematic ways. But who is the one who acts, who is the one who plans and is motivated? Is it the human being in its full humanity? Or, provisionally stated, is it only one of those partial personalities? And if this is the case, which particular modifications of attention, or of the whole bearing toward life, of *attention à la vie*, as Bergson says,<sup>18</sup> must be acceptively given so that acting, projecting, planning, being motivated can occur at all? In the play and counterplay of the different partial personalities, how is it that there is meaning-bestowing at all if, as understanding sociology asserts, it is the subjective meaning of this acting which interests the social scientist<sup>19</sup> even if this subjective meaning becomes visible only in a special reflective attitude toward elapsed experiences, necessitating a division between elapsing acting (*action*)<sup>20</sup> and elapsed action (*actum*)? How do we clarify the radical change in temporal structure

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<sup>16</sup> Once more Schutz expresses the principal architectonic of his work, and to which he returned in his last, planned work, "Strukturen der Lebenswelt," which was to be written during his sabbatical year in 1958. It is theoretically noteworthy that here Schutz at the same time recognizes and phenomenologically brackets the evidence of the social stamp of access to the world in order to first clarify its constitution in the "solitary self." The result once again is the appearing of conditions of non-egological constitution and acceptance of the world within the horizon of the *epoché* which cannot be grasped from Husserl's approach. Essentially these are the problems which later on will induce Schutz to separate himself from Husserl's orthodoxy. Also see below, pp. 82/7173 ff.

<sup>17</sup> In the original manuscript, there follows crossed out, "especially for clarification of social-scientific problems."

<sup>18</sup> Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 166 ff.

<sup>19</sup> See the corresponding definition of Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Chapter I, §1.

<sup>20</sup> This distinction is introduced by Schutz in *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §6.

between the self that projects, the [25/7129] self that acts, the self that has executed the action?

- 2) From action as such the social sciences frequently distinguish rational action which proves to be acting on the basis of a choice.<sup>21</sup> What a wealth of problems are borne by this account alone, problems that are in need of clarification the more so that they can be believed to provide a definite direction of the national economy, e.g., an apriority of acting according to choice as the foundation of the whole system!<sup>22</sup> Is the self believed to be faced with a choice identical with the self who acts? Which particular functions of attention, which specific *attention à la vie*, is presupposed in the one or the other case? And how do we bring about the establishment itself of the systems of ends and means to be chosen? To what extent are they, and their linkages grasped distinctly in view? In all of these related theses as such, is it a matter of assertions about the social world by human beings simply living straightforwardly or rather by typical applications of typical ways of behaving? Can we meaningfully assert of a type that it chooses? And what would be the meaning of such an assertion?<sup>23</sup>
- 3) Yet it is not acting or subjectively meaningful acting in itself that should be the object of the social sciences, but instead all social acting, i.e., meaningful acting<sup>24</sup> [26/7130] oriented toward an *alter ego*. If we now describe how such acting plays out in the simple results in the social world, then in the first place we have to take stock of the question whether we are speaking here of acting mutually related to two or more people in their full humanity, or instead speaking of the interconnected play of specific social attitudes whereby the human selves (taken in the full sense) of these actors retreat behind their social attitudes. But if this is the case, which functions of temporality, of attention, of *attention à la vie*, which moments are otherwise constituted by these attitudes? And how is this highly

<sup>21</sup> Cf. likewise Weber's definition, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Chapter I, §2, and also Schutz's essay, "The Problem of Rationality in the Social World," *CPII*, pp. 73 ff.

<sup>22</sup> Here Schutz alludes to Ludwig von Mises' "apriori" law of actions according to which all actions occur with respect to rational weighing and optimizing of subjective preferences. See von Mises' collection of essays, *Grundprobleme der Nationalökonomie*, Jena: Fischer, 1933, pp. 13ff., 3 ff. Schutz takes issue with this theory in his review of this volume as well as already in *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §49. (See the English translation of his review, *CP IV*, pp. 88 ff.).

<sup>23</sup> Schutz's later essay, "Choosing Among Projects of Action" (1951, *CP I*, pp. 67 ff.) is dedicated to the problem of choice formulated here in connection with that of relevance. An illustration of the set of problems in the context of economic action, originally an integral part of that essay, has been published posthumously with the title of "Choice and the Social Sciences," in *Life-world and Consciousness. Essays for Aron Gurwitsch*, edited by Lester E. Embree, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 565–596; reprinted in *Collected Papers V*.

<sup>24</sup> See Max Weber, *op. cit.*, Chapter I, §1: "Soziologie...soll heissen: eine Wissenschaft, welche soziales Handeln deutlich verstehen und dadurch in seinem Ablauf und seinen Wirkungen ursächlich erklären will." {"Sociology...is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences." Max Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1978, Vol. I, p. 4.}

complex process even differentiated when it is not a matter of the interpretation of social acting which confronts a partner in the surrounding world? Is it not rather the interpretation of an act confronting a highly anonymous institution of the contemporary world, e.g., the state? With what apparatus must the social scientist be equipped if he is to describe a social theory of the state or of an individual relationship? And what consequences does all of this have for the problem of historicity? Who, then, possesses genuine history? The human being in full humanity? The relational point of social attitudes? Or just the type?

- 4) We have already spoken of types. But how is the fashioning of types as such possible, and what do they mean? Where do they begin? Are there [27/7131] only types of the *alter ego* or is there not a fashioning of types already revealed in selfhood itself? And because there are not types simpliciter, but only types relevant to problems, in the play and counterplay of selfhood how are those events accomplished that lead to the setting of the problem? How do we select what is relevant?<sup>25</sup>
- 5) Previously we spoke of events in the social world, how they are shown in the acting and living of human beings among human beings of this social world, of human beings in flesh and blood, so to speak, like you and me and Peter and Paul. By now, however, it is worth while examining whether it is the social scientist who, indeed as social scientist (not as the human being, which the scientist also certainly is), takes on a wholly unique, so to speak, disinterested attitude<sup>26</sup> toward the social world, who wishes to make assertions about the change and drives of these human beings? Or is it not rather the actors who are of a basically different kind whom <the social scientist believes inhabit the social world? Whether the models of thought that the social scientist construes for interpretation of this world are only typically applied attitudes that become homunculi by means of hypostatization? Whether the social scientist proceeds in such a way as though he were a follower of the schizophrenic hypothesis of the ego? [28/7132] And if this were the case, then we have to examine points of view according to which the typically selected attitudes are chosen, and the principles according to which their construction is carried out. We have to examine the extent to which their “acting” is free or, better stated, which limits obtain for imputing the types to conscious experiences that actually occur to those acting in the social world (and according to which of their attitudes?). All of this under consideration of the fact that to strive for social science means nothing else than to consciously adopt an attitude toward this world that is not

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<sup>25</sup> This catalogue of questions, thematizing a view of the aspects of the problem, which at first sight already seems to have been dealt with or clarified in *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, shows how necessary it appears to Schutz to think through once again these problems with respect to aspects of relevance and of the social person. The significance of this line of inquiry was already recognized by Schutz in 1927 when he considered the question about meaning and the question about the constitution of meaning as questions about selection and relevance. See “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur,” pp. 22 f.

<sup>26</sup> Husserl, *Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften*, §§1–27, and below, p. 76/7167

adopted by the human being simply living straightforwardly, thus consciously to shove into the center of the field of regard a partial aspect of <the social scientist's> self. And that leads to the great problem of the reality of the social world: how it is presented in very different aspects for those who live in it and for the social scientist.<sup>27</sup>

- 6) Afterwards a clear picture of the proper set of problems of method of the social sciences allow of being projected. Something may be allowed to be said about whether and to what extent the social sciences are able to make statements about actuality, which interpretations accrue to their empirical rules, what meaning and what universality accrue to their laws. We have to show the extent [29/7133] to which the problems of temporality, of historicity, of chance are relevant for forming social-scientific concepts, what this relevance means, and how far all social-scientific statements refer to a few basic ontological factors the components of which are a true anthropology that will be able to come forth as a science.<sup>28</sup>

The useful application of knowledge so acquired to a few of the most important controversies in several social sciences and to a few of their less concrete problems will seek to demonstrate the fruitfulness of such settings of problems.

It now remains to examine whether the exposition of such questions are relevant <for the reader> and appears to be worth the effort. For even this will be a result of our investigations: If a single person somehow or other faces a choice in fact, then that is the object which interests that person.

Iselsberg, 31 July 1937

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<sup>27</sup> Here Schutz provides a first indication of the set of problems he will later develop concerning the relation of types constructed in everyday life and in scientific thinking. See Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," *CP* I, pp. 3 ff.

<sup>28</sup> At this point Schutz, for the first time, sketches the transition from a transcendental to an anthropological foundation of a mundane phenomenology of the life-world.

# Chapter One

## [I. General Development of the Problems of the Unity of the Person]

Alfred Schutz

[b)]<sup>1</sup> The Unity of the Body<sup>2</sup>

a) My own organism and the constitution of the self.

My organism, that thing of the outer world, given to me as the foremost phenomenon of my inner world, is the mediator in the first place between my experiences in the *durée* and my ideas of a spatial-temporal world. But to speak of inner and outer is already to speak metaphorically and presupposes that unity, which we call our body, as completely constituted. As a consequence, it is only with respect to this completely constituted organism that we can speak of an outer and inner, of space and also of space-time (the *durée* is directly projected into space). The problem of the constituting of space by means of the organism is much too difficult to treat here in its full extent.<sup>3</sup> Our task only requires that we emphasize those moments that lead

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<sup>1</sup> All of the headings added are from the Table of Contents at the end of Schutz's 1936 manuscript; see above, p. II./7061.

<sup>2</sup> This part of a manuscript, with the heading, "The Unity of the Body," was previously unknown (following the 1936 arrangement the heading ought to read, "The Role of the Body;" see above p. II./7061). Because the pages are missing in the Schutz Nachlass, they have a different numbering than those in the microfilm of other parts in the Nachlass. When reviewing the Schutz correspondence, this chapter was found with a handwritten letter, dated (obviously erroneously) 28 December 1928, from Eric Voegelin expressing his interest in the heading of this manuscript and asking to see it. Schutz answered his request in a letter of 19 December, 1945, with which he enclosed the following chapter.

<sup>3</sup> Schutz alludes here to his familiarity with several late manuscripts of Husserl which he discussed with Husserl on his regular visits to Freiburg in 1933. Schutz later edited these manuscripts on the constitution of space and the surrounding world, publishing them in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, I, September, 1940, pp. 21–37, 218–226; and *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, VI, No. 3, March, 1946 pp. 323–343; and in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, edited by Marvin Farber, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940, pp. 305–326.



from the basic positing of the fully constituted organism to the constituting of the basic positing of the unity of the self.

- 1) For me my organism is immediately my organ of perception and thus the bearer of the primal instituting of active and passive kinds of experiencings. Belonging to them are a diversity of kinaesthetic and localizing phenomena that make perception possible in the first place. All theories of perception which overlook this basic fact [31] either confuse perception with apperception or activity with arbitrary acts [*Willkürlichkeit*]. The world of the senses does not befall me, rather I already operate within the organization of even the simplest perceptual experiences and should they be only localizing the places in my back where someone sticks me with needles. By virtue of the spontaneity, however, each perceptual experience always reveals itself with the unmistakable index “my perception” to which, taken in the full sense, “my kinaesthesias” and “my localizations” belong.
- 2) Furthermore, my organism is the only constant conscious process [*Bewusstseins-Erlebnis*] given me in primally instituting experience. Specifically, constant is the consciousness of the *limits of my organism* which never leaves me, whether my organism occupies whatever place in space, whether my organism be found fully at rest or not, whether I be awake or asleep. But precisely because every moment of my *durée* is constituted together with the infinity of all other conscious processes constituting that moment by virtue of constantly experiencing the limits of my organism, it is difficult, indeed even impossible, to isolate this experience without having recourse to changing perceptions in order to clarify just this constant basic experience. Such an attempt would also be of little help. Clarification of the basic experience of the limits of my organism is made possible neither by thermal or tactual sensations of the atmosphere surrounding me, nor by the sensations of pressure caused by the weight of my organism and its members, nor by the multiplicity [32] of experiences of resistance in the outer world, taken singly or all together.

All of these experiences change but they are neither constant nor consistent. They arise instead from the experience of a constant and consistent background that accompanies all of my sensations, thinkings, actings, in short, all of my experiencings. And yet to speak of a “background” is not quite applicable. Instead there arises in the changing stream of my conscious processes a truly permanent primal datum that co-constitutes the field, so to speak, the *place* to which all these experiences that can be called mine must be related. The limits or boundaries of my organism, however, that are constant and consistent in the field constituted by the limits is the one true and *identical* field primally given to me, fashioning the *numerically-identical* conscious process the identity of which is also not lost even if I lose my arms and legs. Were that to happen, the scope of my life would be severely limited although the field, called my organism, always remains the one, numerically identical field, “my organism,” that, for better or worse, is the referential system of all of my experiences. Thus, finally, to speak of the “limits of my organism” is only to speak metaphorically about an essentially ineffable basic fact of our consciousness. Because, however, the metaphor in a well-understood sense does not lack intuitiveness, we shall continue to use it.



[33] Here we come across a primal datum in fact. For the experience of the limits of my organism is, above all, distinguished from other experiences in that it undergoes no modification when touched upon by the retrospective regard of retention and reflection. It is further distinguished by the fact that it cannot become an object of variation in free phantasy, further that it does not reveal any lacunae that can be filled by protentions and anticipations, that attentional modifications themselves of these experiences cannot occur. Finally, it is distinguished by the fact that it is the single primal experience given to me mediated by a self-enclosed, delimited and homogeneous domain and, in this sense, likewise fashions a continuum.

- 3) The closed field of the experience of the limits of my organism, which is called my organism, is distinguished from all other phenomena of the world by that fact that it alone is truly governable by me. I am able to bring about changes in place of this, my organism, and together with it intervene in world-time and world-space. The organism is the medium by which the duration-bound experience of movement in traversable space can be transformed. I am able to observe my writing hand at the same time as movement experienced from within and as movement in outer space, and to identify both. Accordingly, the irruption into the domain of the extended occurs. My organism is the tool of my working, understanding by “working” [*Wirken*] that deed which intervenes in space. [34] On this basis alone working is already revealed as *my* working and always again only as *my* working.
- 4) My organism is the origin of my orientation in the world. It is what constitutes my “*hic*” with respect to which everything else is “*illic*.” It is what allows me to change place and to transform what previously was “*illic*” into “*hic*” as a consequence of which the earlier “*hic*” now appears as “*illic*.” The primordial experiences of right and left, up and down, behind and in front, the entire three-dimensionality of my world-space and of my orientation in it are constituted by my organism that, metaphorically speaking, exhibits the “*origo*” of the system of coordinates that I apply to the world. And on the basis of the “*hic*” in question my surrounding world (the inanimate, the animate and the social) is constituted as the world within reach, within hearing and sight, and beyond that as the world of contemporaries, i.e., as a reachable world, as a phenomenon of probability [*als Phänomen in der Chance*].
- 5) My organism is the object of my growing older. Although certainly not alone. But it is also included in this basic anthropological phenomenon. All being is being toward death; birth, growing older, death, define human existence as well as the human organism. But what distinguishes *my* organism is that it shares *my* growing older. Not only outwardly in its appearance and development at different stages of life. I hardly even recognize it in pictures of my childhood! But it shares my growing older in so far as it is the regulator of the intensity of my life as well as the regulator of my [35] tensions, defining, too, the domain of variation of my *attention à la vie*.

My organism as field of my perceptions as well as bearer of my primally instituting experiences of activity and passivity; my organism as a field of experience that

is constant, numerically identical and fashioning a quasi-continuum that is present to me at every moment; my organism as a tool of my working, as the gateway to world-time and world-space; my organism as the origin of my orientation in the world; my organism as the object of my growing older as well as the limit of the domain of variation of my *attentions à la vie*—: all of these are elements of the constitution of that one and unitary person that I call my own.

Anticipating what will come later on, all of these will become still more distinct when we investigate the meaning of the organism of someone else for the constitution of the *alter ego*.

Inselsberg, 6 August, 1937

[36]

b) The organism of someone else and the constitution of the *alter ego*.

Thy organism is directly given to me as a physical body [*Körper*] incorporated into the three-dimensionality of my world-orientation which has its origin in my organism. While I identify this physical body as organism, and, more particularly not as organism of an animal but as human organism, although as a human organism given in “*illic*” but not in “*hic*,” as human organism not governable by me and of the limits of which I have experience only by a series of perceptions but not by that specific experience through which I know the limits of my own organism—in short, while I recognize this organism as thine, as organism of an *alter ego*—I execute the *general positing of the Thou* [*Generalthesis des Du*]. This general positing consists of the fact that I impute a life of consciousness similar to mine, similar for thee, that I determine in principle like myself <similar> to a similar organism that still is not mine, in short, an organism I posit as another self, as *alter ego*.

Here we can be satisfied with this presentation of the constitution of the *alter ego* even though it is very incomplete. For, to mention just one difficulty, how is it possible for me to claim not to know [*agnoszieren*] a physical thing as a human organism [37] without already being in possession of a concept of human being to which <the concept of> its plurality also belongs, i.e., the fact that outside of me, a human being, other human beings are given? In the succession of constitution, which is the *prius*, is it the experience of another being that founds the phenomenon “organism of someone else,” or is it not rather the experience of a physical thing similar to my organism (in what respect?) that constitutes the phenomenon of the *alter ego*”? We know how difficult these questions are for philosophers to decide, indeed, that here a domain is of concern that has been discovered and made accessible as such only by the most recent advances of phenomenological investigation.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, we are familiar with the arguments brought by old and new positivists against the claim of an intelligent *alter ego* as such.

By limiting ourselves fundamentally to striving for a phenomenology of the natural attitude toward the world, and by not asking whether this, our natural world, is in fact a world of being or only one of harmonious illusion, we are freed from the

<sup>4</sup> Schutz particularly refers here to Husserl’s *Cartesianische Meditationen* as well as to Scheler’s *Formalismus*.

many difficulties that [38] each and every transcendental philosophy encounters when taking seriously its method and by not being frightened by the bugbear of solipsism. For in the natural attitude toward the world our being is already being with others and, as long as humans are born of mothers and not produced in test tubes, genetically-constitutionally the experience of the *alter ego* precedes the experience of my own self. This fact has long been well-known in child psychology informing us of how long the time is before the child relates to a concept of “self” as well as of its own organism. That others outside me are given cannot even be doubted in the natural attitude toward the world. The experience of someone else’s organism is, in this sphere, a primal phenomenon and, with the general positing described at the beginning of these paragraphs, the positing in fact of physical thing appearing to me of such and such a shape as the organism of someone else and therefore as belonging to a thou, to an *alter ego*, is effected at one as well with the positing of thou as a being endowed with reason whose consciousness-structure is analogous to mine.

[39] This account is sufficient for the depths in which our set of problems takes its departure. However, it does not release us from investigating what we really know of the organism of someone else and how the organism of the Thou is distinguished from my own organism.

- 1) In the first place, for me thy organism is by no means the field of thy perceptions, although, by virtue of the general positing, I accept that thy organism is for thee an organ of perception just as my organism is for me. Indeed I accept until proven otherwise that thy perceptions are fashioned in the same way as mine if I were in thy place (and this also with the modification that I attribute to thee “normal” perceptions even when I know that mine are “abnormal,” thus, e.g., I credit thee with seeing more and other than I who am shortsighted). For me, thy organism is, however, above all, a *field of expression*, while my own organism, for me, is not a field of expression (exceptions would be the actor), or only becomes a field of expression in a special attitude of self-observation. Manifest for me in this field of expression are thy activity and passivity, [40] thy acting and suffering, doing or working. In addition thou hath thy spontaneity, even thy kinaesthesias and localizations. So long as I do not encounter proof to the contrary, I posit all of these, thy experiences, as analogous to mine were I in thy place. (To that extent the theory of analogy of the *alter ego* is entirely legitimate and well-founded.)<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Under the heading of the catchwords, “theory of the argument by analogy,” Schutz no doubt refers to the critical discussion of Max Scheler chiefly directed to Theodor Lipps; see Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, 7, pp. 20ff, 215 ff. (Eng. Translation, pp. 9 ff., 220 ff..). See also Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§44, 52; and Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, III: *Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*, Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1954, pp 96 ff. (Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*. Vol. III: *The Phenomenology of Knowledge*. English translation by Ralph Manheim. Introductory Note by Charles W. Hendel New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1957, pp. 82 ff.). Also see Schutz’s later essay. “Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego,” *CP I*, pp. 150 ff.

- 2) For me thy organism is well-circumscribed, although this is the result of visual or tactual perceptions no different from the experience of any other well-circumscribed thing such as a table or a tree, and accordingly includes its open horizons (e.g., the back side, protentional-anticipatory modifications of the aspects that might result from changing places, etc.). Thy organism and its limits or boundaries are not apprehended on the basis of my specific experiences of the limits of my organism. Just this situation makes thy organism belong to someone else who is not me. If I touch thy hand, this situation is wholly different from the one where thy hand toucheth mine. Precisely here what we mean by the experience of the limits of one's own organism becomes particularly pregnant. Any doubt about mine and thine is completely excluded from all of these cases [41], and all of the humor in the story about the guys in the barroom brawl whose legs become so entangled that none knows which are his legs, depends on the impossibility of such doubt.<sup>6</sup> Thy organism is present to me in no other way than any other thing in the outer world. But by virtue of carrying out the general positing <of the natural attitude> I assume that thee knoweth of the limits of thy organism just as I know the limits of mine, that also for thee this experience is a primal datum, constant, continuous and ineffable.
- 3) While it is my organism that constitutes space for me, from the beginning thy organism for me stands in space. While the movement of my organism is directly the experience of inner duration that varies through the medium of my organism in traversible space, a change of position, thus a traversed space is given to me on thy moved organism whereby, thanks to carrying out the general positing of this change of position, I impute to the inner flows that would correspond to my inner experiences were my organism to undertake the same kind of change of position. Belonging to these experiences are those of working on the basis of which I interpret certain positional changes of thy organism as thy doing and as thy working. [42]
- 4) While my organism is always given to me as organism *hic*, thy organism is essentially and always given to me *illic*. However, this organism *illic*—for thee, for whom it is *hic*—is the *origo* of a system of coordinates of orientation in the world for which there are a right and left, an up and down, an in back and in front, which certainly are not *my* right and left, *my* up and down, *my* in back and in front. But, owing to the general positing, I possess the transformation formula enabling me to express each localization in thy system of coordinates and when thou confrontest me, I know that my “right” is a “left” for thee, that my “in back” is thy “in front,” that my “above,” however, is thy “above.” When thou art within

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<sup>6</sup>In the original manuscript, on the left margin of the page next to this sentence there is the entry: “Pathology.” The stories about the ridiculous situations go back to so-called *Lalebuch* (1597); cf. *Das Lalebuch* (1597) mit den Abweichungen und Erweiterungen der Schiltbürger (1598) und des Grillenvertreibers (1603), edited by Karl von Bahder, Halle a. d. S.: Niemeyer, 1914. The story about the entanglement of the legs takes place during a bout of wild drunkenness; see *ibid.*, Chapter 29, pp. 110 f.

the extent of my reach, I assume that I am also within thy reach, and that the phenomena in my Teachableness (the world of contemporaries) are also such in thy Teachableness, are also for the phenomena of probability.

- 5) It is also certain that thy organism for thee is the object of thy growing older. But for me it grows older and changes no differently from the tree in front of my window. As for thy intensity of life, thy tensions and the limits of the domain of variation of thy *attentions à la vie*, I learn nothing about them from thy organism.

Inselsberg, 7. VIII. 1937

# Chapter Two

## Genesis of the Social Person in the Solitary Self

Alfred Schutz

[B.) Problems of Temporality]

[III.<sup>1</sup>] The Tempora of the Self and its Perspectival Division.

Previously we saw<sup>2</sup> how the subjective experience of temporality, constituted immanence, for its part is once again a constituting moment for the stratification of the self. We saw that the basic attitudes of the self, comprised under the headings of “interests” and “attention,” for their part are themselves pragmatically conditioned, i.e., are modifications of that *attention à la vie* originating in the pure pragma of the self at work. We have further shown how such kinds of attitudes of “interests” and “attention,” themselves seen as modifications of the pure pragma, for their part modify the experiences of expectation and of memory that arise from reflection on the course of duration. And <we have shown> how these ramifications can be traced back to the frames of spatio-temporality constituted in the “daily life” [*“bürgerlichen Tag”*]. In daily life no self is simply given but always given in need of a temporal index. It is the self now, the self before now, and the self later on. The study of these “tempora of the self,” as we shall call them, and their perspectival articulation is our next task. [44/7135]

a) My Self Now.

What we call the “self now” in the natural attitude toward the world and in daily life, should not be confused with that instantaneous experience of the self in pure duration that corresponds to the transition from past to future, when the self, in

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<sup>1</sup> All of the headings are added on the basis of the Table of Contents Schutz added to the end of the manuscript written in the Summer of 1936. See above, p. II./7061.

<sup>2</sup> Schutz refers here to sections I and II of Chapter II, B, as well as to the corresponding thematic catalogue of 1936 (above, p 7/7075). There is no further development of this arrangement from 1937 to be found in the Nachlass. Judging from his pagination of this text (pp. 1–118) we presume that Schutz did not work out this section any further in the 1937 phase of his work.

the standing-streaming of its temporality (as Husserl said<sup>3</sup>), designates the becoming-receding moment with a “now and so.” The Now is a limit-concept in the inner duration. It is as though reality were only for us as naive persons who simply live straightforwardly and of whom we can say only live in the present now and do not reflect on it. Just for that reason we have no occasion to step outside the stream of duration. For us, naively flowing along with the stream of duration, our ongoing, receding experiences are centered around a Now which would designate just that transition between past and future that is the taken-for-granted present. We, who simply live straightforwardly, always only live in the Now and always again in a new Now. This and nothing else is what we mean by “being in the stream of the course of duration” fashioned by our attitude of simply living straightforwardly. However, so to speak, we have to step outside the stream of duration if we wish to give an account of thinking about the ideal limiting point between past [45/7136] and future, between our becoming and receding experiences. We have to bring this stream to a stop in order to reflectively turn to it if we wish to raise questions about our Now instead of naively accepting it.

But once we reflect on our experiences in the course of duration, and are no longer simply, naively living straightforwardly, then the object of our reflection is no longer our Now, Here and Thus. It is instead a “just now having been” [*Soeben-Gewesen*], in short, a previous Now which is however no longer our actual Now. Whenever we reflect on how we naively, straightforwardly *live in* the Now, we are put in mind of something always past even if this may also flow into a just-now-having-been. And thus in fact the Now in its pure duration is defined only as a construction, as a limit-concept, making intuitive the continuum of the course of inner duration by marking out the transition from past and future, from becoming and recession [*Entwerden*]. It is a fictive, i.e., unexperienced and unexperienceable Now. And this is why any philosophy examining this fiction [*Fiktum*] can become entangled in the greatest difficulties. From the paradoxes of Zeno of Elea to the problem of Malebranche according to which God creates us anew at every moment, to the modern psychology of the day [*Instantanpsychologie*], [46/7137] the difficulty of all of these philosophical problems lead back to the unjustified hypostization of the fictive Now into a reality.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*. Herausgegeben von Martin Heidegger. *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Bd. IX, Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1928, §§34ff, and Beilage VI. (Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, edited by Martin Heidegger, Translated by James S. Churchill, introduction by Calvin O. Schrag. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964; *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1893–1917). Translated by John Barnett Brough; Edmund Husserl, *Collected Works*, vol. 4. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990).

<sup>4</sup> For the paradoxes of Zeno see Simplicios as well as Aristotle (*Physics*, Book Z, 0); see Diels/Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin: Heinemann<sup>6</sup>, 1952, Fragments 29B1–B3, and 29 A25–A28; (see Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A Complete translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956.). For Malebranche, see his *Traite de la nature et de la grace* (1680).

However, here we shall not speak of them. Rather we wish to take as our point of departure the constituted public life and ask, what we, living in the natural attitude of daily life, really mean when we speak of an “I, now.” Thus we do not speak of a fictive or a real moment but instead of a piece of public time that carries its horizon with it and its perspectives of early and later. It is a piece of public time to which, because it cannot be otherwise, there corresponds a definite course of my inner duration and which co-constitutes this piece of public time. This piece of public time that I call my Now in daily life is never sharply delimited or delimitable. It is not to be defined in terms of minutes, hours, days or even years. Public time has, so to speak, “fringes” [“*Fransen*”]<sup>5</sup> that broadly extend over great distances of time. Yet it also has a center around which all the perspectives of this Now are grouped—a center that we can just as well call a center of density.

[47/7138] It is probably best to begin with a few examples so as to make intuitive what we have just said. I am now on holiday for the purpose of completing this book. I have now reached the point in my thought where I have to overcome the present difficulties. I am reading Keller’s novel, *Der grüne Heinrich*<sup>6</sup> Now I concentrate intensely on Leibniz’s philosophy. Now I have the opportunity to become informed by my friend X about the actual situation of the problems of national economy. Now I go for a walk. Now I await news of Y. Now news about the Chinese-Japanese war arrives. Now we try to see more clearly whether the agreement will last. Now it may be lovely in Italy. Now I’m in a good humor. Now I have to reckon with better times.

My aim in the foregoing examples of interwoven heterogeneous affairs is to consider them neither with respect to their relevance to a single statement, nor with respect to their perspectival arrangements. However, the few statements are sufficient to show that any protocol claiming one of them as constituting for each of us our Now in daily life is impossible because just this Now comprises an indefinite manifold of elements, attitudes, actions, experiences subject to regulation by my interest and attention at the time. (For this set of problems [48/7139] cf. the attempt by a particular novelist, such as James Joyce in *Ulysses*, to adopt a protocol of the Now from the subjective standpoint of a single self; or Jules Romains in his multi-volumed novel, *Les hommes de bonne volonté*,<sup>7</sup> as the same attempt carried out from an objective standpoint.) The present center of density of the Now, or as we can also say, the

<sup>5</sup> Schutz borrowed the concept of “fringes” from William James; see William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), Vol. I, Chapter IX. Schutz had already employed the concept in his early manuscript, “Erleben, Sprache und Begriff” (1925), translating “fringes” by “*Wortfransen*.” His later development of the concept may be found in his essay on William James, “William James’ Concept of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpreted” (1941), *CP*, III, pp. 1–14. See also the references in the correspondence with Gurwitsch concerning “On Multiple Realities.”

<sup>6</sup> Gottfried Keller, *Der grüne Heinrich*, in *Sämtliche Werke*, edited by Thomas Boning/Gerhard Kaiser, Bd. 2 (Erste Fassung, 1854/55, Bd. 3 (Zweite Fassung 1878/80), Frankfurt/M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985.

<sup>7</sup> James Joyce, *Ulysses* (1922); Jules Romains, *Les hommes de bonne volonté* (1932–1946). {English translation as *Men of Good Will*, by Warre B. Wells. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961 ff.}



present center of relevance of the Now, from which all of its other moments receive their perspectival place, gets constituted by my present interest consequently in the play and counter play of acts of my attention. But the phenomena belonging to my Now grouped around this center of relevance are tied together to one another in a context of relevance and consequently experience their perspectival adumbration and distribution while my Now also acquires its horizon. Metaphorically we can say that the landscape of my Now is presented as a system of isohypsometric relevances grouped around a center of density. We do not wish to hound to death this simile, but retaining the concept of the hypsographical contour of lines of relevance [*Relevanzisohypsen*] will serve us well later on. Accordingly it is impossible to exhaustively enumerate the contents of any given Now through a number of protocol sentences.<sup>8</sup> Thus a few general statements may be made that are particularly important for the theory of the self in action [*handelnden Ich*]. They are of special interest [49/7140] for the pragmatic motives of action to be considered subsequently with more precision. The *ego agens* is, in fact, the primally instituting originary experience of the self from which all other aspects of the self are derived from it as modifications.

The Now is characterizable as that segment of public time which, to a greater or lesser extent is foreseeable, and in greater or lesser measure is controllable. A Later also always belongs to the Now, but which is still not a Later On [*Fortan*] even though the boundaries here are fluid. The Before, from out of which the Now arose, does not therefore enter into the naively experienced Now. The Now must instead ask about its Before. That such asking belongs to the Now later on may be shown by the following:

Protentions and anticipations that are related to a Later of this temporal segment are never completely empty and unfulfilled. Rather they are accompanied by a consciousness of a greatest probability so that what is now and so and so presented will also be so and so presented to me in the Later of this Now. The “and so on” and “always again,” as phenomenologists say,<sup>9</sup> are accordingly not pure ideality for the Now in grasp, but instead represent a high degree of probability. The self views even the farthest perspectives of its Now, so to speak, under the *clamula rebus sic stantibus* and accordingly feels justified. This is particularly valid for the self in action which can realize in the Now a prepared plan in an extraordinarily brief distance from its project. And it is only for this self in action that we are able to provide a precise delimitation [50/1741] of the Now. *For the self in action, Now is that segment of public time which comprises the extent of its projects.*

<sup>8</sup> In this connection, cf. the concept of “protocol sentences” introduced by the Vienna Circle, i.e., those sentences accepted as able to mirror immediate experience. See Otto Neurath, “Protokollsätze,” in *Erkenntnis* 3, 1932/33, pp. 204 ff.; and Rudolf Carnap, “Über Protokollsätze,” in *Erkenntnis*, 3, 1932/33, pp. 215 ff. He subscribes to Carnap’s concept of “Protokollsprache,” in “Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft,” in *Erkenntnis*, 2, 1931, pp. 432 ff., as well as in “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache,” in *Erkenntnis*, 2, 1931, pp. 219 ff.

<sup>9</sup> See Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik*, §74.

Belonging to Now in all cases is the constant consciousness of somatic presence<sup>10</sup> [*somatische Präsenzbewußtsein*] of which we previously spoke. Included as well, moreover, are those essentially real experiences (among which are undifferentiable perceptions) which in principle cannot be called back and, as belonging to the intimate person, are ineffable. These experiences, of course, are already constituted in the course of duration correlative to public time. But all public time, accordingly my mundane Now, is co-constituted by this course of duration and each element necessarily finds its correlate in public time. The constant consciousness of somatic presence, however, and its real experiences, of which we have spoken, accordingly have their place in public time in that center of density of the Now around which all isohypsometrical relevances are grouped.

What we have said about the “self now” will be immediately clearer when we contrast it with the “self before now,” my prior self.

Iselberg, 8/11/37

[51/7142]

#### b) My Self Before Now.

To bring the prior self, myself before now, into view we need a special attitude of reflection which, to use Bergson's expression, is tied up with painful effort.<sup>11</sup> This turn back to my own past is also motivated, more particularly, by a specific situation of interest of which my self now needs in order to make the reflective turn and to ask about the specific structure and its full meaning before now from out of which the Now has emerged in the first place. There are all sorts of such strivings to turn back to the past. Common to all of them is the fact that they are pragmatically conditioned in the sense that a particular modification of the *attention à la vie* creates that situation of interest in the first place and on the basis of which asking about the my self before now becomes necessary. In the execution of its actions, the pure *ego agens* in its specific attentional attitude directed to my pragma never has the need to reflectively turn to my self before now, my prior self. The self lives in its Now, we may even say, that the Now is the *tempus kat' exochen* of the *ego agens*. It is, however, the self who has acted, and the self [52/7143] who imagines its future action, thus the self whose pragma is made the object of its reflection or imaginational [*phantasierenden*] contemplation instead of an object of working. By abandoning its specific *attention à la vie* the self belongs to the execution of its actions constituting the specific situation of interest with just the attitude which motivates it to ask about the meaning of its Before. It is our intention to begin with this case in the

<sup>10</sup> The concept of “consciousness of somatic presence” refers back to the concept of “somatic feeling of life” [*somatischen Lebensgefühl*] which Schutz, under the influence of Bergson's concept of *elan vital*, developed in “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur” (see pp. 77 ff.). The concept was linked to our pre-reflective self-experiencing. While the somatic feeling of life rests upon our kinaesthetic perceptions, thus upon the difference between body and organism, the concept of consciousness of somatic presence adds to the discussion our experience of our own duration.

<sup>11</sup> See Bergson, *L'Energie spirituelle*, Chapter VI; *Matter and Memory*, pp. 22 ff., and *Time and Free Will*, pp. 128 ff.

investigations of this section because we shall show later that all the other situations of interest which motivate turning back to the Before are modifications of the situation of interest of the *ego agens* and its *attention à la vie*. This is because the study of the difference [*Gegensatzes*] between the *ego agens*, which executes its pragma straightforwardly, and the *ego* which reflects or phantasies its pragma, is especially revealing for the problem of the *tempora* of the self.

Accordingly, the self needs a special push to carry out the turn back to the Before. Yet it is not just the fact *that* I adopt a reflective attitude that motivates such a turn motivated by my situation of interest, but also *how* I turn back to the Before, and above all the *what* back to which I am turning. We can compare the essence of reflection [53/7144] to a searchlight that sends its ray into the darkness of the Before. For the situation of interest not only motivates shining the light at all, but also constitutes the object to which the cone of the searchlight is directed and thus defines the range of the ray of light itself.

However, the moment we reflect a basic distinction is shown between my self now and my self before now.<sup>12</sup> The fullfledged *ego ipse* can only be apprehended as my self now. For only now does the self have its somatic consciousness of being present, only now does it have its essentially present experiences and its indistinguishable perceptions. All of these experiences co-constituting the Now are not continuous with reflection [*reflexionsbeständig*]. Of course I may remember *that* I have had experiences of such and such a kind (a cheerful outlook or bodily pain), but we cannot reproduce the How of these experiences. And of course I also know that essentially real experiences of such and such a kind belonged to my self before now. But this knowing only extends to the “That” of these experiences, not to their specific “How.” Moreover, my self now as *ego agens* can be fully given to me. This is always the case in naive, straightforward living in public time. [54/7145].

And in a quite specific case my self now as *ego agens*, as the self working on its pragma, is always the *ego ipse* in its totality and fullness. Only my self now operates, only my self now creates its public time while operating. My self before now never operates, though it has operated and if I think about its *actiones* they are presented to me always only as its *acta*. As *actiones* these pragmata are co-constituting of public time which was the complete Now for the previously operating self, but to me, as reflecting self, appear as “then” emergent within the frame of public time. For detached from the *actiones* constituting it, public time is split up into a piece of world-time in which the *acta* have taken place in a sequential order of succession and in flowing duration and which my *acta* have constituted.<sup>13</sup> Public time has no perfect tense. It is essentially present or future. The form of the past belonging to it is the imperfect tense, basically to be found in execution belonging to Now. What public time is today is created by my pragma in the process of execution, and

<sup>12</sup> In what follows Schutz refers to his analyses of the worlds surrounding us, contemporary to us, of our predecessors and our successors in *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §§33 ff., which he developed departing from the concept of the pragmatic genesis of the social person and “public” time.

<sup>13</sup> In this connection, see Schutz/Luckmann, *Structures of the Life World*, Vol. I, Chapter II, Section B 4.

tomorrow will fall again into world-time and its duration running its course. And for that reason because my Before does not belong to public time, but rather emerges from its unity, the Before is free of protentions and anticipations. [55/7146] In so far as I find them in the Before, they are reproducible or retainable as experiences of duration. They carry their horizons open with them because they belong to my actual duration. However, in so far as my self before now belongs to world-time, there no longer are no protentions and anticipations in a genuine and original sense because my previous protentions and anticipations have either been fulfilled or unfulfilled.

The acts which have entered into my world-time are as they are, unique, unchangeable and can no longer be freely varied. What my “self now” designates is precisely the completed synthesis in public time of the present pragma with its open and undetermined, freely variable protentions and anticipations. More particularly, they are protentions and anticipations—now—that carry with them a maximal probability of fulfillment. Even afterwards this probability of fulfillment is still revealed in a diminishing measure, but later on simply remains undecided and open. In pure duration and in public time there are only probabilities and possibilities. In the genuine past, which is always world-time, there are only completion and certainty. What, in an earlier section,<sup>14</sup> we have become acquainted with as the essence of public time, its postestativity [*Postestativität*], its possibility, its possibility of freely calculating probability and freely choosing among probabilities, is something essential to my self now and my self later on. My self before now is no longer potestative and no longer allows for a choice. It is completed, my acts are unchangeable and no longer to be recovered [56/7147], I no longer have the choice of what I will have done.

However, the Now provides the opportunity for the *ego ipse* to come into view in its fullness and totality as an operative [*wirkendes*] self in its *actio*, while my self before now is already split up into its partial aspects and can never be visible in its fullness and totality but always only in its partial aspect. For only the *actio* creates the relationship of unity [*Einheitsbezug*] of the *ego ipse* (at the same time with the constitution of public time). Only the self now operates so as to be able to achieve this production [*Leistung*] of the relationship of unity. My self before now does not operate, it *has* operated and its *acta* do not become allotted to the unitary *ego ipse*. Rather they are already revealed as *acta* of a partial self. Indeed, we can say right away that each of the partial selves which, in retrospect, make up my self before now, are nothing else than my *acta* that have run their course and been completed. In their sedimentation they are *acta* constituting each of the partial selves such that I allot them specific attitudes of my self. But what “to allot” means here is nothing else than that the reproduction of these *acta* results in specific attentional, and, for their part, new pragmatically conditioned modifications, thus sedimented [57/7148] [*geschichtet*] according to hypsographical contour lines of relevance the center of density of which likewise lies in my self now.

<sup>14</sup> See above, p. 7/7075 of the 1936 manuscript.

The acts ordered according to the hypsographical contour lines of relevance of a Now thus constitute the partial selves which come into my purview as my self before now. However, these partial selves are not only articulated according to the order in which they share in the system of hypsographical contour lines of relevance. They reveal among themselves a second perspectival series specific to the aspects of my self before now. First of all there is the partial self whose basic attitude is present in my self now and which co-constitutes it. Metaphorically speaking, this partial self lives on today as the waking self, the *ego ipse*, embracing, among many attitudes, just this attitude formerly specific to my partial self. In the second place there is the partial self whose attitude, more particularly, is not really present but which nevertheless has the possibility of once more belonging to my self now because this basic attitude *can* be assumed again at any time. Accordingly this attitude *potentially* co constitutes my self now. As it were, “the partial self before now” still survives today. But instead of living on as a waking partial self, it lives on as a sleeping partial self that can at any time be awakened again. It belongs to the possibility of my Now that I can awaken again at any time this partial self and bring into play the basic attitude specific to it. [58/7149] Thirdly, however, my “self before now” displays basic attitudes (partial selves) evidentially presentive as never returning and no longer operative, which, so to speak, have died and cannot be resurrected. These phenomena are of the utmost importance for the constitution of my self before now. I as child, as soldier at the front, as neo-Kantian, are all examples of such receded (dead) life-forms of my self before now. However, I cannot find them present as possibilities in my self now even though they once co-constituted my self now because I am, as I am, because once I was a child, a soldier at the front, and a neo-Kantian.

Metaphorically we called this last group of phenomena of the self “dead partial selves.” But it is more than a metaphor if we connect these receded life-forms of my self before now, which will never see the light of day again, with the primal phenomenon of death. Here we shall leave aside the metaphysical inference that, rather than a phenomenon transcending life, the phenomenon of death is a phenomenon immanent to life. It is an inference that immediately makes the problem of immortality visible in all seriousness.<sup>15</sup> Instead we shall limit ourselves [59/7150] to saying that it is just the continuous destruction of earlier life-forms which makes up what is essential to that basic fact of human existence that we call “aging.” Moreover, <we also have to say> that the irreversibility of time <borne by “aging”> —of duration, of world-time, of public time—is identical with consciousness of the inescapableness of death. <But it is consciousness> not only of that death which constantly threatens our total self now, our *ego ipse*, but also of the partial death, which itself touching the most intimately anchored of the basic attitudes of our self, if not also of the *ego ipse*, which survives the death of this partial self by virtue of its capacity to be always be present anew as *ego agens*. In this experience of our own partial

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<sup>15</sup> Immortality is understood here in the sense of the impossibility of being unable to represent to myself, as active consciousness, the cessation of its activity. We also find here the difference between Kant’s and Husserl’s conception of thinking as a formal or as a material apriori.

death there is included the prefiguration of that death which must also befall this *ego agens*, me, this *ego ipse*. Kierkegaard's problem of dread, Heidegger's problem of being cast into the world, rest on this certainty.<sup>16</sup> But resting on the everyday experience that we survive our partial death, resting on the experience that we only undergo change, is all hope in immortality brought by terror of physical death [60/7151] and in which we trust: On this experience rests Plato's doctrine of the transmigration of souls with all its consequences (even of his theory of anamnesis), as well as the foundational Christian attitude of *espérance*, but also even Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return.<sup>17</sup>

Iselberg, 12 August, 1937.

[61/7152]

### c) My Self Later On

So far our investigations have shown that my self already comprises an incommensurable piece of world-time with respect to its physical measure. It is a piece of world-time, more particularly, articulated in an Earlier and Later and in which "fringes" extend from a center of density into the open horizon of the future. Moreover, a delimitation of the Now in more precise form is only possible for the *ego agens*, itself limited by the extent of its actual projects. We immediately saw as characteristic of the Now the possibility that my self is comprehended in its totality as *ego agens*, but also that the "and so forth" and "always again" of my self now is experienced as greatest probability rather than as pure reality, that what is now and so, will also be later and so. My self later on, presented as later, joins my self now in flowing transition. My self later on continues public time as well, even where it is no longer foreseeable and controllable. As we also say, the character of probability belonging to the "and so on" and "always again" is revealed just as it cannot otherwise be, a flowing transition. We must not understand this to mean that it is attached to a core of certainty, so to speak, in concentric circles of levels increasing to indefiniteness, to which we can assign a degree of probability and, where possible, calculate. Instead, [62/7153] it carries with it precisely the "fringelike" delimitation of the Now to which many of tomorrow's phenomena are susceptible, which are unforeseeable and uncontrollable, thus which do not belong to me now, while yet other <of tomorrow's> phenomena enter in which are foreseeable by me with greatest probability and accordingly belong to me now (e.g., my insurance policy which expires in 20 years). My self later on does not "chronologically" succeed my self now. Instead, mixed into that domain [*Spielraum*] of successions we usually call the future are elements of public time that belong to my self now (although to a "later" <self>) <and> with which I am bound later on. And it is particularly characteristic for this state of affairs that partial persons of my self are referred to as belonging to

<sup>16</sup> For Kierkegaard, see the *Concept of Dread*; for Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§29, 31, 38, 58, 68b.

<sup>17</sup> See Plato, *Meno*, 81d ff., *Phaedo*, 74d ff. For the reference to Nietzsche, see *Ecce homo* as well as the controversy with the Pythagorean doctrine of the eternal return in "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben," in *Unzeitgemäßen Betrachtung*, II. ("On the Use and Abuse of History" in *Meditations Out of Season*).

my self now, while other partial persons, whose aspects along <with others> belong just to Now, bear the marks of the self later on—all of this to be sure only when in its totality the *ego ipse* does not presentively realize them in an actual pragma.

It is characteristic for the sphere of the self later on that the ideas of the future self accompanying protentions and anticipations are unfulfilled and remain essentially unfulfillable from the standpoint of Now. This appearance [63/7154] is universally the case of all expectations and also all phantasies whose transport into reality, whose realization, as we say, is not excluded beforehand. But the problems of the self later on disclose the particular appearance that the protentions and anticipations directed to the future self are the more vague the greater the distance at which the levels of the self-phenomenon are apprehended, until they are finally dissolved completely and, in fact, become also unrealizable [*unvollziehbar*], as soon as they are directed later on to the *ego ipse* in its totality. In fact, the future total self can barely be imagined as an empty form. But even these partial selves later on are the more vaguely represented, are endowed with more and more empty places, the closer they lie next to the central, intimate person. Conversely, in the standardized and normative attitudes that constitute the relative periphery of the partial selves there are proportionately fewer empty places shown at least where the process of self-typification of the self has advanced the furthest.<sup>18</sup>

No doubt all ideas of the future self become carriers of characters of probability, though not the character of that maximal change attached to my self now in its form of “I, later,” but instead of a chance that is the more diminished the farther away the self later on is thought of from my self now, but also [64/7155] the closer the imagined “partial self later on” stands to the intimate person. But these assertions are in need of further provisos. Just as the protentions and anticipations directed to the self later on, so also the probabilities belonging to each of these protentions and anticipations, are arranged in the hypsographical contour lines of relevance, the center of density of which lies in my self now. What later on are relevant phenomena for the self are thus a function of my present situation of interest and my now-prevailing attention. But in truth the uncertainty is ambiguous, presenting a concurrence of heterogeneous probabilities. In the first place, from the standpoint of the pre-given relevance system what is anticipated is pure probability, but aside from that the preservation of the relevance system itself is uncertain because these constant attitudes exact attention and interest.<sup>19</sup>

This sketch of the dual character of probability accruing to all experiences directed to my self later on is more than just gratuitous punning. Later we shall introduce an important and useful application of this insight for the theory of objective and subjective probability. However, we have already arrived at the important insight for our problem [65/7156] that it is absolutely uncertain whether the partial self phantasied

<sup>18</sup> In this connection, in the context of the analyses of the theme of relevance, see the unpublished typescript in the Nachlass, “Philosophie der Leerstelle.”

<sup>19</sup> The probability or likelihood that acts of the self later on will be fulfilled is grounded in the concatenation of relevances and experiences of the self now, which, in turn, refer back to the stock of experience of the self before now. This set of problems is dealt with by Schutz in his essay, “Teiresias or our Knowledge of Future Events,” *CP*, II, pp. 277 ff.



later on will be realized in fact with its appertinent attitudes. In addition it is uncertain whether this partial self if actualized will be realized such as we now phantasy it.

We will have to dedicate a particular investigation to the very important concept of probability.<sup>20</sup> In anticipation, however, we have already indicated the specifically unique reference of each probability back to the past, and along with it the reference of the self later on back to my prior self. Every probability, in other words, refers back to the actual stock of experiences on the basis of which, alone, we will be able to make assumptions about definite situations in the present, about the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of definite expectations, about the reiteration of <past> courses <of action>, about the constancy of phenomena, etc. For its part, this actual stock of experiences refers back to all previous experiences out of which it is constituted. It refers back, moreover, to all maxims, rules, harmonious and inharmonious syntheses, confirmed and unconfirmed anticipations, filled and unfulfilled protentions that have entered into that stock of experiences and among which they are linked together. No matter how paradoxical it may seem, public time, constituted in my self later on [66/7157] refers back to the Before split up in world time and the *durée* which, for its part, had once been actuality in public time and which still earlier was an empty, uncertain Later On in public time.

Here, in this characteristic reference of the Later On to the Before we find the beginning point of all speculation about the meaning of one's own life and the possibility of its teleological interpretation. Seen from this angle, the whole appears as the "form, livingly evolved from the law according to which you take your place."<sup>21</sup> There is also here the origin of the idea of transcendence of life and the interpretation of monads as entelechies (*perfectihabia*)<sup>22</sup> The result is that my self before as self now and later on is governed by permanent probability, the seriousness and fruitfulness of which touches upon each aspect of my self: namely, the permanent probability of my own death. Knowledge of this probability is manifested in the basic attitude that we call fundamental dread.<sup>23</sup> This fundamental attitude of dread

<sup>20</sup> Schutz refers here to a section of the manuscript on "*The Problem of Personality*" which he did not complete. The set of problems of subjective and objective probabilities of action are dealt with later in his essay, "*Choosing Among Projects of Action*,". Working out this theme occurs at the time of his renewed interest in the problem of relevance. In the manuscripts and typescripts of this period, and in the essay, "*On Multiple Realities*," CP, I, pp. 207 ff. Schutz further develops the problems formulated here.

<sup>21</sup> See Goethe, *Gedichte und Epen*, I, "Urworte," "Urworte. Orphisch: Daimon, Damon, Z. 1-4: 'Wie an dem Tag, der dich der Welt verliehen, / Die Sonne stand zum Grusse der Planeten, / Bist also bald und fort und fort gediehen / Nach dem Gesetz, wonach du angetreten.'" (See above, p. 10/7078).

<sup>22</sup> In error, Schutz wrote "*perfecti habitas*." The term expresses the idea of something which contains in itself its own goal and accordingly fully realizes itself. Schutz refers here to the translation of the concept of "entelechy" into Latin by Hermolaus Barbarus mentioned by Leibniz; see Leibniz, *Monadology*, §48, as well as *Théodicée* I, §87.

<sup>23</sup> Schutz refers to Heidegger's concept of fundamental dread; see *Sein und Zeit*, §40. In his essay "On Multiple Realities," and again in "Symbol, Reality and Society," the phenomenon of "dread" or "anxiety" is interpreted as the basic anthropological motive of action in the world which serves to overcome its transcendence. Both essays are reprinted in *Collected Papers* 1.



<or, anxiety,> occasions different typical reactions. It can lead to the Epicurean “*carpe diem*” just as well to the Stoic *ataraxia* as well as to Christian *esperance* or to the Buddhist longing for nirvana.

But we digress. We have [67/7158] had to set aside making an object of investigation the phenomenon of fundamental dread and its typical reactions for any true ethics which will be able to come forth as a science. But this can only happen when ethics is combined in its way with the doctrine of the tempora of the self and when we make our own the truth of Leibniz’s statement about the past pregnant with the future.<sup>24</sup>

For our part we wish to emphasize only one consequence of fundamental dread which is as important for our problem of the analysis of consciousness of the self as it is for the social sciences. It is the <problem> of the hierarchy of projects rooted in the *metaphysicum* of fundamental dread: The permanent probability of one’s own death gives rise to establishing life-plans such as professional and educational plans or religious plans in which, however, plans for work and leisure, weekly plans, division of the day and hourly plans all are incorporated and confirmed. All of these plans are nothing else but the technology that binds together and governs life, thus preserving the living synthesis of duration and world-time from its destruction in the dead past [*Vordem*].

Iselberg, 13 August, 1937.

[68/7159]

## [II. Genesis of the Social Person in the Solitary Self]

### [C) Problems of Pragmatic Interpretation]

[4.]<sup>25</sup> Constitution of the World of Working and its Modifications.<sup>26</sup>

In the previous discussions we have repeated what we said about the dominant role of the pure pragma of the working self for the constitution of the *ego ipse*. It is now worth our while to work out these thoughts more precisely and to make the most of the results of our analyses of “attention,” “interest,” “*attention à la vie*” and “tensions of consciousness.”

We take as our point of departure wide-awake, rational working of human beings in the natural attitude. “Wide-awake” designates the particular *attention à la vie* of people engaged in carrying out their pragma and, accordingly, that attitude of attention and of context of interest to which the highest tension belongs and to it alone. We do not speak of “acting” [*Handeln*], because the term is also involved with an inner attitude [*Einstellung*]. Instead we explicitly speak of “working,” accordingly

<sup>24</sup> See Leibniz, *Théodicée*, II, §170.

<sup>25</sup> All the additions are based on the Table of Contents which Schutz established for the manuscript in the Summer of 1936. See above, p. II./7061.

<sup>26</sup> Here Schutz takes up anew the theme of the multiple stratifications of the life forms (see “*Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur*,” pp. 42 ff.) working out in detail the later arguments of “On Multiple Realities.”

of the execution of the pragma in bodily movement itself, of the engagement of the self in world-space and in world-time by the changing of places by the body or its parts.<sup>27</sup> And we particularly make “rational” working our theme. We thus make thematic a working in which the self not only chooses means and ends but all phases of the project, the in-order-to and because-motives, their interplay [*Zwischenspiel*] and their interdependencies in the greatest measures of clarity and distinctness.

[69/7170] But before we can embark on an analysis of the function of working in the constituting of the self and its world, in advance we need to sketch a short description of working itself contained, in part, in the theory of acting in the *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, and which in part goes beyond it.<sup>28</sup>

All working is acting, and as such is projected beforehand. In the project, to which the act of acting will lead, in *modo futuri exacti* the action is thought out in the imagination as finished and concluded. For the acting self, it is the extent of the project which first defines the limits of the action in question. The projected goal of the action is the in-order-to-motive, while the because-motive is the meaningful context in which the project, and the projected in-order-to-motive of the action, alone subsists for the actor. All of the project, and all of the in-order-to and because-motives that belong to it, refer back to the entire stock of experience of the self at the time of the projecting already sedimented in meaningful contexts of monothetically and polythetically integrated experiences. We can examine each acting with respect to its project, each project with respect to its stock of experiences back to which the project refers, the stock of experiences itself with respect to the past experiencings which constituted it.

But if we were to extend this theory of action to a theory of the complete pragma, [70/7161] then the application of the meaningful side of action would be insufficient. This is because the course of thought in the *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, and its specific theme of the “meaning which binds the acting to its action,” does not go far enough even though here differentiation of behavior [*Verhalten*] from action [*Handeln*] has already introduces difficulties. However, our present theme, simply establishing the pragmatic motives in the constitution of the self and its partial aspects, requires the full development of the pragma as pragma.

What the distinguishing of the conscious pragma from all other spontaneous experiencings, such as pure *cogitationes*, emphasizes is that its intentionality <is directed to> the volitional [*volitiven*] act of the “fiat” which belongs to it as its own proper essence.<sup>29</sup> We speak explicitly of a volitional, not of a voluntary, act of “fiat.” <By the term> we would like to designate all of the components in all purposeful willing [*Willentlichkeit*] with the tendency of being directed to the realization of what is willed [*Gewollten*]. <In contrast,> along with the volitional components the term, “voluntary,” embraces the process of free choice [*Kür*], of choosing, thus

<sup>27</sup> See above, pp. 30 ff. {55 ff.}, the section on “The Role of the Body,” for Schutz’s definition of “working.”

<sup>28</sup> For the following, see *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §§6, 8–12, and 30–32.

<sup>29</sup> For this concept, see below, 88/7179–118/7210, and “On Multiple Realities,” *CP*, I.

<embracing> that aspect of arbitrary will [*Willkürlichkeit*] that we would designate “potestateness.” Peculiar to the conscious pragma, this intentionality directed to the “fiat” we call the *purpose* [*Vorsatz*]. Accordingly, taken in a specific sense as correlate of the project, the purpose in its intention as purpose is directed to the “fiat,” as project in its intention directed to the goal of action. [71/7162] But not everything of the pragma of which there is consciousness and hence which is purposeful is pre-projected [*vorentworfen*], and, among other things, may conversely lack the merely projected, purposeful action. What makes up awareness of the pragma in the one and in the other case is, in the case of purpose, awareness of the intentionality directed to the “fiat,” thus to the “That” of realization of the pragma. In the case of the project, however, it is awareness of the course of the pragma itself, thus of the “What” of its realization. We need say nothing of the unconscious pragma, or the mere deed, because this pragma lacks purpose as well as project.

We can now make the following distinctions<sup>30</sup>:

- 1) Pragma without purpose and project = an unconscious pragma, a mere deed. Here we deal with spontaneous reactions evoked by purely physiological stimuli or defined by indiscernible perceptions which, in their own nature, are purely actual experiencings. Whether we qualify such a mere deed as behaving in a certain way [*Sichverhalten*] is a question of terminological taste and not of particular importance.
- 2) Pragma with purpose but without project = genuine behaving in habitual, traditional, ways with an affective foundation (not to be confused with Max Weber’s habitual, traditional <and> affective *acting*)<sup>31</sup> such as going, eating, greeting, caressing, moving the fingers while playing the piano—in short, everything which Leibniz called “empirical behavior.”<sup>32</sup> [72/7163]
- 3) Pragma with purpose and project: Action in the full sense, be it accompanied by bodily movement or not. In the former case, if the action involves the external world, it should accordingly be called “working.”
- 4) Pragma with project but without purpose: mere phantasma; the action is, to be sure, projected in the imagination but without a view to its realization. Of course there belongs to the full phantasma the project itself. It may be that subsequent to the imagined project the purpose emerges so that what previously was just an imagined pragma subsequently becomes a fully realized action.

Accordingly, working, of which we shall now speak in what follows, is characterized as a pragma with purpose and project, thus as action but only as action in so far as it involves the moved body in space. Only work such as this mediates the transition from the *durée* to world-time. While it goes on simultaneously in both

<sup>30</sup> Cf for the following systemizing what Thomas Luckmann provided in the framework of his editing of Schutz’s posthumous *Strukturen der Lebenswelt* (1958, II-2), in Schutz/Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt II* (1984-1-1), Chapter V, pp. 11 ff.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Chapter I, §2.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais*, §§15., 72 f. and *Théodicée*, §§290 ff., 323, 403.

orders it creates the synthesis of public life.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, this sort of working provides the self with an experiencing of the flowing movement from within, and of the space traversed from without and thereby constitutes a world-space for the self.<sup>34</sup> Only working of that kind makes possible the displacement of spatial systems of coordinates in space, the *origo* of which is one's own body, and [73/7164] as a result in the first place makes possible the change of perspectives from *hinc* to *illic*. Only working of that kind makes possible the experiencing of resistance of external matter along with its constituting as *reality* [Realität], but also as well as the delimitation of appearance and being.<sup>35</sup> But while working, like every action, belongs to my self now as *ego agens*—bound to my prior self by means of the project (because-motive), bound to my later self by means of an extent of time [Spannweite] (in-order-to-motive)—the *ego ipse agens* is constituted at the same time as the center of working (the center of action) from which all habitualities and automaticities take their departure. If the working is carried out in a wide-awake fashion, then, in its actualized now, it is the center of all hypsographical contours of relevance proceeding from this Now and conditioned by the particular tension of attention that makes up wide-awakeness. In this sense we can agree with Bergson's interpretation of the primacy of action.<sup>36</sup> The fully developed pragma in actual, waking working for its part, by virtue of perception and apperception, defines the "perforated" ["*vorpunktierten*"] incisions <running> through the world that constitute our perceptual world. As Leibniz said, it creates those "veins in the block of marble" by means of which the sculpture expresses meanings.<sup>37</sup> As we may say, it creates the pragmatic relevances which for their part define all *cogitationes*.

These ontological elements [*Momente*] already reveal [74/7165] why, so to speak, *aphysei* of special dignity accrues to fully developed, wide-awake working. We wish only to briefly add a few points of view of a methodological character in order to show that all analyses of the constitution of the self also have to start from the *nomos* of the wide-awake working self.

<sup>33</sup> Here Schutz follows Max Scheler's limiting of the adequacy of the pragmatic access to the situation of human beings in the relative natural attitude. Cf. Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (1926), in *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol 8, pp. 212 ff. (ed. Maria Scheler, Bern/München: Francke (3rd) 1980).

<sup>34</sup> Working thus constitutes inner and outer actuality, as Schutz had already developed it in the manuscript of "Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur;" and in the analysis there of the "life-forms of the active self" (1927-II-I), p. 87.

<sup>35</sup> Accordingly, not only does the noetic meaning arise by virtue of the reflective turn socially stamped, but also the noematic meaning of experiencing the life-world in working. As a result Schutz sets aside an unclarity of the exposition of the process of constituting meaning in *Sinnhaften Aufbau* where he had not made thematic the noematic meaning of experiencing and exclusively traced out the noetic acts of constitution in the domain of working.

<sup>36</sup> In this connection, see Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 95 ff.; *Creative Evolution*, pp. 162 ff., 180 ff.; also *Mind-Energy*, translated by H. Wildon Carr, New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1948 [1920], pp. 29 ff., 68 ff.

<sup>37</sup> For the metaphor of marble, see Leibniz, *Nouveau Essais*, Avant-Propos, I, 1, §25. For the image of the "perforated" lines, see Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 102 ff. Schutz employs this image from the time of his work on the manuscript of "Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur" (1927).

The wide-awake working self can be reconstructed with respect to motive, project and purpose. The working self can just as well find a place in the category of causes as well as of final causes. It takes reality as given and does not ask whether it is illusion or being. As a process in the external world the working self is manageable. It subsists as such in the temporal change wherein only its motive and the extent of its project undergo adumbrations but not working as a process itself in the external world. And finally—but this is the *nomos* of its most important function—the wide-awake working self transforms the hypothesis of the psychophysical unity of the *ego agens* into a thesis. We now have to investigate more precisely how this process operates together with the constituting of the real world in the wide-awake working of the self.

Kanzelhoehe, 20 August, 1937

[75/7166]

[a] Primacy of the purely actual pragma and the fullfledged reality constituted by it].<sup>38</sup> The world of the<sup>39</sup> self is centered around the organism<sup>40</sup> of this self as the middle point. What lies within the range of my sight, of my hearing and reach forms my surrounding world (using the term in a wholly universal sense and without reference to the phenomenon of Thou, nor to the social surrounding world).

This surrounding world is divided into a multiplicity of perspectives. In the first place, it is divided with respect to spatial nearness and farness, then with respect to temporal earlier and later, whereby, so to speak, the system of coordinates belonging to this division has its *origo* in my body. A further division is introduced, e.g., such as the fact that my visual world, along with all of its optical perspectives, does not coincide with my world within reach but instead intersects it. What lies within my visual range still does not lie to any great degree in the extent of my reach. Conceived more precisely, now, however, fundamentally the immediate core of reality<sup>41</sup> of my surrounding world is only the thing within reach. It is the thing I deal with, that I can *manipulate* [*be-handeln*]*—the thing which can become the immediate Object [Objekt] I can seize upon in the external world. Notwithstanding, however, in the natural attitude—and here we speak only of the natural attitude—not only the things within my reach but also the Objects affecting me in the range of my hearing, of my seeing, etc. are accepted simply as real.*

Thus there is constituted, always centered around my animate organism [*Leiblichkeit*], a core of reality of perceptions and apperceptions belonging to my surrounding world, a core of reality [76/7167] built up within me by my kinaesthetics, in the spontaneous acts of apperceivings without there being an actual working, thus without having to gear into space and having to deal with things. To that extent, not only the one who works, but the psychophysical self in general encountered

<sup>38</sup> Appendix based on table of contents; cf. above, pp. III./7062.

<sup>39</sup> In the manuscript, the word “*wirkenden*” (“working”) is crossed out.

<sup>40</sup> In the manuscript, “*dessen, der da wirkt*” (of the self working there) is crossed out.

<sup>41</sup> In the original, it reads “the immediate core of reality of my working.” The words, “of my working,” are crossed out.

here and now, has its constituted surrounding world. Accordingly, our analysis limited to the working self has the following reasons: In the first place, as we have seen, the *ego ipse* is actually realized in the working self. In the second place, that unbroken *attention à la vie* of the highest tension is appropriated by the wide-awake, working self. As our earlier considerations have shown (Leibniz, Scheler, Bergson<sup>42</sup>) all perceivings and apperceivings are themselves pragmatically conditioned. And, finally, in what follows it is our immediate task to describe with precision the specific structures of the world of working as they sort themselves out from the surrounding world plainly given to the self.<sup>43</sup>

We have emphasized many times that it is in this connection that we speak of the problem of reality for human being in the natural attitude. But the term, “natural attitude,” means that the self simply accepts as real phenomena presented to it without asking whether or not they are truly being or illusion as long as its experiencings of these phenomena are consistent and no event intrudes which would disrupt this consistency. We may also say that the self [77/7168] in the natural attitude exercises a kind of *epoché*, although to be sure quite distinct from that exercised in the phenomenological reduction. The natural self leaves aside whether what is given to it is being or illusion. But it accepts what is given as reality as long as it is not necessary to adopt another attitude. What the self does contain is doubt itself. The object of the natural *epoché* is thus skepticism. In contrast, the phenomenological *epoché*, that directly emerges from the basic skeptical attitude, exercises *epoché* on the affirmation of reality and leaves aside whether what human beings view in reality is genuine being or mere illusion.<sup>44</sup>

In this attitude of the natural *epoché*, as we would like to say, in its manifold of perspectively divided perceptions and apperceptions there is constituted for the self the core of reality of its surrounding world as the world in the range of vision and hearing and reach. This world is the one and unitary world for the<sup>45</sup> self,<sup>46</sup> above all a unity for me geared into this reality and, in working, dealing with the things present in it. This, my surrounding world, is thus a unitary one, above all as the world of my working, or as we may also say, it is my one and unitary, pregiven, world of working. However, my world of working is divided in multiple ways. Its perspectives,

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<sup>42</sup> See the previous discussions in Part II (C, 3) of the 1936 mss, pp. 12/7080 ff., as well as Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais*, II, 4, §§4 f.; Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 16 ff., 33 ff., 152ff, and Max Sender's study of “Erkenntnis und Arbeit,” in *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, pp. 363ff (in relation to Dilthey).

<sup>43</sup> In this connection, see the analysis of the life-forms of the “acting self in the earlier manuscript on “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur,” pp. 87 f.

<sup>44</sup> For the *epoché* of the natural attitude, i.e., the bracketing of doubt, see the passages in Schutz's “On Multiple Realities,” pp. 226 ff.; Husserl, *Ideen I*, §§3If.; *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §§11,15; *Krisis*, § 17 f.

<sup>45</sup> In the original, followed by the word, “working,” which is crossed out.

<sup>46</sup> In the original, followed by the crossed-out words, “it is its world of working. But we have already stated that this world of working is articulated into many perspectives, that with respect to which these perspectives <are unified> with one another.”

we have already stated, permeate one another and my world in its visual range and in the range of its reach, for instance, do not coincide. How is it, then, that, for me, remaining in the natural *epoché*, my world of working is unquestionably given me as one and unitary [78/7169]?<sup>47</sup> The reason lies in that all apprehension of the world, and consequently also of the world of working, refers back to the stock of experience which the self previously constructed out of multiple polythetic and monothetic concatenations of meaning already contained in previous experiences. And also belonging to this stock of experience in principle are the memories of modifications which the cores of reality of the previous surrounding world have undergone by *acts of genuine working*.

Before, there was something in my visual range, although not in my reach. I saw something on my desk and, more particularly, a book. It appears in my optical kinaesthesias in these and those aspects and they distinctly are shown as being in harmony with my previous experiences of just this book, perhaps with “book in general.” Belonging to the aspect of this book in my visual range is the fact that the table, on which it lies, is not within my reach but is instead “three steps distant.” Also belonging to the aspect is the anticipation that “if I take three steps in the direction of the table this book will be within my reach,” as well as a chain of protentions: “While taking those steps my visual aspects of the book lying on the table will experience these and other modifications,” such as “when I pick up the book and turn it over I will find that it has a back side,” etc. Now I take the three steps in the direction of the table, thus changing the place of my organism in space, and shifting the system of coordinates, the center of which is my organism, in a definite way: I see that the thing on the table [79/7170] is now within my reach and is actually a book. It is not just that while going toward the table the expected modifications of its optical aspects are in harmony and thus confirmed. It is also that I take the thing in hand, and for my hand it is also a book. It lets itself be turned over and shows the expected other side. It allows itself to be opened and reveals the expected contents within. It is a real thing and more particularly an “actual,” a real book that I remove from its place, turn all its pages, and on which I can actually go to work.

It is not only just this experience that is found in my stock of experience, but also the innumerable times the maxim was confirmed that something of such a sort encountered in my visual range is brought into my reach by virtue of an act of my working, and that the seen something consequently is confirmed as a fullfledged real thing of such and such an “actual” disposition—or that under certain circumstances is not verified and that, upon a closer look, the real thing is shown to be something else than what I saw. But there, of essence, an act of working, and more particularly either a working in fact carried out, or at least a potentially possible working, is required to firmly establish the unity and unification of my surrounding world. The coincidence of the world within reach with the world in the range of my

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<sup>47</sup> Here Schutz proposes his answer to Husserl’s question, “How is the world accepted?” [“*Wie gilt die Welt*”]. While for Husserl the meaning, thus the acceptance, of the world is constituted in the acts of transcendental consciousness (cf. especially *Krisis*, §§48 ff.), for Schutz, as he indicates here, acts of behavior *qua* working belong to the constitution of world-acceptance.



vision produced by working alone ensures the unity and unification of my surrounding world. In the natural attitude of the world reality always refers back to a working which alone is capable of ensuring the core of reality. And this is also one the reasons why we designate the surrounding world as the world of working and have taken it as the point of departure for these investigation of the working self in this section. We also have here the justification of the pragmatic motive discovered by Leibniz, James, Bergson, and Scheler in the theory of perception. By itself the reference of all reality back to acts of working would extend to justification of the primacy of the pragma. But the role of working in the constitution of the surrounding world is, with this indication, still not exhausted. Its full clarification requires still further investigations.

Kanzelhöhe, 8.22.1937

[80/7171]

The actual world, the world in the fullness of its real, actual being, is directly the actual world of working, the world within reach first of all, then also, however, the world in the range of vision, of hearing, etc. To their constitution belong the chain of protentions of transforming each time this world into the world of working and of being able to bring the seen within reach. (Where this is not the case, merely visual things remain outside the world of working for those who are *naïve*. For the naïve the stars are points of light even when “oriented” in their place in world-space.) The unification of this world of working, of the true and genuine life-world, is itself constituted by the experience of working that has gone on before which fundamentally brought about the coincidence of the range of vision and the range of reach and which is always capable of bringing about that coincidence again.

There are many levels of reality which are centered around the described core of reality of the actual world. Although they may not be actual they are still at least basically actualizable. [81/7172] In this extended sense, there belongs to my real world, in *the first place*, what my previous working was in the core of reality of the surrounding world. All working rests on the changing places of my organism, on a displacement of the *origo* of the system of coordinates, on the transformation of a *hic* into an *illic*. But fundamentally all working is carried out under the ideality of “one can always again.”<sup>48</sup> What was for me before a *hic* and which has now become an *illic* basically I can always again change back into a *hic*. What was previously the core of reality of my surrounding world is no longer so for me but, by virtue of the ideality of “one can always again,” fundamentally once again can become the core of reality of my surrounding world. For me it is, to be sure, not the actual core of reality of my surrounding world. However, it is related to my actual world of working because it was once for me an actual world of working and can “always again” become an actual world of working. *Thus, owing to the pragmatic idealization of “one can always again,” all past reality has the characteristic of potentiality and more particularly in the specific form of probability.* Accordingly, there are

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<sup>48</sup> See Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik*, §74.



further halos around the actual core of reality of the surrounding world in a strictly proper sense. They arise from sedimented experience of previous cores of reality—*ex praeterito* cores of reality, *ex presente* potentiality [82/7173] or, better, “reality *illinc*,” reality in the specific modification of probability.

In the *second place*, however, not only does the reiterability of the same pragma belong to the pragmatic ideality of “one can always again,” but also the readability of an analogous pragma. Annexed to the *world within reach* now and to the earlier world within reach is the *world of reachability*. Accordingly a second level of potentiality is constituted anchored around the actual core of reality. This world is also reality <in the form of> probability, although narrower than that of the first level of potentiality. The world of reachability is neither an actual nor a previous surrounding world. It is a world of contemporaries that can become a surrounding world when I will have brought it within reach.

Here we undoubtedly encounter a difficulty of a systematic nature. In this section we have undertaken to take our departure from the fiction of the solitary self in the natural attitude, although the natural attitude presupposes the being of the self as being with other selves. We did this so that, in the second part, we can investigate separately the social moment in the constitution of the world of the self. Now, however, the world within reach is essentially founded on sociality. For the world of contemporaries (the probable world) is above all for me what is a surrounding world and world within reach for thee, or for anyone who stands within reach or is reachable. The full and genuine sense of this thematics can only be developed at a later place in our investigations. In anticipation [83/7174] we only wish to say that someone else’s world of working for me is always a world of probability. But it remains the heading of further investigations to show the unique reference of this character of probability back to the character of anonymity of our contemporaries for whom my probable world is an actual surrounding world.

With this reservation for taking up the problem more deeply again at a later place,<sup>49</sup> we would like to add a few closing supplementary remarks about the structure of reality of the world of the solitary self.

1. How does our theory of perspectival division of the world of working relate to the theory of the tempora of the self?

Only the self at work is my true self now and therefore is the core of reality of the surrounding world, the actual world within reach, within the range of vision, of hearing, the correlate of my self now. The level of the first potentiality, the phenomena of probability which previously stood in the surrounding world of the core of reality, refer back to my prior self for which it was the core of reality. In so far as the level of the first potentiality lies within the range of the actual projects of the self at work, the phenomena attributed to the self belong to my self now. But that is also to say that the reiterability of working under the pragmatic ideality of “one can always again” bears in this case the character of greatest probability. For this level of first potentiality it is characteristic that the protentions directed to the reactualization of

<sup>49</sup> This “later place” is not to be found in the manuscript of 1937. But see *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §47.

the pragma obtain their intentionalities from reproductions and retentions of their own [84/7175] receding pragmas.

The second level of potentiality, the level of the world in reachability, is quite different in structure. This stratum is a level of the reality of future working. It belongs to my later self, at the most to my self itself later on and is without an essential relation back to my prior self. It is then the case that, like all anticipations, it is founded in the actual stock of experience of my self now which, for its part, genetically refers back to my prior self. What can be anticipated as the reality of future working must not only itself be free of possible contradiction [*possible*], but must also be compossible with this actual stock of experience—compossible as much with the in-order-to-motive of working as with what is required by the means-end relationship determined by it. Belonging here are also the experiencings of my own pragma, of its “transferability” (actualizableness) and thus the “estimation of its own powers.” However, because it is related to my self later on, the world within reach remains subject to the double concurrence of probability which is universally characteristic for my self later on. The farther the world within reach is spatially and temporally at a distance from the actual center of the surrounding world, the less probability [*Wahrscheinlichkeit*] there is. For the more the protentions remain open the more they remain unfulfilled.

2. The division of the actual world as function of attention and of interest and accordingly as conditioned by the pragmatic motive.

[85/7176] All working is an act of the purest spontaneity and presupposes that *attention à la vie* we have designated by the predicate, “highest level of tension.” It is only in this ultimate tension that the core of reality of the actual surrounding world is constituted and, more specifically, just as a world of working. In the original meaning of the word, only the world in which I work, or the world in which I have worked, is my life-world. It is, in the first place, my one and unitary world. For it is just my working (now and in the past) in this world which creates its center of relevance and the hypsographical contour lines of relevance with respect to which it is articulated.

All spontaneity is pragmatically conditioned and, so to speak, directed to working. In the analysis of the phenomenon of attention we saw that what we called passive attention is nothing else but the sum of confused perceptions as a whole, of which I remain unaware, and, as actual experiences, co-constitute my Now and Thus. In this sense passive attention is the counterpart to wide-awakeness and accordingly to wide-awake working. Only the one who works is “wholly interested in living,” only the one who works is possessed of the ultimate *attention à la vie*—thus that active attention directed to the realization of what is to be worked on. It is an attention that, so to speak, guides while it “works” [*erwirkt*]. Included therein is indeed the true meaning of the pragmatic motive of all theories of perception and of all spontaneity. When Leibniz defines spontaneity [86/7177] in terms of striving to acquire other and still other perceptions,<sup>50</sup> then we have attained the full emergence

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<sup>50</sup> See Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais*, II, 21, §§9, 72; *Théodicée*, §§59, 65, 290, 301.

of the genuine pragmatic motive. For to attain other perceptions means, by virtue of a change in the tension of attention, to select specific perceptions from the “flames” of confused perceptions which continuously assail me and make up my passive attention. That means we make these perceptions into apperceptions, make them distinctly clear, and in the optimal case make them into in-order-to-motives of rational behavior.

Spontaneity, taken in its full meaning, i.e., spontaneity under the condition of the highest tension of *attention à la vie*—or, what is the same thing, under the condition of the greatest wakefulness—only occurs in an act of the pragma and, if the distinct and clear grasping of the goal belongs to the active attention, then also only in an act of (rational) working. By “under this condition” we mean to strive to attain other perceptions: to displace the *origo* of my system of coordinates and, accordingly, to change the actual core of reality of my surrounding world. But this can only happen by means of a pragma—let’s say, a change of place by virtue of which an *illic* becomes a *hic* and thus a phenomenon in the likelihood of [87/7178] potential reality becoming actual, thus of Teachableness being brought within reach. Of course: my pragma is continuously at work [*wirksam*], already in passive attention pervaded by the onslaught of all perceptions of which I am unaware <and> which release my volitional acts, or better, by my reactions. But in complete “freedom”—and here that means in the ultimate interest for life, in the highest tension of *attention à la vie* and thus in full wakefulness—confused perceptions change into clear apperception, passive attention is transformed into active directedness to what is to be worked on [*Erwirkende*], mere volition is unified with potestateness into a fully developed, voluntary act. And here in pure working, there is produced for me, *ego ipse*, the one who works, the primal institution of my fullfledged self experienced in full presence [*Präsenzerlebnisses des Ich in der Fülle*] together with the two-fold general positing of the unity and unification of my self and the unity and unification of my world.

With full justification this waking world of working is to be viewed therefore as the archetype<sup>51</sup> of the one and unified world of fullfledged reality, which as fullfledged reality is pre-given to the one and unitary *ego ipse*. All other worlds are derivable as modifications of it, modifications that correspond to other tensions of *attention à la vie*.

Kanzelhöhe, 8/23/1937

[88/7179]

[b)]<sup>52</sup> Modifications of the world of working by variations of *attention à la vie*.

[1.) Preliminary Remark].

My life-world, above all, is the world of working, and as the one and unitary world in which I realize my projects and purposes it is the world of my waking public life.

<sup>51</sup> Crossed out in the original, “prototype.”

<sup>52</sup> Addition on the basis of the table of contents; see above, III.7062.

Its time is public time which is nothing else than the correlate of the full *attention à la vie* at its highest level of tension in which public time as a synthesis of *durée* and world time and the constitution of my surrounding world as my working [*wirklich*] world are both produced. This, my world of working, therefore, can also be suitably designated as my daily life-world because, as we shall see more precisely later on,<sup>53</sup> it is the world in which I am with others and in which all social acts and social relations of my natural attitude are enacted. In its unity and unification it is a “finite province of meaning” with which we would like to distinguish a unitary style of being. For what is realized as pragma in this world of working is not only without contradiction [*possible*] with respect to purpose and project, in-order-to and because-motives, relation of end and means, but is also internally compossible and fit into the great hierarchy of plans of life, work, hours—thus into that hierarchy of plans which yields the incorporation of my later self into the sphere of the “level of the second potentiality.” However, also founded on this genuine ontic style as “finite province of meaning” is the basic possibility for subsequently construing [*nachkonstruieren*] all events and occurrences of this world as long as we adhere to the axiom of full wakefulness, of *attention à la vie* at the highest level of tension or, which is the same, as long as this world of working would be regarded as a world of pure rational working and the subject living in it as [89/7180] a completely rational working subject.

But this last observation does not belong here. It is an anticipation of later considerations which will deal with the problem of the interpretation of meaning of this world, particularly for the social scientist.<sup>54</sup> Here it suffices to insist even for me who lives in this world of working its ontic style is one of a finite province of meaning—while and so long as I am turned to it fully wide awake. Moreover, we have to note that my daily living is primarily living in the world of working, and that a kind of “shock” is needed to get us to break out of this finite province of meaning and to call it into question. These experiences of the “shock” are not unknown to me, and, so to speak, themselves belong my ordinary experience. They teach me that the world of working of public life is certainly not the only finite province of meaning of my life but rather one among many. And although they definitely do not have the *same practical* meaning for me as does the public world of working, they are not all that unfamiliar.

What I undergo as the “shock effect” [*Chockwirkung*] is precisely nothing else than the dismissal of full wakefulness, of the full abandonment of the life-interest at the highest level of tension, and thus the surrender of the basic attitude toward public life. There are numerous cases of such shock effects. As examples we may mention going to sleep and thus making the transition to the world of dreams; the inner transformation when the curtain goes up in the theatre or opening a book as transition to

<sup>53</sup> Here Schutz refers to the undeveloped sections D and E of Chapter Two corresponding to the outline of 1936. (See above III/7062 as well as the relevant thematic catalogue, 21/7090).

<sup>54</sup> Schutz refers here to the undeveloped Chapters V and VI (“Methodological Consequences” and “The Problem of Personality and the Praxis of the Social Sciences” in the outline of 28 July, 1936 (1/7060)).

the world of phantasy; the experience of the “moment” in Kierkegaard’s sense as transition to the religious sphere in which, as Kierkegaard says, the theological subject alone and in full responsibility stands before God; as a transition to scientific contemplation, the [90/7181] conscious decision not to treat the things “of this world” passionately and not to will to take sides, but instead to analyze them in a dispassionate, disinterested, impartial way. Belonging in this connection is the shock effect of wit from which an effect is drawn that transcends the real world of public life for a moment and shifts the accent of reality to a fictive world—a world of wit—or to a world of mental illness, etc.

All of these worlds—the world of dreams, of phantasy and in particular of art, the world of religious experiences, the world of scientific contemplation, the world of wit, the world of mental illness—are *in themselves* finite provinces of meaning. They are also constituted by a unitary regulative principle, they are also *in themselves* compossible (only certainly not compossible in the sense of ordinary experience of reality), they are also subsumed under a lawfulness of meaning *peculiarly their own* (although not the lawfulness of meaning of the public world), they also bear a specific accent of reality *peculiar* to themselves (but not the accent of reality of the “actual” world). But all of these moments—unitary regulative principle, compossibility, own lawfulness of meaning, specific accent of reality—hold only for the finite province of meaning in question. By that we mean to say that all of these moments are different for each of the provinces of meaning and that, e.g., what is compossibility and the accent of reality for one province of meaning *A* is by no means compossibility and accent of reality for the province of meaning *B*. It is rather the contrary: it all would be impossible with *B* and allow *B* to appear as unreal and mere fiction. Just <the impossibility> makes up the “finitude” [*“Geschlossenheit”*] of all of these provinces of meaning. It makes them unreducible to one another. As a consequence, the transition [91/7182] from one to another province does not just happen by introducing a transformation formula but rather by virtue of a sudden shock, of a “leap” as Kierkegaard called it, or as we would like say, by virtue of a radical modification of the *attention à la vie* and which sets into place another partial personality of the self.<sup>55</sup> In the obvious sense, we compare this event with a similar one from modern geometry.

Just as we can derive innumerable other geometrical worlds from the world of Euclidean geometry by modification of only a few of its axioms, thus being finite provinces in themselves subsumed under their own geometrical lawfulness—which is not that of Euclidean geometry—so innumerable other finite provinces of meaning, each with its own ontic style, can be derived from the world of public life by corresponding modifications of the fundamental regulative principle, here full wakefulness.

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<sup>55</sup> While here Schutz resorts to Bergson’s concept of the levels or degrees of *attention à la vie* (see Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 153 ff.), 8 years later in “On Multiple Realities” he refers to James’ concept of the “subuniverses of reality” (see James, *The Principles of Psychology*, II, Chapter XXI). For the reference to the “leap” in Kierkegaard, see *The Concept of Dread*, *Philosophical Fragments*, and the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*.

We have a preeminent practical and scientific interest in the phenomena just briefly described. Moreover, our interest is in the complete clarification of the difference between the world of public life and the world of scientific contemplation. But we are not able to work out this difference in a single analytical step. We have to proceed step by step, accordingly, while we contrast the world of working as typical example to other finite provinces of meaning, first of all to the world of phantasy, then to the world of dreams.

Finally, on the basis of gaining knowledge of the variations in ontic style in the transition from one finite province of meaning to another we can attempt a description of the world of scientific contemplation.<sup>56</sup>

Kanzelhöhe, 24 August, 1937

[92/7183]

[2.]). The World of Phantasy.

If we can characterize the world of working as the world of full wakefulness, as the world of the highest life-interest, then the “leap” which makes possible the transition to the world of phantasy occurs by relaxing the *attention à la vie*. It is not life in this real world with the resistance of the “actual” which we wish to subdue. External things and events no longer confront me with a choice, and the unitary *ego ipse* in the full sense no longer realizes itself repeatedly in a new Now of public time.

All degrees between full wakefulness and mere dreaming make it possible for the conditioned modifications of *attention à la vie* to be traversed and, depending on which of these modifications function as a constituting regulative principle, the finite province of meaning of phantasma results. Accordingly it is fundamentally incorrect to speak of the world of phantasy in the singular. Phantasy itself is, so to speak, *aplurale tantum*. Hence there are as many innumerable worlds of phantasy as there are degrees and shades of *attention à la vie*, and each of them is itself a finite province of meaning—be it the world of day dreams or of free phantasying, or the world of play, the world of art, the world of wit, etc. They are all distinguished from one another in that they each shift the accent of reality to another level of actuality and at the place of this level assume a concatenation of phantasmas as quasi-real. [93/7184] Repeatedly levels of actuality are, so to speak, placed in brackets and thus are incorporated into the naive *epoché* of the anti-skeptical attitude. We can, accordingly, typologically organize into groups the worlds of phantasy to which withdraw the accent of reality from the world of working because these moments no longer stand at the attentional center and in such fashion exhibit to each of these finite provinces of meaning their own peculiar ontic style. But here this is not our task.<sup>57</sup> We are only concerned to indicate a few of the moments common to *all* the finite

<sup>56</sup> Schutz’s conclusion refers to the unfinished Chapter V of the outline of 28 July, 1936, “On Methodological Consequences” (cf. I./7060). Schutz takes up the inquiry later on in his essay, “Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action” (1953). {CP, I, pp. 3 ff.}

<sup>57</sup> The impossibility of spectators to do anything in the world of the work of art already designated for Schutz in his early writings the difference between ordinary life and phantasy; see esp. the mss. “Meaning Structure of the Novel: Goethe.” The typology referred to of “multiple realities” led Schutz to his work, “On Multiple Realities.”

provinces of meaning of phantasma so as to acquire their categories—and the constituents of the world of dreams still to be studied—which are necessary for the study of the world of contemplative observation. In this sense, with awareness of its vagueness and inexactitude, we speak further of a world of phantasy in terms of what all worlds of phantasy have in common.

[93a/7185]<sup>58</sup> We begin with the most important finding, namely that the phantasying self never works and also does not act. Phantasying itself, however projected, can never be an acting in the sense of our definitions because it lacks the “fiat” directed to a purpose.<sup>59</sup> Of phantasying itself, however, we must carefully distinguish between phantasying and the phantasied. When phantasying, which itself is not acting, the self certainly phantasies itself as acting and itself as working. Then phantasied acting refers back to a project, it can organize the in-order-to- and because-motives, it can be led back to its origin in choice and decision and be included in a hierarchy of plans. Indeed, it can itself be willfull [*volitive*] phantasy itself along with acts directed to a “fiat” and as gearing into working in the external world. However, the self phantasies all of that only and always within the phantasmas generated in phantasying. By necessity phantasying itself is not a case of working and stands outside the hierarchy of plans acceptable in the world of working and the purposes coordinated by it. The phantasying self thus never gears into reality. But how?

[93/7184]<sup>60</sup> When Don Quijote charges the windmills, he “phantasies” that he attacks giants. His project (in-order-to motive) is to kill the giants, his because-motive is his duty as a knight to fight evil giants wherever he finds them. His projected action is thus included in his life-plan. The volitional act of the “fiat” enters into this project—Quijote spurs Roscinate and charges on in order to realize what is projected.—Is this description correct? No! In our sense, there is no phantasma present. For Don Quijote, who is already a phantast faced by realities, like Till Eulenspiegel something real confronted by phantasms, no phantasma is present when he [94/7186] takes the windmills for giants. For him actual giants of his world of working are there and he charges those actual giants. Only afterwards does he discover that they were windmills. Don Quijote’s protentions and anticipations, present for his purpose, were thus unfulfilled. He was deceived in the interpretation of the world of working pregiven to him, although no differently than we all are when we doubt whether that silhouette there on the edge of the forest is a tree or a man. Until now everything occurred in the real world of working of Don Quijote. But now Don Quijote does something differ-

<sup>58</sup> This is one of two textual variants of this paragraph. The version inserted in the text here is considered the final revision because of its fewer corrections. See below, p. 95 for the second version.

<sup>59</sup> Here Schutz plainly refers to the three cases of the typology of the pragma in the present manuscript (cf. 71/7163f), even though the “fiat” does not arise as a special feature. According to this typology, phantasying falls under the fourth case.

<sup>60</sup> In the original manuscript, at the beginning of the paragraph, and crossed out, is the following: “We begin with the most important finding... <crossed out,> example... <illegible> the phantasying self never works, although its phantasying undoubtedly is an action, and it is also possible to phantasy itself as working. If the self works, it never does so in the phantasma but always only in reality. But how?”



ent from what we all do: he does not draw the consequence from the “explosion of his experiences” that he has been deceived, that there are no giants, but instead “in actuality” windmills. Instead he comes to the conclusion that his enemy, the magician, to harass him, at the last moment transforms the windmills into giants. And with that in the first place, at this moment, Don Quijote executes the “leap” into the finite province of meaning pertaining to his phantasmas. More particularly—from sheer necessity—he concedes reality to the windmills, but interprets this fact in such a way that it does not belong to the province of meaning of actuality. What is not compossible in the world of working, namely the existence of giants and magicians, and the magical transformation of windmills into giants, is quite compatible in the finite province of meaning of phantasmas.<sup>61</sup>

And, in this connection, the second very important moment pertaining to all phantasying is made clear. Compatibilities and compossibilities of the real world of working are excluded in whole or in part from the finite provinces of meaning of phantasmas. Not even the possibilities are included by which logical compatibilities are meant. I may certainly phantasy giants, magicians, centaurs, even a [95/7187] *perpetuum mobile*, but I cannot phantasy a regular decahedron—it is then that I remain in the intuitionally blind uttering of the name as in waking life. The world of phantasy is freed from the axiom of agreement of experience, from the *adaequatio rei et intellectus*. Only the incompatibilities remain in effect that are produced by the laws of *logical* impossibility, and not those impossibilities stemming from factual incompatibility.

But as a result there are no “probabilities” in the genuine sense given in the province of meaning of phantasmas in the way in which subjective and objective probabilities are pre-given to us living in the world of working. In the domain of phantasmas probability receives the character of a *conditio potestativa*. Phantasying, it lies within our power to fill or not to fill the empty places, to posit its greater or lesser probability. This potestativeness distinguishes all phantasying in unequally higher degrees of freedom than in the world of working.

Of significant importance is the temporal moment in the phantasma. Phantasying I can exclude all moments of public time, with the exception of its irreversibility. So to speak, I can phantasy all temporal recessions as accelerating or as slowing down. Accordingly its irreversibility is still preserved and resists the phantasying variation. For the irreversibility is rooted in the *durée* which remains integral to my phantasying. Even when phantasying, when dreaming, I grow older. And this structure itself is then unchanged when, in the phantasmas of myself, [96/7188] I construct in the past perfect <those phantasmas> which have to flow into a present.

Even our own body can be the object of phantasying, but the potestativeness of the phantasying variation has its limit in the original experiencing of the boundaries of our own organism: my body is preserved even if I phantasy myself as a dwarf or as a giant.

<sup>61</sup> See the almost literally corresponding passage about Don Quijote in “On Multiple Realities,” CP I, pp. 236 f. See also Schutz’s essay, “Don Quijote and the Problem of Reality,” CP II, pp. 141 ff.

In order to avoid having to return to the theme at a later place, let it be assumed that we can phantasy alone, as this is the case, for example, when on sentry duty, but also collectively in common with Thou, as do children at play, or the masses in the hallucinations studied by psychology of the masses. Obviously the *alter ego* also can be an object of phantasying. But the general positing of the *alter ego* is then always retained. Full potestativeness subsists whether the *alter ego* is phantasied as part of my surrounding world or my contemporary world in its corporeality or in its social function, and whether, finally, the phantasma is oriented to it in such a way that phantasied working together with the phantasied *alter ego* warrant and correct one's own phantasmas.

Kanzelhöhe, 25 August, 1937

[97/7189]

[3.])<sup>62</sup> The World of Dreams.<sup>63</sup>

We can interpret the world of dreams as the opposite pole of the world of working in so far as the latter belongs to the highest degree of wakefulness, the former to deep sleep, thus the latter to the highest level of tension of *attention à la vie*, the former to its complete relaxation. Sleep is that condition of the self that is free from all apperceptions.<sup>64</sup> But note well: I say free of apperceptions, but by no means free of all kinds of perceptions. The difference from a waking condition consists precisely in the fact that no pragmatic interest is involved which would transform essentially confused perceptions into partly clear and distinct ones—and that means that they would be changed into apperceptions. Even sleeping I continue to perceive. First of all there are the somatic perceptions of my own organism, not only of its place, of its weight, but also the primordial experience of its boundaries. In addition impressions of light, of sound, warmth are receptively perceived but without acts of looking, hearing, heeding (apperception) taking place. Finally, those “*petites perceptions*” persist which, because of the characteristic pragmatic orientation to life interests in a waking condition remain indiscernible and ineffable, or, as we say today, are unconscious. And just *these petites perceptions* acquire enhanced meaning in the domain of dreams when freed from the “censure” of the *attention [98/7190] à la vie*. More particularly they are not clear and distinct; they remain in a condition of confusion. Even so, that passive attention, which is nothing else than the set of effects exercised on the intimate person by all of these *petites perceptions*, is not interrupted and disturbed by acts of conscious, active, pragmatically conditioned attention: passive attention thus exclusively defines the interest of the one who is

<sup>62</sup> In the original manuscript the following section deviates from the table of contents by being designated as b).

<sup>63</sup> The greater part of this section is taken over in the essay “On Multiple Realities,” *CP I*, pp. 240 ff.

<sup>64</sup> Footnote of Alfred Schutz in manuscript: “We have here a major difference with the world of phantasy. In the latter the self continues to apperceive, but the interpretational scheme of these apperceptions is radically other than the pragmatically conditioned apperceptions in the world of working.” Comment of Editor: In this connection in the essay, “On Multiple Realities,” pp. 240 ff. Schutz refers to Bergson’s *L’Énergie spirituelle*, pp. 91–116.

dreaming. By itself it constitutes the theme of the dream and the “motive” that becomes thematic in this dream (motive in the sense of a musical motive, understood as “*sujet*”). It is Freud’s incomparable accomplishment in his theory of dreams to have established with full clarity this reference back to the unconscious, except that his theory of the self (of the “id,” the “ego,” and the “super ego”) failed to recognize the essence of the productive intentionality of consciousness.<sup>65</sup>

The dreaming self does not work [*wirkt*]. This conclusion would be a mere truism were it not for the fact, as we have previously shown, that this is also true of the world of phantasy. Thus the task arises to pursue the principle difference between the “*epoché* of working” and therefore the “bracketing of the world of working” in phantasy and in dreams. I see the difference in that the essence of all phantasy is the highest degree of potestativeness, while the essence of dreams is free of all potestativeness. The phantasing self continuously chases, “voluntarily” fills in its protentions and anticipations (—it is to these that the phantasing self properly assigns the accent of reality—) [99/7191] and is completely “free” in the interpretation of its probabilities as “*conditiones potestativae*.” None of that holds for the dreaming self. The dreaming self knows no choice and no freedom in the estimating of probability and in the anxiety dream shows the inescapableness of the event of dreams and the powerlessness of the dreamer to influence its course. But nothing would be more absurd than to explain from this fact that experiencing dreams is an experiencing proceeding in pure passivity. The full activity of the producing intentionalities is retained except without being oriented to the external world of working and without actual acts of apperception and volition. The life of the dream is one without purpose.

But how can such an assertion be justified when precisely Freud and his school have taught us the important role played by volitions and drives in dreams? I see no contradiction here. Dreamers have no actual volitions, no actual purposes. What we find in dreams of volitions and purposes are memories, and moreover retentions and reproductions of the volitional experiences of the waking world, to be sure modified and transformed but always having their original institution [*Urstiftung*] in the waking world. The technique of psychoanalytic interpretations of dreams is, indeed, nothing else but tracing the event of dreams back to such original instituting experiences of the waking world.

On the whole the dreams remain in the waking world of working as memory (reproduction and retention) and in this sense we may say that the *attention à la vie* [100/7192] specific to the dream is directed to my prior self. The transformations of dream events primarily consists in reinterpreting the perfect and past perfect experiences, while confusions become distinct, previously empty protentions and anticipations are fulfilled, horizons laid out, anticipations perfected [*perfektisiert*] and reproductions belong to the future [*futurisiert*]. In the world of dreams the sedimented experiences of the waking world of working are, so to speak, dissolved—in default of the latter’s pragmatic motives there is no interest in <the waking world of working,> the stock of experiences are altogether closed to each other—and

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<sup>65</sup> Later, in “On Multiple Realities,” in this place Schutz refers to Freud’s article, “Psychoanalysis,” in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14th ed. Vol. 18, p. 673, where Freud makes reference to certain problems with this three-fold division.

reconstituted. It is important that the agreement of experience, the *adequatio rei ac intellectus*, does not hold for dream events because it is itself a postulate of pragmatic origin and presupposes clear and distinct apperceptions. Thus it happens that the incompatibility of impossibility and also even of logical incompatibility (e.g., the principle of identity) do not hold in the world of dreams, that frequently the dreamer is surprised by now seeing as compossible what he remembers as impossible in the waking world. All of this, and much more, has been made clear by Freud and psychoanalysis. So far as they are relevant for us, our aim was only to translate these results of contemporary investigation of dreams into our own language and to show their place in our system.

I can dream that I am acting, also that I am working with the consciousness of not being at work "in actuality." My dreamed acting has its quasi-projects, its quasi-plan-hierarchies [101/7193], and quasi-plans which derive from earlier sediments. It is particularly characteristic for the dream-self at work that it dreams without purpose and without voluntary "fiat" even when able to work with disproportionately greater or lesser effort.

Requiring a very precise analysis, the temporal structure of the world of dreams is difficult to describe. In appearance, but just only in appearance, the dreams are detached from all constituents of the *durée*. Dreams in actuality are merely detached from the order of daily life and occur in pure subjectivity alone in the order of the *durée*, even if elements of world time enter into the dream events from daily life belonging to the prior self. But even in dreams the irreversibility of time always remains retained. Only when we awake do we have, by way of memory, the illusion of reversibility.

Yet here there arises a great difficulty in dealing with the problem of dreams and even phantasy. As soon as I reflect on either of them, I no longer dream, no longer phantasy, but am rather in full wakefulness and, speaking and thinking, avail myself of the tools tied to the consistency and compatibility of the waking world of working. The problem of all interpretation of dreams is that we are awake, no longer dreaming, while recounting our dreams. It is of great importance here whether the remembered dream is retained or reproduced. But in all these phenomena there lies the eminently dialectical difficulty of the impossibility of a direct communication which transcends the sphere to which they refer. We can only regard [102/7194] the sphere of the world of dreams—as well as the world of phantasy—in the form of "indirect communication," to borrow Kierkegaard's term.<sup>66</sup> For this reason, above

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<sup>66</sup> This "dialectical difficulty" which later on Schutz details in "On Multiple Realities, and which has already arisen in Bergson (*Time and Free Will*, pp. 14 ff.) as well as in Husserl's phenomenology, is related to the problem of the communication of experiences transcending daily life within the world of working. The upshot of the difficulty is that communication is a relation of working par excellence and thus always belongs to the everyday world of working. Later on Schutz tries to resolve this difficulty in his theory of "appresentative systems" in his essay, "Symbol, Reality and Society" (*CP I*, pp. 287 ff.) The locution, "indirect communication," Schutz borrows from Kierkegaard for whom it means that the person addressed must make himself attentive to himself and be provoked to an intensified inwardness (cf. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 68, footnote, 70 ff., 246 ff.)

all, poet and artist have disproportionately succeeded in communicating with the categories derived from the province of phantasy, if not overcoming, at least making transparent the dialectical difficulty.

Here we have no reason to shrink from the difficulty within the framework proposed here. This is because we are aware of already having interpreted the world of phantasy and of dreams in the ontic style proper to them as modifications of the world of working. From this principle we derive the right to apply the categories of the world of working to the phenomena of phantasy and dreams. Even so, it is of the greatest importance for us to grasp the dialectical difficulty in question in its entire significance. *For this difficulty returns, although to a considerably lesser extent, in the world of scientific contemplation to which we now must turn, and which creates a specific instrument for overcoming the difficulty, namely, the scientific method.*

In concluding we must note that dreaming, in contrast to phantasy, is essentially lonely. However, even the *alter ego*, of whom I dream, never appears “in person” but rather in a “ghostly” quasi-We relation, [103/7195] necessarily typified even if I dream of the *alter ego* as being in the most intimate relationship. Only by my grace is the *alter ego* an *alter ego*. We cannot dream together, and the *alter ego* always remains an object of the world of dreams, incapable ever of being its subject. Mirroring the universe, the monad is in fact without windows when dreaming.<sup>67</sup> Kanzelhoehe, 26 August, 1937.

[104/7196]

[4.])<sup>68</sup> The Theoretical World of Contemplative Observation.<sup>69</sup>

All reflective (theorizing) acts are cogitations and accordingly acts. But they are not working in the external world, although they can become motives for working (writing, lecturing, demonstrating). The *attention à la vie* of the world of working thus experiences a characteristic modification in the world of theoretical contemplation such that the pre-given world is regarded not as to be mastered by the world of working but instead as known by the theoretical world. But the world of theoretical observation is and remains, none the less, a *universum*, a theoretical cosmos while the world of working is completely contained in it except that it is not an object of volition.

Let us remain for a moment with this situation which is more complicated than it may at first seem. Even though the contemplative self does not work, it still acts, we have said, in its cogitations. Our point of departure is thus that all thinking exhibits the genuine mark of acting in the sense of our definitions. As a matter of fact, thinking that is scientific contemplation is an act of spontaneity, a projecting

<sup>67</sup> Cf. Leibniz, *Monadology*, §7.

<sup>68</sup> In the original the superscript is found under the division c) in deviation from the table of contents.

<sup>69</sup> In this connection, see Schutz's manuscript on “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur” dealing with the “life-form of the thinking, conceptual self” as well as the corresponding passages in “On Multiple Realities,” *CP I*, pp. 245 ff. Cf. also Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik*, especially §§3–5, 82–92, and 96.

thinking with in-order-to and because-motives, organized within the hierarchy of plans established by the decision to pursue scientific activities. But planning scientific thinking [105/7197] is not lacking in purposes and volitions directed to the proposed goal of thinking and without which it would not be possible for thinking to exert itself. Scientific thinking is therefore indeed action in the full sense. It is distinguished from working only by not gearing into the external world. As a consequence, contemplative thinking is independent of its corporeality, of its public time, of its pragmatic interests, in short, the working self is bracketed from the self striving for science.

Already distinguished from mere phantasying by virtue of the presence of purposes willfully directed to the “fiat” of purposes, and given that scientific thinking is genuine action, how, and with respect to which principles, is scientific action then carried out with its projects, motives, intentions, and purposes? Moreover, on the other hand, if scientific thinking lacks the pragmatic pregivenness of its interests derived from the world of working, with respect to which <principles> is it distinguished at all from action in the real world of working? Does full potestativity reign here as in the province of phantasy? Or complete lack of potestativity [106/7198] as in the case of dreaming? What are the voluntary acts appropriate to scientific thinking? And it still remains to be shown whether a case of action is genuine, and its project is thus bound up with purpose directed to the “fiat.”

To the theorizing thinker the universum of the one and unitary world is also pre-given. For all of us it is our life-world<sup>70</sup> (and also for us though not just for us as theorizing thinkers but instead as the human beings among human beings which we all are). With the decision to pursue science a characteristic hierarchy of plans is set up deviating, however, from that which governs our world of working. In this decision the theorizing self frees itself from all pragmatic interests directed to, and prescribed by, the world of working. It brackets all pragmatic interests, declares itself disinterested. Practically disinterested to be sure, but not theoretically. The one and unitary world, pre-given to the self at work as the empowering and formative life-world in order to gear into it, also retained by the contemplative theorizing self. Yet it is not retained as the world as to be shaped and formed, but only as the world in which the theorizing self is interested in knowing. In this obvious sense the theoretical thinker is a “disinterested observer”<sup>71</sup> of events in the life-world. The theoretical thinker is disinterested in shaping the life-world, but passionately interested in observing it. However with the shift [107/7199] of this accent of interest, with establishing a new hierarchy of plans to pursue science, with the bracketing of all prescribed pragmatic interests—thus with this “leap” into a completely divergent

<sup>70</sup> In what follows Schutz, more distinctly than elsewhere in his work, presents his view that the scientist must adhere to the relation to the world of working so as never to lose sight of his object. He merely varies his attitude toward the world of working. In the same way Schutz insists that science itself is never the work of isolated thinkers, but constructs a necessarily intersubjective system of knowledge and therefore is also a component part of the life-world itself. See Schutz's commentary on Hayek's lecture on “*Wissen und Wirtschaft*” (1936-H-2). (See *CPIV*, Chapter 10, for Schutz's commentary.)

<sup>71</sup> The expression is borrowed from Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §15.

*attention à la vie*—a radical change is achieved of all terms holding valid for the spontaneity and its moments (plans, motives, purposes, etc.) in the finite province of the world of working. We can designate this change by saying that the relevance system of the self has experienced a shift.

What, now, is the particular course of this change? Establishing a new plan hierarchy is also to set up a scientific plan: the contemplative self fixes its theoretical interest on the life-world and, more particularly, chooses a segment of the life-world to observe consistent with the plan. In a word, *the contemplative self sets up a problem*. With the one-time choice of problem it becomes the highest project of scientific thinking in its entirety, and the solution to the problem its highest purpose. From now on, what is relevant to the life-world with the setting of the problem once chosen is determined by just this setting of the problem itself [108/7200]. In place of what is pragmatically relevant in the life-world as world of working there is what is theoretically interesting, specifically the legitimacy [*Problemgerechte*] that now serves the theoretical thinker as a guide through the cosmos of the life-world. Precisely this orientation to the problem, which is the only genuine voluntary act of the theorizing thinker, makes up the ontic style of the theoretical world and regulates that specific modification of *attention à la vie* which we call scientific thinking.

But on that account we need not assume that the choice of the problem by the individual scientist is made in a completely arbitrary way, in complete potestative-ness. Above all there is present the possibility of the “leap” into the theoretical world, and, because it precedes it, into the intimate person of the one who decides to pursue science. In this sense the theorizing thinker is free from being defined by his inmost being, free to be interested in which science and above all in which sedimented levels [*Tiefenschichte*] of the science. As soon as the choice is made the theorizing thinker enters into an already preconstituted world of theoretical contemplation. It is a theoretical world in which many findings by others, many problems set by others, solutions and methods proposed by others are found to be accomplished. The theorizing thinker enters into a theoretical world which itself is a finite province of meaning with its own style of performing and concatenations of problems and its own [109/7201] horizons in need of solution. And now there emerges in every science the postulate that newly proposed problems be so formed that they share the ontic style of all previously posed and solved problems—whether the previous setting of problems be accepted or rejected, or exposed, as not genuine, as an illusory setting of problems. Every problem is intricately connected with the entire cosmos of the scientific world and we easily recognize that for this reason alone the degree of freedom for setting problems at all is limited and that the potestativeness, which everywhere, but especially also here, has its place in scientific thinking, is already disposed over a lesser domain.

Once the problem has been chosen scientific thinking is set in motion oriented to the solution of the problem, leaving no more room for potestativeness. In force here in all rigor is the postulate of the harmony of experience, of observation of all laws of possibility and compossibility, but also the *adequatio rei ac intellectus* taken in its full meaning, i.e., the step-by-step reducibility of all acts of scientific thinking to primally instituting experience. But there is still more! The harmony grounded in



the cosmos <of the scientific world> must not only be preserved within it, but, even more, scientific truth must also be consistent [*kompossibel*] with the world of working which, though bracketed, is still a component part of the one and unitary life-world [110/7202] pre-given to scientific thinking. More particularly, it is the task of scientific thinking to bring clarity to what is confusedly thought in everyday life, to separate illusion from being, but also to receive as an element of scientific harmony what then still remains as a component of thinking in everyday life. We shall examine all of this with greater precision in the analysis of the problem of adequacy of meaning and causality.<sup>72</sup>

All scientific thinking stands under the postulate of maximum clarity and distinctness and, in this sense, under the postulate of maximum rationality.<sup>73</sup> (This concept of rationality peculiar to science should not be confused with that predicated of action in the world of working.<sup>74</sup> To be sure, as action the scientific *cogitatio* bears all the features peculiar to rational action in the world of working, although in addition there must be awareness that the scientific behavior in the project of setting the problem is oriented toward all “intermediate goals” of thinking and the interdependence of the means of scientific method must be clear and distinct.) This postulate contains the task of explicating the hidden implications of pre-scientific thinking, of transforming confusions into distinct thinking, unclarity into clarity, [111/7203] of displaying the open horizons of this pre-scientific thinking and transforming likelihoods of an objective kind into certainty or even, where possible, circumscribing its character of probability. We must not forget that even what is essentially confused as confused can be distinctly conceived, that which is essentially unclear as unclear can be clearly conceived. It is therefore by no means incompatible for the postulate of rationality in science to clearly and distinctly bring into view by means of rational thinking what are, for instance, “*petites perceptions*” that are necessarily ineffable as such because they are in essence actually, and in their confusion, indiscernible. That means that they are to be viewed in their character of confusion and indiscernibility.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup> The corresponding passages were not developed by Schutz in the present manuscript. Cf. *Sinnhafte Aufbau*, §§45 ff.

<sup>73</sup> Here Schutz accordingly marks the difference between the epistemological orientation of American pragmatism in William James, Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, on the one hand, and the European tradition of pragmatistic philosophizing in Henri Bergson and Max Scheler on the other hand. The latter asserts a priority of the pragmatic motive only at the mundane, but not the epistemological, level. Cf. Scheler's *Erkenntnis und Arbeit*, espec. pp. 211 ff., 363 ff., and Schutz's posthumously published manuscript, *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, reprinted in *Collected Papers V*.

<sup>74</sup> Here, long before his controversy with Talcott Parsons, Schutz had already distinguished between the types of scientific rationality and the rationality of everyday life. Thus Schutz's interpretation of scientific rationality insists that it should not be a criterion for everyday rationality, as Parsons argued. Cf. also the essay, “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World,” *CP II*, pp. 64ff; and “*Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur*,” and the distinction between the linguistic and conceptual-thinking self in addition to the thesis of the meaningfulness prior to any science.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais*, “*Avant-Propos*,” II, 9, §§1 ff.; II 19, §§1ff.

This kind of theorizing self has, in theorizing, obviously also all of the pretensions and anticipations that belong to this action. But what distinguishes the action of the pure *cogitatio* in the theoretical world from all action in the world of working is that the theorizing self has no interest in the fulfillment or unfulfillment of these protentions or anticipations. The theoretical thinker is, as thinker, free from the fundamental anxiety of knowing and fearing death. The attitude of the theoretical thinker is one of *ataraxia*.

Accordingly, is theorizing then involved in that problem of time of the self which we analyzed under the heading of the “Tempora of the Self? [112/7204] The question about the structure of temporality in which scientific contemplation proceeds is extraordinarily complex and requires very extensive investigations which we cannot undertake here because they would lead us away from our central theme. A few suggestions will have to suffice. The theoretical thinker also lives in the *durée*, and the thinker also grows older in so far as his stock of experiences continuously changes and always newer intentionalities are constituted and sedimented in his experiences. The theoretical thinker has his historicity, as well as his previous self, recognizes too in his contemplative sphere the phenomenon of survival his own partial death of a partial self [*Teiltodes*] (I, as neo-Kantian). The theoretical thinker can also speak of a self later on and, transcending the present set of problems, projecting the open horizons of always newer sets of problems and newer methods as future tasks. Lacking to the theoretical thinker is the temporal dimension of myself now in so far as every case of myself now is rooted in public life. Just now, theoretical thinking does not really proceed in public life (instead it proceeds in the *durée*, in the Kierkegaardian “moment”). World-time and public time are now possible objects of theorizing although not its medium.<sup>76</sup> To the extent that the product of theory would seem to occur in the public life, as a task of work, as a place of study, etc. [113/7205], it is not a question at all of the act of theorizing itself but instead a genuine working in the world of working in which the products of theorizing become important as the writing of a book, as the contriving of experiments, as communication with others, etc. But in another sense, however, we can very well speak of my self now as of the theorizing *ego cogitans*: We now understand under the heading of this Now the specific task in hand of setting the problems, i.e., the extent of the projects pertaining to theoretical thinking.

At the same time the theorizing thinker brackets the pragmatic world of working he brackets his own bodily existence. We may even say that the theoretical thinker abstracts from his perceptions to the extent that they do not become apperceptions. In a further *epoché* the theorizing thinker can also bracket his whole natural (psychological) self and carry out the full transcendental-phenomenological reduction.

Everything we have so far described is related to the world of theorizing itself, thus to the world in which theoretical *cogitationes* occur, but not to the world of the *cogitata* conceived in those *cogitationes*. Just as phantasying belongs to a world of

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<sup>76</sup> At this place Schutz has not explained communication as the typical characteristic of the world of working and, at the same time, the medium for science, even though he has already referred to it in the present manuscript (above, 101/7193 f.).

the one who phantasies, but what is constituted in phantasying belongs to the world of phantasmas, so it is also the case with theoretical contemplation. By virtue of their intentionality, all *cogitationes* are *cogitationes* of *cogitata*, and these *cogitata* [114/7206] in their totality are nothing else than the world in its fullness, the one and unitary life-world pregiven to all of our life expressions and accordingly also to our thinking showing itself as the one and unitary world from the start.

And here arises the dialectical problem of thinking already familiar to us from our analysis of dream life.<sup>77</sup> In the case of scientific contemplation, the dialectic is two-fold.

In the first place, there belong to the phenomena, to the objects, of possible *cogitationes* the world of working itself including the working self of the thinker himself, but also the working of others. Indeed, in so far as others are given the theoretical problem arises of how I come to know of these others in the natural attitude and what I can experience of them. The peculiar difficulties arise the moment when the world of working in its public time becomes the theme of theorizing in those sciences that deal with human beings and which we commonly call cultural or social sciences. As long as thinking is not busied with the world of working and public time, but instead—by neglecting our own process of subjectivity—with making objects out of phenomena in world-time, doing so particularly in the natural and mathematical sciences [115/7207] proper, the dialectical problem in all its difficulty does not arise. But how, in its theoretical disinterestedness and essential aloofness from working, does the remaining self [*verharrende Ich*], the theorizing self which has bracketed the world of working, make statements about natural being and life in the world of working? Of whom should the thinker make the statements? Of those selves now in their full humanity working in public time? Were that possible then this full humanity would become manifest only in its actual working. But if that is the case, then outside of working the human self would no longer be a self now but a previous self and the synthesis of public time in world-time and the *durée* would have to collapse! And yet the meaning of all social sciences depends on the essential possibility of descriptively apprehending and being able to make theoretical objects of just this working of naive human beings in their life-world. Therefore as theorizing social scientists we must not forget our own subjectivity which above all teaches us that there are others, what working is, what meanings bind us together. <Yet the fact is that> that subjectivity which can serve us, the social scientists, as a source of knowledge <can do so> only by virtue of the bracketing of our whole life and humanity as living human beings. Here we see the difficulty we encountered before [116/7208] in our analysis of dreams where only when we no longer dream can we speak of our dreams. We have to bring into view this dialectical problem in its full weight in order to understand that a straightforwardly and naively undertaken solution must always fall into new dialectical difficulties. Only then will we understand that theorizing thinking about the naive life-world in which you and I, Peter and Paul, and everyone live in our full humanity, in which we love, suffer, are anxious

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<sup>77</sup> See above, 102/7194

and hope, plan, work, act, in which we are deceived and are successful, in which we take interest and notice, and in which we have confused and indiscernible perceptions—only then, I say, will we understand that theorizing thinking is unable to say anything about this naive life-world itself.

Instead we need an artificial device [*Kunstgriff*] to bring the life-world as such into theoretical view, and by means of which, however, stripped of its livingness and the humanity at work in it, the life-world is deprived of its full humanity. This artificial device—precisely the social-scientific method—overcomes the dialectic difficulty indicated in such a way that the life-world is replaced by a model of the life-world populated not by human beings in their full humanness [117/7209] but by puppets or homunculi [*Schemen*] of such human beings, by types as we will say in anticipation. All together <the puppets or homunculi> are so outfitted that, without interrupting the harmonious experience, by the grace of the social scientist, we can regard them in their needs and hopes, in their deeds and strivings, which always are deeds and strivings <regarded> as analogues of our life-world. We will still have to busy ourselves with this problem of social-scientific method. Here we are only concerned to indicate the difficulty in the dialectic of all thinking about the life-world.<sup>78</sup>

But even with this indication, the difficulties are hardly exhausted. The second level of problems pertaining to the dialectic of thinking arise from the fact that scientific thinking is an event of life and in this sense belongs precisely to the life-world that has been bracketed. (Now seen not subjectively, from the standpoint of the theorizing self.) The theorizing is of course solitary as long as it remains imprisoned just in the course of theoretical *cogitationes*. But we must not forget that the pre-given world of the theoretical set of problems is not only pre-given to me, the theoretical thinker, but that it is also your world and mine, the world of all of us. For that reason alone my experience of this world, even the theoretical <experience,> is already directed toward <the fact> that [118/7210] others also experience, that others theorize, and that my experience of other subjects is legitimate and right. This reciprocal legitimation and justification, however, can no longer be operative in the theoretical province, but only in the world of working itself by means of acts of living and working themselves and in relation of one person to another in full humanity. Yet just this paradox, that the full theoretical development again is only possible in the realm of the fullness of life, freezes all theorizing in a solipsism in which each theorizing subject is solitary and remains embedded in a fictive world. As a result the paradox arising from the dialectic of contemplation once again becomes a component part of the life-world. Conversely: the miracle of *symplosopein* returns full humanity to the theoretical world.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>78</sup> Schutz refers here to the connections made between *Sinnhafte Aufbau* and the first version of 28 July 1936 in the two planned chapters (V, Methodological Consequences,” and VI, “The Problem of Personality and the Praxis of the Social Sciences”). See above, I, 7060. These connections are taken up anew in two later works, “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation” (1953), *CP I*, pp. 44ff; and “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences” (1954), *CP I*, pp. 58 ff. In the first essay Schutz formulates the so-called “postulate of adequacy” between the (everyday) typification of the first degree and the (scientific) typification of the second degree.

<sup>79</sup> See the almost identical concluding statement in “On Multiple Realities,” p. 259.

Kanzelhohe, 27 August, 1937.  
Textural Variant:

The following paragraph is the first of two versions in the manuscript.<sup>80</sup>  
[93a/7099]. We begin with the most important assertion, that the phantasying self never works and that the phantasying itself, however projected, on that account is not an acting because it lacks the purpose directed to the fiat. But in this phantasying the self can be phantasied as acting as well as also working. Whether working or acting, the self never does this in the finite province of its world of working. It is characteristic of all phantasying that even to the phantasied action there remains in its the reference back to the project (which always, even in the world of working, is a phantasma) an in-order-to-motive and a because-motive, just as its origin from choice and decision remains in the inclusion in the hierarchy of the plan. However, there is never in the phantasied action the genuine volitional act of purpose acquired by intentionality directed to the fiat such as is in the case of real action, although purpose and fiat can themselves be phantasied, but can only become phantasied. Phantasied working can of course stand within the hierarchy of plans within which the coordinated hierarchy of purposes in the world of working does not stand. But how?

Glossary

The meanings listed are literal, and do not take account of any special use put to them by Schutz, or the context in which he uses the terms.

	Greek
Ataraxia	Peace of Mind
Epoché	Bracketing, withholding judgment
Kat' exochen	In a preeminent way, privileged, prominent
Nomo	Lawful, regulative, according to law
Pros hemas	What is of concern, is at issue
Symphilosophein	To philosophize together
Physei	According to Nature, natural
Hypokeimenon	The Underlying, fundamental; substance
	Latin
Actum	Action, action performed or elapsed, deed.
Actio, actiones	Elapsing action(s), action in its performance
Actio mea	My own action
Adequatio	Agreement
Adequatio rei ac intellectus	Agreement of affairs with the understanding; agreement of actuality and thinking.
Agere	To do, to act, doing

(continued)

<sup>80</sup> See above, p. 84.

(continued)

	Latin
Aliud cogitans, volens, agens	Thinking, willing, acting otherwise
Alter ego	The other, other self, someone else
Carpe diem	Seize the day
Clara et distincta perception	Clear and distinct perception
Cogitare	Thinking
Cogitatio, cogitationes	Thought, what is thought, thoughts, ideas
Cogitatum, cogitate	The thoughts, the content(s) of thinking
Conditio potestativa	Condition of having power or authority
Ego	Self, ego, I
Ego agens	The acting self (or I), the working self
Ego agens et semper idem agens (volens)	The self acting and always doing (willing) the same
Ego cogitans	The thinking self
Ego cogito ergo sum	I think, therefore I am
Ego ipse	I, myself; the self itself.
Ego ipse agens	The acting self itself
Ego qua civis Romanus	I as Roman citizen
Ego qua pater familias	I as father or head of the family
Ego volens	The desiring, willing self
Ex praesente	From the standpoint of the present
Ex praeterito	From the standpoint of the past
Hic	Here
Hinc	From here, from now on
Idem sed non eodem modo	The same, but not in the same way
Illic	There
Illinc	From there
Intellectus agens	The acting or active mind
Intellectus patiens	The suffering or passive mind
Me ipsum	Me, myself
Modo futuri exacti	In the mode of the future perfect
Modo plusquam perfecti	In the mode of the pluperfect
Modo potentiali	In the mode of the probable (possible)
Modo praesenti	In the mode of the present
Modo praeterito	In the mode of the past
Multiplicem aut simplicem se sentiens	Finding itself or oneself as many or as one
Origo	Origin
Plurale tantum	A concept which has to be expressed in the plural
Rebus sic stantibus	Thus things stand; in this case

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## **Two Goethe Texts**

# Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre and Wanderjahre

Alfred Schutz

## Editor's/Translator's Introduction

By Michael Barber

In the summer of 1948, while traveling back and forth between the United States and Europe to re-establish business contacts for the Reitler Company that had fled Austria during the *Anschluss* in 1938, Alfred Schutz produced two manuscripts. The shorter one concerned Johann Wolfgang Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (*Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*), and a longer one dealt with *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* (*Wilhelm Meister's Years of Travel*). The first of the Goethe novels tells the story of Wilhelm Meister, a young man who leaves his family to pursue a career in drama. In the course of several twists, turns, and reversals of fate he discovers that he is the father of Felix, his son, whose mother Wilhelm had met early in the novel but who had died, and he manages by the end of the novel not only to take his son under his care but also to discover the love of his life, Natalia. In the second novel, Schutz considers the relationship between a later version of the novel (1829) and an earlier shorter version (1821) and illustrates the artistry of the second version, despite its criticism by several literary critics. Schutz's defense involves attending carefully to the novel's details, distinguishing literary reality from the everyday reality whose norms the critics use to impugn Goethe's achievement, and even refuting criticisms by Goethe's literary executor, Johannes Eckermann, on the basis of contradictions in Eckermann's diaries. In the novel, Wilhelm is forced to wander for several years away from Natalia, and theme of wandering takes on a metaphysical significance reminiscent of Schutz's own philosophical reflections on temporality. He also extends his insights in the essay "Meaning Structures of Literary Art Forms," ("Sinnstruktur der Novelle: Goethe") in *Life Forms and Meaning Structures*, by showing how novel reading involves the reader in intersubjective, meaning-interpretive relationships with the author and with the characters of the novel itself.



Though both of Schutz's manuscripts remained unpublished until now, the *Lehrjahre* manuscript, which was typed, was further along toward publication than the merely handwritten *Wanderjahre* manuscript. These manuscripts give the reader an insight into how Schutz read and interpreted novels. He was no doubt drawn to Goethe's Wilhelm Meister novels insofar as these novels emphasize the historical progress of one's life, the unexpected events that change its course, the losses and renunciation that life entails, and the courage needed to overcome life's diminishments—the kinds of concerns with which his own experience of the *Anschluss* and emigration had made him quite familiar. He became even more aware of the significance of these experiences when he returned to Europe after the war.

## **“Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre”**

### **Alfred Schutz**

The key to Wilhelm Meister lies in the questions of necessity and accident, deterministic fate and free will, which Goethe already made central in his poetry and thinking. Discussions of these questions enter at decisive turning points of the novel, especially in the “contrapuntally” elaborated Chapter I, 17, in which the “fate motif” plays a foundational role. In this concluding chapter of the first book, one can find the most important passage; it is attributed to the Stranger, who knew Wilhelm as a small boy and remembers well how eager he had been to explain the artistic cabinet of his grandfather. Here the important symbolism of the image of the ill son of the king appears for the first time. This is the same “stranger,” whom we will later meet as a member of the Society of the Tower. This linkage is of great importance. For Wilhelm's family history and development, all of the following are of decisive significance: the sale of the grandfather's art collection and of the old house, the investment of the proceeds in the business enterprise of the old Werner, and the tasteless building of the new house. Before he met the Stranger, he had decided to break with the unwanted tradition that had been forced upon him. He writes a letter to Mariana, whom he has made a mother and whom he looks upon as a marital partner with whom to contract “the beautiful formality” of marriage, so that the blessing of heaven can render a blessing on earth. In the letter he asks her to marry him before he departs on his wandering, and he carries it, folded in his pocket to hand it to her [top text missing here]. He ends up leaving against his will “her lips and her door,” but not without having snatched her neckerchief (“procure for me a cloth from her breast”) in which he will soon find Norberg's note. On the street, he meets the Stranger and enters into a conversation with him. When he tells the Stranger his name, the Stranger asks him whether he is not the grandson of the elder Meister who possessed the beautiful art collection which his father had exchanged for a good sum of money. Wilhelm affirms this and adds that the loss of the art collection for him “signified the first sad time of his life.” The Stranger admits that the purchase of the collection came about through his friend,

“a rich nobleman.” This friend, who we will subsequently learn was the uncle of the “beautiful soul” (and the great uncle of Natalia and of the countess and of Lothario and Friedrich), had sent him as an expert to Wilhelm’s grandfather. The Stranger and Wilhelm both remember their meeting. And it is the Stranger, who speaks of young boy’s favorite picture, of which he did not wish to let go, the image of the king’s sick son, who was consumed in love over the fiancée of his father. The Stranger considers the picture to be of little artistic value, and therefore it had been hung by the sensible grandfather in the “outermost vestibule.” He criticizes Wilhelm’s first artistic impressions, even as in the second book the “spiritual” man on the boat attacks the idea of a puppet show, and Jarno in the third book criticizes him with reference to his poetic attempts. Wilhelm, though, does not speak of the artistic value of the picture; he rather will speak of the object which impressed him as he played in the vestibule.

What a melancholy object is a youth that must shut up within himself the sweet impulse, the fairest inheritance which nature has given us, and conceal in his own bosom the fire which should warm and animate him and others, so that his vitals are wasted away by unutterable pains! I feel a pity for the ill-fated man that would consecrate himself to another, when the heart of that other has already found a worthy object of true and pure affection. [Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, trans. Thomas Carlyle (New York: The Heritage Press, 1956), 63]

In this moment, Wilhelm does not know how decisively his own life will be like that of the king’s sick son. But in another way, he feels his own life to depend on the sale of the art cabinet.

In truth, the sale of that cabinet grieved me very much at the time; and often since I have thought of it with regret: but when I consider that it was a necessary means of awakening a taste in me, of developing a talent, which will operate far more powerfully on my history than ever those lifeless pictures could have done, I easily content myself, and honor destiny, which knows how to bring about what is best for me, and what is best for everyone. (*Ibid.*)

But to what does this “significant” allusion of Wilhelm’s refer? We do not experience it here. First after the catastrophe, when Wilhelm burns his early, poetic attempts, will he admit his belief in his poetic mission in his outbreak of feeling before Werner. And this belief in his mission is most intimately connected with Mariana.[“... she was as the hook on which the ladder of my hopes was fixed. See! With daring aim the mountain adventurer hovers in the air: the iron breaks, and he lies broken and dismembered on the earth” (*Ibid.*, 78)]

Here the Stranger interrupts: “It gives me pain to hear this word destiny in the mouth of a young person, just at the age when men are commonly accustomed to ascribe their own violent inclinations to the will of higher natures (*Ibid.*, 63–64).”

(This is the first dialectical version of the idea of destiny in the setting of the novel: interpretation of the will as destined as characteristic for a definite stage of life and spiritual development.)

“You, then, do not believe in destiny? No power that rules over us and directs all for our ultimate advantage?” (*Ibid.*, 64)

“The question is not now of my belief,” answers the Stranger—he will later, at the end of the Apprenticeship also speak of his belief—“nor is this the place to explain how I may have attempted to form for myself some not impossible conception of things which are incomprehensible to all of us [the Apprentice letter will be the place for this]: the question here is what mode of viewing them will profit us the most.” (*Ibid.*, 64) If one were to break off here, the formulation of the Stranger would sound remarkably pragmatic. But the Stranger proceeds forth as follows and gives us therewith the previously mentioned key text for understanding the entire novel:

“The fabric of our life is formed of necessity and chance: the reason of man takes its station between them, and may rule them both; it treats the necessary as the groundwork of its being; the accidental it can direct and guide, and employ for its own purposes: and only while this principle of reason stands firm and inexpugnable, does man deserve to be named the god of this lower world. But woe to him who, from his youth, has used himself to search in necessity for something of arbitrary will; to ascribe to chance a sort of reason, which it is a matter of religion to obey. Is conduct like this aught else than to renounce one’s understanding, and give unrestricted scope to one’s inclinations? We think it is a kind of piety to move along without consideration; to let accidents that please us determine our conduct; and, finally, to bestow on the result of such a vacillating life the name of providential guidance.”

[Wilhelm responded,] “Was it never your case that some little circumstance induced you to strike into a certain path, where some accidental occurrence ere long met you, and a series of unexpected incidents at length brought you to some point which you yourself had scarcely once contemplated? Should not lessons of this kind teach us obedience to destiny, confidence in some such guide?”

[The Stranger answered,] “With opinions like these, no woman could maintain her virtue, no man keep the money in his purse; for occasions enough are occurring to get rid of both. He alone is worthy of respect, who knows what is of use to himself and others, and who labors to control his self-will. Each man has his own fortune in his hands; at the artist has a piece of rude matter, which he is to fashion to a certain shape. But the art of living rightly is like all arts: the capacity alone is born with us; it must be learned, and practiced with incessant care (*Ibid.*, 64).”

Here is the program of the novel: the mastery of art through life, life through art; the dialectical antithesis is laid wide open, but for now it remains intentionally undecided.

These discussions our two speculators carried on between them to considerable length: at last they parted without seeming to have wrought any special conviction in each other, but engaging to meet at an appointed place next day (*Ibid.*, 64–65).

But as it happens, it never comes to this and we thereby lose sight of the “Stranger” for a long stretch. Thus immediately Goethe displays with Socratic (or Mephistophelian?) irony a whole series of events through which he justifies Wilhelm’s viewpoint on the accidental, however unjustified his optimism seems to be. Wandering the streets and listening to the musicians’ serenade, Wilhelm feels that Mariana is as near as ever.

“He groped for the neckerchief he had taken from her; but it was forgotten, it lay in his other clothes. His frame quivered with emotion. (*Ibid.*, 65)” [He distanced himself from her house.]...

"Had he then had about him the master-key with which he used to open Mariana's door, he could not have restrained himself from penetrating into the sanctuary of love (*Ibid.*, 67):" [He vacillated, half-dreaming under the trees and then set out for home.] "And he constantly turned round again; at last, with an effort, he constrained himself, and actually departed. At the corner of the street, looking back yet once, he imagined that he saw Mariana's door open, and a dark figure issue from it (*Ibid.*, 67):" [Hurrying to his house, he came to the conviction that it had been an illusion.] "To soothe his heart, and put the last seal on returning belief, he took the neckerchief from the pocket of the dress he had been last wearing. The rustling of a letter which fell out of it took the kerchief away from his lips: he lifted and read,—" (*Ibid.*)

It is Norberg's note, which brings to Wilhelm's life a decisive turn. Also the mere external placement [of this episode] is of notable significance; it forms the conclusion of the first book.

The second dialectical layer of the destiny motif is reached in the ninth chapter of the second book and in a discussion between Wilhelm and the clerical individual on the boat. Later we will recognize him as the Abbé of the Society of the Tower. Also here it is important to be clear about the circumstances of this meeting. To this purpose, some further information is needed and we must consider the masterful organization of the second book, which describes the new stage of Wilhelm's life-path.

The first two chapters are devoted to Wilhelm's reaction to the catastrophe with Mariana; we have even anticipated an important section in this regard (in our mention of Wilhelm's conversation with Werner). The function of the third chapter is at first puzzling. It concerns Wilhelm's visit in the mountains with the manufacturer, who, with his workers, organizes theatrical performances. The meaning of the chapter is threefold: first of all the "beginning of all acting art" should be demonstrated in the simple theatrical striving of the workers. This is one extreme of acting possibilities, another is the presentation of the tightrope dancers treated in the following chapter, and a third in the impromptu theater on the boat, on which we will meet the clerical man. A fourth layer is shown in Melina's undertaking, and a fifth is reached via the "Shakespeare" symbolism. The second [meaning of the chapter] is the scenic homage, which the workers plan for the birthday of the factory owner, one of the many Goethean anticipations, which refer to the homage prepared by the count for the prince and which we will find in the third book. Thirdly, the chapter is intended to explain why Wilhelm, who, like his horse, is worn out because of his journey in the mountains, takes a longer rest in the city that evening, where the events take place that in the unusually long fourth chapter are most wonderfully organized as follows:

In the four first paragraphs of this chapter the following determining motifs are touched upon: (a) the equipping for the entrance of the tightrope dancer troop; (b) Philina and Friedrich; (c) Mignon; (d) Laertes and the symbol of fencing. This group of four is developed thematically now first in the same series and then later in a changing series—almost like a quadruple fugue. Significant symbols arise: Mignon's childhood dress, Philina's slippers, her powder knife [dubbed] "my purpose." In the "interlude" the dialectic of the third chapter (the theatrical presentation of the factory workers) is taken up again: the social meaning of the drama is

presented, on the one side, in the mountain miner-farmer pantomime, and, on the other, in tightrope dancer troop. Philina, who is the symbol for that type of theater art, which is not Mariana's (and not Aurelia's, which will present the third level of the development), has the same role as a catalyst, which she plays throughout this book and the following one, indeed throughout the whole novel. She fetches Mignon in order to acquaint her with Wilhelm (his first word to Mignon: "Fear not, dear little one" will define his whole relationship to her); in the "coda" Narciss and Landrinette appear as a new contra-point. The fifth chapter brings Mignon's "I will serve" and introduces again the now changed Melina couple. Wilhelm had seen Mrs. Melina in the court room in the first book instead of his Mariana, for whom a similar destiny had been prepared through him, and he had formed a high concept of the maiden's convictions. She is only a mere chameleon over against the authenticity of Philina and of the very unique Mignon. In the sixth chapter, Mignon's "ever increasingly stimulating form and essence" is contra-pointed to Melina; in the seventh, Philina brings the "pedant" and therewith also the "hobgoblin" with his two insignificant daughters. The old hobgoblin's appearance stirs up Wilhelm's soul; he had often seen him act near Mariana and in fact experienced through him Mariana's more distant fate. The eighth chapter begins with the depiction of the spiritual turmoil into which Wilhelm is transported by his information. He sees the mother of his child without help wandering in the world: Wrapped up in this thought he turned homeward, but Mignon awaits him. She presents before him the highly symbolic egg dance. Wilhelm was torn from himself by the peculiar performance, "he forgot his cares; he followed every movement of the dear little creature, and felt surprised to see how finely her character unfolded itself as she proceeded in the dance (*Ibid.*, 109)." He longs to incorporate this forsaken being within his own heart, and Mignon chooses the new dress, which he promises to be "in his color," that is, gray, with a light blue border.

In this context, the group takes a boat trip, to which the ninth chapter is devoted. One arranges—notably under Laertes' proposal—an impromptu performance which is carried out to pass the time on the water:

"Excellent," said Wilhelm. "In a society where there is no dissimulation, but where each without disguise pursues the bent of his own humor, elegance and satisfaction cannot long continue; and, where dissimulation always reigns, they do not enter at all. It will not be amiss, then, that we take up dissimulation to begin with, and then, behind our masks, be as candid as we please." (*Ibid.*, 111)

The Abbé—or is it, if we should believe Jarno later, his twin brother?—held to be a Lutheran country clergyman (also already from the beginning in a mask) boards the ship—it stops for his sake—and takes part in the impromptu performance. Afterwards, he enters into a conversation with Wilhelm on such topics as: the education of the actor, inborn talent, upbringing in general, the influence of the child's environment. Wilhelm says:

"Happy, then, are those whom Fate takes charge of, and educates, according to their several natures!"

"Fate," said the other smiling, "is an excellent but most expensive schoolmaster. In all cases, I would rather trust to the reason of a human tutor. Fate, for whose wisdom I entertain

all imaginable reverence, often finds in Chance, by which it works, an instrument not over manageable. At least the latter very seldom seems to execute precisely and accurately what the former has determined."

"You seem to express a very singular opinion," said Wilhelm.

"Not at all," replied the other. "Most of what happens in the world confirms my opinion. Do not many incidents at their commencement show some mighty purpose, and generally terminate in something paltry?"

"You mean to jest."

"And as to what concerns the individual man," pursued the other, "is it not so with this likewise? Suppose Fate had appointed one to be a good player; and why should it not provide us with good players as well as other good things? Chance would perhaps conduct the youth into some puppet-show, where, at such an early age, he could not help taking interest in what was tasteless and despicable, reckoning insipidities endurable or even pleasing, and thus corrupting and misdirecting his primary impressions—impressions which can never be effaced, and whose influence, in spite of all our efforts, clings to us in some degree to the very last."

"What makes you think of puppet-shows?" said Wilhelm, not without some consternation.

"It was an accidental instance: if it does not please you, we shall take another. Suppose Fate had appointed any one to be a great painter, and it pleased Chance that he should pass his youth in sooty huts ... to dispossess him." (*Ibid.*, 114)

Here the second dialectical layer of the fate-idea is bound up in an important manner with the puppet-show symbolism that is decisive for Wilhelm. The decisive significance of the entrance of the cleric—and his disappearance without bidding adieu—is emphasized through the following reaction of some persons, with whom Goethe, doubtlessly with the highest deliberateness, begins a new, tenth chapter: Laertes believes that he has already seen the peculiar man before. Likewise, Philina—"she was, in some respects, a bond of union for the whole" it is said of her after her disappearance (*Ibid.*, 328)—says:

"And you may in truth ... be mistaken there. This person seems to have the air of an acquaintance, because he looks like a man, and not Jack or Kit."

"What is this?" said Laertes. "Do not we, too, look like men?"

"I know what I am saying," cried Philina, "and, if you cannot understand me, never mind. In the end my words will be found to require no commentary."

Two coaches now drove up...

The narrative then goes on to other subjects.

The third dialectical layer of the fate-thematic is now indicated, if not made absolutely clear in poetry, in the second song of the harpist about the heavenly powers:

To earth, this weary earth, ye bring us,  
To guilt ye let us heedless go,  
Then leave repentance fierce to wring us,  
A moment's guilt, an age of woe. (*Ibid.*, 130)

The problem is developed in the following three books then on different levels and in illustrative examples. The one level lies in the role, likewise a mask, which Wilhelm is destined to play in relation to the count and countess. In the night robe of the count, under his lamp, he awaits the countess. Nevertheless, the unexpected count actually returns and supposes that he sees himself—with the tragic result that

he falls into a kind of religious melancholy and surrenders himself to the ideals of the Moravians of Herrenhut. His spouse, the countess, in the departure scene with Wilhelm, carries a bracelet with his initials. She gives him a ring with an escutcheon interwoven with a plait of her hair underneath a crystal. He kisses her hand and means to rise, "but, as in dreams, some strange thing fades and changes into something stranger, and the succeeding wonder takes us by surprise (*Ibid.*, 191)," they hold each other suddenly in their arms; mutual, vivid kisses yield happiness; he grasps her with vivacity and presses her to his breast. Suddenly, the countess tears herself away from him with a cry and presses her heart with her hand. "He stood confounded before her: she held the other hand upon her eyes, and, after a moment's pause, exclaimed, 'Away! Leave me! Delay not!'" (*Ibid.*, 191)

He continued standing.

"Leave me!" she cried; and, taking off her hand from her eyes she looked at him with an indescribable expression of countenance, and added, in the most tender and affecting voice, "Flee, if you love me."

Wilhelm was out of the chamber, and again in his room, before he knew what he was doing.

Unhappy creatures! What singular warning of chance or of destiny tore them asunder? (*Ibid.*, 191)

With this question mark, the third book closes. We learn at the end of the fifth book of this tragedy. Wilhelm in his embrace of the countess had forcefully pressed the valuable portrait of her husband studded with diamonds—it presented him as her bridegroom—against her breast. She feels a severe pain, a little redness appears, of which almost no traces still remain, but, even though the doctor is sure that this impression can have no evil consequences, the countess imagines that the evil will end in a cancerous sore and that her youth and lovability will be fully lost for herself and for others. Wilhelm hears of this development from her doctor and his knowledge about this will decisively determine his relationship to the countess's sister—Natalia, and Lothario.

This is only one of the many variations dealing with the unfolding of this theme [of fate] on the level of the novel's action—variations that first stand out in the two final books, which bring about a meaningful resolution of the manifold symbol series. The appearance of the Amazon (Natalia) in the encounter with the robbers; the surgeon's case, which heals Wilhelm and which later plays an important role in the identifying of Natalia; the custom of little Felix to drink from the bottle instead of the glass—which will save his life; the ticket which, written in Natalia's hand, is found in the pocket of the overcoat of the uncle; Philina's little slippers; the veil of the ghost of Hamlet's father, which Mignon places in Wilhelm's valise; later the arrangement of the marchese's notes, that is of the instruction regarding the lodging of guests in the house of the uncle according to the count, an instruction which includes the manuscript containing the life history of Augustine, the harp-player, which leads to the supposed poisoning of little Felix, to the suicide of Augustine, and to the vow of Natalia—all these highly symbolic events and many others are variations about the motif of fate and chance on this level. It is the same motif which rules the *Elective Affinities* and which Goethe himself formulated in the proposition: "In the first you are free, in the second, you are slaves."



But from now on, the thematic does not only unfold on the level of life, but also on that of the artwork, especially through the great symbols of Shakespeare and Hamlet. The ten or twelve Hamlet commentaries, which are scattered throughout the fourth and fifth books of the novel, exist not only to serve didactic purposes or to initiate a discussion of the drama-novel or the essence of theatrical art, etc. But they are also essential for the formation of the central action because they stand as counterpoints to its motif, so to say, by augmenting it.

Jarno, whom Wilhelm significantly—and in a certain sense correctly—takes to be a “recruiter,” makes Shakespeare accessible to him. “They are no fictions!” says Wilhelm to Jarno after the first lecture. “You would think, while reading them, you stood before the unclosed awful Books of Fate, while the whirlwind of most impassioned life was howling through the leaves, and tossing them fiercely to and fro.” (*Ibid.*, 182)

“Bravo!” said Jarno, holding out his hand, and squeezing our friend’s. “This is as it should be! And the consequences, which I hope for, will likewise surely follow.”

“I wish,” said Wilhelm, “I could but disclose to you all that is going on within me even now. All the anticipations I have ever had regarding man and his destiny, which have accompanied me from youth upwards, often unobserved by myself, I find developed and fulfilled in Shakespeare’s writings. It seems as if he cleared up every one of our enigmas to us, though we cannot say, Here or there is the word of solution. His men appear like natural men, and yet they are not. These, the most mysterious and complex productions of creation, here act before us as if they were watches, whose dial-plates and cases were of crystal, which point out, according to their use, the course of the hours and minutes; while, at the same time, you could discern the combination of wheels and springs that turned them. The few glances I have cast over Shakespeare’s world incite me, more than any thing beside, to quicken my footsteps forward into the actual world, to mingle in the flood of destinies that is suspended over it... (*Ibid.*, 182)

These universal theses will be confirmed in the individual general analyses. Wilhelm, doubting that he can find an emphasis, in which he can carry out his whole role with all its deviations and shadows, hopes, after going astray for a long time, to approach his own goal in an entirely particular way.

I set about investigating every trace of Hamlet’s character, as it had shown itself before his father’s death: I endeavored to distinguish what in it was independent of this mournful event, independent of the terrible events that followed; and what most probably the young man would have been, had no such thing occurred (*Ibid.*, 206).

And Wilhelm comes to the known conclusion that the key to Hamlet’s entire behavior lies in the words: “The Time is out of joint; O woe to me that I was born to set it right (*Ibid.*, 234).”

To me it is clear that Shakespeare meant, in the present case, to represent the effects of a great action laid upon a soul unfit for the performance of it (*Ibid.*, 234) ... Impossibilities have been required of him—not in themselves impossibilities, but such for him (*Ibid.*) ... It pleases us, it flatters us, to see a hero acting on his own strength, loving and hating at the bidding of his heart, undertaking and completing, casting every obstacle aside, and attaining some great end. Poets and historians would willingly persuade us that so proud a lot may fall to man. In “Hamlet” we are taught another lesson: the hero is without plan, but the play is full of plan... (*Ibid.*, 243)

“After a pause, in which they looked at one another,” Serlo begins to speak, the one to whom it fell to play a Mephistophelian role in the realm of art over against

Wilhelm—"He makes the Sophists," it is said of him—Jarno takes up a similar role against Wilhelm when it comes to the things of life. And, reversing doubly the dialectical shift, Serlo says:

You pay no great compliment to Providence, in thus exalting Shakespeare; and besides, it appears to me, that for the honor of your poet, as others for the honor of Providence, you ascribe to him an object and a plan such as he himself had never thought of (*Ibid.*, 243).

In this spiritual condition, confused because of his preparation for the Hamlet presentation and because of Serlo's offer to help him to become a professional actor, Wilhelm writes with the help of Laertes his fictional travel journal for his father and Werner. What had begun as a joke helps him to become more attentive to the circumstances and daily life of the actual world. He suddenly sees himself placed before the choice between an active life and art. Regarding this recent turning point, Wilhelm Meister carries on a monologue (Book 4, Chapter 19), which one would almost be led to name a counter piece to the first Hamlet monologue.

"Here standest thou once more," said he within himself, "at the Parting of the Ways, between the two women who appeared before thee in thy youth. The one no longer looks so pitiful as then, nor does the other look so glorious. To obey the one, or to obey the other, thou art not without a kind of inward calling: outward reasons are on both sides strong enough, and to decide appears to thee impossible. Thou wishest some preponderancy from without would fix thy choice; and yet, if thou consider well, it is external circumstances only that inspire thee with a wish to trade, to gather, to possess; whilst it is thy inmost want that has created, that has nourished, the desire still further to unfold and perfect what endowments soever for the beautiful and good, be they mental or bodily, may lie within thee. And ought I not to honor Fate, which, without furtherance of mine, has led me higher to the goal of all my wishes? Has not all that I, in old times, meditated and forecast, now happened accidentally, and without my cooperation? Singular enough! We seem to be so intimate with nothing as we are with our own wishes and hopes, which have long been kept and cherished in our hearts; yet when they meet us, when they, as it were, press forward to us, then we know them not, then we recoil from them" (*Ibid.*, 264).

We cannot her repeat the whole monologue. He turns himself in the direction of Mariana, whose symbolic character here becomes clear particularly on the reflective plane: "Was it, then, love to Mariana that bound me to the stage? Or love to art that bound me to her?" (*Ibid.*, 264–265)

From here on one sees particularly clearly the parallel nature of the relationships Wilhelm-Faust, Mariana-Helen, Euphoriön-Felix. This is only incidental, since it does not belong to our central theme, which we now find returning thematically, even if it is not fully unfolded, upon a new, third level, namely that of the religious sphere.

The sixth book involves the confessions of a fair soul, which are frequently seen as an interpolation, only loosely connected with the principal narrative. But this is contradicted by the ingenious technical function of the sixth book, namely to prepare for the sarastrosphere of the seventh and eight books, and, likewise, through the confessions of the religious woman to give a full spiritual biography of her to whom her niece Natalia is so similar. The purpose is even deeper. It is the transition besides to a new "Stage on Life's Way," which reminds one strikingly of the Kierkegaardian structure. The novel has run through the erotic and aesthetic spheres, and now it

reaches the religious sphere "A" (as Kierkegaard would name it). (The religious sphere "B," is made visibly Christian in the opening chapter of the *Wanderjahren*). And here in this sphere of the religious mysticism again all the earlier motifs return, among them fate and chance.

The authoress of the manuscript decides to remove herself from the counsel and influence of her friend in spiritual matters. As a result, she also acquired the courage to go her own way in relationships with others.

But for the assistance of my faithful, invisible Leader [namely God], I could not have prospered here. I am still gratefully astonished at his wise and happy guidance. No one knew how matters stood with me: even I myself did not know. (*Ibid.*, 370)

Next follows the unhappy bond with Philo, the drawing near to the uncle, and the marriage of the sister. The dialectic culminates in the conversation with the uncle. He is the one who built the "Hall of the Past" in which he was to be placed after his death. According to his order, his memory bust plays showed a roll inscribed with the words "Think to live." Mignon's funeral rites take place in this hall. It is the same uncle, who through the mediation of the previously mentioned "Stranger" was able to acquire the art collection of Wilhelm's grandfather, including the painting of the sick son of the King. Wilhelm, whom Natalia will receive in the house of her uncle who has died in the meantime, will dwell among these art treasures of his grandfather and "find himself once again in the presence of his inheritance (*Ibid.*, 487)". These art works which his father had sold

appeared to him [as] an omen that he himself was destined never to obtain a lasting, calm possession of any thing desirable in life, or always to be robbed of it so soon as gained, by his own or other people's blame (*Ibid.*, 532).

In the presence of these artworks, the previously mentioned dialogue took place. The uncle speaks "with great modesty" of that which he possessed and had brought here and "with great surety" of the meaningfulness with which it had been collected and erected. He makes use of religious language in order to enter his niece's world-view. She responds with laughter and encourages him to speak in the language appropriate to him.

"I may continue," he replied, "in my own most peculiar way, without any alternation of my tone. Man's highest merit always is, as much as possible to rule external circumstance, and as little as possible to let himself be ruled by them. Life lies before us, as a huge quarry lies before the architect: he deserves not the name of architect, except when, out of this fortuitous mass, he can combine, with the greatest economy and fitness and durability, some form, the pattern of which originated in his spirit. All things outside us, nay, I may add, all things near us, are mere elements; but deep within us lies the creative force, which out of these can produce what they were meant to be, and which leaves us neither sleep nor rest, in one way or another, outside us or near us, until we have produced it (*Ibid.*, 383–384)."

The two last books tie together all the threads and bring out the meaning of the manifold symbolism of the earlier books. The thematic followed by us enters at the decisive points especially emphasized before. Already in the prelude to the seventh book the theme is referred to, since on the way to Lothario's castle a pedestrian overtakes Wilhelm, keeps him company, and walks with a strong stride

beside Wilhelm's horse. After a reciprocal equal exchange of thoughts, he says to the rider:

"If I am not mistaken, I must have already seen you somewhere."

"I, too, remember you," said Wilhelm: "had we not some time ago a pleasant sail together?—Right!" replied the other.

Wilhelm looked at him more narrowly, then, after a pause, observed, "I do not know what alternation has occurred in you. Last time we met, I took you for a Lutheran country clergyman: you now seem to me more like a Catholic priest."

"Today, at least, you are not wrong," replied the other, taking off his hat, and showing him the tonsure. "Where is your company gone? Did you stay long with them?"

"Longer than was good: on looking back upon the period which I passed in their society, it seems as if I looked into an endless void; nothing of it has remained with me."

"Here you are mistaken," said the stranger: "every thing that happens to us leaves some trace behind it; every thing contributes imperceptibly to form us. Yet often it is danger to take a strict account of that. For either we grow proud and negligent, or downcast and dispirited; and both are equally injurious in their consequences. The safe plan is, always simply to do the task that lies nearest to us; and this in the present case," added he, with a smile, "is to hasten to our quarters." (*Ibid.*, 397–398)

Still the hour has not arrived in which the Abbé is permitted to disclose to Wilhelm his apprenticeship letter. He has several tests yet to endure in order to be able to live in accord with the "demand of the day." This last phase of his apprentice year will present him with the tasks which he will have to undergo now in Lothario's environment. His meaningful dream in the first night in Lothario's house will bring together his previous life, so that he can improve upon it and prepare for the change that lies before him. All the symbols flow together in this strange dream. As Hamlet's father so Wilhelm's appears to him in his house attire, even as he with speaks with Mariana who seems to have no memory of their past failed relationship. Aurelia turns away when he tries to speak with her; Frau Melina, Laertes, Philina, Mignon, Felix, the harp-player—all appear, each in remarkable, though, at first confused, situations. The Amazon, Natalia, rescues the burning Felix; Wilhelm's father and Mariana seem to flee him; nature and inclination invite him to come to their help, but the hand of the Amazon holds him back.

Now follows a series of events after the meeting again with Jarno and his first exposure to Lothario's philosophy of the demand of the day ("Here or nowhere is America! Here or nowhere is the Moravian community!"), for example, the discovery that the countess is Lothario's sister and that Jarno and his friend know more about Wilhelm than he could suppose. The young surgeon carries the instrument case of his father, and this case reminds Wilhelm of his first meeting with the Amazon. This doctor brings news of the sad condition of the harp-player, to whom nothing but the feeling of his own guilt remains "and this [feeling] appears but like a dim, formless spirit, far before me (*Ibid.*, 412)." And now comes the "peculiar and critical" mandate to Wilhelm, after Lydia's departure, to help with her who has now become the burdensome loved one of Lothario. To the hesitating [Wilhelm], Jarno promises as a recompense that he will come to know Theresa. "I may say, she is a genuine Amazon; while others are but pretty counterfeits, that wander up and down the world in that ambiguous dress (*Ibid.*, 414)." Wilhelm is moved, he hopes in Theresa to find his Amazon again and this hope awakes in him the most singular

movements of heart. "He now looked upon the task which had been given him as the intervention of a special Providence (*Ibid.*)" {In what has preceded, one can notice that in Wilhelm's relationships to women the typical hermaphrodite have a well-organized significance: Marianne as a young officer, Mignon as a boy, Theresa as a young hunting boy, Natalia as the Amazon—they all stand over against the thoroughly "femine" series: Philina, the countess, Aurelia. But Mariana becomes a mother through him, Mignon changes into an angel, after she has passed a "terrifying moment" at the feet of the harp-player after her misbegotten effort to spend a night of love with Wilhelm; Theresa, the housewife, dons the hermaphrodite's mask, to recount for Wilhelm her history, "the history of a German girl" (and already thereby alone could one conclude that she in fact cannot be the daughter of her mother); and Natalia, whether she bears the cross of the order of her aunt, the "beautiful soul," or appears as the Amazon, will never lose her "calm, soft, indescribable height [of spirit]" with which she confesses that she "never or always" has loved.}

Theresa's personality and history, her calm, active demeanor, her "bright appearance," imbue Wilhelm with the wish to know Mignon and Felix under her supervision; then he reflects on himself and feels the kind of joy it must be to live in the company of a such a wholly pure human being. So he fulfills his "fate": He waits to find his Amazon, Natalia, but he succumbs to the bewitchment of Theresa. Later he will restrain himself regarding her and only after special developments be led to Natalia. But Theresa will be correct when she says at the end that Wilhelm's reason has chosen her, but his heart Natalia, and that now his understanding has to come to the help of his heart. First, though, Wilhelm returns to Lothario, and, "as he approached Lothario's castle, he observed, with more than usual interest, the central tower and the many passages and side-buildings." (*Ibid.*, 435)

Because we have more or less followed unintentionally the presentation of the events in the seventh book, which lead to the sharing of the apprentice-letter, a small insertion may be permitted to which the seventh chapter is devoted and which reveals the technique of Goethe in its full greatness. It has, purely technically speaking, a similar function as the previously discussed third chapter of the second book. Its chief content—Lothario revisits the love of his youth, now a mother several times over, and the youthful aunt with whom he confused her—has to serve not only as a tranquil point in the troubling series of narrated occurrences. It binds itself as a contrast with the preceding meeting of Wilhelm with Theresa and prepares for the re-appearance of the ghost of Mariana in the next chapter. To be sure, Mariana is dead, and "the heart of Mariana beats no longer with impatience to behold: she is not waiting in a neighboring chamber for the conclusion of my narrative or fable (*Ibid.*, 451)." But the reader, who also experiences the ghostlike scene of the report of the old Barbara to Wilhelm about Mariana's unhappiness, compares unconsciously, how very differently a new meeting between Wilhelm and Mariana would have had to be structured as opposed to that between Lothario and Margaret.

But we have gotten ahead of ourselves. Wilhelm, returns to the city, hears from the old Barbara about the end of Mariana, holds proof of her innocence, and learns that Felix is his child—and is thereby through circumstances led to doubt whether he is really his son. He sends the children to Theresa, returns to the castle, and now

the hour has come in which he will be taken into the society of the tower: his apprenticeship years are ended.

The handing over of the apprentice letter takes place in a ceremony, which consciously captures the motif raised in these pages. One can compare the technique chosen here by Goethe only with that of Beethoven at the beginning of the fourth movement of his Ninth Symphony. At that point, all the principal themes of the preceding movement are defined in a series, before the theme of concluding movement itself is developed.

Wilhelm enters the chapel in the tower. It is empty. A voice invites him to sit down.

But now the curtain, which hung down above the altar, went asunder with a gentle rustling, and showed, within a picture-frame, a dark, empty aperture. A man stepped forward at it, in a common dress, saluted the astonished looker-on, and said to him, "Do you not recognize me? Among the many things which you would like to know, do you feel no curiosity to learn where your grandfather's collection of pictures and statues are at present? Have you forgot the painting which you once so much delighted in? Where, think you, is the sick king's son now languishing?" Wilhelm, without difficulty, recognized the stranger, *whom, in that important night, he had conversed with at the inn*. "Perhaps," continued his interrogator, *"we should now be less at variance in regard to destiny and character."* (*Ibid.*, 463, italics are Schutz's)

Wilhelm was about to answer when the curtain quickly flew together again.

"Strange!" said Wilhelm to himself: *"can chance occurrences have a connection? Is what we call Destiny but Chance? Where is my grandfather's collection? And why am I reminded of it in these solemn moments?"* (*Ibid.*, 463, italics are Schutz's)

He had no time to think any further, since the curtain opened again—how much all this reminded him of the puppet theater symbolic—and someone stood before his eyes whom he recognized as the country clergyman, who with the merry society and him had made the water journey; he resembled the Abbé, whether he was the same person or not. With a cheerful countenance and a dignified expression, the man began:

"To guard from error is not the instructor's duty, but to lead the erring pupil; nay, to let him quaff his error in deep, satiating draughts, this is the instructor's wisdom. He who only tastes his error, will long dwell with it, will take delight in it as in a singular felicity; while he who drains it to the dregs will, *if he be not crazy*, find it out." The curtain closed again, and Wilhelm had a little time to think. "What error can he mean," said he within himself, "but the error which has clung to me through my whole life,—that I sought for cultivation where it was not to be found; that I fancied I could form a talent in me, while without the smallest gift for it?" (*Ibid.*, 464, italics are Schutz's)

And then the officer, because of whom he had taken Jarno to be a recruiter, had called out to him "in passing":

"Learn to know the men who may be trusted!" ... "If so many men," cried he [Wilhelm, speaking to himself], "took interest in thee, know thy way of life, and how it should be carried on, why did they not conduct thee with greater strictness, with greater seriousness? Why did they favor thy silly sports, instead of drawing thee away from them?"

"Dispute not with us!" cried a voice. "Thou art saved, thou art on the way to the goal. None of thy follies wilt thou repent; none wilt thou wish to repeat; *no luckier destiny can be allotted to a man.*" (*Ibid.*, 464, italics are Schutz's.)

And now Wilhelm has his apprentice's letter. But the part which we now get to know, deals only with art. Before Wilhelm experiences the part that concerns life, there are still broader presuppositions to fill in, which imply a new and highly unexpected turn to the fate-chance thematic. First, Wilhelm is permitted to expect an answer to the question that "lies next to his heart and should lie next to his heart." It is not the question about the whereabouts of the "art collection" as the symbol of the youthful ideals of Wilhelm the poet, which refers to the aesthetic sphere. Nor is the question about the picture of the sick king's son, which looks toward the erotic life-form. It is the *only life question*, namely, whether Felix is actually his son.

"Hail to you for this question!" cried the Abbé, clapping his hands for joy. "Felix is your son! ... Hail to thee, young man! Thy Apprenticeship is done: Nature has pronounced thee free." (*Ibid.*, 466)

The following eighth book sees the much changed Werner enter into a connection with Lothario's purchase of real estate. A world separates him from Wilhelm. On this occasion, Wilhelm has not only the opportunity to return to his past. He demands from Jarno the roll of his apprenticeship from the tower.

Jarno said it was the very time for that...

"It is a feeling of awe and fear which seized on a man of noble mind when conscious that his character is just about to be exhibited before him. Every transition is a crisis, and a crisis presupposes sickness. With what reluctance do we look into the glass after rising from a sick-bed! The recovery we feel: the effects of the past disease are all we see." (*Ibid.*, 473).

On the basis of this roll Wilhelm draws up an extensive narrative about his life and sends it to Theresa with a letter, in which he asks for her hand. He does this in accord with an inner conflict about whether he should first take counsel with Jarno and the Abbé, but he refrains from doing this.

From his parchment roll it appeared with certainty enough, that in very many actions of his life, in which he had conceived himself to be proceeding freely and in secret, he had been observed, nay, guided; and perhaps the thought of this had given him an unpleasant feeling. (*Ibid.*, 474)

For Mignon's sake, he is called "to Lothario's sister." He, who knew only the countess to be Lothario's sister, was frightened before the meeting, but he departs with Felix. (When he was sent from Jarno to Theresa, he hoped in this to find his Amazon. Now, because he will in fact find her again, he believes himself to be sent to the countess, for whose entire misery he felt himself to be culpable.) Only a single glance upon the beautiful, peaceful young man consoled him.

"Oh, who knows," cried he, "what trials are before me! Who knows how sharply by-gone errors will yet punish me, how often good and reasonable projects for the future shall miscarry! But this treasure, which I call my own, continue it to me, thou *exorable or inexorable Fate!*" (Schutz's italics, *Ibid.*, 477)



As soon as Wilhelm discovers that the note given to him from Lothario comes not from the hand of the countess but from the hand of Amazon (from who he had found some handwritten lines in the overcoat of the uncle at the time of the robbers' attack), he enters in the house with its marble statues, with which his youthful impressions appear to be bound up. In the vestibule hangs the picture of the sick king's son. "O that she were the one," says he to himself in this decisive moment. He finds Natalia and soon Mignon, who has been transformed into an angel and whose earlier life is now revealed to a greater degree. Natalia does not share at all the educational maxims of the Abbé, even though she was raised by him. To the Abbé he [Wilhelm] is a child, a young man, one of those who go wrong in their own way, rather than several others, who change correctly but follow another's way. The former, either through themselves or through direction, find the right way, which is the one that which is in accord with their nature, and so they will never leave it, and, as opposed to this, the latter are in danger every moment, of shaking off another's yoke and giving themselves over to unconditioned freedom. To associate this kind [who go wrong in their own way and don't follow others] with what it is to be human would be wholly against Natalia's convictions.

To my mind, he who does not help us at the needful moment, never helps; he who does not counsel at the needful moment, never counsels... Nay, I could almost venture to assert, that it is better to be wrong by rule, than to be wrong with nothing but the fitful caprices of our disposition to impel us hither and thither; and, in my way of viewing men, there always seem to be a void in their nature, which cannot be filled up, except by some decisive and distinctly settled law. (*Ibid.*, 493)

There are also theological questions about the plan of the world and of its governance, which are treated here. A third possibility for educating adults and children is Theresa's method. She herself cited the following in her letter to Natalie to Jarno's sarcastic formulation of the same:

"Theresa trains her pupils, forms them." Nay, once he [Jarno] went so far as to assert that of the three fair qualities, faith, love, and hope, I was entirely destitute. "Instead of faith," said he, "she has penetration; instead of love, she has steadfastness; instead of hope, she has trust." (*Ibid.*, 497)

All this appears in the letter in which Theresa explains that she is ready to accept Wilhelm's hand. Scarcely does this letter arrive at Natalia's, and it is shared with Wilhelm, than Jarno arrives with the news that Theresa is not the child of her mother and therewith the obstacle to her marriage with Lothario falls by the wayside. Wilhelm's reaction to this communication brings a new dialectical turn of the fate motif, or rather, so to say, its inversion:

"Formerly," said he, "while I was living without plan or object, in a state of carelessness, or, I may say, of levity, friendship, love, affection, trust came toward me with open arms, they pressed themselves upon me; but now, when I am serious, destiny appears to take another course with me. This resolution, of soliciting Theresa's hand, is probably the first that has proceeded altogether from myself. I laid my plan considerably; my reason fully joined in it: by the consent of that noble maiden, all my hopes were crowned. But now the strangest fate puts back my outstretched hand: Theresa reaches hers to me, but from afar, as in a dream; I cannot grasp it, and the lovely image leaves me forever." (*Ibid.*, 499)

This thought finds its advancement in Wilhelm's resistance to Jarno's belief that all that he has seen in the tower are only relics of a youthful undertaking, in regard to which most initiates were at first earnest, but about which now all usually only laugh.

"So, with these pompous signs and words, you do but mock?" cried Wilhelm. "With a solemn air, you lead us to a place inspiring reverence by its aspect; you make the strangest visions pass before us; you give us rolls full of glorious mystic apothegms, of which, in truth, we understand but little; you disclose to us, that hitherto we have been pupils; you solemnly pronounce us free; and we are just as wise as we were." (*Ibid.*, 512)

He ridicules the apprentice letter and refuses to allow Jarno to read it aloud or to explain it. He does permit him to read the following lines in which Jarno finds traces of the Abbé's influence:

"One power rules another, none can cultivate another: in each endowment, and not elsewhere, lies the force which must complete it; this many people do not understand, who yet attempt to teach and influence." "Nor do I understand it," answered Wilhelm... "For Heaven's sake, no more of these wise saws! I feel them to be but a sorry balsam for a wounded heart! Tell me, rather, with your cruel definiteness, what you expect of me, how, and in what manner, you intend to sacrifice me." (*Ibid.*, 516)

Jarno delivers a reprimand to him, which he at this point will hear none of.

But after Mignon's funeral, the revelation of the fate of the harp-player, the apparent poisoning of Felix, and the suicide of Augustine, Friedrich, who has recently appeared on the scene, commits the indiscretion of mentioning Wilhelm's love for Natalia, and, as a result, Wilhelm pulls together this thematic in a final outbreak of doubt, once again:

"How richly do I merit Jarno's censure! I imagined I had seized it: how firmly did I purpose to employ it, to commence another life! Could I, might I, I have done so? It avails not for mortals to complain of fate or of themselves. We are wretched, and appointed for wretchedness; and what does it matter whether blame of ours, higher influence or chance, virtue or vice, wisdom or folly, plunge us into ruin?" (*Ibid.*, 565)

But exactly in this moment Lothario can reveal to Wilhelm the following:

"And what ... what if your alliance with my sister were the secret article on which depended my alliance with Theresa? ... And now, since we have come together so unusually, let us lead no common life: let us work together in a noble manner, and for noble purposes! It is inconceivable how much a man of true culture can accomplish for himself and others, if without attempting to rule, he can be the guardian over many; can induce them to do that in season which they are at any rate disposed enough to do; can guide them to their objects, which in general they see with due distinctness, though they miss the road to them. Let us make a league for this: it is no enthusiasm, but an idea which may be fully executed, which, indeed, is often executed, only with imperfect consciousness, by people of benevolence and worth. is a living instance of it. No other need attempt to rival the plan of conduct which has been prescribed by Nature for that pure and noble soul." (*Ibid.*, 565–566)

So is the antithesis accident/fate, direction/guilt retained in the sphere of pure humanity. But still there remains the dialectical tension Abbé; the second part of the novel, *The Years of Wandering* (*Wanderjahre*), will show that in no way is it

resolved. And the subtitle refers to the fact that only the renunciants (*Entsagenden*) can strive for the solution. For the novel itself, as a work of art, what Wilhelm says about Shakespeare is valid:

They [his works] seem as if they were performances of some celestial genius, descending among men, to make them, by the mildest instruction, acquainted with themselves... It seems as if he cleared up every one of our enigmas to us, though we cannot say, Here or there is the word of solution. (*Ibid.*, 182)

And one can likewise find the program of technical execution in a decisive place in the work itself, namely in the conversation with Serlo about the essence of drama and of the novel (5/7).

Our friends were also of opinion, that, in the novel, some degree of scope may be allowed to Chance, but that it must always be led and guided by the sentiments of the personages: on the other hand, that Fate, which, by means of outward, unconnected circumstances, carries forward men, without their own concurrence to an unforeseen catastrophe, can have place only in the drama; that Chance may produce pathetic situations, but never tragic ones; Fate, on the other hand, ought always to be terrible, —that is, in the highest sense, tragic, when it brings into a ruinous concatenation the guilty man, and the guiltless that was unconcerned with him. (*Ibid.*, 294)

If this theory is right, then *Wilhelm Meister's Apprentice Year* is no pure novel, thanks be to God. It contained the drama of Mariana, Mignon, the harp-player, and many others also. However that may be: "The hero has no plan, but the play is fully planned."

S/S Parthia

June 3, 1948

## VI. On Wilhelm Meister's Years of Travel

Alfred Schutz

*But you—you would know thus and thus,  
In better wise what I have known,  
What Nature, gladly industrious  
For my sake, made long since my own.*

*In your own selves do you divine  
Like force—push on in your own trade!  
But should you look on work of mine  
Learn—"Thus he willed it should be made!"*

West-Eastern Divan  
Book of Ill Humor

[886] The *Years of Travel* relates to the *Apprenticeship* as the second part of *Faust* relates to the first. While in the *Apprenticeship*, the development of problems follows on the concrete reality, in *Years of Travel* the ground of reality is, if not abandoned, at least stripped of its own sense. Everything that happens in the actual world becomes only signs, only ciphers with a secret significance. Reference is continually made in such a way that "for a little book like ours restraint and mystery may be fitting" and that everything real remains intimation and fragment.

Several artistic means are deployed to reach this finally realized aspect. First, fiction is maintained as if the novel were nothing more than the redaction of various papers, which are more or less fragmentary in character, which scarcely or not at all repeat large stretches of action, and which limit themselves in other

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Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *West-Eastern Divan*, trans. Edward Dowden (London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1914), 72.

parts to the repetition of inner states. Further, pieces of the action are transferred into self-enclosed, apparently scattered narratives, in which the persons appearing in these enclaves suddenly enter in the main action of the novel. In the process of working upon the 1821 edition for the final version, a crucial detail is omitted, for example, namely the last offhand indication, which would have explained why Wilhelm knows in general the female chief characters of the “Man of Fifty-Years”—Hilary and the beautiful widow—and why he seeks and finds them in landscape of Mignon’s childhood. In the 1821 edition, Hersilie had mailed Wilhelm not only the papers sent to Makarie, but also a puzzling, geographic map with an arrow affixed by Hilary and the widow, whose tip points to the landscape of Mignon’s childhood. This detail is omitted in the reworking of the edition, and, as a result it is no longer understandable how Wilhelm shows the beautiful pair the arrow they indicated and [887] how he can end up among them (II,7). On the other side, important connections remain purposefully un-discussed. In the previously mentioned Chapter II/7, Wilhelm meets a painter, who accompanies him in pursuit of the traces of Mignon. It is established that the artist is deeply moved by Mignon’s destiny and that he has imagined her against water-colored landscapes as details in the background in order to capture how she loved and lived in circumstances varied in form and essence. Explicitly, that is, there is one picture that came into prominence—it depicts Mignon among the tight-rope walkers in a wild, rocky landscape—and he painted this on the journey there, “even before meeting Wilhelm, [and he produced this painting] by indicating all of her characteristics.” [Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister’s Years of Travel or The Renunciants*, trans. H.M. Waidson (London: John Calder and New York: Riverrun Press, 1981), II, 7, 70. All citations with page numbers will refer to this English translation, unless another text is indicated]. Goethe disdains to say how it is that the artist knows of Mignon. This is obviously suppressed, since the motivational systems that were of great importance in the *Apprenticeship* have become fully irrelevant in the atmosphere of the *Years of Travel*.

A further artistic means, deployed to allow the different spheres of reality and irreality to flow into each other, consists in the conscious change of the first and third person of the narrator. Two places might be marshaled as examples: Wilhelm narrates to his friends in the I-form (III/3) about his studies as a surgeon [and] his familiarity with the old sculptor, who presents anatomical models. Suddenly, and without any evidence of an outward occasion, the narrative shifts to the third person in the following sentence: “Wilhelm was likewise summoned as the next candidate” (III, 3, p. 12). That this is a matter not of an error in the redaction, but rather a wholly conscious purpose of Goethe, can be shown by the fact after the narrative proceeds for a while in the third person and the sculptor is reintroduced, repeatedly speaking, then the text proceeds: “This,” says Wilhelm [888], “was our last conversation.” (III/3, 17). Also in another place this artistic means is quite consciously utilized. One experiences the touching episode, when Lenardo finds again his “Beautiful-Good One”—appearing first as the “nut-brown maiden,” then as Nachodine, and finally as Suzanne—and gives an account in his

diary in which naturally he speaks of himself in the I-form (III,13). The entry "Sunday, the 21st" reports of the death of the father of the Beautiful-Good One. It states:

Meanwhile a child who had been keeping the father company asked me to hurry up, as the good man was restless. We entered; he was sitting up in bed, cheerful, indeed transfigured. "My children," he said, "I have been spending these hours in continuous prayer, and no psalm of David has escaped my attention; with my faith strengthened, I add these words of my own: Why does man hope only for what is close at hand? It is then that he must be active and help himself; it is with regard to what in the distance that he should have hope, and he should trust in God." He grasped *Lenardo's* hand and that of his daughter, placed them together, and said "Let this be no earthly union, but a heavenly one; love, trust, use and help one another like brother and sister, as unselfishly and purely as God may help you." When he had said this, he sank back with a serene smile and passed away. His daughter knelt by the bedside, as *Lenardo* did by her side, too, their cheeks touched, and their tears joined upon his hand.

The assistant rushed in at this moment, petrified at the scene... (III, 13, 98, note that the translator substitutes "I" for the italicized "*Lenardo*" above and so "rectifies" precisely the inconsistency between first and third persons that Schutz thinks is a matter of Goethe's artistic technique).

The entire rest of the chapter is narrated in the third person. The diary is set aside, and with the change of form Goethe inserts himself in the course of main action of the novel. The stylistic means, the change of the narrator's person, is strengthened through the sudden alteration between the past and the present tense in the following texts.

[889] A further method for mixing reality-spheres consists in the frequent interpolations of the poet to the reader, some of them indicated as such (two important ones of the 1821 edition were eliminated in the final edition); some in the form of proclamations, (often unrestrained) continuations of events; some dressed up as general reflections. We will have an opportunity to indicate in examples how such interpolations work out the accentuation of relevances and how they are determined to lead the reader to the essential symbolic content and away from unessential mundane content.

The *Years of Travel* has often been seen as a loose collection of novellas, mixed with philosophical, didactic pieces, sometimes as a typical work of an elderly author, which lacks unity and which, without the illustrious name of Goethe, would scarcely have survived for posterity. Some of these criticisms defend their thesis about the loose character of the whole work by pointing out the completely new organization of the final edition in contrast to the 1821 edition. But precisely this new organization should fill the observant reader with reverence and wonder.

In order to grasp the organization of the whole, one must keep in sight the fact that Goethe has grouped the parts of the novel after the fashion of the painting in the hall of the pedagogical province:

"As you see," the old man [who leads Wilhelm through the hall] replied, "for you will notice that the bases and friezes offer not only actions and events taking place at the same time offer not only actions and events taking place at the same time (*synchronistische*), but also actions and events of a like nature (*symphronistische*), since among all peoples happenings

occur that have similar meanings and that point to similar things. Thus you can see here that while in the main panel Abraham is being visited by his gods in the shape of beautiful youths,[890] in the frieze up above Apollo is among the shepherds of Admetus; from that we can learn that when the gods appear to men, they usually mingle unrecognized in their midst." (II, 2, 15–16)

As it seems to me, this text is the key to the technique of the novel. That technique is one of thematic (*symphronistic*) presentation. The following can be distinguished in terms of principal field, bases, and friezes:

*Principal Field:* The principal narrative, as well as those apparently self-enclosed novellas and narratives, from which "it will eventually become clear how the personages of this seemingly separate occurrence are intimately interwoven with those whom we know and love already (III, 3, 22)." Here belong: The Flight to Egypt (I,1); Saint Joseph the Second (I,2); The Home Visitation (I,2); The Lily Stem (I,2); The Nut-brown Maiden (I, 11); The Man of Fifty-Years (II, 3–5); Not too Far (III,10). Here also belong naturally the different shared letters and diaries of the principal characters.

*Frieze:* The separated, thematic narratives

The Foolish Pilgrim (I/5)

Who is the Betrayer? (I/8-9)

The New Melusine (III/6)

The Dangerous Bet (III/8)

*Base:* The two series of maxims and reflections

Considerations on the meaning of the wanderer (at the close of the second book)

and those from Makarie's archive (at the end of the third book)

both of which form a running commentary on the excellent arrangement for the general myth.

[891] In the principal narrative we have to differentiate two principal motifs, which appear in the principal title and subtitle of the novel: the motifs of wandering and renunciation. Strictly speaking, both are aspects of one and the same thing: wandering and separation, renunciation and hope, "through which the proper entrance into life is first of all thinkable" (the suppressed interpolation of the 1821 edition). [Johann Wolfgang Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, trans. of the first edition by Thomas Carlyle (Columbia, South Carolina, 1991), 237] Wandering is verbally and metaphorically to be understood: in the first sense wandering across the sea (the America-motif of the *Apprenticeship*) and in the second sense as wandering in more prosperous provinces, as Lenardo describes in his long discussion on the federation (III/9). The basic proposition of the *Apprenticeship*: "Here or nowhere is America" stands over against the one [for this novel]: "Where I am of use is my fatherland," "Over all be at home"—as the *Years of Travel* generally presents a dialectical antithesis to the *Apprenticeship*. Furthermore, wandering, a continual change of place, which is a condition that Wilhelm's covenant prescribes, and first on the basis of important grounds, is through the intercession of Jarno relaxed in order to make it possible for him to study the medical arts. Why is Wilhelm mandated to wander, why is he obliged not to remain under one roof for more than



3 days, and why he must leave no shelter without at least distancing himself some miles from it and without returning to an abandoned place for a year? Wilhelm knows and mentions in his first letter to Natalia that these commands should hinder the least desire to settle anywhere from awakening in him.

"You are the sort of person," [says Jarno to him at the end of the second book,] "who easily gets used to a place, but not so easily to a vocation. A variable style of life is prescribed for all such people, so that they may perhaps arrive at a secure way of life." (II, 11, 114; the non quoted section on Jarno is Schutz's interpolation).

And in the conversation before the charcoal pile in which Jarno sees a comparison with all pedagogic efforts (he compares himself with a charcoal bucket full of good beechwood charcoal), he says to Wilhelm,

I see you as a pilgrim's staff which has the unusual quality of growing leaves [892] wherever it is put, but of nowhere taking root. Now work out the image further for yourself, and learn to understand why it is that neither forester nor gardener, neither charcoal-burner, nor joiner, nor any kind of craftsman will know what to do with you. (I, 4, 41)

We know only one of the conditions "which the Society laid down for me, indeed which I laid down for myself! The association [prescribes] to me who prescribe it to me myself!" (I, 1, 19): "Now among the strange obligations of the Renunciants there was also this: that when they met they should only be occupied with matters relating to the present and were not to talk about what was past or future." (I, 4, 39) This condition resembles generally that imposed on the pupils of the pedagogical province. It is not given to the children to know the highest meaning of the gestures which symbolize the three reverences, but [they are given] an important, comprehensible meaning:

At the same time everyone is ordered to retain and cherish for himself whatever information it has been found right to impart to him; they are not allowed to chatter about it either with strangers or among themselves, and so the teaching is modified a hundred times over. Apart from that, a secret has great advantages: for if a man is constantly told what something is all about, he comes to think it is about nothing. Reverence is owed to certain secrets. If certain secrets were to become generally known, they would need to be respected by drawing a veil over them and by silence, for these have their effect on modesty and good manners. (II, 1, 8)

All wandering in this and that meaning involves renunciation. Separation is the first test of all renunciants. This is the state in which we come to know Wilhelm at the beginning of the *Years of Travel*. The long desired reunion with Natalia appears to constitute the conclusion of the *Apprenticeship*. Now he is far from her. He writes to her:

What could separate me from you? From you, to whom I belong eternally, even if a strange destiny separates me from you and unexpectedly shuts me out of the heaven to which I was so close. I had time to collect myself, and yet no length of time would have sufficed to give me this composure, if I had not obtained it from your words [893] and your lips at that decisive moment. How could I have torn myself away, if the lasting thread had not been spun which was to bind us for time and eternity? However, I am not permitted to talk about all that. I don't wish to infringe your tender commands; may it be there, on this peak, that I utter the word "separation" to you for the last time. My life is to be one of travel. (I, 1, 18)

What has happened between the end of the *Apprenticeship* and the beginning of the *Years of Travel*? What was the decisive moment, what were the tender commands?

We do not know and we will not experience it in what follows. Because these are Wilhelm's direct and indirect communications to Natalia, her name accompanies him in all his wanderings. No letter of Natalia's to him, no report about her circumstances is reported to us, except when, in the large summary, it is said

that Lothario with his wife Theresa and Natalie, who did not wish to be separated from her brother, have already gone to sea in fact, accompanied by the Abbé. They set out under favorable portents, and it is to be hoped that a helpful wind will fill their sails. (III, 14, 100–101)

And [there is] only one of the “interpolations,” which show so clearly the conscious technique of the novel, according to which all that is factual is consigned to the realm of the irrelevant:

But we, in our narrative and descriptive function, should not permit these dear people, who at an earlier stage gained so much of our affection, to undertake such a long journey without our having provided more news about their intentions and actions up to this point, especially as it has been so long since we heard anything in detail about them. *None the less we shall omit doing this* since their activities hitherto were directed only in a preparatory manner toward the great venture to which we see them [895] heading. But we live in the hope that in some future time we shall find them again, cheerfully leading lives of full, orderly activity and revealing the true worth of their various characters. (III, 14, 101, Schutz's italics).#

{[894]footnote: # Here lies before us one of the few indications regarding the planned third novel of the series, “The Master Years,” of which Goethe says to Chancellor Müller, “‘The Master Years’ is moreover the most difficult and the most dreadful in the trilogy. Everything is to be taken only symbolically, individually something else stands behind [everything]. Every solution of a problem is a new problem.”}

[895 continued] This serves for the meantime as an example for a repeatedly found, entirely conscious technique of omitting the irrelevant factual. Not factual wandering in the real world, but the metaphorical wandering in the symbolic sphere and the closely connected motif of renunciation make up the content of the novel. The interpretation, “what it all means, this strange discovering and rediscovering, parting and meeting,” (II, 7, 53) [as it is repeated in the chest-key symbolic], the “labyrinth of human conviction and fate” in relation to the world order, and not its description in the real-sphere, is the theme of the novel.

But this symbolism has its realm and its hierarchies, and the key to this lies in the doctrine of the three reverences, in the heart and core of the novel (II/2): The first reverence deals with what is over us. It is expressed through the gesture of crossing one's arms across the breast and directing a joyful look toward heaven, a testimony to the effect that a God is there above, who reveals himself and is reflected in parents, teachers, and legal guardians. On this reverence rests ethnic religion, the religion of different peoples, and the first, happy loosening from a base fear. All pagan religions are of this type, whatever names they may have, if they wish. The first article of the Christian creed is of an ethnic type and belongs to all peoples.

The second reverence has to do with what is under us, and it is symbolized through the gestures in which the hands are folded behind the back, as if bound, and

through the lowered, smiling look that says [896] that one considers the earth with care and gaiety; it provides the opportunity for nourishment; it grants unspeakable joys; but it also brings disproportionate suffering. When one injures oneself physically, whether deliberately or accidentally; when earthly arbitrary force allots to one suffering, then he thinks carefully; then such danger accompanies him for a whole lifetime. The religion, which is grounded on the reverence before that which is under us, is the Christian. It not only allows the earth to lie under it, while also summoning itself to a higher birthplace, but also recognizes as divine lowliness and poverty, ridicule and shame, aching and misery, suffering and death, since favorable things and offenses are to be known not as obstacles but as demands for a holiness to be won lovingly. The second article of the Christian creed has to do with this religion [and] deals with those struggling with suffering and dominating it.

The third reverence follows on the second in an act of taking courage. The individual turns himself toward his comrades and directs himself toward them. He stands direct and bold, not selfishly isolated. Only in a bond with his equals does he make a front against the world. The religion, which is grounded on that reverence, which we have when faced with that which is equal to us is philosophical: since the philosopher, who stands here in the center, must draw all that is higher to himself and distance himself from all that is lower, and only in this middle state does he deserve the name of the wise one. Since he understands his relationship to his equals and also to the whole of humanity and the relationship to all residual earthly undertakings, whether necessary or accidental, he lives in the truth in the cosmic sense. [897] The third article of the creed teaches the inspired community of holy ones, which is to say, of those who are in the highest grade good and wise.

In the previous grouping of the most important citations, one takes account of the noteworthy (but to me up until now unrecognized) circumstance that the hierarchy of the three reverences and religions correlative to them and the divine persons embodied within the articles of the Creed in an astonishing way are not parallel. To be sure, the reverence for that which is over us and also the ethnic religions are fundamental for the hierarchy. However, insofar as the second reverence has to do with that which is under us, a reverence that must be overcome through a reverence before that which is *like* us, the last correlative religion-type is the philosophical religion, which is ranked over against the second, the Christian, which for its part, is also designated the ultimate to which humanity can attain. Here lies a great hidden problem for the interpretation of the Goethean *Weltanschauung*, for which at this time I find no solution.

The last overall reverence, the reverence for oneself, is only indicated, not developed. Also the galleries, through which Wilhelm is led in order that he might see in pictures the development of the religion, remains fragmentary. He sees the representation of the Old Testament, thematically accompanied by events from other mythologies. He sees in a—shorter—gallery the representations of the New Testament and becomes aware at the end that one has traversed [898] the circle of the courtyard. The New Testament, it is explicitly said, concerns only the philosophy of Christ. As far as that ultimate religion is concerned, the one which springs out of that which is under us, that honoring of the disagreeable, the hated, and the repulsive, one should

present it to each child in the world only “provisionally” so that he might know where he must find something similar, if he should experience such a need. Wilhelm is invited to return after a year and is promised then to be initiated into the “Holiness of Pain.” However, when he returns, there is nothing more said of this promise.

The doctrine of the three reverences, we should say, provides the key for understanding the structure of the whole novel. Let it be assumed that each of the three books of the novel is devoted to one of these ground-attitudes, and in what follows in this investigation I will undertake to support this assumption through an analysis of the materials.

[899] The first book begins with the symbol sphere of the life of Mary. Not only the flight to Egypt, but also the legends of the Search for a Home, the Lily Stem, and the Annunciation are anchored vividly and deeply in the reality sphere. What is wonderful is taken in earnest because it rests on an earnest ground. The deteriorated chapel of Joseph is built on a ground, whose stones originated in Campostela. All the prehistory of Mary touches upon the double motif of the novel: wandering and renunciation. Driven from her home during the war and separated from her spouse, whom the well-armed group had attacked, Mary finds help with Elizabeth and Joseph, who after seeking her hand for a long time, wins her assent. Wilhelm feels himself deeply moved by the likeness which belongs completely to the ethnic sphere of the Christian legend, but also through conviction coming to expression in Joseph’s narrative. He sends the notes of his history to Natalia and observes that when he had expressed here and there his own convictions in connection with Joseph’s, it was entirely natural, given the affinity he felt with him. “Is not the way he reveres his wife akin to the feeling that I have for you? And does not even the way these two lovers met have some resemblance to ours?” (I, 3, 32).

The next symbol sphere, which we will name the “chthonic,” belongs to the domain of Montan-Jarno. Fitz, the overpowering young man, who is dressed in the garb of a treasure-seeker and who possesses the key to the mysterious chest, which Felix will find in the cave of the giant castle, leads them to Montan. Where the chest comes from, how it ended up in the giant castle, what it contains [900]—we find out none of this here or in the later course of the narrative. At the close of the first book—an important place—the chest is given to the antiquarian for safe-keeping; he advises against opening it:

“It’s true, I believe we could do so without causing particular damage,” he said, “only as it has come into your hands by so strange a chance, you should test your good fortune with it. For if you were born to good fortune and if this casket has some significance, at some time or other the key to it will be found, just when you least expect it.” (I, 12, 126–127)

And the antiquarian narrates the story of the crucifix with the broken arms, which had been found by chance subsequently.

...delighted at such a happy combination of circumstances, I can’t help recognizing here the fate of the Christian religion which, although it has often been dissected and dispersed, must always come together again finally at the cross. (I, 12, 127)

Wilhelm marveled at the image and the strange arrangement of fate, “‘I’ll follow your advice,’” he added, “may the casket remain locked up until the key has been

found, even it means leaving it like this until the end of my life." (I, 12, 127) "He who lives a long life," said the old man, "sees many things collected and many scattered." (I, 12, 127)

The key is found—only in the third book—in Hersilie's hand; she had secretly taken it out of Fitz's jacket, the jacket he had to abandon, when he was squeezed in the trap door of the uncle's property. Hersilie asks Wilhelm to come: "But in the first place the casket must stand unopened between us, and then when it is opened, it will indicate what is to follow." (III, 2, 10) Then it occurs to her that neither she, nor Wilhelm have a right to the chest, but only Felix, its finder. "And again, what a state of affairs it is! Things move and get displaced." (III, 2, 10) Later, she has possession of the chest, delivered with the help of the shopkeeper of the deceased antiquarian. She dares not open it, but yearns to know the meaning of this strange discovering and rediscovering, parting and [901] meeting (III, 7, 53). Finally at the end of the third book, Felix appears with Hersilie, he snatches away the chest and key. In the words of her letter to Wilhelm:

"I'm not interested in your key!" he cried out; "it's your heart I would like to open, so that it should be revealed to me, so that it would approach me and press me to itself, so that it would allow me to clasp it to my breast." He was most handsome and lovable, and as I was approaching him he kept on pushing the casket in front of him on the table; the key was already in the lock; it threatened to turn, and turned in fact. *The key broke, and the outer half of it fell on to the table.*

I was more confused than it is possible to be and than one ought to be. He takes advantage of my inattentiveness, leaves the casket, approaches me, and takes me in his arms. I struggled in vain, his eyes came close to mine, and there is something fine in seeing one's own image reflected in loving eyes. I saw this for the first time when he pressed his mouth fervently upon mine. I will admit that I returned his kisses; it is after all very lovely to make someone happy. *I tore myself away, the gap between seemed to me all too clear;* instead of composing myself, I went too far, I pushed him angrily away, my confusion gave me courage and sharpness of mind; I threatened and scolded him, I ordered him never to appear in my sight again; he believed in the sincerity of my manner. "All right, then," he said, "I'll ride off into the world until I die." He threw himself on to his horse and galloped away. Still half dreaming, I wanted to take care of the casket, *half of the key was broken off, I found myself doubly and triply embarrassed.*" (III, 17, 117–118, italics are Schutz's)

This long quotation was indispensable, since only in Goethe's own language does the manifold symbolism of the broken key for the mysterious chest come forward, and the application of this likeness to Felix's relationship to [902] Hersilie appears. But the key is not broken. It is shown to an "old, much esteemed goldsmith." (III, 17, 118) He considers the broken key and shows "us something we had overlooked until then," (III, 17, 118) namely that the break was a smooth rather than a rough one. When touched the two ends fasten on to each other, he removes the key in its entirety; the two parts are bound magnetically together, hold fast to each other, and only respond to someone who knows what is happening. The man withdraws a little, the casket springs open, but he immediately closes it; and opines that it was not good to meddle with such secrets. (III, 17, 118)

And to this report Hersilie adds:

You will certainly not be able to imagine how strange I felt, thank heavens; for how could someone standing outside this confusion be expected to recognize it? *The portentous casket*

*is before me, I have in my hand* the key which does not function; I would gladly let the casket remain unopened, if only the key would reveal to me the immediate future.

You need not worry about me for the time being, but I do beseech and implore you, and urgently recommend: make inquiries about Felix; I have sent around without success to find out which way he has gone. I don't know whether I should bless or fear the day that brings us together again.

(III, 17, 118, italics are Schutz's)

We have here presented the complete chest-key symbolism, in which Felix finds the chest and makes acquaintance with Fitz. The motif arises at decisive points in the novel and gives an example of his [Goethe's] technique. After the above completely reproduced places, there follows the short chapter on Felix's fall with his horse in the river and his rescue by Wilhelm's lance. With this the novel concludes. But is it not in fact still necessary, after the whole affair with the chest [903], to say something about Felix and Hersilie's future? But this would be the case only in another atmosphere, such as that which governs in the *Apprenticeship*.

We return after this digression to the analysis of the first book, where we have seen Wilhelm, accompanied by Felix with Fitz's guidance, reach Montan's sphere. Jarno, asked by Wilhelm how he had come to study orology, answers,

"My friend... we have had to be in a state of resignation, if not for ever, at least for a good time. The first thing that occurs to an able man in such circumstances is to start a new life. New things are not sufficient for him, they only valid as a distraction; he demands a new totality and immediately puts himself into the middle of it." "But why then," Wilhelm interrupted him, "precisely this most unusual activity, this most solitary of all interests?" "For the very reason that it is hermit-like. I wanted to avoid people. There's no helping them..." "All the same, they seem more entertaining to me than your rigid rocks." "Not at all... for these latter at least are beyond our understanding." "You're being evasive... for what has that got to do with these rocks and crags?" "But what if I were to treat these very splits and cracks as letters," was the reply, "and tried to decipher them, to make words out of them, and to learn to read them..."

(I, 3, 35-36)

And later, "It [inanimate nature] appears to us *in the shape of Sybil* who presents in advance *a testament of that which has been decreed from the beginning of time* but is only to become real in due course." (I, 4, 37, italics are Schutz's) There follows a conversation about pedagogy, about many-sidedness and one-sidedness, about the inaccessibility of the idea of a general education (of the ideals of the *Apprenticeship* and the first part of *Faust*), about the inevitability of acquiring proficiency in a speciality, and about the necessity of acquiring knowledge "within a complete environment." Montan hopes to take advantage of his mountain-man knowledge "both in the new and the old world." (I, 4, 39) Therefore, Wilhelm shares his plan with him to learn "a certain, particular occupation, an entirely particularly useful art." (I, 4, 41) What kind of occupation this is, we will first experience later, in the confession letter of Wilhelm to Natalia [904] at the end of the second book, in which fragments from the here discussed conversation with Jarno are reintroduced. Wilhelm wishes to become a surgeon. He pulls out of his pocket the surgeon's instrument-case, which has a symbolic importance that pervades the *Apprenticeship* and that refers to Natalia. Jarno names it his fetish. Jarno promises to use his influence with his

confederates in order that the condition of Wilhelm's constant changing places can be altered, and the friends part ways, Jarno with Fitz heads toward the mountains, Wilhelm and Felix set out for the giant castle, where Felix finds the chest.

Fitz meets them at the giant castle and leads them along a forbidden way into the property of the great land-owner—a trap door opens, those entering are imprisoned, and Fitz, upon letting go of his jacket escapes safely. Wilhelm and Felix have entered a new symbolic realm, that of the historic tradition and the organization of the polis.

No name is given to the master of the house, the uncle of Juliette and Hersilie—he was born in Philadelphia, where his grandfather had immigrated. As a young man, he returned to Europe, preferring to lose himself here cooperating with the orderly mass of people rather than play at being an Orpheus and Lycurgus across the seas centuries later. He took over the family estates and knew how to build up acquisitions within the world of agriculture and to develop a modest area, which, within its limited conditions, is still utopian enough. A small *polis* (city) is arranged in this area: religious freedom [and] an assembly of elders are arranged, Sunday is dedicated to considerations toward bringing to speech all that oppresses humanity in their religious, moral, societal, or economic relationships. “You can see from this [says Hersilie, the niece, to Wilhelm] that we take full care not to be received into your order, into the community of the Renunciants.” (I, 7, 77) The motto of the head of the household is “From the useful through the true to the beautiful.” (I, 6, 61) Not “the best to the greatest number,” rather “what is desirable to many” is his principle. (I, 6, 62) In the whole castle one finds no picture that has anything to do with religion, redemption, legend, or fable. Maps and images of the city, portraits [905] of great individuals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, collections of the handwriting of these people are to be found in the gallery.

“This is my kind of poetry,” the host said with a smile; “my imagination needs to hold on to something; I can hardly believe that something has really existed if it is no longer there. I try to get the strictest evidence about such relics of a past age, otherwise I wouldn't accept them.” (I, 7, 73)

Other motifs run together in this household. Here are the nieces, Juliette and Hersilie, and of the latter the text finally says in a later “interpolation” that she is

a lady as strange as she is lovable who only rarely appears in our reports, though every time she appears she will undoubtedly have attracted every intelligent and sensitive person in an irresistible manner. Furthermore, the fate that affects her is possibly the most singular one that can befall someone of delicate feeling. (III, 16, 116)

This fate, whose outcome the previously mentioned chest episode clearly indicates, is anticipated in the beginning of the novel through the blossoming inclination of Felix to Hersilie, which the father thinks he notices when he notices that Felix dresses himself with more care than otherwise. Felix falls off the horse when he tries to gather the flowers that Hersilie desires, he will learn to write to send her letters, and he will learn to ride in order to be back with her again. Hersilie opines doubtfully that she will never have luck with contemporary admirers and that it seems that the next generation will have to compensate her. She, who will stand



between father and son, gives Wilhelm a novel to read, translated by her from the French. This is the first of the included novellas, "The Foolish Pilgrim." Hersilie hands it over with the words, which resound as a foreshadowing of her own fate: "There's a mad girl in it! That might well be no particular recommendation, but if I ever were to lose my reason, as I often feel I'd like to, this is the way it would be." (I, 5, 49) [906] This is the introduction to the novella in the last edition. In the edition of 1821 the novel is situated in the third book and is spatially and temporally juxtaposed to Hersilie's tragedy. But rather than Hersilie, it is Friedrich in this edition who presents it to Wilhelm, with the explanation that Leonardo would have entrusted to him the manuscript from the treasures of his collection.

That so both of us may see thoroughly what a difference there is between a mad pilgrimage, such as many lead in the world, and a well-meditated, happily-commenced undertaking like ours, of which I shall at this time say no more in praise. (*Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 290)

(What is meant is the "group" under Lenardo's and Odoardo's leadership). The placing and change of framework is of the highest significance, and it in no way proves that the novellas constituting the *Years of Travel* are only loosely linked together. Rather, to the contrary, this is one of the most astonishing proofs of the artistic intelligence predominating in this edition. Hersilie and no one else must have found sufficient participation and pleasure in the event expressed in the French affair in order to translate the history from the French.

In a "thematic" manner we recognize the foolish pilgrim as a wanderer and in her own way a renunciant. Only a "burlesque romance," which she sings, reveals something of her previous history—also for her it appears that she will not have much success with her admiring contemporaries (the history of the mill of the unfaithful). In the house of the Master of Revanne, in whose mouth the narrative is placed, she stands between the father and son and may only free herself from the both of them if she gives each of them to understand that the other had achieved wide ranging rights to her pleasure. [907] The situation is significant from several perspectives. In an "interpolation" within the novella the following commentary is delivered:

I will now tell the story of the foolishness of a sensible woman in order to show that folly is nothing else but reason under another outward appearance. It is true, a strange contradiction will be found between the noble character of the pilgrim and the comic subterfuge she made use of; but we are already familiar with two of her disparities, the pilgrimage itself and the ballad song. (I, 5, 57)

The motif of the young woman between two men, of the exchange of love-pairs, is a basic motif of the Wilhelm Meister poetry. In the *Apprenticeship*, we have found Philine between Friedrich and Wilhelm, and Theresa in the like situation between Wilhelm and Lothario. In the next thematic novella of the *Years of Travel*, "Who is the Traitor?" which is intimately connected to "The Foolish Pilgrim," one finds that Julietta, who was thought to be Lucidor's, belongs to Anton and Lucidor belongs with Lucinde. In "The Man of Fifty Years," the Major and his son Flavio stand in a similar, unclarified relationship to Hilarie and that nameless beautiful one, who is only named the "young widow" or "the remarkable one" or one time "our queen of

hearts." When these two last-named women enter in the "main field of action" (II, 7), Wilhelm and his painter-friend find themselves in a similar, unclarified relationship to them. And finally the same situation returns in "Not too Far" (III, 10), complicated through the position of Odoardo between his wife and Aurora and the position of the "house friend" between the "Lady" (Odoardo's wife) and Florine. But in "The Foolish Pilgrim," in "The Man [908] of Fifty Years," in Hersilie's fate, the woman stands not only between two men: she stands between father and son, has no good fortune with contemporary admirers, and her renunciation is doubly difficult. Doubtless at play here for the poet of the Marienbader Elegy and the poem entitled "Phenomenon" ["Phoebus on high receives rain cloud's embraces," see "Phenomenon" *West-östlicher Divan/West-Eastern Divan*, trans. J. Whaley (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979), 17] are some autobiographical moments, from which, though, an objective analysis of the novel must properly distance itself. As far as what concerns Hersilie's own fate, it suffices to examine the one statement from the previously cited letter to Wilhelm (III, 17): "Oh men, oh human beings! Will you never be able to pass on reasonableness from one generation to another? Was it not sufficient that the father caused so much damage, do we need the son as well, to confuse us insolubly?" (III, 17, 118) Already earlier (II, 10) Hersilie writes to Wilhelm:

For many years the whole world has been reproaching me as a moody and strange girl. Well, if I am, it is not through any fault of mine. People had to be patient with me, and now I need to be patient with myself and with my own imagination which now and again brings father and son before my eyes, now together, now in alternation. I seem to myself like an innocent Alcmena who is continually haunted by two beings that represent each other. (II, 10, 100)

As a little, more stimulating detail, refer to the fact Hersilie had prepared a letter case, "a very dainty one, without knowing very clearly who was to have it, father or son, through certainly one of the two." (Felix keeps it as a cover for the little slate: Hersilie's greeting to Felix, the peddler makes use of it). Also in "The Man of Fifty Years," the young widow has prepared a letter case (II, 4): Not Flavio, but his father, the Major, receives it ("I watched it grow in skillful hands..." II, 4, 45) and uses it as a cover for copies of his hunting poetry. [909]

Because we have worked out with satisfaction in what preceded the motif of "The Foolish Pilgrim," here is perhaps the place to add a word about the second thematic novella: "Who is the Betrayer?" In the 1821 edition, it too is placed in the mouth of Friedrich. In the final edition, an important person in the environs, "the young official," presents it to Wilhelm with an accompanying letter:

...if you have been able to esteem the trimness of an elegantly wealthy French aberration, I hope that you will not despise the simple faithful honesty of German customs, and will pardon me, if, according to my fashion and way of thinking, and to my origins and position, I find no more agreeable picture than that which is offered to us by the German middle classes in the unsullied domesticity. (I, 7, 77)

The novella itself is a variation in German taste on the similar theme, which had been handled earlier in the French style. (Can one not almost be led to liken the

principles of organization of the *Years of Travel* with that of Bach's "Goldberg Variations"? Not only the organization of a thematic kind finds itself here and there, not only the alternation between strict arabesque variations, the progressively complicated canons, but also the overture in French style and the German *Quodlibet*.) Let it be noted only that also here the motif of wandering is decisively presented: In the traveling coach Anton, the cosmopolitan, will lead his Julie into distant places, of which she had always longed, even as Lucidor, who had been destined for her, hopes to find his happiness with Lucinde in settled labor.

With the working out of the significance of the property-owner and Hersilie, we have not yet followed all the threads which are interlaced in this principal chapter of the novel. In accord with them, Wilhelm says to Hersilie in his departure,

I set out to observe and to think, I have experienced and learnt more that I could ever have hoped for in your company, and I am convinced that in the next [910] direction which has been indicated to me I shall become aware of and learn more than I can anticipate. (I, 7, 74)

The next path will lead Wilhelm to Hersilie's Aunt Makarie. Before we accompany him there, we must speak of his cousin Lenardo who appeared to us for the first time in a noteworthy letter exchange. Lenardo, even he, is a wanderer and renunciant: he spent 3 years far distant, only giving news of his residence symbolically through sending gifts.

I wanted to see the world and give myself up to it, and during this time I wanted to forget my home from which I had come and to which I hoped once more to return. I wanted to retain the impression whole, so that isolated aspects should not confuse me after the event. (I, 6, 67)

His only question concerns Valerine, the daughter of the tenant-farmer, whom his uncle with right but also severity drove out. He confuses the blonde Valerine with the brunette Nachodine, who had turned to him for help, a help, which, because of many circumstances, he had not given to her. Lenardo's passion was for Nachodine and her alone—a "passion for conscience's sake" as it is called in an important "interpolation." (III, 14, 110) Lenardo resembles in broader measure Lothario. When Wilhelm is sent by Makarie to him (I, 11), his first question is about the nut-brown young woman. He asks Wilhelm to seek for Valerine—which he believes to be her name—and then changes his mind and accompanies him to find her. In this technique, usual for Goethe, namely the double processing of the same motif, this visit is comparable with Lothario's visit with his earlier loved one, the farmer's daughter, in the *Apprenticeship*. But the difference in the atmospheres of the *Apprenticeship* and the *Years of Travel* becomes evident here: Lothario visits his earlier love, Lenardo will fulfill a duty of conscience. And when Lenardo recognizes the error in the persons with terror, he commissions Wilhelm to seek Nachodine. In the *Apprenticeship* Lothario had entrusted to Wilhelm a similar but entirely different mission: namely to keep his beloved [911] Lydia at a distance. Lothario, led by the "Bonded Ones," changes his motto "Here or nowhere is America" and travels at the close of the *Years of Travel* with his spouse Theresa to America. Lenardo, who must begin from all that went before, organizes the "Group," and prepares the project through long travels, in which he studies the life of the mountain farmers. Wilhelm has found Nachodine—a

mysterious friend of Lenardo's (i.e., the antiquarian, to whom Wilhelm had entrusted the chest), (I, 12) had put him on her tracks. We know none of the details here. She grew up with her father in the mountains. Wilhelm reports (II, 6) that he had found her in the most enjoyable of circumstances. In his journey in the mountains, Lenardo "through a wonderful fate" (III, 14, 109) encounters the Beautiful-Good One. She lives as Frau Suzanne in prosperous industry. Her husband had been torn from her through a misfortune that is not further clarified (Lenardo's diary, III, 13, Friday the 10th). The scene of the death of her father we have presented in another context. An assistant is assigned for her and she will emigrate, and he initially will not; but then he changes his mind. Lenardo sends his diary to Makarie with a request for advice. Meanwhile Lenardo has founded and organized the "Group," about which we will learn at the opening of the third book. Finally, Makarie summons the Beautiful-Good One to her side as a successor to Angela. Lenardo has never expressed anything in the least about a nearer bond with the Beautiful-Good One. As one anticipates in feeling, as she foresees such a relationship, she responds that she does not feel it appropriate to respond to such an affection by handing over to him her divided self. The memory of her spouse so absorbs her whole being that there is no room for love or passion. One calms oneself in this setting, regretting that in such cases one has little advice to offer (III, 14).

[912] Wilhelm leaves the Good One to attend to Makarie and encounters herewith the realm of the cosmic symbolism. Angela, the faithful assistant of Makarie and the Doctor-Astronomer receive him. The conversation turns to the applicability of mathematics to the natural sciences. To be sure, the content is not shared here, but a limited series of maxims and reflections from Marakie's Archive, which is given with the third book, might be taken to be a summary of the conversation. Why the conversation does not appear in the "main field" is justified in an "interpolation": "Our friends have picked up a novel, and if this work has already become here and there more than reasonably didactic, we none the less find it advisable not to put to the patience of those who are well disposed to us further to the test." (I, 10, 104) Only Wilhelm's reaction to the reading is registered:

"Here I have been learning about great natural gifts, capacities, and accomplishments but finally also about much that is dubious concerning the way they are used. If I were to sum up the matter, I would exclaim: 'Great thoughts and pure heart are what we should ask God for.'" (I, 10, 104)

The pilgrimage through the province of reverence for that which is above us reaches its highpoint in Wilhelm's visit to the observatory:

Deeply moved and astonished, he closed his eyes. Something that is vast ceases to be sublime, it transcends our mental capacity, it threatens to destroy us. "What am I then in relationship to the whole?" he asked himself, "how can I confront it, how can I stand in its midst?" (I, 10, 105)

And finally he comes, considering the result of the evening's undertaking, to the conclusion:

How can anyone take up a position with regard to the infinite unless he gathers within his most inward, deepest being all his intellectual and spiritual [913] forces which are extended

in many directions, unless he asks himself: "Can you only conceive of yourself in the midst of this eternally living order if there arises at the same time within yourself a force that is both unyielding and mobile, circling around a pure central point? And even if it should become difficult for you to find this center within your breast, you would recognize it from the fact that a kindly and beneficent effect emanates from it and bears witness to it." (I, 10, 105)

This is the Goethean interpretation of the famous Kantian statement regarding the starry heavens above me and the moral conscience within me, those two things, which in like measure fill us with reverence.

How can we get to know ourselves? Never through reflection, but it may well be through action. Try to do your duty, and you will at once know what you are worth.

But what is your duty? The requirement of the day. (II, "Reflections in the Sense of the Travelers," 114)

And in this sense, Wilhelm proceeds with his reflections:

I have no need to be ashamed of my present position, my aim is to restore an excellent family circle to a commendable unity; the path is marked. I am to examine what it is that is keeping good people apart, I am to remove obstacles of whatever kind they may be. This you may avow before these heavenly hosts; if they were to notice you, they would smile at your limitations, it is true, but they would certainly respect your intention and would favor its fulfillment. (I, 10, 105)

[914] There follows Wilhelm's dream of the bond between Makarie and the world-system, a dream, which reminds one of the dream of the beautiful Amazon in the *Apprenticeship*. Still Wilhelm does not know Makarie's Archive, the portfolio named "Makarie's peculiarities." (I, 10, 110) We ourselves first experience these at the end of the novel (III, 15) namely that she is a living armillary sphere and a spiritual device that is "able to follow the course of the stars of its own accord and in its own way." (III, 15, 113) [In her wandering through the planet-system, no imagination can follow her there, "but we hope that such an entelechy will not disappear completely from our solar system, so that she may again be active in earthly life and well-doing." (III, 15, 113) Therewith Goethe concludes this "ethereal poetic narrative" while "hoping for forgiveness," (III, 15, 113)] Here, though, in Wilhelm's dream, this revelation is anticipated: The astronomer cries out:

A marvel, indeed a marvel! You yourself don't realize how strangely you've been speaking. Let us hope that this is not pointing to the departure of that wonderful being who has been allotted such an apotheosis [the dreamed transformation of Makarie into a star], at one time or another. (I, 10, 107)

Wilhelm's dream was kept a secret from Makarie, but, because of his peculiar, spiritual intervention and his unexpected grasp of the deepest mysteries, Angela feels emboldened to lead him further: she gives him an account, in analogies, of Makarie's relationship to the solar system.

Makarie sends Wilhelm to Lenardo. In the framework of the novel, now follows the episode of the nut-brown maiden, which we in the course of the analysis have seen presented and gone beyond. [915] Lenardo sends him to an old friend who had exercised a great influence on his youth.

I know that he is widely familiar with all in this world that is connected together by any sort of noble thread ... In the course of my distress I recalled that the child's (the nut-brown maiden's) father was a pietist, and at the moment I was pious enough to turn to the moral order of the world with the request it might for once reveal itself in a wonderfully gracious manner in my favor. (I, 11, 122)

This old friend will give Wilhelm information about the pedagogic association, "a kind of Utopia" (I, 11, 122), where Wilhelm can leave Felix during his investigative search for Nachodine.

The friend, to whom Wilhelm journeys, is that wonderful antiquarian, with whom he leaves the chest that Felix found. He is in fact connected to the superiors of the pedagogic province: they had recommended to him his helper, who rescued his house and property from a fire. He gives Wilhelm a letter of recommendation for those wise men.

"After that," [he continued,] "I may hope that at this well-established center you will be directed towards finding that good girl who made such a strange impression on your friend who has so raised the value of an innocent and unfortunate creature by moral feeling and consideration that he has been impelled to make her existence the aim and purpose of his life. I hope you will be able to reassure him; for Providence has a thousand ways of raising the fallen and supporting those who are cast down. Our destiny often looks like a fruit-tree in winter. Who would think from the sad [916] appearance of the tree that these rigid boughs and jagged twigs could turn green again next spring, be covered with blossom and then bear fruit? But we hope and know that this is so." (I, 12, 128)

These words, in which the principal motif of the *Apprenticeship* [*Years of Travel*?] appears combined with that of renunciation, are placed in an important location: they constitute the conclusion of the first book, of the wandering, which began in the symbol-sphere of the Legend, proceeded through the chthonic sphere of Montan and that of the myth of the Polis, only to end in the cosmic universe of Makarie.

S/S America, 18. 8. 48

New York 23.8.48

The second book deals with the reverence for what is under us and teaches that humanity has to consider well and clearly the earth, which furnishes endless joys but also unspeakable suffering. It is divided into two parts, which are separated by two interpolations, specifically designated as such. The one affixed to the end of the eighth [seventh?] chapter indicates that a time span of some years lies between the events treated, "in whose course [i.e., in this second book?] we have seen a considerable enhancement in the affairs of our old friends and at the same time we have made new acquaintanceships." (II, 7, 83–84) If it only were a matter of typographical arrangement, here a volume would have had to be closed. But referring to the following it is said:

...the prospects are such that is to be hoped that for everybody, when they have found their way in life, things will work out entirely as they would like them to. Let us therefore in the first place expect to meet one character after another again, interweaving and moving away [917], on paths both marked and unmarked. (II, 7, 84)

The close of the first book spoke of our fate, which many times appears as a fruit-tree in winter. At the end of the eighth [seventh?] chapter, the appearances are such that it stands to hope that to each it would be granted what he wishes when certainly "he has found his way in life"—and that means when he understands renunciation.

We hope to show how there exists a certain parallel between the construction of both halves of the second book. The beginning of both parts constructs a representation of the pedagogic province, in the first part (chapters 1 and 2), directed to life-history and religion, in the second part [chapter 9 (8?)], bringing not the promised revelation of the higher levels of the symbolic, but rather following the problematic through the realm of art. Only at the end of the ninth [eighth?] chapter is it shared that one of the Three [principal leaders of the Pedagogic Province], "and in fact one to whom he felt particularly drawn" (II, 8, 95) approaches Wilhelm. "Helpful gentleness, an indication of the purest peace of mind, was imparted most refreshingly." (II, 8, 95) "It was this excellent man who gave him a more general conspectus of their inner circumstances and outer links, also informed him of the interaction of all the various regions ... Enough, it tallied completely with all that he had heard previously." (I, 8, 95)

We have already discussed extensively the principal theme of both the first chapters, the doctrine of the reverences, and can therefore let pass here any analysis of the first and second chapters. [918] In the final edition, the third to the eighth [seventh] chapter is devoted to the novella "The Man of Fifty Years." It is one of those novellas which is intimately interwoven with the principal action. In this edition, an "interpolation" introduces the novella, which states that it had been the original intention to present the narrative that follows in several sections in order to indulge the habits of the esteemed public, "which for some time has taken pleasure in allowing itself to be entertained in serial fashion." (I, 3, 22) The inner structure, still, considered according to its attitudes, emotions, and events, would have allowed a continuous narrative.

It is hoped that this last will serve its purpose and that at the same time it will eventually become clear how the personages of this seemingly separate occurrence *are* intimately interwoven with those whom we know and love already. (I, 3, 22, Schutz's italics)

In the 1821 edition, the novella is enclosed in a letter of Hersilie's to Wilhelm, in which it is said:

But, to set my good-will to you in the clearest light, I now tell you in confidence, that there are two most enchanting creatures on the road; whence, I say not, nor whither; described they cannot be, and no eulogy will do them justice. A younger and an elder lady, between whom it always grieves one to make choice; the former so lovely, that all must wish to be loved by her; the latter so attractive, that you must wish to live beside her, though she did not love you. I could like, with all my heart, to see you hemmed in, for 3 days, between these two Splendours; on the morning of the fourth, your rigorous vow would stand you in excellent stead.

By way of foretaste [919], I send you a story, which, in some degree, refers to them; what of it is true or fictitious, you can try to learn from themselves. (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 158)



Here follows the novella, but only to the end of the third chapter of the earlier edition.

There are a series of careful schemata contained in this novella, which show how much the arrangement of them lay close to Goethe's heart. The novella begins with the visit of the Major, the man of fifty years, to his sister, the baroness, the mother of Hilary. He comes from his brother, the senior marshal—only the younger couple [in this story], Hilary and Flavio, has names—with whom he has come to an agreement over the distribution of the family goods. Because the Major's son, Flavio, has already for a long time been in love with Hilary, the marriage of both will make easier the long-wished-for economic distribution. But the baroness reveals to her brother that Hilary's heart is no longer free. He, the Major, is the one she loves. The effect of this revelation upon the ageing Major is carefully depicted. The problem of the recovery of youth treated in the first part of *Faust* reappears here. But the bewitched kitchen is replaced here by the toiletry chest of his theatrical friend and his cosmetic room servant. The situation between Hilary and the Major becomes clear and the latter decides to travel to the garrison to share with Flavio this unexpected development. But Flavio comes before his father, sharing with him that only a young widow and not Hilary can make him happy. The Major, innerly overjoyed because of this development, replies that only his (son's) marriage with Hilary can deliver for him his portion of the senior marshall's inheritance according to the agreement, but Flavio is more than happy with such an outcome. He leads his father to the beautiful [920] one, who, in the circle of her friends is occupied with the preparation of a letter case—"a work of Penelope-like delayed completion (II, 3, 36)"\*—but she understands how to pay the greatest attention to the Major and to make him the center of all interest. [\*This is only one of the many references to antiquity, which run through the novel. Many of these metaphors are taken from the circle of thought in the *Odyssee*—the great epic of all wandering and renunciation. So, (I, 4) the sleeping Felix is brought to Hersilie on an excellent mattress "like the unconscious Ulysses of old." (I, 4, 47) Other examples of this motif of antiquity: Horace and Ovid deliver the commentary on the relationship between the Major and the beautiful widow; Flavio is likened to Orestes pursued by the furies (II, 5); the "riding grammarians" are named centaurs (II, 8, 86); Lenardo (III, 13, Diary, Friday the 19th) finds the Beautiful-Good One as Penelope among the maidens; in the last chapter (III, 18) Wilhelm and the rescued Felix stand embracing each other "like Castor and Pollux, brothers meeting on the two-way path from Orcus to the light." (III, 18, 119)] Flavio knows how to remain alone with his beautiful woman and to explain his inclination to her.

I dared to take her in my arms and to ask her if she would be mine. I kissed her impetuously; she pushed me away.—"Yes, surely, yes!" she said, or something of the sort; she spoke in an undertone and as if confused. I took my leave and cried out: "I'll send my father, he can speak for me!"—Don't say a word about it to him!" she replied, following me a few paces. "Go now, and forget what has happened."

We will not expatiate on what the Major thought. (II, 3, 37)

Father and son decide that the Major will make only a visit to bid farewell to the beautiful widow and then he will pursue his association with Hilary; the son would pursue his own affair and expedite his suit as might best be possible. [921]

In the 1821 edition, the story ends here. Hersilie writes:

Here I break off, partly because I can write no more at present, but partly also fix a thorn in your heart. Now, answer the question for yourself: How strangely, from all that you have read, must matters stand with these ladies at present! Till now, they had no mutual relation to each other; they were strangers, though each seemed to have the prospect of a marriage which was to approximate them. And now we find them in company, but by themselves, without male attendance, and wandering over the world. What can have passed, what can be to follow? You, my worthy sir, will doubtless get quit of the difficulty, by mournfully exclaiming to yourself: "These, also, are Renunciants!" And here you are perfectly right: but Expectants, too? This I durst not discover, even if I knew it. (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 186)

"To show you the way how this amiable pair may be met with on your wandering" (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 186) Hersilie encloses the map with the arrow, from which there has been discussion in this study from the beginning: the arrow refers to the area of the Borromean Island, the landscape of Mignon's childhood. There Wilhelm will meet both in fact in the [final edition's] seventh chapter.

In this 1821 edition, the reader (along with Wilhelm) is familiar with only a single significant situation of the two women, out of which he must derive all the rest and develop it himself. This is the same technique that is applied in the novella situated in the third book, "Not too Far!" and that Goethe describes in an interpolation, whose cleverness makes one dizzy:

As must be emphasized at this point, we have taken upon ourselves the epic author's rights and have plunged the well-disposed reading only too quickly into the midst of a passionate [922] scene. We see a prominently placed man in a situation of domestic confusion, but without our having learned anything further about him; for this reason we are joining the good old woman for the moment, with a view to clarifying the situation to some extent, and are going to listen to whatever she might be murmuring quietly or calling out loud, agitated and embarrassed as she would be. (III, 10, 67)

(A monologue of the "good old woman" follows, which reveals another part of the previous history.)

Here in "The Man of Fifty Years" arises a huge technical problem, how the action of the novella, so to speak set in brackets, with its own derivative reality-sphere, can be carried over into the principal action of the novel. This was all possible in all these cases only by means of a "Leap," (*Sprung*) an arbitrary shoving aside of the reality-accent. Already in the first edition it is clearly shown, how principal and subsidiary action coexist: the young woman between father and son, the "confusion of feeling" (as it is called in a schema of Goethe's) [See "Paralipomena, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, Allgemeine Schemata," "Berliner Ausgabe auf CD-Rom," *Goethe's Werk im Kontext*, 522], and the motif of renunciation and wandering. In no way was any weight placed in the first edition upon even showing us the inner states that bring Hilary and the beautiful widow together and lead them to renunciation and to wandering. On the other side, it was carefully made understandable how Wilhelm had achieved knowledge from the "unheard of event coming to pass"—Goethe's famous definition of the novella, and it is also carefully motivated why the stake, which Hersilie had plunged into his heart, will allow him to seek both women. How, though, Hilary came to know of this event, remains posited here as

irrelevant. In the final edition, on the contrary, the context [923] is fully reconfigured. From here on, the reality-sphere of novella and the principal action of the novel run in tandem. It is not through any communication of Hersilie, which itself has its existence only in the world of the novel, that we have any experience of the major and his own people. The narrator of the novella's action is the same poet who narrates the principal action and makes us aware in an anticipatory interpolation that it will finally become clear how much both actions are bound up with each other. Not Wilhelm, but the reader, after he has read, must ask the question how strange the situation of the two women must be. Not Wilhelm, but the reader must expect that both will find each other again and must divine how it is that both of them, up until now unknown to each other, now are drawn into the world so that we might discover in what renunciation consists. Hersilie, who in the first edition, played the role of confidant, found in classical comedies, and commented on the matter, here falls out of the picture. Therefore, the reader must experience more of the states, inner and outer, of the participating personages. Therefore, the narrative is lengthened by two thirds of its size in order that the reader might be in a position, on the basis of the course of events shared with him as relevant in the one sphere of the novel's unbroken reality, to open up the typical, symbolic significance of the narrative. After this turning point, it remains entirely irrelevant, how Wilhelm acquires knowledge of these states. The only indication related to this matter is the communication that Makarie is the friend of the baroness [924], that the baroness shared her concerns via letters with Makarie, and that Makarie gave these letters to the beautiful widow, who drew out from them her conclusion regarding renunciation. Wilhelm might have read the whole of what was contained in Makarie's archive, although that is not consciously claimed, and therefore received the stake sunken in his heart. The present mysterious history of the map and the arrow are taken over simply unchanged from the earlier edition, and the lack of any context for them is simply overlooked. Certainly, according to Düntzer and his colleagues, one sees here before oneself the erroneous flightiness of an ageing poet; but this [seemingly] erroneous flightiness finds its deep, inner grounding in the arrangement of the reality-sphere in the second edition: the novella and its world are no longer in the brackets, no more brackets need to be dismantled, there are no more frameworks to leap over. Whatever in the practical world of daily life would be always interpretable or needing interpretation as the necessary and relevant context of an event, here appears within the "reality world" of the novel as absolutely unimportant. Moreover, in the dream-like seventh chapter, which we soon will analyze, every person is stripped of his or her individuality and treated as a representative of an inner state. Here there is no more place for actions in the outer world and the motivation systems of daily life. [925] But let us turn back to the events in the novella "The Man of Fifty-Years" that Goethe did find necessary to share with the reader of the first edition.

The next morning, the Major makes the planned visit to the beautiful widow. He finds her in the company of old women. The Penelopean letter case has been completed. The conversation is about Flavio's poems and the major's educational poem regarding hunting, which both women know and love. Upon departure, the Major takes the letter case in exchange for a promise to use it as the case for his manuscript

which he intends to send back to them. "Thus he finally found, not without some embarrassment, that he was involved in a pleasant relationship." (II, 4, 41) He reports the incident to his sister, upon whom his overly-excited presentation made a very mixed impression. Hilary is too young for her brother, and the "seductive widow" is too old for the son. To lighten her own heart, she writes a friend, whom we will discover, is Makarie. The senior marshal, with his lawyer, comes to meet the Major as the Major had done with the baroness, and the Major becomes anxious in the face of his constant feeling of the marshal's insufficient command of his many business endeavors. When the cosmetic room attendant departs after having explained that he can be of no more use to the Major, the Major devotes himself to producing a copy of his hunting poetry, which he sends with the letter case back to the beautiful widow. He accompanies this poetry with a cheerful transcription of a quote from Ovid, whereupon a kind of sadness came over him since he compares the beautiful women with a spider. As a result, one would see her, if only from a distance, hovering as a spider in the midst of a widespread net. But the involvement with the poetry of his youth makes the Major's past youth now particularly palpable to his feeling. To finish up a certain business matter, the Major journeys to the residence, which the baroness [926] and Hilary are using to deal with Hilary's dowry. On a November evening everything is set up in the well-lighted room. Suddenly Flavio appears—he is first called by his name here—in a fearful state. He looks for his father. His state of soul is such that he can only be brought to peace at least in part by some sleeping medicine. The baroness and Hilary visit him asleep:

The room was dark, there was only one candle flickering behind the green screen, little could be seen, nothing heard; the mother approached the bed, Hilary longingly took hold of the light and let it play on the sleeper. And so he lay, turned away from them, but a most charming ear, a full cheek, which now was somewhat pale, were most delightfully revealed beneath locks that were already curling again, a hand in repose together with longish and delicately strong fingers attracted the attention of unsteady glances. Breathing quietly, Hilary believed that she could herself hear gentle breathing; *she held the light more closely to him, and like Psyche, was in danger of disturbing the most healing sleep.* The doctor removed the light and lit the way for the women to return to their rooms. (II, 5, 51, Schutz's italics)

This episode is doubtlessly the point with which all the further development is bound up. The next morning, the women look after Flavio:

Hilary approached, he offered her his hand too—"Greetings, dear sister"—that went to her heart, he did not let go of her hand, they gazed at one another, a splendid couple, forming a contrast in the pleasantest sense. The young man's sparkling dark eyes fitted in with his dark tangled locks; she on the other hand was standing as an apparently heavenly figure in her calm, though now the deeply affecting event was linked to a present full of misgivings. The designation "sister"!—her most inward self was in a turmoil. (II, 5, 51–52)

Flavio complains that they have been bleeding him and have taken away his blood, "that's impertinent; it isn't mine, it all belongs to her." (II, 5, 52).

Hilary's mein [927] showed her mother a dreadful expression, it was as if the dear child were seeing the gates of hell opened before her, *and were observing for the first time, and for ever, something monstrous.* She hurried through the assembly room with impassioned

haste, threw herself on to the sofa in the last small room, her mother followed and asked a question, though unfortunately, she already understood. Looking up strangely, Hilary called out: "The blood! It all belongs to her, to her, and she is not worthy of it. The unhappy man! The poor fellow!" With these words the most bitter flood of tears brought relief to her afflicted heart. (II, 5, 52).

There follows a break in the course of things through the order of the doctor who requires that no further visits be allowed until later. The following interpolation makes it understandable: "Who indeed would undertake to unfold the circumstances that developed from what has gone before, or to reveal the inner harm that befell the ladies in consequence of this first meeting?" (II, 5, 52) The poetry verses, which Flavio and Hilary exchange, undertake this task. Here with poetic means a form is reached, which ordinarily would belong to a musical variation. We put stanza and anti-stanza side-by-side to make it clear how, in another intertwinement, the last of the similar rhyme in one stanza serves as the first in the correlative one, only that the hell (*Hölle*) in Hilary's mouth is changed into brightness (*Helle*) in Flavio's:

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Flavio:	Hilary's answer:
<i>Ein Wunder is der arme Mensch geboren,</i>	<i>Bist noch tief in Schmerz und Qual verloren</i>
(Into the world as a wonder poor man is tossed)	(Though deeply lost in suffering and distress,)
<i>In Wundern ist der irre Mensch verloren</i>	<i>So bleist du doch zu raschem Jugend gluck geboren,</i>
(In wonders the man who goes astray is lost,)	(You were surely born for youthful happiness;)
<i>Nach welcher dunkeln, schwerentdeckten Schwelle,</i>	<i>Ermanne dich zu raschem, gesundem Schritte,</i>
(To which obscure, remote aims can we tell)	(Show strength and take a quick and healthy stride,)
<i>Durchtappen pfadloss ungewisse Schritte?</i>	<i>Komm in der Freundschafts Himmelglanz und Helle,</i>
(That pathless unsure steps will feel their way?)	(Encounter friendship's heavenly radiant light,)
<i>Dann in lebendigem Himmelsglanz und Mitte</i>	<i>Empfinde dich in truer guter Mitte</i>
(Aware of heaven's vital central day,)	(And feel that good, true comrades are at your side,)
<i>Gewahr, empfind ich Nacht und Tod and Hölle.</i>	<i>Da spriesse Dir des Lebens heitere Quelle</i>
(I yet can feel night, death, and hell.)	(For you the fountain of life will then flow bright.) (II, 5, 52–53)

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[928] Rhyme scheme:

Flavio a<sub>1</sub>, a<sub>2</sub>, b<sub>1</sub>, c<sub>1</sub>, c<sub>2</sub>, b<sub>2</sub>

Hilary: a<sub>2</sub>, a<sub>1</sub>, c<sub>1</sub>, b<sub>3</sub>, c<sub>2</sub>, b<sub>4</sub>

Flavio more and more takes on the characteristics of the major. He resembles the portrait of his father; he appears in his clothes; the doctor compares them both; the father is taller, therefore the coat is too long; the son is broader in the shoulders, therefore the coat fits the son too tightly.

Both incongruities gave this masquerade a comic appearance.

So by means of these details the awkward nature of that moment was overcome. For Hilary, it was true, there remained something uncanny, indeed oppressive, about the similarity of the youthful picture of the father with the fresh, living presence of the son. (II, 5, 54)

Flavio and Hilary grow closer and closer. They take turns reading together poems composed by Flavio,

...and what is more, as the reading only took place from the one text which both of them had to look into, in order to come in at the right time, and for this purpose both had to take hold of the volume, it so happened that, sitting near to one another, they gradually came closer together, person to person, hand to hand, and finally made contact quite naturally without it being noticed. (II, 5, 55)

This scene appears for Goethe to have been the core cell of the whole history. It is located in the first schema and returns in the ten or twelve following unchanged.

As concerns what Flavio had done in leaving his garrison without vacation leave, only *conjectures* are uttered. On any reflection, Flavio's "mystery" *would* not have been difficult to solve.

That attractive woman had decisively repulsed the unhappy young man in an agitated moment that had been occasioned by his importunity, and removed and shattered the hopes that he had obstinately clung to hitherto. We have not dared to describe a scene to show how this happened, for fear that we might be lacking here in youthful fire. Let it be said that he was so little in control of himself that he rushed off without leave from his garrison. (II, 5, 55)

[929] There follows the scene with the flood, the visit of the pregnant woman (a motif which we have already seen in the history of St. Joseph), and the journey home of the couple in which

the habit of seeing each other and being together in all sorts of circumstances had been strengthened, and the dangerous situation in which sympathy and congeniality believe themselves justified in *mutually drawing near and holding fast* to one another became more and more hazardous. (II, 5, 57, Schutz's italics)

The oncoming frost converted the flooded area into an ice-skating rink and allured both of them further into the way of love. "Separation and parting, which at other times is such an anxiety, became here a playful little act of mischief; they took flight from each other in order to come together a moment later." (II, 5, 57) On a moonlit night, the returning Major meets both of them on the ice and later appears with them in the castle of the baroness. The major finds it "strange, though not unexpected, that his room was as if it were occupied; his own clothes, linen, and implements were lying around, only not in such an orderly fashion as he was used to." (II, 5, 60) The baroness speaks with her brother about what has happened.

From a technical standpoint, the new interpolation which is included here, is of great significance.

Our readers will see for themselves that from this point on we must no longer proceed with the reporting of our story in a descriptive manner, but by narrating and reflecting, if we wish to penetrate into the states of mind, on which everything now depends, and to picture them to ourselves. (II, 5, 60)

Another perspective, another *accent of reality*, has been imported here. No longer will the reader participate in the living out of a pregnant situation, but will now partake of the unfolding of the consideration of inner states. To pursue this point in individual details cannot be our task. We have in what preceded focused our analysis with particular emphasis to show that the displacement of the reality perspective

through artistic [930] concepts of all kinds brings it about that here also the representational means functions as a representational content. Experiences of many kinds—the loss of the cosmetic room servant, the loss of his front teeth—make the Major a renunciant. He is ready to renounce Hilary and to leave her to Flavio. But Hilary withholds her assent with loftiness and dignity and proposes with energy and truth the impropriety, indeed the criminal character of such an association. It is decided to give Hilary time; the Major finds himself torn in two; he would feel himself forever wounded, if Hilary should decide for the son. Were she to decide for him himself, he was convinced that even then he would have to refuse her hand. In this situation, the Major is invited to a nearby post house in which he finds the beautiful widow. She asks him for pardon for the unhappiness that she has brought to his family. “Pardon me, pity me, you see how I am punished.” (II, 5, 66) She has learned of the whole course of events from the letters of the baroness to Makarie, which Makarie has sent to her. Makarie has held before her a “mirror of ethical-magic power” and has made it possible “to adorn [herself]... from within.” (I, 5, 67). She lays before the Major this letter exchange with Makarie; he is able to read to reread the letters. “It is true, you would need an hour, or more, if you like, to read and reread them and to think them over; after that it will only need a few words to decide our positions.” (II, 5, 67) She leaves him and goes to walk up and down the garden; he spreads out the series of letters whose content is indicated in summary. Makarie sends the exchanged letters to the beautiful woman, “whose fine inner nature now comes forth and begins to give its splendour to what is outward. The whole concludes with a grateful reply to Makarie.” (II, 5, 68)

This is the conclusion of the fifth chapter and there we will leave the reader. We do not experience from the few [931] words that were exchanged enough “to decide our positions” (II, 5, 67) nor do we experience more about the growing relationship between the beautiful widow and Hilary, who together now give themselves to wandering. We will meet Wilhelm and his artistic traveling companion in the seventh chapter. In the fourteenth chapter of the third book we are briefly informed that Hilary has become the spouse of Flavio and the “irresistible one” the spouse of the Major (III, 14, 101–102).

New York, 10. October 1948

Here is perhaps the indication given that, as we know, the *Elective Affinities* (*Wahlverwandtschaften*) was planned as a novel pertaining to the Wilhelm Meister cycle, as was also the case with the “The Amazing Young Neighbors” which forms a component of *Elective Affinities* (see chapter 28, pp. 235–244). This observation has other than philological or biographical motives. In 1823 Goethe notes in the “Day and Year Volumes” [1807, “Die ‘Berliner Ausgabe’ auf CD-Rom,” “Goethe’s Werk im Kontext,” p. 207]: “*Pandora* and *Wahlverwandtschaften* express the painful feeling of deprivation and can therefore quite well stand near each other.” But the connection between the action of the novella “The Man of Fifty-Years” and *Wahlverwandtschaften* is unrecognized. It has to do with the “confusion of feeling.” The Major is related to Hauptmann doubtlessly, as Hilary to Otilia and Eduard to Flavio. Many details, such as the flood motif and the common reading from one book, allow one to recognize still more clearly their common root.



[932] The very short sixth chapter consists of two letters of Wilhelm, one to Lenardo, which shares with him that Wilhelm has found the nut-brown maiden and to be sure in the most pleasant of circumstances. "A domestic situation, based on piety, enlivened and sustained by industry and order, not too narrow, not too broad, in a most congenial relationship of duties to capabilities and powers." (II, 6, 68) The second letter to the Abbé, reported that Lenardo now is passing time among friends. Wilhelm reports the "completion of the business on behalf of my good friend" (II, 6, 69) and asks that he be permitted to embark under the already stated conditions upon the rest of his life—we will later learn that it will have to do with study to be a surgeon. Prior to this, that is, before entering upon this new course of life, Wilhelm, however, will complete "a pious pilgrimage." (II, 6, 69)

In the seventh chapter we find Wilhelm on this pious pilgrimage, on a visit to the places in which Mignon had lived her childhood, and he is accompanied by a painter who was captivated by Mignon's appearance and who, we mentioned at the beginning, is visiting the Marchese palace. They cannot withhold a sad smile when they saw "oranges and lemons opening into blossom while at the same time the fruit glowed forth from the dark bushes." (II, 7, 71). They cross the sea from coast to coast, and the painter-friend points out and paints every object and locale related to Mignon. [933]

A third person watching the friends could have now finally observed that the mission of both of them was really finished...

Wilhelm himself felt also that their real purpose had been achieved, but he could not deny to himself that the wish to see Hilary and the beautiful widow needed to be satisfied too, if they wished to leave this region with a free mind. His friend to whom he had confided the story was no less curious...

Now they sailed in all directions, watching the places where strangers usually make their way into this paradise. They had told their crew of their hope of seeing friends here, and it was not long now before they saw a finely ornamented, splendid vessel glide past; they gave chase and had no hesitation in going on board with enthusiasm straight away. The ladies were somewhat taken aback, but at once took heart when Wilhelm showed the note, and both acknowledged without hesitation the arrow which they themselves had sketched in. The friends were at once invited in a friendly way to board the ladies' ship, and this took place at speed. (II, 7, 72–73)

This place [in the novel]—identical in the 1821 edition and the final one—is the breaking through of the bracket, which up until now had separated the reality-sphere of the novella from the principal action of the novel. We have already above referred to the decisive change of motivation contexts in both editions, and we will now concentrate on the last edition. In this, all questions about rational-causal motivation [934] in the reality-sphere are meaningless. How does Wilhelm generally know of Hilary and the widow? How is he familiar with their history? How can his pilot make him acquainted with the hope that he will meet friends? What is meant here by the page with the arrow, whose indication moves the somewhat perplexed women to invite them trustingly onboard? And even in the 1821 edition questions presents themselves for the rational logic of the realists: Why are Hilary and the widow traveling here—where the action of the inserted novella has broken off earlier—especially since they barely know one another but are now traversing the world together? Why do they refer to Makarie? Why Hersilie? Why does she [Hersilie]

show Wilhelm their travel plans with the map and arrow? Why does their journey take them to the land of Mignon's childhood? All these questions are meaningless. The dominating motivation is not pertinent to the reality-context of daily life, and it is incommensurable with that realm's logic. It is a motivation of entirely other kind, a motivation which resembles that of the dream experience, in which the dream-images mix, shove each other out, pass into each other, without such phenomena giving one access to astonished questions about the how, where from, or why. A map with an arrow, of which the dream-content to this point knew nothing, is a sufficient motive for the dreamer to envision relationships between contents that would not be compatible in real life. There is a logic of the poetic event, which runs against the current of daily life as [936] against that of rational thought, even as there are grammatical categories in the language of lyrics, which run against the grammar of everyday speech.\* [935] \*Compare, for example, the function of the subject of the genitive "*tausendfältiger Karfunkel*" (of a thousandfold almandite) and the verbal predicate function of the adverb "*smaragden*" ("emeraldly") in the following stanza from Goethe's "*Vollmondnacht*" ("Full Moon Night"):

*Schau? Im zweifelhaften Dunkeln*

See in this uncertain doom

*Glühen blühend alle Zweige,*

Every branch in blowing glows,

*Nieder spieled Stern auf Stern;*

Starry light reflects a star;

*Und smaragden durchs Gesträuche*

*Tausendfältiger Kafunkel*

A thousandfold carbuncle shows

*Emerald hues where bushes loom:*

*Doch dein Geist ist allem fern.*

But from this your mind is far.

*"Ich will küssen! Küssen! Sag ich."*

"I would kiss! Yes, kiss, I told you."

[Edwin H. Zeydel, "Full Moon Night," *Poems of Goethe*,

University of North Carolina Studies in Germanic Languages

and Literatures, Number 20 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957), 91]

Further it is stated in every logic book for one to read that a "virtuous triangle" is a contradiction. "Gray, true friend, is every theory and green the golden tree of life" is meaningful beyond every criterion of text-book logic.

[936, continued] Homer and Virgil have troubled the gods for the representation of similar connections. These allow for meetings of heroes who live in different spheres. Goethe, who needed Hersilie as a confident in the 1821 edition in order to present the appearance of a connection plausible in the world of everyday life, denies himself radically in the last edition the use of this means—a move that would be permissible in the art-sphere, even if shocking. Art is among other things, the conscious reinterpretation of the relevance-structure of the life-world. The imaginary is not bound to the limits which are established in daily life through the requirement

of efficaciousness. A “key” will open the realm of the mother for Faust, a map and arrow will bring Wilhelm to the beautiful widow, and in the world of “fairy tales” the beautiful lily sings:

How do the many good signs help me?  
 The bird’s death, the black hand of the friend?  
 The swipe of the jewel, is there anything equal to it?  
 And has not the lamp sent him here to me?  
 Far away from sweet human enjoyment,  
 Am I not familiar with misery.  
 Ah, why doesn’t the temple stand on the river!  
 Ah, why is the bridge not built!

[translated from *Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten*, Die “Berliner Ausgabe” auf CD-ROM, “Goethe’s Werk im Kontext,” “Märchen,” 388]

Such examples do not only not contain any logical contradiction, rather with all the clarity of an Alpine dream they make determinate the tragedies of the singers whose hereby [937] revealed fate must call forth the liveliest participation of others who share such a fate: the old, the serpent, the sad youth.

If one could already on the ground of these considerations set aside the whole critique of the German art critics that the *Years of Travel* is a hurriedly pasted together work of an old man that is full of redaction errors, the two paragraphs below, which are connected immediately to what has been presented above, show doubtlessly the purposefulness of Goethe’s procedure which he employed in editing the *Years of Travel*. Goethe himself explained this purposefulness in a letter to Joseph Stanislaus Zamper in September 1821: “Coherence, goal, and aim lie within the little book itself; it is not of one piece, but it is of one meaning and this was the task itself: to bring together foreign or at most externally related events that are consistent with the feeling [involved].”

So Goethe goes on [in the following two paragraphs]:

And now *one imagines* the four as they sit together facing one another in the most delightful cabin, wafted on by a gentle breeze, rocked on glittering waves, in the most blissful surroundings. *One thinks* of the feminine pair, *as we have seen them described a short while ago*, the masculine pair *with whom we have been traveling for weeks now*, and *after some consideration we see* that they are all in the most agreeable, though most dangerous [938] situation.

For the three who, *willingly or unwillingly*, have already been counted among the renunciants there is no need to fear the most difficult lot, though the fourth might well see himself received in that order only too soon. [II, 7, 73, Schutz’s italics, the first two italicized passages have been altered in the Waidson translation to accommodate Schutz’s point below; and this translation is closer to the German text than Waidson’s.]

One observes in the first paragraph the underlined words which in the most artful fashion achieve the transposition of reality spheres, the alteration of the objective and subjective aspects. “One imagines” ... “one thinks” ... “as we have seen them described a short while ago” ... “with whom we have been traveling for weeks now” ... “we see them.” *Beginning with the anonymous “one,” and ending with the intimate we relationship*, ever deeper lying personality-layers of the reader are drawn

into participation. What we have heard of the three, what we remember of the past, will be transposed into the immediate, living we-relationship of the face to face.

The second paragraph justifies the one meaning of the thematic interweaving of the apparently independent spheres and fulfills the promise of the interpolation that opens the third chapter of the last edition: at the end it will become clear how the personages of this seemingly separate occurrence are intimately interwoven with those whom we know and love already. (II, 3, 22) The beautiful widow, Hilary [939], and Wilhelm are, first unwillingly, finally willingly, already renunciants, and the painter-friend will all too soon see himself taken up into this order. This is in fact the case. Hilary, who already for a long time was accustomed to her beautiful talent with signs and symbols, becomes the student of the artist. Under his guidance, her capacity is developed to the point of competence, without her suspecting it. Hilary feels herself overtaken by a new youthfulness and cannot deny herself a peculiar *inclination* to that one to whom she has become indebted for this *happiness*. Then, the moment of departure comes. On the last day the beautiful widow reveals to Wilhelm "the strange fate that had caused the two ladies to be separated from their earlier background, to be intimately linked to one another, and to be sent out into the world." (II, 7, 79) Wilhelm wrote up "the sad narrative" later, and "this, as he compiled it and transmitted it by Hersilie to Natalie, we purpose by and by communicating to our readers." (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 210) This promise was not fulfilled. Perhaps here lies again a foreshadowing of the Master Year, though according to my knowledge neither a schemata nor paralipomenon with reference to the unfolding of this event is to be found. Moreover, it has all become irrelevant. What is still worth sharing is briefly indicated: the enchanting mood of the evening before their planned departure, the last that they would be together, the feeling of the artist was that

he was being initiated into all the sufferings of the first grade of the renunciants, a stage which the [941] other friends had already been through, though now they saw themselves in danger of being painfully put to the test again. (II, 7, 80)

The next morning the women have left. A letter of "our queen of hearts" (II, 7, 80) demands that "they should not follow the ladies nor visit them anywhere, indeed if there should be a chance of meeting they should conscientiously go out of each other's way." (II, 7, 80) Also Wilhelm parts from the artist, who hurries to Natalia:

...to report in a confessional manner the unexpected incident, and because of this he came to be received in the most friendly way into the midst of the membership of the renunciants and to be consoled if not healed, by affectionate treatment." (II, 7, 81)\*

\*[940] We have generally no experience in the last edition of the kind of impression this meeting had made upon Wilhelm. In the 1821 edition (there the fourteenth chapter corresponds to the letter of Hersilie that is shared in the second chapter of the third book of the final edition), the following sentence appears in a letter of Hersilie to Wilhelm:

Wherever this letter may reach you, my noble friend, to a certainty it will find you in some nook where you are striving in vain to hide from yourself. By making you acquainted with my two fair dames, I have done you a sorry service. (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 293–294)

In the principal action of the novel, however, the episode is not presented in either of the editions. [return to 941] And now after the sharing of a letter of the Abbé's to Wilhelm, there follows in both editions an "interpolation" designated as such. The variations are so interesting for an understanding of Goethe's novel technique that a juxtaposition of texts is in place.

1821 Edition	Last edition
...we cannot hope that a complete view will be attained from our communications.	At this point, however, we find ourselves in the position of announcing to the reader an interval, and what is more, an interval of <i>some years</i> ; on this account we would have gladly brought a volume to a conclusion here, if this could have been linked with the typographic arrangements.
Again, it is to be observed, that in the Novel, as in Universal History, we have to struggle with uncertain computations of time; and cannot always decisively fix what has happened sooner and what later. We shall hold, therefore, by the surest points.	Yet surely the space between two chapters will suffice also in order to pass over the measure of imagined time [942], since we have long been accustomed to let this kind of thing happen between the lowering and raising of the curtain in our presence in person.
That <i>a year</i> must have passed since Wilhelm left the Pedagogic Province, is rendered certain, by the circumstance, that we now meet him at the Festival to which he had been invited: but as our wandering Renunciants sometimes unexpectedly dive down and vanish from our sight, and then again emerge into view at a place where they were not looked for, it cannot be determined with certainty what track they have followed in the in the interim.	In this second book we have seen a considerable enhancement in the affairs of our old friends and at the same time we have made new acquaintanceships; the prospects are such that is to be hoped that for everybody, when they have found their way in life, things will work out entirely as they would like them to. Let us therefore in the first place expect to meet one character after another again, interweaving and moving away, on paths both marked and unmarked.
( <i>Wilhelm Meister's Travels</i> , 214–215, italics Schutz's)	(II, 7, 83–84, italics are Schutz's)

The basically different attitudes of both interpolations and therewith the increasing solidification of the latter against the earlier edition are clearly visible from this juxtaposition. The first interpolation justifies only the break in chronology and takes the remaining relevance system of the unreported events as given. The more recent edition gives the time gap as some years, because one year alone would not allow Felix to mature into the suitor of Hersilie, nor could it ground the fact that Wilhelm concluded his anatomy studies or that Jarno-Montan had fulfilled his geological mission. Essentially as this expression is however a glance backward upon "the enhancement in the affairs" of our friends, out of which the anticipation of finding them again in enjoyable circumstances grows easily—to be sure under the important [943] condition that they know how to find themselves in life.

We have earlier spoken of a parallel of the two halves of the second book. The first chapter of the second book begins with the sentence, "The pilgrims had taken the way as they had been directed and succeeded in finding the border of the

Pedagogic Province, where they were to learn so much that was remarkable.”(II, 1, 7) Wilhelm, who at the end of the first part of the second book had ended his pious pilgrimage in the land filled with dreams and memories of Mignon, is introduced by the first sentence of the ninth [eighth?] chapter as follows: “If once more we seek out our friend who has been left to himself for some time, we come upon him as he is advancing from the plain and entering the Pedagogic Province.” (II, 8, 84) There follows the reunion with Felix, the horse-breaker—a symbolism which reminds one of the boy-charioteer in *Faust* (“Allegories that we are—And as such you ought to know us”) {[Goethe, *Faust*, Part 2, Act 1, trans. Philip Wayne (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959), 53] and “Berliner Ausgabe auf CD-Rom,” *Goethe's Werk im Kontext*, 330}. We meet again the supervisor and in a single sentence it is reported: “At that moment the father missed his son at his side, and caught sight of him between the gaps in the crowd keenly bargaining and dealing with a young salesman about some trifles.”(I, 8, 85) This statement is added in the last edition. This young salesman is the peddler who will bring back the writing tablet with Felix's message: “Felix loves Hersilie. The riding-master is coming soon.”(II, 10, 101) While in the first part, the travel through the Pedagogic Province follows the ethical-religious development, now they will traverse the realm of [944] art. From the region of the “riding grammarians,” “the centaurs,” (II, 8, 86) one arrives in the area of instrumental music and lyrical poetic art, then in that of architecture and the fine arts related to it.

The three reverences and their gestures, with some variation according to the nature of the work in hand, have been introduced and given emphasis here too, as everywhere in our province, and this greatly assists the teachers. (II, 8, 89)

Wilhelm inquires in which area the art of drama is undertaken and the supervisor replies that no such region is to be found.

Who among our pupils should find it easy to decide to arouse by means of false gaiety or feigned grief an untrue feeling in the crowd that does not belong to the moment, in order thereby to call forth in turn a pleasure that is always doubtful? ... The theater ... has an ambivalent origin which it can never wholly deny, either as art or craft or as hobby.” (II, 8, 94)

Wilhelm (in this significant hour because he finds again Marianne's son [Felix])

Cast his eyes down, for all at once everything that he enjoyed and suffered on the stage came before him; he blessed the pious man who had known how to spare their pupils such grief and had banished those dangers from their circle as a matter of conviction and principle. (II, 8, 94)

But as the supervisor proceeds to explain that, in order not to allow the minimal natural talent for mime to spoil, there is an arrangement with the great theaters of all nations in order to send a capable pupil to them “so that, like a duck on a duck-pond he may be quickly led to his future life's quacking and cackling on the stage.” (II, 8, 94) Wilhelm hears this “with patience, but was only half convinced, and perhaps somewhat annoyed.”(II, 8, 94) “For man is so strangely disposed that he can indeed be convinced of the unworthiness of some beloved object, can turn away from it, and even curse it, but does not wish to see it treated by others in the same way.”(II, 8, 94–95) One compares this reaction of Wilhelm with the critique by Jarno of his

acting talent in the *Apprenticeship*, in order to recognize how much Wilhelm has renounced his theatrical calling. [See Johann Wolfgang Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, trans. by Thomas Carlyle (New York: The Heritage Press, 1959), 183–184.] The point becomes of greater importance in the dispute in the conversation with Jarno-Montan (again it is Jarno!) in the following chapter. Here lies before us a key to the understanding of development through renunciation, of “knowing how to find oneself in life,” and this point is underlined through an ironic, in the Socratic sense, interpolation of the author:

[946] Indeed the editor of these papers may himself confess at this point that is with some reluctance that he lets this strange passage go through. Has he not also in many ways directed more life and energy to the theatre than is reasonable? And could he indeed be convinced that this has been an unpardonable error, a fruitless effort? (II, 8, 95)

In the following—tenth [ninth?]-chapter Wilhelm visits with the supervisor a mountain festival, “an agreeable manifestation ... in which a most useful occupation, dispersed underground and out of sight as it is, presents itself to us in its entirety making visible a great, secret alliance.” (II, 9, 96) Among the principal people, appears Jarno in a solemn, stately costume “initiated into mountains and ravines, and happier in this confinement below and above the earth than can be imagined.” (II, 9, 96) Wilhelm hopes to receive more enlightenment and a report about him than was had at the earlier meeting.

At this point, the final edition decisively alters the 1821 edition. It is important, too, for the chief problem of the *Years of Travel* to go more deeply into this.

The 1821 edition proceeds here in this way:

At this point our manuscripts forsake us: of the conversations of these friends there is nothing specified; as little can we discover the connexion of what follows next; [947] an incident of which in the same bundle, in the same paper, we find brief notice: That a meeting had taken place between our Wanderer and Lothario and the Abbé. Unhappily, in this, as in so many other leaves, the date has been neglected.

Some passages, introduced rather in the way of exclamation than of narrative, point to the *high meaning of Renunciation, by which alone the first real entrance into life is conceivable*. Then we come upon a Map, marked with several Arrows pointing towards one another; and along with this we find in a certain sequence, several days of the month written down; *so that we might fancy ourselves again walking in the real world*, and moderately certain as to the next part of our friend's route, *were it not that here also various marks and ciphers, appended in different ways, awoke some fear that a secret meaning at the bottom of it would forever live hid from us*.

But what brings us *out of all historical composure*, is the strange circumstance, that immediately on all this there comes in the most improbable narration; *of a sort like those tales*, whereby you long keep the hearer's curiosity on the stretch with a series of wonders, and at last explain: That you were [948] *talking of a dream*. However we shall communicate without change what lies before us. (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 236–237)

There follows now a dream narrated by Wilhelm in the first person—one of those dreams which like the one at the conclusion of the *Apprenticeship* or in Makarie's house are alike in their symbolic content. Wilhelm, wandering in the mountain, climbs to a crag whose peak permits only one person to stand on it. Several persons, mostly women, are gathered together on another broader ledge. One takes a step



near the edge of the abyss, stirring concern. It is Natalia, as Wilhelm clearly sees "when a perspective [telescope] came before my (his?) eyes." (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 238). He notes entirely clearly that she also has a telescope and looks at him and (Wilhelm?) seeks "by such tokens as stood at my command, to express the profession of a true and heartfelt attachment." (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 239). And also as sets the telescope aside, he sees the dear one precisely and clearly, although he was still unable to know her company.

And as I was trampling round my narrow station, struggling toward her the more, the abyss was like to swallow me, had not a helpful hand laid hold of mine, and snatched me at once from my danger and my fairest happiness. (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 239)

With this sentence, the second book in the 1821 edition closes. The principal motif of [949] the novel, which is renunciation and the transposition of the reality- and relevance-spheres, in the interpolation and the dream-symbolism, is here worked out clearer as in any other place, and the art of the great symbolizer shows itself in what he leaves out.

The last edition transposes the abstractly posited thought-motive and shows thereby not only this same symbolism in new perspectives but also binds together the "inner relationships" in a strict symmetry with the first part of the second book.

Although Jarno dismisses Wilhelm's request for further instruction, with the words that the mountains are mute masters and silence their pupils, a report of the undertakings of the friend is eventually given. That evening, the conversation returns to "no lesser an issue that the creation and origin of the world," (II, 9, 97) which opens the possibility of considerations about various cosmogenic theories. The next morning Wilhelm asks Jarno why he supports each of several contradictory opinions, but does not express his own. Jarno replies that he can "no longer take the present generation seriously." (II, 9, 99)

"I have become completely convinced that everyone must retain within himself quite seriously whatever is dearest to him, [950] and this means after all our convictions, everyone knows for himself what he knows, and he must keep it secret; ... Once you know what it's all about, you stop being conversational." "But what is it all about?" Wilhelm put in quickly ... his companion replied: "Thinking and doing, doing and thinking, that is the sum of all wisdom... Both must move back and forth in life continually, like breathing out and breathing in; like question and answer, the one ought not to take place without the other... He who makes it a rule to assess action by thought, and thought by action... cannot go wrong, he will soon find his way back to the right path." (II, 9, 99)

Wilhelm, inspired by this conversation and convinced that because of his actions and thoughts he too had been successful in living up to the requirements his friend expressed in a distant book, reports on how he had spent his time, since it was granted to him to use the wandering life imposed upon him to pursue his own education. Still, we do not know that he has become educated to be a surgeon, though an interpolation promises us a more detailed report before we set this volume down.

This passage leads into the chief problem of the third volume, in which the theme of the interaction of doing and thinking is exemplified in the activity of the group [of Lenardo and Oduardo] and the labor of the Beautiful-Good One. Two important commentaries discuss this principal thesis: "It is not sufficient to know, we must

also be able to apply the knowledge; it is not sufficient to wish, we must also act.” [III, “From Makarie’s Archive,” 128], it is said [951] in the maxims “From Makarie’s Archive” given at the end of the third book. In a letter to Rochlitz about the *Years of Travel* (28.11.1829) Goethe says of the *Years of Travel*:

With such a little book it is as with life itself: in the complex of the whole is to be found the necessary and accidental, the authoritative and the excluded, soon achieved, soon frustrated, through which a kind of infinity is contained, which does not allow itself in understandable and reasonable words to be thoroughly grasped or opened up.

Goethe appends in a highly characteristic transition the following consideration:

Because we still have space, I add this too: “*Act discretely* is the practical side of *know yourself*. Both could be considered neither as a law nor as a requirement; it is demanded like the eye of the target, which one must have always in sight even if one does not always hit it.

There follows now only the short, eleventh [tenth?] chapter which consists of a letter from Hersilie to Wilhelm. It reports on the message of Felix brought through the peddler whose answer is wrapped in the letter case that was meant for the father or the son. We have mentioned this course of events already at an earlier stage of this study. Here it only needs to be pointed that this short chapter factually and technically corresponds fully to the novella of “The Man of Fifty Years” in the first half of the second book. One can on this point say precisely [952] that Hersilie can be treated very quickly because we have discussed already quite extensively the relationship of a woman standing between father and son and the love of a young man as compared with that of an elderly one. Through the charming repetition of the letter case symbolism, the interconnection is made wholly clear. Also Hersilie experiences the shock of the exchange of reality-spheres. The peddler departs, with the letter case and the answer:

He departed in due haste and had already disappeared, I did not really understand how, while I was gazing after him.

It is over now, *I am once more on the ordinary everyday plain level and can scarcely believe in the apparition*. Am I not holding the little slate in my hand? ...I believe I would have kissed it, if I had not been afraid of obliterating what is written on it. (II, 10, 102, italics are Schutz’s)

In the twelfth [eleventh], last chapter of the second book a parallel is created with the dream of Mignon’s landscape. The first edition would have actually closed with the dream of Natalia’s distant and precariously happy image. In the last edition, a letter of Wilhelm to Natalia puts in its place the evocation of her figure. Instead of finding in a dream the meaning of an actual situation [953], Wilhelm seeks in his early life for an unconscious motive, which may have led him to become educated as a surgeon. The defining experience of youth is so narrated that it itself forms a self-enclosed, thematic novella. It refers anticipatorily, even prophetically to the rescue of Felix from death by drowning at the end of the novel. The drowning motif shows once again the linkage of the circle of thought pertaining to the Wilhelm Meister cycle to the *Elective Affinities* and to the “Amazing Young Neighbors.” Wilhelm’s boyhood love for Adolph, the beautiful son of a fisherman, who drowns

with four others while delivering promised crabs to the pastor's wife, his dubious effort to give life to the dead through rubbing and mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, his fruitless prayer for a miracle, the instruction of his father—again, as in the *Apprenticeship*, the spirit of his father appears at a decisive point in his connection with Natalia!—that a well-timed blood-letting would have rescued Adolph's life—all this leads Wilhelm, the young boy, to the decision to learn all that would be necessary, “especially blood-letting and other similar things.” (II, 11, 111). Alone, Wilhelm adds:

But soon normal daily events claimed my attention. The need for friendship and love had been aroused; I looked around everywhere in the hope of satisfying it. Meanwhile, sense, imagination, and mind had been excessively stimulated by the theatre; how far I was led, [954] and led astray in this direction, I need not repeat. (II, 11, 111)

And now, excusing himself because after this detailed narrative he has not yet arrived at the aim that he has shared, Wilhelm gives with the next sentence the most important disclosure about the composition of the whole novel, that little book, “with which it is as it is with life itself:”

If the humorist is permitted to throw his account into confusion, if he boldly leaves it to the reader finally to discover in its half significance what can possibly be got from it, ought it not to be appropriate for the man of sense and reason to aim in an apparently strange way at many points round about, so that they can be recognized and understood as finally taking place and being comprised in *one* focal point, just as the most varied influences surrounding the individual impel him to a decision which he would not have been able to take in any other way, neither from inner impulse nor from outer occasion?

With the variety of things that I still have to say I have the choice as to which I take first; but even this does not matter, you must just contain yourself in patience, read and carry on reading, finally that will all at once become clear and seem quite natural to you which, if spoken in one phrase, would have seemed [955] most strange to you and indeed so much so that afterwards you would have scarcely been willing to give a moment to these introductory comments in the form of explanations.

...

The affairs of our life take a mysterious course which cannot be calculated. (II, 11, 112, italics are Goethe's)

And now Wilhelm speaks of the instrument case, which he purchased from the son of Natalia's surgeon and which he always carried with him. He also speaks of the conversation he carried on with Jarno before the charcoal burner about this “fetish of memory” and of Jarno's advice that it is better to achieve that which these work-tools require mutely of him. This is especially so since this requirement concurred with and concerned Wilhelm's purpose ever since his experience with Adolph. Wilhelm also speaks of Jarno's advice to seize upon this purpose now.

Jarno rejoined: “I see that you have been occupied for so long with matters which concern and are related to the human mind, temperament, and heart—and whatever else this may be called; but what have you gained from it for yourself and for others? Intelligence can do nothing to heal the mental sufferings in which we may be involved through misfortune or our own mistakes, reason can do little, time a great deal, on the other hand, resolute activity can do everything. Let everyone act with and upon himself in this respect, this you have experienced with regard to yourself and also to others... Your general educational development and all institutions for this purpose are a lot of nonsense... What matters is that a man

can understand a certain thing quite definitely [956], carry it out excellently, better than most other people in his immediate circle, and this is taken for granted particularly in our organization." (II, 11, 113)

With these words, Wilhelm concludes his letter to Natalia, the chapter, and the second book of the novel. In them, we have seen in fact the "considerable enhancement in the affairs of our old friends." (II, 7, 83) As far as individuals are concerned, the book has taught us to consider well and calmly the earth, which accords us unspeakable joys and brings disproportionate sorrow; it has taught us—above all in the history of Adolph—how the arbitrary forces of the earth can allot to us suffering, a danger, which accompanies us all our life. This all, however, we remember, is the second form of reverence, the reverence for what is "under us"; the overcoming of this stage follows, when the individual pulls himself together, [957] turns toward his comrades, and isolates himself no more, and rather, in unity with his equals, makes a common front against the world. The transition to this third form of reverence, reverence for what is in the midst of us, for the active effort in the community, to which the third book should be devoted, is developed here.

There follows now the series of maxims and reflections constituting the pedestal which are gathered under the title "Reflections in the Sense of the Travelers" and which carry the subtitle, "Art, Ethical Concerns, Nature." (II, 114) It is unfortunately impossible, in the framework of this study to go into the astonishing inner connections of this group of aphorisms. The first six aphorisms present the theme dominating in the "principal field"—the ethics of the demand of the day—which only in a series of well-considered variations, separately developed from each other, can be related to the three levels of art, of ethics, and of nature. If it is true that this grouping is the work of Eckermann, to whom Goethe presented two thick bundles of manuscripts entitled "Statements about natural science, art, literature and life, all intermingled" with the commission to edit them; if it is true that it was Eckermann who divided the aphorisms in both collections "From Makarie's Archive" and "Reflections in the Sense of the Travelers," then Eckermann has [958] in fact brought to completion a philosophical-poetic masterpiece and one would understand that he—under the date of Sunday, May 15, 1831—states with satisfaction that Goethe appeared to be at peace with his work. One has, to be sure (presupposing that one is not one of those German literary historians, who will bestow full confidence on Eckermann's trifling report), has important grounds to doubt this unfolding of events, and it would probably be very rewarding to one's efforts to test the peculiar history narrated by Eckermann by examining its sources. Purely philologically, it is striking that Eckermann reports the incident in 1831 at the conclusion of the conversation, in which Goethe assigned him to be the executor of his literary estate, no doubt making use of this occasion to show that he was equal to such a task. However, if we take account of Goethe's diaries and also the year of the appearance of the second edition of the *Years of Travel*, then this history must have taken place in the first 2 months of 1829. In fact, Eckermann mentions under the date of February 15, 1829:

Goethe received me with much praise, on account of my arrangement of the natural-historical aphorisms for the "Wanderjahre." "Devote yourself to nature," said he; "you are born for that purpose, and, as the next task, write a compendium of the 'Theory of Colors.'" [*Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann and Soret*, trans. John Oxenford (London: George Bell and Sons, 1875), 368.]

[959] It may be, that Eckermann ordered and prearranged the *natural scientific* aphorisms, which are taken up in both series, and that the man, naïve and fully insensitive to Goethe's irony, took for pure praise Goethe's advice that he "devote himself to nature [and write] a compendium of the 'Theory of Colors'" and that he did not see it for the critique of his inadequacy that it was. Then, whatever his cooperation in the aphorism series may have been, it is sure, that he has not grasped the inner connection of the aphorisms with the principal theme of the *Years of Travel*. The technique itself had already most conscientiously been applied in *Elective Affinities*. But even around May 15, 1831, Eckermann narrates his grotesque history that the novel's second edition had been estimated to take up two volumes, that in the process of the work the manuscript had grown in size, that Goethe because the writer had written further than he had otherwise planned and so was mistaken, and that the manuscript had gone to three volumes for Cotta [Press]. But as the press had gone to a certain point and then found that Goethe had made an error and that there was not enough material on hand for the last two volumes, Cotta would have requested a new manuscript; "and as the course of the novel (*Roman*) could not be altered, and it was impossible to invent, write, and insert a new tale (*Novelle*) in the hurry of the moment, [961] Goethe was really in some perplexity." (*Conversations of Goethe*, 550) Therefore Goethe allowed for an elaboration of the two manuscript packets (—the two of them had already, as noted beforehand—openly been "thought out and bound"! ) and assigned Eckermann "to make up from these six or eight printed sheets" in order to fill up the holes in the *Years of Travel*.

"Strictly speaking, they have nothing to do with it, but the proceeding may be justified by the fact that mention is made of an archive in Makarie's house, in which such detached pieces are preserved. Thus we shall not only get over a great difficulty for the moment, *but find a fitting vehicle for sending a number of very interesting things into the world.*" (*Conversations of Goethe*, 550–551, Schutz's italics)\* [960: \* Now certain circumstances, for example, the great interpolation in the middle of the second book ("if this could have been linked with the typographic arrangements," II, 7, 83) and also the announcement of the new edition of the collected works in 1829, both make the case that the *Years of Travel* had been planned for a long time as a two-volume work. It is also thoroughly possible that Goethe through the impetus of the Cotta edition came to the conclusion to publish the *aphoristic paralipomena* of the *Years of Travel* with this edition. But who will believe that the aphorisms about the "demand of the day" taken as they are do not belong in the volume? Do we not read often enough in the diaries the entry: "After dinner the paralipomena is ordered, or "preoccupied with early poetry, evening paralipomena worked though."]

[return to 961] One has here precisely the feeling that Goethe, through such historical events, wanted to test the naïveté of the humorless Eckermann.

Then is everything reported in earnest—and the Weimar edition follows with the thoroughness of history—that Goethe also had the wish likewise "for sending... into the world" two poems and for affixing them to the aphorism collection, namely the poem "Testimony" ("No being can be wholly lost, Eternal forces work throughout")—to the second volume and to the third volume the poem "On Schiller's Skull" ("In the earnest charnel-house"). In fact, these poems are added on particular pages and in particular editions [962] to corresponding volumes of the edition of 1829. Now one can certainly not rightly suppose that the one page which each poem takes up, in any printing technology, would have filled up a palpable hole, and the explanation of the Weimar edition to the effect that the gray poet had wished to

bring to publication as soon as possible certain works that had become dear to him is nothing more than absurd. After all and in the first place, the poem on Schiller's skull dates from 1820 and secondly it would hardly have been difficult for Goethe to place that poem in some almanac or pocket book or perhaps in the newspaper *Chaos*. Also Eckermann's [following] statement in his report of 1831 shows that he was lacking any clue as to what was going on:

But when the "Wanderjahre" came out, no one knew what to make of it. The progress of the romance was seen to be interrupted by a number of enigmatical sayings, the explanation of which could be expected only from *men of certain departments*, such as artists, literati, and natural philosophers, and which greatly annoyed all other readers, *especially those of the fair sex*. Then, as for the two poems, people could as little understand them as they could guess how they got into such a place." (*Conversations of Goethe*, 551, italics are Schutz's)

And what did Goethe do with a critique such as this? Goethe laughed at it:

"What is done, is done," said he today, "and all you have to do is, when you edit my literary remains, [963] to insert these things in their proper places, so that when my works are republished, they may be distributed in proper order, and the 'Wanderjahre' may be reduced to *two* volumes, according to the original intention." (*Conversations of Goethe*, 551, italics are Schutz's)

In the few pieces of literature that I have consulted I have not been able to find a single investigation which attempts to show the inner relationships between the two poems and the novel. It seems to me, however, that they provide a most profound interpretation of the meaning [of the novel] and our study of the second book shall conclude with an analysis of its addition, the poem "Testimony."

[964] In the edition of Goethe's poems that appeared in 1836, one finds the poem "Testament" in the section "God and World" immediately after the end of the poem "One and All," to which it belongs on the basis of inner and outer grounds. The arrangement of the remaining poems of this group had been undertaken by Goethe himself after the most careful reading and evidently because of an inducement by Riemer,

Your good thought has had a reasonably good effect here, already the older as well as the newer poems, which relate to *natura naturans*, are written and placed together. More is here than one thinks, and as one can aim at completeness, so we see here the great advantage that one never attains it (to Riemer, Jena, November 1, 1821).

It is therefore always important to go over this arrangement, above all the three poems that originated in very different time: "Stability in Change" (1801), "One and All" (1821), and "Testament" (1829) in order to show without doubt that there is an inner unity among them.

The cycle originating in 1816 begins in Goethe's arrangement with the poem "Proemion" (in the name of the one who created himself, which in this arrangement contains the verses "What god at work in outer space would linger" and "Within us too a universe doth dwell," which already had already been written and published in 1821.) [Edwin H. Zeydel, "Proemion," in *Goethe, the Lyrist*, University of North Carolina Studies in Germanic Languages and Literature, Number sixteen, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955), 167.]

[965] There follows the set of ideas associated with *West-Eastern Divan* and the poem "Refinding" ("Star of stars; O can it be!") (which is preceded in the book *Suleika* by the poem "Full Moon Night"), with its cosmogony in the image of the re-encounter of two lovers.

[966] The following verse from this poem is important for our problem:

Creatures all with hurried striving  
 Seek their own affinity,  
 And to full unmeasured living  
 Heart and eye turn eagerly,  
 Seized or snatched, howe'er you state it,  
 'T must be held whate'er is caught!  
 Allah need no more create it,  
 We'll create the world he's sought.  
 (From "Rediscovery," *Poems of Goethe*, 89)

There follows the poem "World Soul," ("Distribute yourselves in all regions") (the first and later rejected heading: "Palingenesie") which was written in 1802, which had been arranged earlier under the rubric of the "Companionable Songs," and which concludes with the following verses:

Now how the crowd of creatures multiform  
 Is all astir, delicious light to see;  
 And on a happy meadow the firstborn  
 Couple you are, in wonder there to be.

And now the boundless striving flickers out,  
 Becomes the look that you exchange in bliss;  
 Thankful you turn this gift of life about—  
 Restored the universe within us is.

[*"Universal Soul,"* in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Selected Poems*, ed. Christopher Middleton (Boston: Suhrkamp, Insel Publications, 1983), 167.]

In the similar rubric one might originally find the poem "Stability in Change" ("Ah, could but a single hour/Hold these boons with which we're blest") (written in 1801). Its Heraclitean, basic thought should be supposedly a paraphrase of what S.C. Reil has spoken of in his rhapsodies about the application of the psychological treatment methods for spiritual derangement. (See Gräf, Vol. 1, p. 395).

Every rain that comes to pound  
 Will transform your dale sublime,  
 Ah, but in those floods that bound,  
 You'll not swim a second time.

You yourself! What fixed and steady  
 Seemed unalterable to you—  
 Walls and palaces already  
 Change before your very view



Gone the lips and all their blisses  
 That in kissing once were tense,  
 Gone the foot at precipices  
 With a chamois' insolence.

And that hand, so freely giving,  
 Stirring for the good and right,  
 Every organism living—  
 All that have changed before our sight.  
 And whoso that Place is taking  
 That with your name once was blent,  
 Came like some huge billow breaking,  
 Hastening toward its element.

Let Beginning now and Ending  
 Merge and fuse into a One!  
 Swifter than all things attending,  
 Let your flight be sooner done!  
 Thankful for the Muses' favor  
 Brings a boon that ever lives:  
 Substance born of heart's endeavor  
 And the form your spirit gives.  
 (From "Stability in Change," *Goethe, The Lyrical*, 169, 171)

[967] And now comes the poem "One and All," written in 1821:  
 To find their place where bounds are banished  
 Lone mortal men have gladly vanished,  
 And gone is everything that cloys;  
 Instead of wishes, rash demanding,  
 Annoying plea, and stern commanding,  
 Renounce your will, and yours are joys.

World-Soul, o make your impulse ours!  
 Then wrestling with World-Spirit's powers  
 Will be our highest duty's call.  
 Kind spirits, showing helpful features,  
 Will lead us well, as highest teachers,  
 To Him that made and fashions all.

To recreate what was created,  
 That by no rigor it be weighted,  
 Unending, living deeds are best.  
 And what was not, will now take life;  
 Pure suns and world with colors rife;  
 And by no means shall there be rest.

't must stir and change in new creation,  
 First take on form, then transformation;  
 Not long does it appear to rest.

The eternal stirs and works for ay;  
 For everything must once decay  
 It if would live to stand the test.  
 ("One and All," from *Goethe, The Lyrical*, 167, 169)

[968] One would, in considering that the above poem appeared in the year of the first edition of the *Years of Travel*, not err in finding lots of connections with the Meister literature, without it requiring special commentary for those who understand it. The poem "Testament" accompanying the second edition accords with the above poem in the narrowest dialectical progression, since here the impossibility of persistence in being, as the poem "Persistence in Change" had shown, leads to the necessary conclusion that no essence can decompose into nothing.

No being can be wholly lost,  
 Eternal forces work throughout,  
 Find happiness in present life!  
 Existence is unending, for laws  
 Preserve the living treasures with which  
 The universe has decked itself.  
 (From "Testament," *Wilhelm Meister's Years of Travels*, 2: 134)

[969] There is the eternal law, which teaches us reverence for that which is above us, the same law, which Makarie's doctor-astronomer had learned from the starry heavens and Montan had learned from his strict masters of doctrine, the mountains. Should one believe Goethe, who is supposed to have said to Eckermann (February 12, 1829),

"I wrote this poem," said he, "in contradiction to my lines—  
 'For all must melt away to nothing  
 Would it continue still to be;'—  
 which are stupid, and which my Berlin friends, on the occasion of the late assembly of natural philosophers, set up in golden letters, to my annoyance." (Thursday, Feb. 17, 1829, *Conversations of Goethe*, 364)

or the Goethe, who on the same day wrote to Zelter, "*It will end, according to the latest system of philosophy, in everything crumbling into Nothing ere it has yet begun to be...*"?

[italics are Schutz's, Letter of Goethe to Zelter, February 12, 1829 in *Goethe's Letters to Zelter, with Extracts from Those of Zelter to Goethe*, selected, translated by A.D Coleridge (London: George Bell and Sons, 1887), 248]

According to this Prooemium there is no doubt that the following second strophe will express nothing more than the first form of reverence:

That which is true has long been found  
 And has united noble souls,  
 Take hold of what is old and true.  
 O man, give thanks to that wise spirit  
 Who bade the earth go round the sun  
 And showed the moon its destined track.  
 ("Testament," 2: 134)

As Wilhelm, standing in Markarie's observatory, had given for himself a new interpretation to the Kantian proposition of the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me as those two things, which fill us equally with reverence, [970] so follows also here the passage to the second stage of reverence regarding the moral law:

Turn inwards now without delay,  
 You'll find the centre there within,  
 No noble soul would have doubt of this.  
 And there you'll find no lack of rule,  
 For conscience in its autonomy  
 Will be the sun to your moral day.  
 ("Testament," 2:134)

And to a cheerful consideration of the earth:

And then you have to trust your sense,  
 They'll not permit you to be misled,  
 So long as your judgment stays alert.  
 Take joyful note with eager glance  
 And make your way with supple sureness  
 Throughout the fields of the abundant world.  
 ("Testament," 2:134)

"Act Conscientiously" is established as the practical correlate of "Know Yourself," and it is to be aimed at as the bull's eye of the target.

Enjoy prosperity and blessing  
 With modesty, and welcome reason  
 Wherever there's delight in life.  
 For then the past events are constant,  
 While future things awaken now,  
 And the moment is eternity.  
 ("Testament," 2:134)

[971] And now the turn from the second form of reverence through the demand of the day to the third form, to reading with the others and in community, which was the ideal of Jarno/Montan, Lenardo, and of those around the Abbé.

And if you finally succeed  
 And find yourself filled with the feeling  
 That only what is fruitful is true;  
 You'll consider the general trends,  
 And how they rule in their special way,  
 But you will join the smallest group.

And as philosophers and poets  
 Have always quietly created  
 Their much beloved works as they wished,  
 You too will gain the highest favour;

For the most desirable of all tasks  
Is to point the way to noble souls.  
("Testament," 2:134–135)

Is this not the thought which Wilhelm expressed at the conclusion of the second book?

I hope it will suffice for me to say that I shall appear as a useful and necessary member of the group in the course of the great undertaking that you are planning, and that I shall attach myself to your ways with some sense of certainty, indeed with some pride, for it is a laudable pride to be worthy of you. (II, 11, 114).

[972] The arrangement of the third book is so complex, that its content cannot be understood if one wants to attempt to present it in the stages of the individual chapters. Perhaps the opening sentence suppressed in the last edition is definitive of the basic motif of this part: "Here at last we again step on firmer ground, the localities of which we can settle with some probability; though still here and there on our way there occur a few uncertainties, which it is not in our power altogether to clear up." (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 240)

We begin with an overview regarding the parts (following the final edition; chapters that are not contained in the edition of 1821 are designated with *x*):

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Chapter 1.	First meeting of Wilhelm with the group, St. Christopher with the Red-Mantle; meeting again with Lenardo and Friedrich
	2. Hersilie to Wilhelm: The key to the chest is found.
X	3. Wilhelm narrates to his friends the story of his studies in anatomy, the meeting with the "plastic anatomist," concluding conversation about the old and new worlds and their possibilities.
X	4. Friedrich reports regarding the basic laws of the association: perfection in a profession.
X	5. Lenardo's diary, first part; technique of weaving, the sale of yarn, St. Christopher, to the first mention of "Frau Suzanne"
	6. The New Melusine, narrated by the Red-Mantle
	7. Hersilie to Wilhelm: the chest open to the key
X	8. The Dangerous Bet; narrated by St. Christopher [973]
	9. The Group: Large speech by Lenardo on the meaning of wandering
X	10. Odoardo's arrival: the narration of "Not Too Far"
X	11. The "constitution" and the alliance: "Politeia"
X	12. Odoardo on inner colonization
X	13. Lenardo's diary, the second part: the nut-brown maiden found; Frau Suzanne and the problem of travel beyond one's country: philosophy and machine
X	14. The great synthesis. Report on the condition of various old friends
X	15. Makarie's place in the solar system; the divining rod
X	16. Felix with the official in search of Wilhelm
X	17. Hersilie's letter to Wilhelm: Felix with Hersilie, the chest opened
X	18. Felix's fall and the rescue by Wilhelm
	From Makarie's archive (maxims and reflections)

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The history of Hersilie-Felix (chapters, 2, 7, 17, 18) we, now waiving aside, have treated earlier, including large parts of the history of the nut-brown maiden

(chapters 5, 13), even though many motifs, which bind this episode with the principal action, still remain to be discussed: We will in the following pursue first the analysis of the association, its goals, constitution, and organization, in such a way as to investigate that motif of wandering in its double form: emigration to America and inner-colonization, and we will finally occupy ourselves with the scattered thematic novellas and their relationship to the principal action. Some concluding considerations will be devoted to the organization of the whole.

In the beginning of the third book in his search to approach the association, Wilhelm finds an inn in which he will pass the night. The host receives him in a friendly way but turns him away because the whole inn for some time has been leased to a society of young men, without whose permission he cannot welcome any new guests. There is no one at home, but the bailiff is expected to arrive soon. Wilhelm decides to wait, he is led into an empty hall, over whose doors he finds the motto that reads "Ubi homines sunt modi sunt" in golden letters; "this we interpret as saying that where people come together in society, the manner in which they wish to be and remain together immediately develops." (III, 1, 2) The bailiff appears and accepts Wilhelm under the condition that he remain only 3 days and that he quietly take part in all that might happen, and happen what will, not to inquire about the origins, and not to ask for the bill on leaving. Now the young men who belong to the society begin to appear in pairs, in a masterly fashion singing duets with corresponding parts for each. They ask Wilhelm, who merely commiserates, whether nature has denied him a beautiful voice, whether some song has pleased him in all his wanderings, one that they might sing. Wilhelm grants that "a secret spirit within me often seems to whisper something rhythmical to me," (III, 1, 2) and he takes a piece of paper with the verses of a poem, which two of them, joined by others, present in a duet whose verses are sung reciprocally. This poem will, in the course of this chapter, be varied and expanded by the singers, its last verse will take shape at the conclusion of the long speech of Lenardo's on the wanderer in the ninth chapter, and it will, in a way unsuspected by Wilhelm, bring to expression the idea of that group, which wants to build a new world in America. In the twelfth chapter, Odoardo, the leader of that group which seeks to stay in their country and devote themselves to the inner colonization of it, will deliver a song which his group "according to a well known melody" sings at the conclusion of Odoardo's speech. This speech of Odoardo, as will be shown, is a conscious opposition-speech to that of Lenardo's and the "well-known melody" must well be that of the first poem, as the rhythm and structure show. Both speeches, as do both poems, develop the dialectic of the emigration problem with complete clarity and therefore both songs are here juxtaposed to each other:

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*Song of Lenardo's Group*

*Wilhelm's Verse:*

*Von dem Berge zu Hügeln,  
Nieder ab das Thal entlang,  
Da erklingt es wie von Flügeln,  
Da bewegt sich wie Gesang;*

---

*Song of Odoardo's Group*

*Bleiben, Gehen, Gehen Bleiben,  
Sei fortan dem Tüchtigen gleich.  
Wo wir Nützliches betreiben,  
Ist der wertheste Bereich.*

---

(continued)

(continued)

*Au dem unbedingtem Tiebe  
Folget Freunde, folget Rath;  
Und dein Streben, seis in Liebe,  
Und dein Leben sei die That.*

*Dir zu folgen wird ein Leichtes  
Wer gehorchte, der erreicht es.  
Zeig ein festes Vaterland.  
Heil dem Führer, heil dem Band.*

From the uplands to the hills  
Down the valley and along,  
There's a sound as from wings,  
And a movement's that's like song;  
Joy and counsel follow  
Where sheer impulse leads;  
Let your striving be in love,  
Let your life consist of deeds.  
(III, 1, 6)

If he leaves or if he stays,  
Either suits an able man,  
Where we're doing useful work  
Is the best place in our plan.  
Following you is something easy,  
To achieve is to obey;  
Show us a worthy mother-country,  
Hail to leader and men today!  
(III, 12, 82)

[Variation of the two last lines through "St. Christopher, das xxxxkind," (St. Christopher the xxxxchild), "*das Tempo zu einem langsameren Schritt herabziehend*." (time dragging to a lazy step). In life shove away nothing, but let it be deed for the sake of deed.]

[976]

(continued verses)

*Denn die Band sind zerrissen,  
Das Vaterland ist verletzt;  
Kann ich sagen, kann ich wissen,  
Welchem Zufall ausgesetzt,  
Ich nun scheiden, ich nun wandern,  
Wie die Witwe trauervoll,  
Statt dem Einen, mit dem Andern,  
Fort and fort mich wenden soll!*

*Du vertheilest Kraft und Bürde  
Und erwägt es ganz genau.  
Gibst dem Alten Ruh und Würde  
Jünglingen Geschäft und Frau.  
Wechselseitiges Vertrauen  
Wird ein reinlich Häuschen bauen  
Schliessen Hof und Gartenzaun,  
Auch der Nachbarschaft vertraun.*

For the bonds have now been severed,  
Confidence is undermined,  
Can I say and understand now,  
To what chance perhaps confined,  
Like the widow in her mourning  
I must take my leave and go,  
Not with one but with another  
I must turn away, I know.  
(III, 1, 6–7)

You allot the strength and burdens  
With fineness of a knife,  
For the senior quiet and honour,  
For the young men work and wife.  
Confidence that's shared together.  
Will construct a tidy place,  
Will enclose the yard and garden,  
Trusting neighbours face to face.  
(III, 12, 82)

*Bleibe nicht am Boden haften.  
Frisch gewagt und Frisch hinaus,  
Kopf und Sinn mit heitern Kräften  
Überall sind sie zu Haus.  
Wo wir uns der Sonne freuen,  
Sind wir jede Sorge los;  
Das wir uns in ihr zerstreuen,  
Darum ist die Welt so gross.*

*Wo an wohlgebauten Strassen  
Man in neuer Schenke weilt,  
Wo dem Fremdling reichermassen  
Ackerfeld is zugeteilt  
Siedeln wir uns an mit Andern.  
Eilet, eilet einzuwandern  
Is das feste Vaterland.  
Heil dir, Führer! Heil dir, Band!*

(continued)

(continued)

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Do not always stay unmoving,	We shall settled down with others
Venture forth without a care,	Where beside a well-built road
Head and arms with cheerful vigor	We can linger in a new inn,
Will be welcomed everywhere.	Where new land in generous mode
When we take joy in the sunshine	Can be given to the stranger.
We are in a happy state:	Hurry on to find your way
So that we may be spread through it,	To this worthy mother-country,
That is why the world's so great.	Hail to leader and men today!
(III, 1, 7)	(III, 12, 82)

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We will have to occupy ourselves sufficiently with the thematic of the attitudes toward the problem of wandering that come to expression in both histories. Here let us focus on the lovely artistic means with which Goethe knows how to aim at the antithetic effect of the two poems with the result that the first halves (of the right column) correspond exactly through the crossed rhyme positions in the first column of verses; but in the second halves of the verses (in the right column) there is a successive rhyming in pairs that replaces that rhyme scheme and so that they express the ideal of settled harmony in the stable fatherland also technically in the most beautiful way.

[977] Here, however, as far those belonging to Lenardo's circle are concerned, we must devote some attention to the first poem. The first verse is Wilhelm's poem. It is a pure traveling song, the song of an individual who has passed from the way of striving in love to life in actuality. And when Wilhelm, hearing his verse resound in the melody of another, finds his own totally private experience transposed into the social sphere, then he is in doubt "as to whether this was his own melody, his earlier theme, or whether it had now for the first time been adapted in such a way that no other movement was conceivable." (III, 1, 3) Other youths, "whose attributes at once marked them out as masons, while the two who followed them could not but be carpenters" (III, 1, 3) came forward, and joined in the song, and finally the giant, St. Christopher, whose "pace ... has to be measured and sure ... to make ... [his] way up and down the slopes with the burden" (III, 1, 3) he carries, refuses to allow himself to be taken out of stride in his singing. "It was significant," it was remarked, "that he at once changed his part of the refrain" (III, 1, 3) from what had been indicated. From striving in love, St. Christopher knew nothing. He who among his wandering as carrier in the mountains had to meet people at a definite place and on time, knows only the basic proposition, "Let your life know no delays" as a motif of daily living. (III, 1, 3) But as in the case of the Saint, after whom he is named, his raw power is that of carrying a love of which he knows nothing and yet for which he is merely an instrument.

[978] When the bailiff appears, one takes in common the meal, which reminded Wilhelm of similar food during the time he was still eating with the actors, "but the present company seemed to him much more serious, not focused for the sake of entertainment on pretence, but directed toward significant aims." (III, 1, 4) The next morning, as in the history of 1001 nights, the secretive barber appeared, who without speaking exercised his art on Wilhelm, and who was named by him "Red-Mantle."



The bailiff brings to Wilhelm a special invitation: the *association* summons him to lunch. At the given hour, Wilhelm is there, and is led to a table on whose far end he sees three persons. To his most joyful surprise, one is Lenardo himself, the other Friedrich, Natalia's brother and Philine's spouse, the third, as is presented later, the official of the count's castle, who, at the end of the novel, enters so decisively, insofar as he shows Felix the way to him. One takes "the meal with a certain solemnity," (III, 2, 6) and at the end of the table Lenardo gives a sign and Wilhelm is very much surprised to hear his verse of yesterday presented in duet and accompanied by a pleasingly restrained choir.

No sooner had this duet ... approached its conclusion than the two singers opposite stood up with impetuosity: with their serious vehemence they reversed the song rather than continuing it. (III, 2, 6)

They sing the second verse, the pleasing choir was even more populous and powerful.

In the end the sadness increased in almost frightening fashion; a disgruntled mood, with the skill of the singers, brought something fugue-like into the whole song so that it seemed to Wilhelm to have a certain terrifying effect. Indeed, they all appeared to be completely of one mind and to be mourning their own fate shortly before departure. The strongest recapitulations and the frequent rekindling of the singing when it was almost extinguished *seemed finally to be dangerous to the group itself*; Lenardo got up, and everyone at once sat down, interrupting the anthem. He began speaking in a friendly tone, "Certainly I can't blame you for constantly recalling the fate that confronts us all, so that we may be ready to confront it at every hour. If aged men who are tired of life have called to those around them: 'Be mindful of death!' we younger people with our enjoyment of life may constantly cheer and admonish ourselves with the happy words, 'Be mindful of wandering!' In so doing, however, it is well to speak with restraint and cheerfulness of what we either willingly undertake or else believe ourselves obliged to do. You know best what stands firm among us and what is fluid, let us take pleasure in this by means of happy, encouraging music as well; let us drink this parting toast for the present occasion to this wish!" (III, 2, 7, Italics are Schutz's)

And now follows the third verse of the song: "Do not always stay unmoving." (III, 2, 7)

[980] The repeated speech of Lenardo's binds together several themes of the novel. "Be mindful to live" was the motto that Natalia's and Lenardo's great uncle had opposed to "Be mindful of death" that aged men, tired of life, take for theirs. "Be mindful of wandering" is Lenardo's admonition. *Partir c'est mourir un peu*. But the first wandering-renouncing one can undertake with measure and serenity, whether he willingly has chosen it or whether he believes himself compelled by the guidance (of others) or fate.

Head and arms with cheerful vigour  
Will be welcomed everywhere. (III, 2, 7)

The one traveling overseas need not be a stranger in a new country. He will be a homecomer in the new land and the renunciant will leave behind his worry:

When we take joy in the sunshine  
We are in a happy state. (III, 2, 7)

The significance of this verse is underlined by the fact that with it Lenardo concludes his long speech which he, in the ninth chapter, holds on the day “when it would be decided who really wanted to go afar off into new lands or who would prefer to tarry and seek his fortune over here, on the cohesive soil of the old world.” (III, 9, 58) This is the course of Lenardo’s thoughts in great brevity—and that means that in a way we have destroyed their organization and beauty:

The human being, belonging customarily to the homeland in which he was born, both grows with others and all interhuman relation-[981]ships, from the family to the state, and is grounded on the hold and the claim of that space in great things and small things. But private property is only a small part of the goods conferred upon us. When that which a person possess is of great value, so must we ascribe to what he does and achieves a greater value. The highest goods consist in what is moveable and in that which is won through a life of movement. We young ones should not persist in that which we have inherited from our parents. Let us hurry to the coast of the sea and let us consider the immeasurable space which lies open for our activity. On that side of the sea we will not lose ourselves in a limitless expanse; from an overpopulated area we will turn toward the wide, broad earth of so many lands and kingdoms, which were traversed by nomads, whose cities are mobile, and whose herds can be taken anywhere. Not where it goes well with me, but rather where I can be of use—that is my fatherland. “May everyone aim to be of use everywhere to himself and to others” (III, 9, 60) is in fact neither teaching nor advice, but the utterance of life itself.

After hindering the building of the Babylonian tower, God himself has scattered the human race throughout all the world. All young people set themselves in motion, they rush in where their drive for knowledge leads. Examples are presented: the investigation of nature, the wandering piece worker, the traveling businessman, the Jew\* [\* “But what should I say now of that people who before all others take unto themselves the blessing of eternal wandering and through their action know how to deceive those who stay in one place and to get ahead of their fellow-travelers? Of them we may speak neither good nor evil; we may say nothing good because our league is on its guard against them, and nothing evil because travelers are obliged to treat all whom they meet in a friendly manner, bearing in mind each other’s mutual advantage.” (III, 9, 61)], the artist, the actor, the scholar, the missionary, the pilgrim, the diplomat, the soldier, the conqueror (Emperor Hadrian); but [982] the time is past, in which one runs through the world in an adventurous spirit, we know through the efforts of scientific world travelers more or less what we have to expect. The individual, however, can attain no complete clarity. Our society is therefore grounded on the idea that each in his own measure and according to his own goal will find clarity. In this sense we conceive ourselves as a world federation. Unity is all-powerful, therefore there is no division, no conflict among us.

As far as we have principles, they are common to us all. We maintain that man should learn to think without constant reference to external matters, he should seek what is consistent not in his environment, but within himself: that is where he will find what he needs and can cherish with loving care. He will become trained and adjusted so that he will be at home

everywhere... But whatever a man may take up, the individual on his own is insufficient; social relations are the prime need of a stout-hearted man...

And hence everyone knows how our League came into being and what its conditions are; each one of us could at any moment use his special skill to good purpose and could be assured that wherever he might be led by chance, inclination, and even passion ... he would ... be ... well ... received ...

[983] After that we have undertaken two duties in the strictest fashion: to respect all forms of worship, for they are all *contained* more or less *in the Creed*; furthermore, to be likewise tolerant of all forms of government, and, since they all require and encourage purposeful activity, to make efforts to carry out their wishes, that is, within each one of these states and no matter how long a time is involved. Finally, we consider ourselves obliged to practice and encourage morality without pedantry and severity, *as is required by that reverence for ourselves which arises from the three reverences which we all acknowledge* ... (III, 9, 63–64, italics are Schutz's)

In the solemn hour of parting, to seal the sad farewell, Lenardo ends his speech with the words: "Do not always stay unmoving..." (III, 9, 64)

With the repetition of this verse in the 1821 edition, not only the chapter but also the whole closes. Here the dialectic of the problem—emigration or inner colonization—is not resolved. Not only is the second traveling song missing but also the whole of Odoardo's character. Also lacking [984]—and we will see that this is important here—are Lenardo's diary, the novella "Not too Far," and the chapter that reports Wilhelm's meeting with the plastic anatomist. In all these parts added to the final edition, is the problem of "emigration—inner wandering" treated either directly or indirectly. (Perhaps during the thoughtful preoccupation with the closing part of the trilogy, the "The Master Years," the plan is first developed to transfer the entire setting to America). The 1821 edition also does not contain the important commentary on the moral doctrine of the emigrant proclaimed by Lenardo at the conclusion of his speech, which the actual eleventh chapter contains:

What follows represents the quintessence of the discussion:

All religion insist that man should submit to what is inevitable, and each one endeavours in its own way to cope with this task. The Christian religion help agreeably by means of faith, love, and hope; from these qualities there arises patience, a sweet emotion which remains an estimable gift even when life is laden not with pleasures that are desired, but with suffering instead. (III, 11, 75)

The association will hold fast to this religion, according to which it will educate its children, and it will later share knowledge about its founder, after the basic principles are grasped. Therefore, first will the person of Christ become the object of love and value, and every report that relates to him becomes sacred. In this sense, "which may perhaps [985] be called pedantic, but nonetheless must be acknowledged as consistent," (III, 11, 75) the association tolerates no Jew in its midst, since how should one be permitted a share in the highest culture, whose origin and tradition he rejects?

Our ethical teaching is completed separated from this; it is concerned solely with actions and can be summed up in these few terms: *moderation in which is arbitrary, diligence in what is necessary*. Now if everyone makes use of these laconic words in his own style in the course of his life, he will possess a text that can be productively applied in limitless situations. (III, 11, 75, Schutz's italics)

Some interpretations are added: Respect for time as for the highest gift of God—and therefore a system of exact, public clocks which are synchronized through telegraphs with the help of an ingenious device. Particularly through the distribution of time and attention to the hour, housefathers and housemothers have greater obligations, since each must take care of himself, boys and girls, male and female servants. Reading, writing, and counting result through the method of mutual, uniformly delivered lectures. Everything comes down to educating both teachers and students at the same time. No judiciary, but police. The basic principle: no one should be troublesome to another. Continually official police directors have the right, to admonish, reprove, scold, and remove. If they find it necessary, they can summon jurors together. If the votes are evenly divided, it is not the chairman who decides, rather [986] the lot, because one is convinced, that among opinions standing against one another, it does not matter which is followed. As far as the majority is concerned,

...we have our own quite particular thoughts; it is true, in general we acknowledge them, but in particular we place little trust in them. However I may not express myself further on this subject. (III, 11, 76–77)

The higher authorities, who link everything together, continually move about as did the German emperors of old. There should be no capital city. —All these are general points of view, and only when one is on location in a particular place, will it be possible to permit concrete punishment and legislation for governance.

What always remains as of principal importance is that we take over with us the benefits of civilization and leave behind us its disadvantages. Taverns for the sale of spirits are not tolerated in our community, nor are public libraries; but I prefer not to reveal our attitude towards spirit bottles and books: things of that sort need to have been put into practice, if they are to be judged. (III, 11, 77)

Let us now juxtapose the great speech of Lenardo and the system of a moral and legal order for the emigrant intended by him with the lecture of Odoardo regarding those who stay behind. The chief points are the following:

[987] In the old world as well as the new, there are places that need cultivation. In the new world there are untouched, wild stretches, and one has to win property little by little, one part at a time. In the old world the pieces of property have already been seized and made sacred by law. There lies the limitless, and here the simply well-defined properties produce severe obstacles. Custom, youthful impressions, reverence for procedure, inclinations to turn one away from the neighbor, and a hundred other things make the owning of property inflexible. In opposition to the neighbor, to working with him, several attempts at betterment fall apart. But the century is coming to our help, the time which makes spirits free, and likewise opens their view to something wider. People will not only achieve what is easy, to be at one in the pursuit of their goals, but will also agree about the means. In an expanded heart, the higher advantage overcomes the lower.

Odoardo's prince had given him and two other proxies a province separated from his other states and capable of being developed. Measurements were taken, streets and villages planned, and technicians, materials, and money for the building

projects were standing ready. How can one find the organization, the structure, in which "all the workers" are united and in which a worthy position is arranged for them with regard to each other and the rest of civil [988] society. As soon as we enter upon that designated area, then crafts will be declared "strict arts" and separated and distinguished from the "free" ones. (III, 12, 80) Because here we are only speaking of occupations, which make construction their concern, what follows will explain how they raise the buildings: stonemasons, masons, carpenters, roofers, glazers, locksmiths, whitewashers. The stages of apprentice, journeyman, and master must be observed most strictly, and the testing cannot be careful enough. Exactly here the strict art must become the model for the free one. And Odoardo concludes,

I will not repeat myself, for our entire lives will be a repetition of what has been said; I will simply note as follows: he who devotes himself to a strict art, must do so for a lifetime. Hitherto people have talked of handicraft, quite rightly and properly; practitioners should work with their hands, and if hands are to do this, they must be inspired by a life of their own, they must be a form of nature on their own behalf, with thoughts and will-power of their own, and they cannot do this in a multifarious fashion. (III, 12, 81)

And afterwards, the speaker,

...had closed with the addition of a few further good words, all those who were present stood up, and the members, instead of leaving, formed a regular circle in front of the table of those in authority. Odoardo distributed printed sheets to them all; from they sang in a restrainedly cheerful manner a friendly song, following a familiar tune: "If he leaves or if he stays..." (III, 12, 81–82)

[989] The free-mason symbolism is not only intellectual, but also portrayed consequently in outer ritual and implemented in contrast to Lenardo's group in details. So it is said in Lenardo's speech at the beginning of the tenth chapter: "Toward the end of the song a large number of those present quickly rose and left the room *in pairs amidst the reverberating sounds.*" (III, 10, 64, italics are Schutz's)

"If he leaves or if he stays." In the 1821 edition the thought of emigrating decisively rejected by Lenardo and Friedrich, and Lenardo's speech is related, as is the song "Do not always stay unmoving," exclusively to the problem of inner colonization. There is here no idea of remaining here, no conflict, and so the character of Odoardo is not introduced. Lenardo presents his own conception. Only through the additions of the final edition is the problem in general presented: America or Germany.

This claim may at first blush appear highly paradoxical, but we hope to be able to make it clear.

[990] In the—fallen away—sixteenth chapter of the 1821 edition, it is shared that all persons, whom we know through the *Apprenticeship*, find themselves living well, even better than before, because they are striving for the worthiest goal, in fully decisive activity, each in his own way, in alliance with many co-workers, but of this goal, no further knowledge will be conveyed. Let it be our duty and opportunity here to open up what is more broadly public in the course of the trusted conversation of the society in which we now find ourselves—Lenardo, Friedrich, Wilhelm—and

so show how they would have clarified their own intimate preferences, maxims, and goals, bit by bit.

*The whim of Emigration* may, in straightened and painful circumstances, very naturally lay hold of men; if particular cases chance to be favored by a happy issue, this whim will, in the general mind, rise to the rank of passion; as we have seen, as we still see, and *withal cannot deny that we, in our time, have been befooled by such a delusion ourselves.* (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 288, Schutz's italics)

The emigration happens in the illusory hope of a better condition, and it often proves deceptive in the following travel, because one find himself, wherever one succeeds, in an ever again conditioned world, and when one need not be forced to a once and for all emigration, still he is inclined to cherish the wish in quiet.

*We have therefore bound ourselves to renounce all Emigration, and to devote ourselves to Migration.* Here one does not turn his back on his native country for ever; but hopes, even after the greatest circuit, to arrive there again; richer, wiser, cleverer, better, and whatever else such a way of life can make him. (*Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, 288, Schutz's italics)

This is the maxim, which in all its sharpness, is advanced in the 1821 edition. Only in the later added sections, appears the problem of the new world on the other side of the sea.

Here is Wilhelm's report about his meeting with the plastic anatomist (III, 3), whom Wilhelm names his master. This one feels that his thought to replace dissection through plastic models of the human body is not recognized by the masters of the profession in Europe. He has, therefore,

...got in touch with Lothario and the group of friends; they felt that the establishment of such a school in those developing provinces was particularly suitable, indeed very necessary, especially among naturally civilized and highly intelligent people for whom real dissection always has a quality of cannibalism. (III, 3, 15)

"Over there across the sea, where certain humane views are continually becoming more widespread," (III, 3, 16) the artist will reserve a chapel for Aesculapius. This was the last conversation Wilhelm had with the artist. The models in store had been packed and were to cross the sea. Wilhelm watched the well-packed cases sail down the river, wishing them the safest of journeys and [992] and a joyful present with each other upon being unpacked. And when Friedrich objected to Wilhelm regarding this undertaking with the plastic anatomist, Wilhelm responded:

A project like the one under discussion can perhaps only be put into practice in a new world where the mind must see that it is indispensably necessary to seek out new methods because there is a complete lack of the old ones. The inventive spirit is roused, and is joined by the boldness and persistence of the need... (III, 3, 17-18)

In the old world everything goes according to a routine, and anything new is treated in the old way, while what is growing meets with rigidity. (III, 3, 18)

The second important treatment of the problem occurs in Lenardo's diary, whose functional role in the novel is multi-faceted. It is above all the continuation of the novella "The Nut-Brown Maiden"; it is further a clarification of that "passion for conscience's sake" which is definitive for Lenardo's fate and for his decision to immigrate; it is an exemplary presentation for the quintessence of life with another

after the model of the third reverence, namely, that a person must take charge of himself in what cannot be avoided and that faith, love, hope and patience can help in this task; and it is an example for measured life in the arbitrary and assiduity in the necessary.

And finally it contains a grappling with the problem whether a group of in themselves well-grounded and well-organized craftsmen and machine workers should emigrate or stay in their own land. All that is shown in a minute depiction of the hand-weaving industry of the mountain dwellers to whom Lenardo traveled in the company of St. Christopher. The technical presentation refers, as we know, to Johann Heinrich Meyer, whose sketches on the hand-weaving industry in his Swiss homeland are taken over in long citations. Goethe thanks Meyer in a letter that he in such a manner had delivered "the real warp to a poetic woof."

In company with the "yarn trader" Lenardo meets the "equipment-mender," who shows himself as "a very sensible man, one who was in a certain sense educated and who was completely equal to his work (III, 5, 30)." Lenardo thinks whether this man who is so masterful in dealing with work tools and machine could not be a most useful member for the association, and he proposes to him, half in jest, but all the more directly the proposition, "whether he would not like to join a society of some significance and consider planning to emigrate overseas." (III, 5, 33)

The machinist excused himself

...with the cheerful affirmation that he was doing well here and expected to do even better; he had been born in this type of country, was used to it, was known far and wide, and was well received everywhere. In general [, he continued,] it would be found that people in these valleys had little inclination for emigration; they were troubled by no distress, and the mountains held [994] their people fast.

"That's why I'm surprised that people are saying that Frau Susanne is going to marry the agent, sell their possessions, and go overseas with her money," the yarn carrier said. (III, 5, 33)

This is the first mention of Frau Susanne, the nut-brown maiden, in the diary, and this conversation structures the end of the manuscript which is eventually presented to Wilhelm later. (III, 5, the end)

Both parts of the diary are separated through "The New Melusine," "The Dangerous Bet," the large speech of Lenardo's, "Not Too Far," the ethical teaching of the association and the speech of Odoardo—an organization not without its deeper relationship.

In the second part of the diary we find Frau Susanne, "like Penelope surrounded by her maids," (III, 13, 85) and just as Wilhelm had depicted her:

A domestic situation, based on piety, enlivened and sustain by industry and order, not too narrow, not too broad, in a most congenial relationship of duties to capabilities and powers. A succession of those working with hands in a pure and literal sense moves about her; here there is limitation and far-reaching effect, circumspection and moderation, innocence and activity. (II, 6, 68)

She narrates to Lenardo her fate, her wandering, her acceptance among those like-minded, the visit of a mysterious stranger, her husband and his sudden death, and the stroke of her father. Fortunately, it is as though fate had given her a competent



helper, who as her agent took care of that might require masculine aid. She leads Lenardo to her sick father, who thus recognizes him and in the joy of seeing him again recovers speech. The mysterious stranger [995] is revealed as Wilhelm by a sheet left with his handwriting on it. Some lines from this sheet, which brought the Beautiful-Good One some consolation, contain the synthesis of Wilhelm's philosophy, a glance backward on the *Apprenticeship*, and the new attitude, which he now has adopted:

Every human being, from the earliest time in his life, finds himself continually conditioned and limited in his position, at first unconsciously, then half-consciously and finally with full awareness. But as no one knows the aim and purpose of his life, for its secret is concealed by the highest power, the individual feels, catches hold, lets go, keeps still, moves about, hesitates, and is too hasty, and in so many ways causes all the errors to arise which confuse us...

...He seldom knows for sure where he is to turn to next and what in fact he should or should not be doing.

Fortunately, all these wondrous questions and a hundred others are answered by your incessantly active way of life. Continue in direct observance of every day's duties (*der Pflicht des Tages*), and at the same time examine the purity of your heart and the certainty of your mind." (III, 13, 92)

Susanne speaks to Lenardo about her anxieties about her business in the future. The proliferation of machinery, which approaches slowly like a thunderstorm, concerns and torments her, as it has tortured her spouse. She sees the population of the lovely valley brought to her work and the mountains falling back into the age-old solitude.

"In this situation there are only two courses to pursue, the one as sad as the other: we can either take up what is new ourselves and accelerate the process of decline, or we can set off, taking the best and most deserving people with us and seeking a more favorable destiny overseas. Either course has its disadvantages [996] but who will help us to consider the reasons that should determine our action? ...I should look upon myself with contempt if I were to rob these good people and to see them in the end as poor and helpless vagrants; for sooner or later they will have to give up their homes and move. They have forebodings of this, indeed they know and talk of it, and nobody can decide upon any beneficial step. But where is the decision to come from? Is it not just as difficult for everyone else as for myself? (III, 13, 95)

Her spouse had decided to emigrate. They would have yearned with perhaps an all too infinite hope in such a new area of land that might be able to be valued as duty and right, which is here conceived of as a crime. Now she is in the opposite situation since the helper is of the opposite opinion. He, who as successor to the spouse should have been determined to emigrate, is himself against emigration and in favor of procuring machinery. The decision is pressing since the "equipment-repairer" is arousing a drive for mechanization in the neighborhood. The help is wooing her and places before her eyes the inadvisability of thinking about emigrating and neglecting the unique means of self-preservation. Lenardo, asked by her for his advice, narrates how he has seen in all his journeys that all finally comes down to the fact that the drive for and necessity of emigrating increases every day; still that is the most dangerous of the options. Unprepared leaving brings an unhappy return, no other undertaking requires so much foresight and leadership, and Lenardo tells her

of the "splendid [997] association of various travelers and emigrants." (III, 13, 98) She is interrupted because the father lies near death. There follows the scene that we have described in another context. The helper enters the room and is deeply disturbed to find the Beautiful-Good one kneeling near Lenardo by the death bed of the father. She clarifies the situation. The helper says:

The moment is too significant for it not to be the decisive one. What I have to say is not spoken on the spur of the moment, I've had time to think it over, so listen now: the reason why you refused my proposal was because I was unwilling to go with you when you wanted to emigrate, either of necessity or as a whim. So I here solemnly declare before this valid witness that I will put no obstacle in the way of your emigrating, on the contrary I will encourage it and will follow you everywhere. But in return for this declaration, which has not been forced from me but only precipitated by the strangest of circumstances, I ask at this moment for your hand. (III, 13, 99)

He reaches his hand out to her, but the two others pull back surprised.

...but do not think it was a matter of overhastiness and whim on my part, for I would have renounced mountains and rocks for your sake and would now have been making arrangements in the town so that we would live according to your wishes. But I proceed not alone now, you won't deny me the resources for this, you will still have enough to be able to lose it as you fear, and as you rightly fear. For I too am at last convinced that that rogue of a busybody has turned to the upper valley; he's installing machines there, you'll see how he'll take over the whole enterprise; perhaps you'll want to call back, and soon enough at that, the faithful friend whom you are driving away. (III, 13, 99–100)

[998] Therewith closes the diary. But we experience in the next chapter the solution: the Beautiful-Good one gives to the helper all her property, he marries the second daughter of that hard-working family in the upper valley and so becomes the brother-in-law of the machinist. As a result, the complete arrangement of a new factory through local, cooperative efforts becomes possible and the dwellers in the work-hungry valley will be occupied in another, lively manner. The Beautiful-Good One herself demands that Wilhelm prepare himself and proceed to Angela's place in the company of Makarie. She will not enter into any closer relationship with Lenardo at this time because she cannot give her whole soul to him. The memory of her spouse is still too alive in her that she has no space for love and passion. So Lenardo has to offer courageously his great undertaking, to begin it himself, and to leave the rest to the course of events and fate.

At the same time it could be assumed that he was mainly sustained in that undertaking by the thought that when he had gained a firm footing he would summon her to join him, if he did not indeed come to call for her himself.

This is therefore the personal fate of Lenardo, of the association, of the leaders of that group, which will gain a new life across the sea. He is the one, who as a child never had played, who applied all his free hours to produce and create something. (III, 4) He was since that time less favorable toward machinery than to immediate craftwork; because from childhood, he had been trained to handle carpenter's work tools [999] and had been educated at the turner's bench by a thousand artists, his inborn drive for the technical increased. He understands this to pose for him new demands, to become a skilled blacksmith and therefore a locksmith, tool sharpener, and watchmaker. But his "passion for conscience's sake" becomes for him a lovely

situation, he sees himself sunken into in a beautiful longing and into an irresistible desire. Later, after he has found the nut-brown maiden, he understands his earlier condition: "at that time (when he first met Wilhelm) there could only be talk of the immediate future, of the deep suffering that was prepared for me and which I was so busy at intensifying." (III, 4, 21) The solution of this conflict was produced through the society of the tower; they give him "the important task... of investigating the conditions of the mountain population and of recruiting for our expedition useful people who were keen on traveling." (III, 4, 23) Here Lenardo finds Susanne, as he finds himself again. Then, as he says, "in everything we produce we always mirror ourselves." (III, 4, 23).

All these are additions in the final edition. It was necessary to depict the personal experiences which lead someone like Lenardo to his task and to prepare him for this. He, who with his own friends is drawn into the world in order to be dispersed there, who has decided to turn instead of with one to joining with the others, onward and onward, and who hopes to be free of his cares there, where one enjoys the sun. His diary in its quiet whole, in its description of the idyllic circumstances of the circle of craft-workers, carried on in the indescribably [1000] animated, homelike, and friendly weaving rooms, leads one to the conviction that the individual can arrive at his own complete clarity. He has learned to think of himself without lasting exterior relationships and to seek the conclusion not in outer circumstance, but rather within himself. And this renunciation and separation determines him in a wonderful way to begin his great undertaking and to leave the rest "to the course of events and fate."

Which personal experiences may have defined the leader of those remaining behind to his preference to wander about the stable fatherland and to offer society to youth and women in mutual trust, to set up colonies with others? What have been the defining experiences in Odoardo's life? To elucidate this, the novella "Not too Far" is inserted. Its tone, its form stand consciously in contrast to the "novella" of the nut-brown maiden. The latter shows the history of a passion in a broader presentation, full of loving details with references backward to the past and pre-views of the future. In the former case, in a single dramatic episode, in passionate representation, there is "some enlightenment concerning the life of a fine man." (III, 10, 65) We see him, without having experienced anything further of him, in a domestic predicament. Only fragmentarily Odoardo gives his friends Lenardo and Friedrich, an account of the matter of his spirit and heart. He does this, as it is called in an "interpolation," in order to make plain his purposes and intentions and to legitimate his qualification [1001]. His purposes and intentions are to offer to those who will belong to the soil of the fatherland for a longer time sufficient daily work for several years.

But now he could not [it is said in the interpolation] account for the business in further conversations with such excellent people without considering the humane basis on which the whole operation rested.

As they continued talking, explanations and confession of deep emotional content were shared. They stayed together until well into the night and became ever more inextricably enmeshed in the labyrinths of human sentiments and fate." (III, 10, 65)

The suddenly following novella, of only nine pages length, "Not too Far" is this fragmentary report. Two compact sentences depict how Odoardo, late one evening, with his two children idly await Albertine, his spouse, whose birthday they should be celebrating. In the next paragraph, Odoardo is given an opportunity to speak. He narrates how impatience rose to the point of doubt, how he no longer hoped but rather feared that she might come in, excuse herself with her usual grace, claiming that she is tired and behaving as if she is objecting to him that he limits her pleasure. "Everything went round and round inside me, and much that I had put up with over the years weighed heavily on my mind as it came back to me. I started to hate her." (III, 10, 66) [1002] The children have fallen asleep, Odoardo stuttered some excuse to the "good old woman [family friend]," left the house and wandered up and down the nearby streets. There follows one of the most astounding interpolations:

As must be emphasized at this point, we have taken upon ourselves the epic author's rights and have plunged the well-disposed reader only too quickly into the midst of a passionate scene. We see a prominently placed man in a situation of domestic confusion, but without our having learned anything further about him; for this reason we are joining the good old woman for the moment, with a view to clarifying the situation to some extent, and are going to listen to whatever she too might be murmuring quietly or calling out loud, agitated and embarrassed as she would be. (III, 10, 67)

From the monologue of the old woman we learn that she has often warned the graceful woman. She cannot be allowed to have men around her and the husband to find when he comes home in the evening an empty home or an uncomfortable social setting. Now, on her birthday, she has left the house early and is now not yet home at around eleven o'clock. The doubt now drives the husband in the evenings out of the house. Why is obvious, but where does he go? She would warn the graceful woman often of her rivals, a beautiful woman now has her eye on him, and who knows what his struggles have been up to now. She would say to her on more than one occasion that she should not push things too far.

Now an interpolation: "Let us now return to our friend and hear his own words." (III, 10, 67). Odoardo reports in the "I" form how he has reserved a room in a distinguished hotel for expected friends. He portrays his own spiritual condition.

A third interpolation: "The honourable man, whom we so unexpectedly see here becoming passionately concerned about an apparently trivial incident, will by now have certainly have aroused the interest of our readers to the extent that they would like to hear further news about his circumstances. We will make use of the pause which occurs here in the nocturnal adventure; our hero continues to pace up and down the room, mutely and emphatically." (III, 10, 68)

Here follows a narrative of the prehistory in the third person; after a new interpolation, Odoardo is introduced reporting in the first person, while still reporting he introduces the waiter, and after this speech the author immediately begins speaking and proceeds in the third person. To these occurrences we will come back. A newer interpolation ushers in a change of scenery: back at the house and back with the good, old woman, Albertine's arrival, her dialogue with the chambermaid, departure from the children, Albertine in tears, alone. Then there is a new interpolation, a report on Albertine's prehistory; her relations with Lelio, the friend of the house; Florine; the

accident with the carriage, the discovery in the village inn, the relationships in common with Lelio, the untrue friend, Florine, and the treacherous woman friend.

Albertine stood there looking on her own and was scarcely noticed; the other two recovered and pulled themselves together, but the damage was done; but all three were compelled to sit in the coach again, and even in hell that cannot be such a close concatenation of incompatibly minded people, of those who have betrayed and those who have been betrayed. (III, 10, 74)

With this sentence the novella abruptly ends. We experience nothing more of Florine or of Lelio. Albertine never appears again and there are no further reports on how her relationship to Odoardo further might have been structured or what has happened with the children. Very little follows about how Odoardo overcomes the conflict, in which he sees [1004] himself thrown. However, his domestic experiences are sufficient motive for the kind of renunciation chosen by him and the wandering, as we have learned of them in his speech to those members of the association who are staying behind.

We have purposefully portrayed the technique of the novella in what we have just recounted in detail. While we have gained knowledge of Lenardo's decisive experience with Susanne only on the basis of his diary, but also in a singular subjective presentation, while there in the most expansive configuration, including the introduction of all kinds of unimportant secondary characters (the yarn salesman, the machine-repairer) and through a nearly exhausting technical treatment of hand-weaving the entrance of the Beautiful-Good One upon the scene is prepared for, likewise here Odoardo's fate is illuminated in momentary developments from different perspectives. The modern reader might try to speak of the camera-technique of modern films: there is lacking here nothing of a grand uptake nor of a slow-motion camera, and at the same time the artistic device of "flash back" is employed in a rich fashion. The means of this presentation and the tempo correspond to the presented content. Mountain village and city contrast just as Susanne, the Beautiful-Good One and Albertine,

The sort of woman to whom it is difficult to find anything to say in private, though she is very much welcomed at a large social gathering... Their charm is of such a nature that it needs a certain amount of space in which to express itself and be expansive; for their effects they need a fair-sized audience, they need an atmosphere that will carry them along and compel them to be charming; but they scarcely know how to behave in the company of an individual. (III, 10, 72–73)

[1005] Let us gather together what we in the progress of the novella have experienced regarding Odoardo's pre-history. He is the offspring of an old family, educated in a military school. After a brief service in the court he was sent on a diplomatic mission since he was fluent in languages and particularly gifted and in order that he might smooth out some contradictory interests. The first minister of his prince seeks to ally him with himself and arranges for him to marry his daughter, Albertine. Thereby, the rumors appear to be laid to rest that Odoardo loves the princess Sophronia who was thought to be intended for the hereditary prince and that he had featured her all too passionately in one of his poems under the name "Aurora." But incidentally to a diplomatic mission, Odoardo undeservedly comes under new

suspicion, and his father-in-law must summon all his entire influence to procure for him a type of governorship in a distant province. Odoardo loves the particular residence which allows him to set all his powers into action in order to achieve lastingly useful things. Albertine, though, is unhappy, she misses the balls and the country parties of the capital city. Odoardo accommodates a house friend, a stranger, who has known him for a long time.

Now [as we return to the story, we find that] Odoardo has left his home, and residing in an inn, seeks despairing to arrive at some decision, and at this point a coach comes down the street. ("He's coming from the mountains," the waiter says.) The servants believe that those coming—an older and younger women with room servants—are the friends expected by Odoardo, and they lead them into the prepared room. The women, surprised at their reception, discover that a stranger, whom they suppose to be the uncle, has made all the preparations, and they demand to see him so the waiter brings Odoardo to them.

[1006] Now he was standing by the door; the ladies, believing that they could hear the Uncle's steps, hurried to meet him; he stepped in. What a meeting it was, what a sight! The beautiful young lady gave a cry and threw her arms round the older one's neck; our friend recognized them both, he started back, then he felt urged forward, he was at her feet, and touched her hand, which immediately let go again, with a modest kiss. The syllables "Au-ro-ra!" died on his lips. (III, 10, 72)

This is all that we experience of Odoardo's fate. But after the clear reference to the previous cited interpolation, it is "the humane basis on which the whole operation rested." (III, 10, 65) Odoardo's experience is of such a kind that he also is converted into a wandering renunciant. But a person to whom this has happened will not find the courage to "venture forth without a care." (III, 1, 7) He will provide for "the senior [person] quiet and honor, for the young men work and wife." (III, 12, 82) Others will find the happiness which he must renounce.

Confidence that's shared together  
Will construct a tidy place,  
Will enclose the yard and garden,  
Trusting neighbors face to face. (I, 12, 82)

This is said in the printed page that Odoardo distributes after his long speech. With respect to improvisation, such as that of Lenardo's:

Head and arms with cheerful vigour  
Will be welcomed everywhere.

It is now the case that that one [Lenardo] is enabled insofar as he sees himself in his undertakings strengthened through the thought that "when he had gained a firm footing he would summon" the Beautiful-Good One, whom he knows [is] with Makarie in harmonious relationship, "to join him, if he did not indeed come to call for her himself." (III, 14, 110)

[1007] The moral from this conflict of hearts—the one of Lenardo and the many others of Odoardo—is drawn by the fairy tale of the new Melusine, which in the final edition is placed in the mouth of the Red-Mantle—Barber and which has found

its place after the first part of Lenardo's diary and before the depiction of his meeting with Susanne and before the novella "Not too Far." In the 1821 edition (in which both Lenardo's diary and the whole appearance of Odoardo, as repeatedly mentioned, are missing) it is immediately introduced through the following "Forward":

One has demanded the fairy-tale, of which I have spoken at the end of the second volume of my confessions. Unfortunately I will not now present it in its first, innocent freedom; long after that moment it has been written down and refers in its present structure to a more mature time, as is that one with which we are preoccupied. So much must I strive to do to prepare the insightful listener. Should I narrate presently that fairy-tale, I would begin with the following figure: [Actually the passage appears in the first printing of the New Melusine, 1817, and may well have been in Goethe's first edition of the *Wanderjahre*, though the Carlyle translation lacks it. I have translated it here, from "Varianten, Einzelschemata, und Entwürfe," "Berliner Ausgabe", 1963, 575–576]:

That the fairy tale of the new Melusine has a decisive significance for the development of all the novellas in the *Years of Travel* can be deduced from the first discovered outline for the *Years of Travel* (Sophia text, I, 25, II, p. 214):

Pious	Joseph
To seek first love	Nachodine
Interchange of feeling	Hilarie
Fantastic courtesy	The Foolish Pilgrim
Exaggerated to the point of Fairy-tales	Melusine
	Fairy-Tale
	Glove

[1008] Here compare the following diary entry from S. Boisserée (September 20, 1815). "Goethe's works. Meister's wandering. Novellae. *Defined number of different possible love confusions*. (Schutz's italics) Beautiful pilgrim. On the occasion of the adventurous appearance in Kupée."

In the tenth book of *Poetry and Truth*, Goethe reports how he narrated the fairy-tale of the New Melusine (1770) in the summer house at Sesenheim. For him it was an achievement

...in awakening curiosity, in fixing the attention, in provoking overhasty solutions of impenetrable riddles, in deceiving expectations, in confusing by the more wonderful which came into the place of the wonderful, in arousing sympathy and fear, in causing anxiety, in moving, and, at least, by the change of what was apparently earnest into an ingenious and cheerful jest, in satisfying the mind, and in leaving the imagination materials for new images, and the understanding materials for further reflection. [Goethe, *The Autobiography of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (Dichtung und Wahrheit)*, trans. John Oxenford (New York: Horizon Press, 1969, 2:59)]

At the beginning of the eleventh book, Goethe reports that the women listening to the narration "in which the common with the impossible boldly enough switch places" have been wholly entranced by his strange presentation. His friend Weigand informed him on the way home that the good children in the area knew and thought of a married couple like that depicted in the fairy-tale: he, large, solid, bulky; she,



maidenly and dainty enough, as if Goethe had slyly wanted to present just these characters.

And in the time at Sesenheim—February 13, 1769—Goethe wrote Frederike Oeser: “A fairy-tale [1009] has truth and must have it, otherwise it would not be a fairy-tale.” And in the *Years of Travel* itself, the novella “Who is the Betrayer?” speaks of the “gay country squire” who has recourse to a book in order to enliven the faltering undertaking through reading beforehand: “He read a succession of genuine fairy-stories which always take people out of themselves, pander to their wishes, and cause them to forget all the constrictions which even in our happiest moments still hold us fixed.” (I, 8, 86–87)

The history of the new Melusine is so well-known that we do not need to repeat its content. It suffices here to lay out the places in which the truth of the fairy tale and its symbolic relationship to different types of possible love confusions appears to be expressed.

After the hero of the history and the daughter of the dwarf king had become the happiest couple in the world, the lover makes the discovery that his loved one from time to time takes on the configuration of a dwarf and withdraws into a box. He peeps through a crevice in the box and sees inside a brightly lit hall, in which “a woman holding a book in her hands came from the other side of the room, and I immediately recognized her as my lady, although her features had been contracted to the smallest scale.” (III, 6, 41) He can clearly recognize “the dear, little creature” was pregnant. He feels himself to a degree alienated from his beautiful one and does not know whether he should wish for or fear her reappearance in full human size. After some time, she appears in the usual form. She feels that her lover has seen her in the time in between and that he has become cognizant of the condition in which she finds herself in certain times. Her presence and graciousness make him forget the memory [1010] and he surrounds her with liveliness, assures her of his passion, and does everything to quiet her.

“Examine closely whether this discovery has not damaged your love,” she said, “whether you can forget that I am at your side in two forms, and whether the *diminution of my being* will not also cause the decrease of your affections.” (III, 6, 41, Italics are Schutz’s)

I looked at her, and she was more beautiful than ever, and I thought to myself:

Is it then such a great misfortune to possess a lady who occasionally becomes a dwarf so that she has to be carried about in a casket? Would it not be much worse if she became a giantess and hid her husband away in the box?... “My dearest,” I replied, “let us remain as we have been...”

“The business is more serious than you think,” the lovely lady said; ...I will trust you and do all that is possible from my point of view, only promise me that you will never think of this discovery reproachfully”...

I promised what she asked, I would have promised anything; but she herself turned the conversation, and everything was as before.” (III, 6, 42)

The promise was not kept. It comes, in society, in an angry scene because the beautiful one intends to prevent him from attending a drinking party.

"What does the dwarf want?" I exclaimed, with impetuous gesturing that caused me to overturn the goblet.—"A great deal has been spilt here!" the beautiful one cried. (III, 6, 44).

Melusine sings her departure song.

For the first time the music appealed to me; the first verse she sang was friendly farewell to the company, since it could still feel itself to be united. With the next verse [1011] the group as it were flowed apart, everyone felt isolated and apart, no one could believe that he was present any more. But what then shall I say of the final verse? It was directed to myself alone, the voice of injured love that is saying farewell to ill-humour and arrogance. (III, 6, 44)

When it comes to the separation and Melusine shall return forever to her fatherland, her lover asks whether there would be no possibility that she could take him with her. The only possibility is that he share with her the fate of being a dwarf; he takes it on and allows himself to place her golden ring on his finger. "Scarcely had this happened when I felt a terrible pain in my finger; the ring withdrew and tortured me dreadfully." (III, 6, 48) He is transformed into a dwarf and finds the beloved one beside him "after a short and yet so strange separation or, if you like, a reunion without separation," (III, 6, 48) and "the little couple felt as happy as the large-sized one." (III, 6, 48) He is led first in the lordly presence of the king, who receives him with much love and sets the date for a marriage ceremony the following morning. But to him it felt dreadful to hear all this talk of marriage. He flees, and is brought back by ants, who are allies of the king, and allows the marriage ceremony to take place.

Everything around me was fully in proportion with my present appearance and needs, bottles and goblets were appropriate to a small-sized drinker, indeed they were of a rather greater suitability than in our own case. . . . Unfortunately, however I had not [1012] *forgotten my previous condition in the meantime*. I sensed within myself a measure of earlier greatness which made me restless and unhappy. *Now for the first time I understood what is what philosophers might have in mind with their ideas* with which men are said to be so tormented. *I had an ideal of myself, and at time appeared to myself in my dreams like a giant*. Suffice it to say that *the woman, the ring, the dwarfish shape, and so many other bonds* made me so completely unhappy that I began to think seriously about my own liberation. (III, 6, 51; Schutz's italics)

He files through the ring and achieves thereby his previous stature. "Now I was standing there once more, indeed that much taller again, but quite a lot thinner and more awkward, or so it seemed to me." (III, 6, 51) He set out on his way and "in this way I finally returned, through quite a long detour, to the cook's stove where you first got to know me." (III, 6, 52)

Here Mephisto narrates the history of the separating-renouncing. Neither in the *Apprenticeship* nor in the *Years of Travel* is there a pair to whom this history cannot be instructive. Alone Natalie and Makarie, perhaps also the Beautiful-Good One, avoid the "diminution of their essence," for the sake of which the man must change himself into the form of a dwarf. And when he puts on the golden ring of his beloved, it tortures him horribly. He cannot forget his previous state, files through the ring, and stands there again much the greater, alone, as it had been for him before, but also much thinner.

[1013] The "prank," "The Dangerous Bet," presents a second Mephistophelian variation upon this ground theme, which before all pervades the *Apprenticeship*. It is first introduced in final edition with the following inserted observation:

Among the papers which are at our disposal to be edited we have a comic tale which we are fitting in here without further preparation because our affairs are becoming ever more serious and we might well not find any other place for irregularities of this sort.

On the whole this story might perhaps be acceptable to the reader in the form in which Saint Christopher related it in the course of a cheerful evening to a circle of convivial companions. (III, 8, 53–54)

The anecdote is quickly narrated. Students happen upon an inn, when a distinguished older man arrives with servants. One of the students bets that he, in spite of all the man's prominence, will be able to deliver a tweak on the nose without that student experiencing anything himself for the worse. The wager is taken and won by the fact that the student knows how to introduce himself to his Excellency as a barber and then tweaks him on the nose while cutting his hair in front of an open window. His skill is recognized, though not without the censure of his peasant-like nastiness. But one of his comrades narrates the history to his girl-friend, and this one spreads the story more widely, and finally it reaches the noble gentleman. A follower of the man comes after the students in order to thrash them, and they cry out "the devil's got us by the nose"—. They all save themselves "except for the actual miscreant who narrates the history" but, motivated by the fact that he wants to keep his skin safe and all his bones unbroken, even he does not explain why he does not report what happened to him. He proceeds as follows:

Only you must hear further how this presumptuous joke had unfortunate consequences.

The old gentleman, deeply hurt by the unavenged mockery, took the matter to heart, and it has been contended that this incident led to his death, [1014] if not directly, at least in a contributory fashion. His son tried to get on to the track of the culprits and unfortunately learnt of Rough-and-Tough's [i.e., the prankster's] complicity; it was not until years later that he became quite certain about it; he challenged him to a duel, and a wound that disfigured that handsome man was a source of annoyance for the rest of his life. This fray affected his opponent's well-being for some years too, because of events linked by chance with the affair. (III, 8, 57–58)

And the story comes to its conclusion: "Since every story is supposed to teach some sort of lesson, it will be as plain as a pikestaff what the present tale is aiming at." (III, 8, 58).

Is this not a parody on the fate motif, which runs throughout the *Apprenticeship*? Should not the "tragic" consequence of the student trick be compared with the scene in which Wilhelm Meister in the *Apprenticeship* presses the beautiful countess, the sister of Natalia, to his heart, and thereby presses a broach against her breast, whereby she believes she has contracted a harmful cancer and succumbs to melancholy? And with that other event neighboring on this previously mentioned one, in which Wilhelm, for a joke, decks himself out in the clothes of the count and is surprised by the count, who returns all too early and who sees himself sitting at his own writing table—an appearance that the count takes for a sign of his own imminent death and which lead him to develop an strict conscience and finally to join the

Moravians? And are not also in the *Years of Travel* little causes seemingly unmotivated, and still, in a deeper sense clearly bound up with the most significant of effects? Are not the linkages between Lenardo's unsatisfied moral obligation to Nachodine and the rest of his life plans, and the chance meeting between Odoardo's people and Aurora a similar kind of thing? It may not be of one piece, but it is [1015] still of one significance. Only that here Saint Christopher, representing Kothurne (Faust II, End of Third Act), finds it necessary to comment on the tragedy in the epilogue.

In our analysis, following different strands of the work, we have now come to great synthesizing fourteenth chapter, which, an addition of the last edition, reports on the fate of most of the persons in the *Apprenticeship* and *Years of Travel*. "At this point, however, the task of communicating, delineating, elaborating, and contracting becomes more and more difficult," (III, 14, 100) it is said in an interpolation. We discover that Lothario is with Theresa, who has become his spouse, and Natalia, who will not leave her brother alone, has gone to sea in the company of the Abbé; Lenardo and Friedrich are committed to follow; Philine, now Friedrich's spouse, and Lydia, Montan's wife, wait at Makarie's place for Montan, who shall get her and at the next available opportunity set sail with her; Philine is accompanied by a pair of all too lovely children; Angela, the true companion of Makarie, will marry Werner's assistant, and go with him across the sea. Each of the emigrants has acquired a particular skill which he or she hopes to take advantage of; in some profession one must be adept, if he is to make some claim against his comrades. Through his memory and competence in stenography, Friedrich will be of the greatest use; Lothario will deal with military things, with exercises, and he will occupy himself with self-defense; Lenardo, with respect to his traveling group, will exercise the function of highest superior; Montan will take care of what has to do with mountains; Wilhelm works both as a surgeon for wounds and a plastic anatomist; Philene understands how to cut clothing; Lydia to sew; Angela's spouse is [a] genius at calculating; the Red-Mantle is a barber and a narrator of fairy-tales. We experience also more about the [1016] America plans. Already in the first book it was mentioned that Juliette's and Hersilie's uncle was born in Philadelphia and came to Europe as a young man and that his father, importantly, had settled in the new world on the boundaries of the populated land (I/7). The uncle himself preferred to remain in Europe, perhaps out of a desire to contradict as a son his father's convictions but also perhaps drawn to

this inestimable civilization, which in the course of several thousand years has originated, grown, expanded, been muted and oppressed but never wholly stifled, drawing fresh breath, coming to new life and expressing itself now as ever in unending activities. (I, 7, 75)

He will, so it is said there, rather lose himself in Europe in the great, active, measures than to play there, across the sea, a 100-years belated Orpheus and Lycurg. He will rather resign himself to his king and with his comparable neighbors than to war with the Iroquois in order to drive them out or to deceive them with contracts, or to compel them to leave their swamps, where one would be tortured to death by mosquitoes. He only brings freedom of religion from the new world into the cultured old world. Now (III/14) we experience that the uncle's

important overseas properties has been up until now up for lease and had produced little profit in the midst of several unpleasant moments. The society of the emigrants has the right according to him

to claim possession there, by means of the most complete and normal arrangements; from this starting-point, it can look to its interests as an influential unit of the state and can extend its influence further, into virgin territory that has not been built on as yet. It is here that Friedrich, together with Lenardo, wishes to distinguish himself, to show how possible it is *to make a new start and to take a natural path.* (III, 14, 103; italics are Schutz's)

From those staying behind, we learn that Juliette, Hersilie's sister, has married a man after the heart of the uncle, thoroughly in agreement with his mind and cooperating with him. Hilary has become Flavio's spouse; she is graceful and deserving of love as ever, but she also has retained her "all too effortless ease with which she moved from one interest to another." (III, 14, 101) This makes a good impression upon the men, because each may hope and wish to come to be part of this series. Flavio, her spouse, has been appointed to an executive position and has appeared decisively as a property-owner. He appears to be fully chained to Hilary's inclination, and *she appears to have forgiven the past itself.* Flavio proceeds to write poetry passionately, "although one learnt nothing from it that one did not know already, and felt no emotions that one had not already sensed." (III, 14, 102) His father, the major, had married the beautiful widow; he is an educated military man, a good house-owner and landlord, a friend of literature, and a writer of didactic poetry.

All these relationships, which little by little are established, undone, and again reconfigured, run through Makarie as their middle-point. Many of those, upon which she has had a beneficent influence, meet together around her, of which "some had taken leave in order to set sail over the sea while others had left in order to find their living on land." (III, 16, 114) Throughout the whole novel Makarie remains the "holy one," as the symbol of the cosmic order in the center of all happenings. The threads of every person run to her and she has entered into every fate, each in relation to another, always bringing to each an encouraging support and allotting to each a place measured for him or her. With the nieces, Juliette and Hersilie, and her brother, the elderly uncle, she is from time immemorial in the closest of relationships. Lenardo, her dear one, turns to her in his heart's [1018] concerns to seek counsel and he sends her his diary. She brings into her presence, as it cannot otherwise be, the Beautiful-Good One, "otherwise named the nut-brown maiden," gives her Angela's position next to her, cares in such a manner for the future, and gives Lenardo the peace so necessary for the commencement of his important undertaking. She is familiar with the fate of Hilary through the letters of her mother. Makarie found no opportunity with her to mention the past, which Hilary herself preferred to omit. As far as what concerns her spouse Flavio, Makarie agrees, "although unwillingly," (III, 14, 102) to hear the departure poem composed by him in her honor and for her acquaintances in the few days of his having been there. That poem in its presentation was light and pleasing, in its turns of phrase and rhymes there was a bit of novelty, though one might have wished that the whole thing would have been a bit shorter. Finally, she accepts the poem very beautifully written on edged paper,

and everyone parted in a state of contentment—the whole tragedy of the wandering of the pair Hilary—Flavio is depicted in these few words. What a way there is from the “psyche in danger” in that frightening scene by Flavio’s sick bed, from the student of the young artist in the landscape where Mignon grew up, to the rich property-owning spouse, whose all-too-great ease at changing, passing from one interest to another, awakens hope in others, whose own turn [to be passed by] will eventually come! What a way there is from the poet of the verse “The poor human being’s birth is a wonder” to that Flavio who is now an executive, who is characterized as “robust, cheerful, and amiable enough,” whom one could often see walking up and down in the open air and “after a pause he would again stride forwards with animated [1019] gestures, writing on his slate, pausing to consider and writing again.” (III, 14, 102) And when he appears to hold his poem for completed and his presentation is allowed, unwillingly, then one experiences nothing that one has not already known and feels nothing other than what one has already felt.—The couple Hilary—Flavio hurries homeward, so that the Major, the Man of Fifty Years, can “leave the house,” (III, 14, 102) the very man who “with that irresistible lady who had now become his wife, also wished to breathe in some of the delightful southern air for his own benefit.” (III, 14, 102)

These both come then also, as Goethe says, “in turn” (III, 14, 102)—this continual changing of both couples dominates their whole life—“and the notable lady made an excellent impression on Makarie, as she was in the habit of doing wherever she went; this good impression was demonstrated in particular by the fact that the lady was received in the inner rooms and by herself.” (III, 14, 102)—The arrival of Philine and Lydia, “guests of quite a different kind... and also made welcome,” (III, 14, 103) are accompanied with the short interpolated observation, “we hardly expected to see Philine and Lydia in such hallowed surroundings, but they arrived nonetheless.” (III, 14, 103) They have come to link up with Montan, who after passing time in the mountains, was supposed to meet them here. They were at first not received in the inner rooms but were met alone. It was said of them, “Both ladies were warmly received by the housekeepers, stewards, and by other women employees in residence.” (III, 14, 103) They display first of all with their embroidery an all-too-great activity and were thereby burdensome even in their measured, regular state. Philine came with her eager scissors into the room where materials of all kinds lay ready in supply for making dresses. Philine wants to cut everything up, “it [1020] was really necessary to remove her from the scene and lock the doors, for she knew no reason or moderation.” (III, 14, 104) Even Angela fears

to be treated as a prospective bride for she was afraid of such a dressmaker and cutter; in general the relationship between the two did not develop at all happily... and Philine insisted on being introduced to Makarie. The meeting took place, because there was hope of then getting rid of her all the more quickly; and it really was strange to see the two sinners at the feet of the saint. On either side of her they lay by her knees, Philine between her two children whom she cheerfully kept pressed down as well; she said with her usual lightness of manner: “I love my husband and my children, see to it that I have plenty to do for them and for others too; as for the rest, I am sure to receive your forgiveness!” Makarie greeted her with a blessing and on leaving she bowed decorously. (III, 14, 104)

In the cosmos of Makarie there is a place also for the sinner Philine and in addition she is greeted with a blessing: "...we stretch our arms out in prayer, upward, but not guiltlessly as you do." (Epigramme, Venedig 1790, #39, "Berliner Ausgabe," p. 230) But Lydia—whom she would receive without having been forced to—was received in an entirely different way:

Lydia was reclining with her face in the holy lady's lap, weeping bitterly and unable to speak a word; Makarie, interpreting her tears, patted her shoulder as if to soothe her, then she kissed her head at the parting of her hair, as this head lay before her, ardently and repeatedly, with pious intention. (III, 14, 104)

And now something wonderful happened. Lydia feels [1021] that the difficult, weighty pressure, which took away all her reflection, almost all of her conscience, was lifted from off of her head, she "can now raise my [her] eyes and turn my [her] thoughts up on high," and she adds after drawing a deep breath, "I believe that my heart wants to follow." (III, 14, 105). And in this moment, Montan who has just returned, enters, Lydia goes to him, embraces him, and leads him before Makarie; he might learn what he owes to this godly person and he can bow with her in gratitude. Montan is taken aback and against what is his custom he is to a degree embarrassed. It is the first time that Lydia, his spouse, approaches him with openness and love; he has become indebted to Makarie. And now in an addendum to the *Apprenticeship* it becomes truly clear

that Montan had loved Lydia from her early years onward, but that when the more attractive Lothario had taken her from him, he had remained loyal to her and to his friend, and had finally acquired her as his wife, to the not inconsiderable surprise of our earlier readers, perhaps. (III, 14, 105)

The meeting of Montan with Makarie sets forth symbolically the cosmology begun at the close of the first book: Montan, the representative of the terrestrial, Makarie, the representative of the ethereal principle. For each of these two principles there is an appropriate myth, and there follows an "ethereal poetic narrative" suitable for Makarie, and a "terrestrial fairy-story" belongs to Montan. (III, 15, 113)

Makarie sees the solar system not only with the spirit, soul, and power of imagination, she "herself forms a part of it" (III, 15, 111); she sees herself being drawn forth into those heavenly circles; she has transformed herself ever since childhood into a spiral around the sun and ever more she seems to be distancing herself from the center of the solar system and traveling toward outer regions.

If it may be assumed [1022] that beings, in so far as they are ... spiritual [gravitate toward] the periphery; she seems to have been born only so that she may liberate herself from what is earthly and penetrate the nearest and the furthest spheres of being. (III, 15, 111)

Her interior is illuminated from a light, than which the sunlight itself was no stronger, and she often saw two suns, an inner one namely and an outer. Since her heart, her spirit was wholly filled with supernatural visions, her doing and acting remained always according to the most noble, the ethical.

As she grew, she was everywhere helpful and persistent in services great and small; she moved on earth like an angel of God, for although her spiritual entirety moved round the



world's sun, it moved toward the otherworldly in continuously extending circles. (III, 15, 111–112)

This interrelation has been indicated to us in the poem, “Testament” that closes the second part of the Years of Travel:

O man, give thanks to that wise spirit  
Who bade the earth go round the sun  
And showed the moon its destined track.

Turn inwards now without delay,  
You'll find the centre there within,  
No noble soul would have doubt of this.  
And there you'll find no lack of rule,  
For conscience in its autonomy  
Will be the sun to your moral day.  
(II, “Testament,” 134)

Her friend, the doctor-astronomer-mathematician, initially took Makarie's peculiar relationship to the solar system as a kind of deception which she allowed to be taken outwardly for a sickness—a headache. He knows that Makarie has astronomical knowledge and would therefore not be dissuaded that she had learned it. [This knowledge was] the result of a power of imagination that was to a high degree regulated, something to be assumed to be the influence of memory, a co-functioning of a power of judgment, particularly, however, [1023] a concealed form of calculus. He is a mathematician, and consequently obstinate; a clear thinker, and therefore skeptical; and he resists for a long time. When he noted how Makarie's claims correspond to the newest state of astronomy, how she once beholds still undiscovered small planets, and so describes the solar system as if she were near to the orbit of Jupiter, indeed as if she in concepts had passed beyond this orbit and striven toward the infinity of Saturn, there the astronomer enjoyed himself with the theory of another mathematician, Leibniz, that of the pre-established harmony, which the divine clock-maker has established between two like-directed clocks.

Why now should not God and nature create a living armillary sphere, an intellectual and spiritual device, and so arrange it that it might be able to follow the course of the stars of its own accord and in its own way, as indeed clocks do for us on a daily and hourly basis? (III, 15, 112–113)

And with the hope that *such an entelechy* would not distance itself wholly from our solar system, but rather that when, it has arrived at the limits this system, it might long to return, for the good of our great-grandchildren in earthly life and for the good that can again be done, Goethe concludes this ethereal poem, hoping for pardon, and he turns then to that terrestrial fairy-tale, of which already earlier a preceding indication had been given.

This terrestrial fairy-tale treats the mystery of Montan, of which he had already spoken to Wilhelm on the occasion of the mountain festival in the pedagogical province (II, 10). Here Montan wishes to see the mountain man greeting “Good luck” to be replaced by “Good understanding,” (II, 9, 99) since [1024] meaning is

more than happiness. Montan has achieved clarity about the presence of metals in the mountain. Luck does not do it alone, rather meaning, which calls luck forth to control it. He does not know how the mountains have originated, and he does not want to know it also. But he thinks daily about how to win from them their own intrinsic essence.

How I do it I keep to myself, and provide the occasion for finding what is wanted. Following my directions they attempt it experimentally, it works, and they say I'm lucky; what I understand, I understand for myself, and what I succeed in, I succeed in for others, and nobody thinks that he could succeed in this way similarly. *They suspect me of owning a divining-rod*; but they don't notice that they contradict me when I put forward some sensible idea, and that in this way they are barring the way to the tree of knowledge where these prophetic twigs are to be broken off." (II, 9, 99–100, italics are Schutz's)

So far Montan at the mountain festival.

Here, now, in the third book, Montan discusses with the doctor-astronomer the question whether, in studying sciences, particularly those which treat of nature, that which has been handed down from ancestors can be taken over with security and without question. The criterion for deciding upon this question appears to be investigation whether what is taken up is still vital and effective in the active endeavor and whether it has been beneficial and has remained so. What the new demands, so must [1025] the investigator protect himself or herself from, namely, not to take over some belief merely on the basis of authority. Should the false in science also gain the upper hand, there will always be a minority for whom the truth remains there and

Even if this minority were to dwindle to one single mind, that would not matter. This one person would work on in quiet concealment, and the time would come when people would ask about him and his convictions, or when his theories would dare to venture out into the broad light of day. (III, 14, 106)

You'll consider the general trends,  
And how they rule in their special way,  
But you will join the smallest group.  
And as philosophers and poets  
Have always quietly created  
Their much beloved works as they wished,  
You too will gain the highest favor;  
For the most desirable of all tasks  
Is to point the way to noble souls.  
("Testament," II, 134–135)

After this general conversation about the meaning and method of science, Montan makes "mysterious and wonderful" the revelation that for him in his mountain and mining researches a person accompanied him who had wholly wonderful capacities and a unique relationship to everything that one could call a stone or mineral or *that one could generally call an element*. This person feels not only merely certain effects from underground streams of water, metallic sediments and passages, as well from coal [1026], rather also, what is even more wonderful, she experienced herself differently and then again differently, as soon as she changed the ground on which

she walked. She knew how to distinguish well chemical and physical elements through feeling, and she could tell by looking whether something was heavy or light. This wonderful person is, as we later learn, a woman, whom Philine and Lydia had brought with them, under the pretext that she was a servant. Her manner, though not uncouth, showed no social refinement, her body is robust, but well-built, her dress, her entire personality suggested something rural about her. She attached herself to the gardeners and the fieldworkers, and she would have always known how to find one or the other sources of pure flowing water in whatever place she found herself and whenever she needed it.

Before we, along with Montan and the doctor compare this chthonic myth with the celestial one of Makarie, there is a little insertion of interest, which relates not so much to the *Years of Travel* but to *Elective Affinities* (*Wahlverwandtschaften*). In the second part, eleventh chapter, the companion informs the traveling Lord of his peculiar conversation with Otilie. She would have persisted in taking the boat to navigate over the lake instead of following the Lord on a nearby path. Asked about why she would have done this, Otilie responds:

“...I will give you an explanation... Although even I find the fact a little [1027] mysterious, I have never walked on that path without being overcome by a peculiar chill which I have never felt anywhere else and which I cannot explain to myself. I rather avoid, therefore, exposing myself to that sensation, especially since immediately afterward I feel a pain in the left side of my head—a pain from which I suffer at other times, too.” [Goethe, *Elective Affinities*, trans. Elizabeth Mayer and Louise Bogan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963), 246.]

The companion reports that he would have discovered on land to his great wonder a clear trace of coal, which would have convinced him one might find after digging perhaps a lucrative mother lode in the depths of the lake. He would wish then to undertake an oscillation test with Otilie. The Lord does not believe in such things, [but] his companion insists on his wish and opines that one needs to investigate all the more earnestly these kinds of things because “perhaps, many new relations and affinities among inorganic substances and among organic substances, as well as between organic and inorganic, might be discovered—all of them at present unknown to us.” (*Elective Affinities*, 247) The oscillation test was undertaken, they are thorough failures according to Charlette, [but] with Otilie they succeed by waiting for a period. They have to be broken off, because she is afflicted again with a headache.

But let us return to Montan’s exchange with the doctor. The latter reveals more thoroughly Makarie’s relationship to the world system. There follows a commentary in the form of an interpolation of the author, which not only sets both myths over against each other [1028], binding the reverence for that which is over us with that which is under us, and therefore the synthesis of the third reverence, drawing on that of daily life—because it comes down here, as it did in the cases of Lenardo and Odoardo, to the human ground on which the whole peculiarly rests—why a man like Jarno-Montan, whose relationship to Lydia and whose redemption through Makarie has just been depicted, has turned to the chthonic realm.

However, let us admire the similarity of these two cases in spite of their great differences. The one friend had found his way into the deepest crevices of the earth, so that *he should*

*not turn into a Timon of Athens*, and even deep down in the ground he became aware that there is in human nature something analogous to what is most hard and rough; for the other friend the spirit of Makarie proved an example from the other side, to the effect that gifted natures may be drawn in some instance to *staying in one place*, and in others to traveling far off, and that it is neither necessary to penetrate towards the centre of the earth nor to move beyond the confines of our solar system, but that we are already occupied enough and that we are pre-eminently poised for and summoned *to action*. On and in the ground we find the material needed for our highest earthly needs, a world of matter that has been available for development by man's highest capacities; but on that way of the spirit there will always be found sympathy, love, and room for free, regulated practical activity. *The highest form to which man has to develop involves bringing these two worlds closer together and displaying their reciprocal qualities in the [1029] transient phenomenon of life.* (III, 14, 107, the italics are Schutz's)

This place appears to be the last intimation of the whole novel. Staying and distancing, wandering and renouncing, binding and loosing, moving against another and uniting with them, all these are categories of life as well as those of the myths and they meet us in our wandering, may they proceed from the center of earth or to the limits of the solar system.

The significance of this point is marked out in several ways.

With this the two friends came to an agreement and undertook not to make a secret of their experiences *since someone who could smile at them as fairy-tales which might well have a place in a novel might none the less consider them as a symbol of what was most desirable.* (III, 14, 107–108)

The series of aphorisms "From Makarie's Archive" which is added to the third book can be seen as a strictly conducted commentary on the above point. On this, unfortunately, we can hardly go into much depth. The first aphorism, which hits upon the ground theme, ought to be cited here:

The secrets of life's paths may not and cannot be revealed; there are stumbling-blocks over which every wandered must trip. The poet, however, points out the place. (III, "From Makarie's Archive," 120)

[1030] But in the most penetrating way, the problem that is handled at the end of the novel is one which with good grounds closes the *Years of Travel*. It has become well known under the name of "Schiller's Relics" and it is present in the *terza rima* form so rarely used by Goethe, the form in which Dante depicted that other wandering from the Inferno to Paradise.

I saw within the solemn charnel-house  
How skulls were ranged and fitted in with skulls;  
It made me think of old and long gone times.

The foes of earlier days stand side by side,  
And sturdy bones that once fought to the death  
Lie crosswise in this place at rest now tamed.

Wrenched shoulder-bones! Nobody now inquires  
What once they bore, and dainty, active limbs  
Are scattered, hands and feet, once linked in life.

You weary ones, in vain you lay down here,  
 You could enjoy no quiet in the grace,  
 But were returned once more to the light of day.

We cannot fondly love the dried-up husk,  
 However fine its kernel once has been.  
 For me as adept the writings had been written.

Which did not show their sacred sense to all,  
 When in the midst of such a rigid throng  
 I saw a structure wondrous beyond all price,

And in the mouldering, cold, constricting place  
 I felt refreshed in freedom and in warmth,  
 As if new life were issuing from death.

Oh, how the form entranced me secretly!  
 The trace conceived by God which had been preserved!  
 A glance that took me to that distant sea

[1031]Where figures in enhanced form surge.  
 Mysterious vessel! Offering oracular words!  
 How can I deserve to hold you in my hand?

Removing you, rare treasure, from the mould  
 With open-minded reverence taking you aloft,  
 And turning in piety towards the light of the sun.

What more can man gain in his life  
 Than that God-Nature should be shown to him?  
 That he should learn how matter turns to spirit,  
 And how God-Nature preserves the spirit's fruits.  
 (III, "From Makarie's Archive," 139–140)

New York, November 20, 1948

[1032]

Goethe to Joseph Stanislaus Zauper, Sept. 1821 (II p. 326)

That you have kept tight reins on your impatience in reading again the *Years of Travel* makes me very happy. Coherence, goal, and aim lie within the little book itself; it is of one piece, even if it is based on one meaning and this was the task: to bring into confrontation several incompatible exterior events that nevertheless confirm the feeling. The second part is not as satisfying as the first, still I hope that it is good for you, that reader who has understand this book so well.

To Rochlitz, July 28, 1829 (II p 372)

A work like this, which announces itself as a collection, since it seems certainly to be undertaken only as a bringing together of the most disparate elements, demands

more than another that each appropriate for herself what is according to her measure, what in her situation is heartening and might show itself harmoniously active in good.

..... Nov. 23, 1829 (p. 517)

With such a little book it is as it is with life itself: it finds itself in the complex of the whole the necessary and the accidental, the proposed and the closed, now achieved, now frustrated, through which it ...

[1033]

contains a kind of infinity, which never allows itself to be thoroughly grasped nor locked up in understanding and reasonable words... The little book does not deny its collective origin, and even allows and demands more than any other that one partake of the individual pieces that come forward... Because the space is constrained, I add something here: *Act conscientiously* is the practical side of *Know yourself*: Both should be thought neither as a law nor as a demand; rather they are established as the bull's eye of the target, which one has ever in aim, even if one does not always hit it. Human beings would be more knowledgeable and happier if they know how to distinguish between the infinite goal and the conditioned end and to watch time after time for how far their means actually reach.

So far! Expressing the truest wishes for your peace.

[1034]

Goethe, Selections German

1901–14

Goethe on his poems NFGH vol. 2

Literary-historical Society Bonn

Writings

New Series 7–9

[1035]

(Sophia edition, I 25/II 214)

A Scheme for Wanderings

Pious	Joseph
In search of first love	Nachodine
Confusion of feeling	Hilarie
Phantasy Amorous	the foolish pilgrim
Exaggerated to the	Melusine
Point of being a	Fairy-Tales
Fairty-tale	Glove

---

Poems, 1821 preceding the *Years of Travel*:

- |                             |  |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | a) The years of travel have now begun          |
|                             | b) And so I lift old treasures                 |
| Co-given:                   | c) You would scarcely know what exactly to say |
| Testament                   | d) Before we write again                       |
| In the solemn charnel-house | e) What is an hour long to me                  |
|                             | II   |
|                             | a) Test fate, I know it well why               |
|                             | b) What do you do in the world                 |
|                             | c) Emveri say the most lordly                  |
|                             | d) My part of the inheritance as lordly        |
|                             | e) It is still day                             |
|                             | f) As one may so life                          |
- 

[1036]

Weaving description:

The real warp for poetic woof (Jan H. Meyer)

“Testament” (No essence to fall into nothingness) II Book “given for filling up the volume”

“To the solemn charnel house it was” III. Volume

Closing word: “It is for setting forth” is related to the third part: Meister year Spinoza’s Ethics, part 5, sentence 19:

*Qui Deum amat, conari non potest, ut Deus ipsum contra amet.* (Who loves God is not able to strive that God on the other hand might love him), Goethe to Herder, Feb.20, 1786,

cf Philine,

cf *Poetry and Truth*, III/14

Goethe to Lotte Kestner:

If you do not feel that I love you, why do I love you? (Letter to Miarz, 1774)

Goethe to Kuebel, March 16, 1819, on his work with Riemer,

On WM: Because I have written this little work as I have my other things as a sleep-walker, so for me your observations on my style are highly instructive and heartening.

[1037]

Goethe to Riemer, Conversation, March 26, 1814 (on the opportunity of the WM reading which we had together before:)

The poesy has an advantage with relation to the art of sculpture namely that it is not *eu synopton* (*eu sunoptos*: good to look over, easy to look over), therefore works of greater spirit rhapsodically must be delivered (or they demand to be delivered).

Sayings in Prose:

The novel is a subjective *Epopöe*, in which the author asks the permission to treat the world in his own manner. It is only asked whether he has a manner of his own, the rest will be found there.

To Müller on the *Years of Travel*, Jan. 22, 1821.



The whole novel is symbolic, behind the persons given lies something general, something higher hidden.

To the same, June 8, 1821

The *Meister* Years are without a doubt more difficult and the most serious in the trilogy. All is to be taken symbolically and overall something else stands behind it. Every resolution of a problem is a new problem.

[1038]

To Götting, January 17, 1829

The conclusion of the whole follows next and I will first again breathe freely when this Sisyphusian stone, which so often rolls back down again, finally leaps on the other side of the mountain, into the public.

Day-Years Volume, January 1823

*Pandora* as well as *Elective Affinities* express the painful feeling of deprivation and can therefore unfold near each other.

[1039]

Diary, S. Boisserée

Goethe's works. Meister's wandering. Novellas. A definite number of different possible love entanglements. The beautiful pilgrim. On the occasion of the adventurous appearance in the railway compartment.

# Author Index

## A

Adler, Guido, 190  
Aristotle, 152, 165, 167, 168, 178, 181, 266  
Augustine, 82, 233, 240, 320, 329  
Averroes, 209

## B

Bach, Carl Philipp Emmanuel, 186–188, 207, 344  
Bach, Johann Sebastian, 186, 207  
Barber, Michael, 1–7, 313–330  
Bayle, Pierre, 209  
Beethoven, Ludwig von, 182, 183, 186, 187, 326  
Berg, Alban, 181  
Bergson, Henri, 1, 11, 14, 16, 17, 20, 23–25, 27–33, 36–38, 40, 46, 47, 49, 83, 84, 98, 144, 147, 179, 184, 201, 206, 208–210, 212, 215, 216, 219, 220, 223, 224, 227, 234–236, 239, 251, 253, 279, 281, 283, 288, 292, 294, 298  
Berkeley, George, 47, 48, 254  
Boileau-Despreaux, Nicolas, 162, 166, 178  
Bollnow, Otto Friedrich, 206

## C

Cassirer, Ernst, 23, 25, 105, 127, 208, 211, 261  
Cohen, Hermann, 192  
Corneille, 166

## D

Descartes, René, 215, 217, 223, 252  
Dvorak, Max, 207

## E

Eckermann, Johannes, 6, 7, 168, 313, 366–368, 371  
Embree, Lester, 202, 254  
Endress, Martin, 199  
Euripides, 172

## F

Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 225, 235  
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 206, 233, 252  
Freud, Sigmund, 222, 230, 231, 233, 234, 239, 293, 294

## G

Gluck, Christoph Willibald von, 174, 175  
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, 1, 5, 6, 181, 214, 313, 315, 331, 332, 334, 362, 369  
Gurwitsch, Aron, 202, 212, 254, 267

## H

Handel, Georg Friedrich, 188, 190  
Heidegger, Martin, 213, 222, 223, 234, 235, 266, 273, 275  
Husserl, Edmund, 1, 208, 257, 266

## J

James, William, 189, 210, 267, 298

## K

Kant, Immanuel, 206, 210  
Kaufmann, Felix, 208, 219  
Kersten, Fred, 1, 4, 13, 199, 206, 239

Kierkegaard, Søren, 206, 213, 221, 222, 226,  
234, 235, 238–240, 273, 288, 294  
Kuhlmann, Georg, 206

## L

Landsberg, Paul Ludwig, 206, 213  
Lask, Emil, 78, 135, 136  
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 398  
Lempertz, Heinrich, G., 207  
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 166, 167, 173  
Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph, 141  
Lipps, Theodor, 261  
Liszt, Franz, 187  
Luckmann, Thomas, 210  
Lully, Jean, 174

## M

Malebranche, Nicolas, 266  
Mann, Thomas, 239  
Mead, George Herbert, 189, 224  
Meister, Wilhelm, 151, 238, 239, 313–405  
Mises, Ludwig von, 254  
Molière, Jean-Baptiste Poquelin, 179, 249  
Monteverdi, Claudio, 173  
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 3, 175, 184, 186,  
188, 190–195

## N

Natanson, Maurice, 202, 213, 248  
Newton, Isaac, 127  
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 3, 158, 180, 182, 184,  
186, 189, 234, 239, 250, 273

## O

Osthans, Carl E., 207

## P

Parsons, Talcott, 248, 298  
Piccinni, Niccolò, 175  
Plato, 201, 206, 221, 222, 234, 235, 273  
Plessner, Helmut, 206, 239

## R

Rameau, Jean, 174  
Rilke, Rainer Maria, 137  
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 174  
Russell, Bertrand, 25

## S

Sachs, Hans, 174, 193  
Scheler, Max, 206, 210, 214, 224, 226, 261,  
279, 298  
Schiller, Friedrich, 162, 165, 168, 180,  
183, 235  
Schlegel, Friedrich von, 180  
Schmitz, Hermann, 207  
Schoenberg, Arthur, 181  
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 86, 182, 192,  
235, 238  
Schubert, Franz, 186  
Schutz, Alfred, 11–21, 23–33, 35–115,  
117–119, 121–195, 197–240, 243–263,  
265–302, 331–405  
Schutz, Heinrich, 175  
Schwarz, Otto, 206, 239  
Schweitzer, Albert, 186, 240  
Shakespeare, William, 2, 137, 166,  
174, 179, 181, 190, 239, 317,  
321, 322, 330  
Simmel, Georg, 25, 118, 220, 233  
Sombart, Werner, 207  
Spinoza, Benedict, 206, 209, 404  
Srubar, Ilja, 12, 14, 199  
Strauss, Richard, 187  
Stravinsky, Igor, 181, 187  
Strindberg, Johann August, 166, 172, 179,  
180, 240

## T

Trapassi, Pietro, 175

## V

Virgil, 173, 357

## W

Wach, Joachim, 206  
Wagner, Helmut, 11, 202, 204,  
211, 214  
Wagner, Richard, 175, 182, 187, 190  
Weber, Max, 20, 23, 48, 78, 139, 217,  
253, 254  
Wiese, Leopold von, 207, 235  
Wolf, Hugo, 186  
Wundt, Wilhelm, 225

## Z

Zeno of Elea, 266

# Subject Index

## A

Accent of reality, 288, 289, 293, 354

### Action

- rational, 197, 227, 254, 298
- social, 197, 204, 248, 254
- unity of, 166, 167, 178

### Adjectives

- attributive, 3, 144, 146–149
- predicative, 3, 147–150

Ageing, 6, 7, 213, 349, 351

Alter ego, 124, 202, 203, 205, 208–212, 214, 215, 230–232, 251, 252, 254, 255, 260–263, 292, 295, 303

America, 324, 334, 344, 347, 374, 379, 381, 394

Anonymization, 205, 236

*Anschluss*, the, 313, 314

Apollinian dimension, 180, 182

Apperception, 27, 29, 47, 48, 54, 56, 61, 71, 73, 84, 85, 94, 100, 108–110, 136, 137, 225, 231, 238, 258, 279–281, 286, 292–294, 299

A priori, 29, 73, 102–105, 107, 141, 150

Art, 3, 13, 37, 117, 151, 171, 207, 247, 262, 288, 313, 334

### Attention

- active, 205, 237, 285, 286
- à la vie*, 4, 204, 205, 210–212, 216–218, 220, 223, 228, 229, 231, 236–240, 251, 253, 254, 259, 260, 263, 265, 269, 270, 276, 281, 285–289, 292, 293, 295, 297
- passive, 205, 237, 285, 286, 292

Attitude, 54, 75, 164, 191, 193, 194, 210, 223, 228, 229, 233–236, 238, 239, 244, 246–251, 253–255, 260, 266, 267, 269–275, 289, 296, 299, 348, 360, 376, 380, 384

natural, 4, 15, 225, 243, 250, 252, 260–262, 265, 267, 276, 279–281, 283, 284, 287, 300

Audience, the, 118, 157–159, 173, 175, 180, 190, 191

Awareness, pure, 54, 55, 58

## B

Behavior, 15, 223, 229, 236, 277, 278, 282, 286, 298, 321

Being-thus, 31–33

Bergson-period, 1, 2, 11–13, 197

Biology, 208

Body, 12–14, 25, 41, 122, 184, 203, 250, 257, 269, 382

somatic experience, 89–92, 96

## C

Categories, 16, 20, 24, 29, 30, 75, 98, 105, 125, 126, 129, 161, 163, 166, 167, 181, 187, 210, 224, 231, 239, 280, 290, 295, 357, 401

Chance, objective, 25, 137, 138, 176, 191, 197

Chorus, the Greek, 180, 189

Collectives, 119, 197

*Commedia dell' arte*, 174

Communication, 3, 30, 104, 117–119, 121, 125, 149, 154, 156–161, 168, 169, 175, 220, 294, 299, 328, 336, 351, 360

Concepts, 15, 20, 23, 35, 38, 119, 122, 154, 175, 210, 251, 260, 266, 318, 355

Conduct, 15, 161, 248, 316, 319, 326, 329

Confusion of feeling, 350, 355, 403

Consciousness, 16, 25, 35, 37, 118, 125, 154,  
177, 203, 246, 258, 266, 329  
the stream of, 38, 164, 166, 170  
Consciate, 38, 39, 48, 104, 123, 153, 157,  
158, 161, 165, 175, 176, 179, 180, 186,  
190, 195  
Constitution, 63, 113, 131, 132, 135, 202, 204,  
211, 212, 218–220, 223, 224, 228, 232,  
236, 237, 243, 247, 248, 252, 253, 255,  
257, 260, 271, 272, 276, 277, 279,  
282–284, 287, 373, 374

## D

Dance, 27, 30, 174, 181, 183, 184, 318  
Dead partial selves, 4, 272  
Death, 4, 7, 106, 126, 202, 206, 213, 219, 221,  
223, 238, 239, 250, 259, 268, 272, 273,  
275, 276, 299, 321, 323, 333, 337, 345,  
353, 358, 364, 377, 383, 385, 393, 394,  
401, 402  
*Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*,  
11, 124, 203  
Destiny, 5, 181, 315–318, 320, 321, 326–328,  
332, 335, 347, 384  
Dionysian dimension, 158, 180, 184, 185  
Don Quixote, 208, 230, 231, 290, 291  
Drama, 12–14, 37, 117, 118, 151–153,  
156–159, 162, 165–169, 171–195, 207,  
313, 317, 321, 330, 361  
Dreaming, the world of, 231, 251  
Dreams, 4, 5, 38, 69, 106, 166, 174, 182, 204,  
213, 228, 230, 231, 233, 287–290,  
292–295, 300, 320, 324, 328, 346, 351,  
357, 358, 361–364, 392  
Dualism, 25–28, 55, 111, 251  
Duration  
memory-endowed, 20, 32, 56–58, 60–62, 65,  
66, 68–75, 77, 79–85, 87–91, 93, 95–104,  
106, 107, 109–115, 123, 128  
pure, 20, 32, 38, 40, 44, 45, 47–49, 51–63,  
65–67, 69–73, 77–79, 82–84, 86, 87,  
90, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 107, 109,  
114, 115, 123, 153, 159, 177, 189, 190,  
195, 211, 266, 271

## E

Economics, 6, 240, 248, 254, 341, 349  
Ego  
*agens*, 4, 203–205, 209–212, 216, 223,  
224, 235, 250, 268–270, 272, 273, 279,  
280, 303

*cogitans*, 205, 209, 210, 235, 250, 252,  
299, 303  
Epic, 157, 162, 169, 173, 178, 181, 190, 349,  
350, 387  
Epistemology, 20, 28, 29, 76  
*Epoché*, 4, 225, 232, 253, 281, 282, 289, 293,  
299, 302  
Epos, 149, 151–153, 161, 162, 167–169, 176  
*Erfahrung*, 77, 208, 213  
*Erleben*, 77, 267  
*Eros*, 25, 27, 214  
Essence, 39, 45, 46, 81, 82, 95, 102, 142, 156,  
164, 168, 187, 190, 191, 247, 270, 271,  
277, 282, 293, 298, 318, 321, 330, 332,  
371, 392, 399, 404  
Europe, 6, 15, 179, 313, 314, 341,  
382, 394  
Everyday life, 1–3, 6, 17, 26, 220,  
244–246, 248, 251, 256, 298, 357  
Evidence, 16, 25, 30–33, 82, 85–87, 90, 127,  
128, 137, 176, 191, 195, 200, 228, 252,  
253, 332, 341  
Experience  
inner, 40, 43, 54, 98, 126, 129, 262  
tactile, 108  
Experiencings, essentially actual, 211, 221,  
223, 234  
Expression, 3, 15, 16, 30, 56, 71, 80,  
84, 86, 98, 118, 125, 133, 134,  
137, 144, 146, 149, 156, 158–161,  
167–169, 172, 173, 175–177, 180,  
189, 192, 198, 201, 209, 212, 235,  
261, 269, 296, 300, 320, 326, 338,  
352, 360, 374, 376

## F

Fantasy, 43, 44, 82, 126, 131, 142, 158, 163  
Fate. *See* Destiny  
*Faust*, 143, 331, 340, 349, 358, 361, 394  
Feeling  
life, 86  
somatic, 82–98, 101–108, 112, 123,  
129, 269  
*Fiat*, 40, 123, 141, 210, 229, 231, 277, 278,  
290, 294, 296, 302  
Fiction, 4, 251, 266, 284, 288, 321, 332  
Foundation, 1, 2, 11, 33, 121, 137, 138, 162,  
165, 166, 169, 203, 206, 230, 239, 245,  
254, 256, 278  
Founding, 23, 26–31, 207, 247  
Freedom, 5, 14, 27, 59, 77, 99, 229, 231, 232,  
235, 286, 291, 293, 297, 328, 341, 390,  
394, 402

**G**

- Geisteswissenschaften*, 15, 20, 24–26, 122  
 Gestalt, 77, 132, 236  
 God, 37, 74, 217, 250, 266, 288, 316, 323,  
     330, 333, 334, 336, 345, 357, 368, 378,  
     380, 397, 398, 402, 404  
 Growing older together, 215

**H**

- Habit, 26, 38, 44, 105, 348, 354, 396  
 Harmony, 25, 46, 119, 162, 163, 182–185,  
     225, 226, 230, 235, 253, 282, 297, 298,  
     376, 398  
 Hero, the, 172, 176, 177, 179, 181, 188, 191,  
     193, 321, 330, 391  
*Hic illic*, 259, 260, 262, 283, 286  
 Historicism, 198  
 Historism, 198  
 History, 3, 7, 46, 81, 99, 134, 143, 163,  
     167, 171, 173, 178, 180, 190, 198,  
     205, 207, 220, 240, 245, 255, 273,  
     314, 315, 320, 325, 338, 342, 348,  
     350, 351, 354, 356, 360, 366, 367,  
     373, 376, 386, 391–393  
*Homo*  
     *oeconomicus*, 207  
     *religiosus*, 220, 250  
 Horizon, 134, 211, 215, 219, 220, 228, 231,  
     245, 250, 253, 262, 267, 268, 271, 273,  
     293, 297–299, 390

**I**

- Idealization, 218, 219, 226, 283  
 Ideal type, 1, 26, 27, 35, 59, 76, 102–105, 107,  
     128, 145–147, 198, 205, 217, 218  
 Image, 16, 27, 37–39, 123, 182, 212, 279,  
     314, 335  
     the pure apperceptive, 56, 58, 60, 62  
 Imagination, 29, 124, 277, 278, 341, 343, 346,  
     365, 390, 397, 398  
 Interpretation of meaning, 25, 74, 118,  
     119, 152–157, 160, 163, 164, 171,  
     181, 190, 287  
 Intersubjectivity, 5, 118, 124, 214, 252, 261  
 Intuition, 27, 32, 251  
 Irreversibility, of time, 222, 230, 232,  
     272, 294  
 I, the. *See also* Ego, *agens*  
     acting, 1, 2, 20, 27, 47, 57, 58, 79, 82, 89,  
     90, 92–102, 105–108, 110, 111,  
     113–115, 121, 123–125, 128, 129, 136,  
     137, 139, 145, 147, 153

- conceptualizing, 1, 3  
 interpreting, 21  
 speaking, 1, 3, 21, 41, 58, 107, 121,  
     125–126, 145, 152–156  
 the total, 31, 33

**J**

- Joke, the, 213, 231, 322, 393  
 Judgments, synthetic a priori, 29, 141

**K**

- King James Bible, 199

**L**

- Language, 1, 12, 26, 36, 38, 117, 121, 151,  
     175, 198, 201, 294, 323, 339  
 Law  
     of art, 162  
     essential, 163  
     style-immanent, 162, 165  
 Leap (between provinces of meaning), 221,  
     238, 240, 288, 289, 291, 296, 297, 350,  
     351, 405  
*Lehrjahre*, 2, 5, 7, 313–330  
 Leitmotiv, 3, 187, 193  
 Life, 1, 11, 20–21, 23, 35–115, 121,  
     152, 173, 200, 244, 258, 265,  
     313, 334  
 Life-form, 1, 13, 20, 23, 35, 56, 121, 152,  
     184, 219, 272, 327  
 Life forms and meaning structures, 1–3, 6,  
     7, 11–18, 20–21, 37–115, 122, 201,  
     211, 313  
 Listener, the, 117, 118, 126, 131, 140, 143,  
     144, 146, 148, 149, 152–158, 160,  
     161, 163, 164, 178, 182, 183, 190,  
     191, 193, 195  
 Literature, 1–7, 118, 162–170, 173, 178,  
     180, 200, 201, 206, 225, 357, 366,  
     368, 371, 395  
 Logic, 15, 16, 20, 27, 29, 30, 39, 59, 71,  
     126, 131, 141, 143, 144, 148, 201,  
     356, 357  
 Logic of the poetic event, 6, 357  
 Lyrics, 181–187, 193, 357

**M**

- Marks, 19, 148, 150, 162, 209, 274,  
     298, 362  
 Mathematics, 345

## Meaning

- contexts, 48, 67, 69, 74, 118, 119, 124, 138, 153–157, 160, 164, 169, 197, 215
- objective, 74, 131, 137, 139, 140, 145, 148, 149, 153–155, 158, 160, 163, 164, 169, 172, 190
- posited, 67, 74, 124, 139, 144, 148, 157, 163, 171, 172
- subjective, 5, 25, 131, 137, 139, 140, 149, 154–158, 160, 171, 176, 205, 253
- Me ipsum*, 4, 203, 213–217, 225, 303
- Melody, 40, 163, 183–190, 374, 376
- Memory, 1, 11, 20, 24, 38, 123, 153, 185, 202, 251, 257, 265, 323, 345
  - remembering, 44, 50, 53, 57, 71, 75, 100, 218
- Metaphor, 80, 142, 143, 187, 224, 258, 272, 279, 349
- Metaphysics, 25, 29, 31, 44, 54, 104, 239, 252
- Methodology, 27, 217
- Modo futuri exacti*, 221, 229, 277, 303
- Modo plusquam perfecti*, 221, 303
- Monad, 203, 212, 216–218, 223, 231, 233, 252, 275, 295
- Motivation, 4, 166, 167, 181, 234, 247, 248, 351, 356, 357
- Motives
  - because, 205, 277, 287, 290, 296
  - in-order-to, 205, 224, 227, 228, 237, 238, 277, 279, 285, 286, 290, 302
- Movement, 4, 12, 38, 123, 176, 215, 259, 277, 318, 375
- Music, 3, 13, 25, 118, 156, 171, 214, 247, 361
- Myth, 152, 173, 183, 193, 334, 347, 397, 400, 401
- Mythos*, 152, 184, 192, 195

## N

- Naming, 25, 80, 131, 132, 134–136, 140–144, 147, 153
- Narration, 118, 149, 151, 159–162, 190, 362, 373, 390
- Narrator, the, 158–161, 332, 333, 351
- Nation, 198, 218, 236, 361, 397
- Neo-Kantianism, 78, 192
- New School for Social Research, 3
- Non-communicability, communicability, 30
- Nouns, 3, 14, 33, 79, 99, 121, 129–132, 140, 150
- Novel, 1–3, 5–7, 13, 118, 151, 152, 157, 168, 176, 177, 267, 289, 313–316, 318, 320–322, 329, 330, 332–334, 336, 338, 340–346, 349–351, 355, 356, 360, 363–368, 377, 382, 395, 401, 404, 405

- Novella, 6, 13, 151, 152, 159, 162, 168, 169, 333, 334, 342, 343, 348–351, 356, 364, 374, 379, 382, 386–388, 390, 391, 405
- Now, The, 40, 43, 64, 85, 88, 124, 125, 137, 221, 253, 266–271, 273
  - and thus, the, 31–33, 49, 51–54, 60, 63, 64, 66, 72, 77, 83, 88, 139, 193

## O

- One-can-always-again, 218, 283, 284
- Opera, 3, 7, 12–14, 117, 152, 171–195, 239
  - buffo*, 174
- Oratorio, 190, 191
- Orchestra, 117, 162, 189, 191, 193
- Organism, 183, 252, 257–263, 269, 280, 282, 283, 291, 292, 370
- Outcomes, unexpected, 2, 5, 7
- Overture, 187, 189, 344

## P

- Pascal, Blaise, 240
- Past, 2, 5, 7, 33, 43, 51, 53, 54, 63, 81, 98, 123, 140, 153, 155, 160, 176, 216, 221–223, 226, 228, 231, 245, 250, 266, 269–271, 275–277, 283, 285, 291, 293, 303, 323, 324, 327, 333, 335, 341, 352, 356, 359, 372, 378, 386, 395
- Perception, 29, 47, 54, 82, 127, 130, 132, 142, 182, 183, 211, 212, 221, 223, 225–227, 231, 233, 237, 238, 250, 258, 260–262, 269, 270, 278–281, 283, 285, 286, 292, 298, 299, 301, 303
  - indiscernible, 223, 237, 278, 301
- Person
  - intimate, 26, 30, 198, 204, 205, 208, 210, 219, 228, 234–238, 252, 269, 274, 292, 297
  - social, 4, 197, 202–207, 209–212, 215–240, 243–256, 265–303
  - unity of, 208–216
- Personality, 2, 4, 6, 7, 158, 199–240, 249, 251, 252, 275, 287, 288, 301, 325, 358, 400
  - partial, 4, 216, 249, 253
- Phantasy, 2, 4, 204, 213, 220, 228–231, 233, 259, 270, 274, 275, 288–296, 300, 403
- Phenomenology, 1, 13, 121, 210, 213, 214, 218, 251, 252, 256, 260, 261, 266, 294
- Phenomenology of the Social World, The. *See Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*



Phenomenon, 15, 16, 39, 40, 43, 45, 49, 52,  
57, 59–61, 63, 67, 70, 71, 75, 77, 82,  
86, 90, 103, 104, 106, 114, 123, 129,  
131, 143, 148, 155, 164, 177, 184, 187,  
204, 214, 217, 218, 225, 226, 233, 245,  
246, 248, 249, 257, 259–261, 272,  
274–276, 280, 285, 286, 299, 343, 401

Philosophy, 1, 11, 16, 20, 24, 25, 28–31, 38,  
39, 46, 74, 78, 81, 99, 122, 126, 127,  
139, 144, 157, 174, 178,  
182, 192, 207, 208, 223, 224, 234, 257,  
261, 266, 267, 324, 337, 371, 373, 384

Plans, hierarchy of, 223, 224, 238, 287, 290,  
296, 302

Play, the, 3, 43, 172, 174, 179, 253, 255, 268,  
272, 289, 321, 330

Plurality, 130, 132, 135, 260

Plural, the, 14, 130, 132–136, 190, 303

Poetry, 2, 3, 7, 118, 149, 151, 152, 156–162,  
165–169, 173, 175, 176, 178, 181, 183,  
186, 189, 231, 314, 319, 341–343, 352,  
353, 367, 390, 395, 404  
lyrical, 149, 156

Postulate, 24–26, 29, 32, 48, 60, 62, 91, 122,  
135, 162, 164–167, 169, 232, 294, 297,  
298, 301

Potestativity, 229, 231, 232, 278, 286,  
291–293, 296, 297

Pragma, 4, 204, 209, 210, 221, 226–229, 231,  
236–238, 265, 269–271, 274, 276–280,  
283–287, 290

Pragmatism, 4, 197, 298

Predicate, 3, 79, 126, 135, 148, 149, 285, 357  
attributive, 136

Pre-scientific sphere, 39, 75, 76

Probability, 90, 201, 221, 223, 226–229, 237,  
259, 263, 268, 271, 273–275, 283–285,  
291, 293, 298, 373

Project, 2, 11–14, 19–21, 23, 24, 35, 39, 41,  
94, 95, 102, 105, 111, 113, 115,  
117–119, 122, 123, 197, 200, 202, 204,  
210, 221, 223, 224, 227–229, 231, 232,  
237, 239, 245, 254, 268, 273, 275,  
277–280, 284, 286, 287, 290, 294,  
296–299, 302, 327, 344, 381, 382

Province of meaning, 4, 287–289, 291, 297

Psychology, phenomenological, 11, 252

Purpose, 3, 5, 6, 13–15, 17–19, 29, 31, 35, 40,  
48, 51, 54, 59, 61, 65, 71, 78, 83, 103,  
124, 125, 128, 130, 133, 143, 185, 199,  
201, 229, 231, 232, 235–237, 239, 267,  
277, 278, 280, 286, 287, 290, 293, 294,  
296, 297, 302, 316, 317, 319, 321, 322,  
329, 332, 347, 348, 354, 356, 359, 365,  
366, 379, 384, 386

**R**

Race, 198, 218, 378

Reality  
literary, 2, 4, 313  
multiple realities, 1, 2, 4, 6, 202, 204,  
220, 225, 228, 231, 232, 251, 267,  
275–277, 281, 288, 289, 291–293, 295,  
301

Reason, 6, 11, 23, 36, 38, 121, 151,  
177, 211, 244, 261, 266,  
316, 340

Recollection, 68, 69

Relationship  
author/reader, 3, 4  
speaker/listener, 144

Relevances, 3–7, 13, 28, 33, 113, 131, 143, 197,  
203, 205, 212, 222–224, 228, 232, 237,  
254–256, 267–269, 271, 272, 274, 275,  
279, 285, 297, 298, 333, 357, 360, 363

Renunciation, 6, 29, 46, 195, 314,  
334–336, 338, 343, 347–351,  
362, 363, 386, 388  
renunciants, 335

Representation, 14, 20, 37, 56, 59, 68, 70,  
73, 75, 79, 82, 127, 134, 152, 157, 160,  
161, 168, 169, 190, 337, 348, 357, 386

Rhyme, 7, 157, 180, 353, 376, 395

Ring of the Nibelungs, 193

**S**

Sciences  
natural, 15, 16, 24–26, 28, 39, 74, 122,  
132, 345, 366  
social, 1, 2, 6, 14, 16, 20, 21, 25–27,  
40, 122, 197, 203, 205, 207–208, 217,  
246, 248, 252–256, 276, 287, 300, 301

Secularization, 205, 238

Self, now  
later than now, 204  
before now, 204, 221, 265, 269–272, 274  
partial dead selves, 272  
partial selves, 271, 272  
the solitary, 202, 203, 216–219, 234, 238,  
240, 250, 252, 253, 265–303

Sex differentiation, 198

Shock-experiences, 4

*Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt*, Der.  
See Phenomenology of the Social  
World, The

Social collectivism, 202

Social individuum, 202

Social sciences, 1, 2, 6, 14, 16, 20, 21, 25–27,  
40, 122, 197, 203, 205, 207–208, 217,  
246, 248, 252–256, 276, 287, 300, 301

Sociology, 20, 25, 27, 48, 49, 57, 67, 75, 197, 253, 254  
 Space, 3, 12, 27, 36–39, 123, 153, 177, 212, 250, 257, 277, 360  
   unity of, 167, 178  
 Strangeness, 246  
 Stranger, the, 212, 314–316, 324, 326, 376  
 Substantives. *See* Nouns  
 Symbol  
   sphere, 30, 32, 114, 128, 144, 338, 347  
   system, 17, 28, 30–33, 65, 66, 70, 74, 75, 77, 95, 100, 152, 153, 161, 165, 167  
 Symbolization, 1, 3, 13, 17, 24, 26, 31–33, 62, 100, 101, 105, 111, 123, 136, 138, 139, 153, 164, 165, 170, 176, 177, 184, 190  
   the symbolized, 3, 56, 57, 62, 64  
 Syncretism, 24, 25, 76, 104

**T**

Taken-for-granted, 58, 67, 105, 138, 216, 238, 266, 366  
*Tempora*, 204, 218, 220, 221, 265, 270, 276, 284, 299  
 Temporality, 4–7, 140, 204, 209, 212, 218–223, 254, 256, 265–276, 299, 313  
 Tensions of consciousness, 237, 276  
 Theodicy, 74, 235  
 Theoretical contemplation, 2, 4, 295, 297, 300  
 The Problem of Personality in the Social World, 2, 4, 6, 7, 199–240, 243  
 Thing, the, 125, 131, 135–143, 148, 149, 280, 282  
 Thou, 1, 20, 25, 39, 118, 121, 156, 171, 197, 202, 243–256, 260, 280, 322  
 Thou-relationship, 1–3, 125, 156, 175–177, 180, 194, 195  
 Time, 2, 11, 25, 36–39, 119, 122, 153, 174, 200, 247, 257, 266, 314, 333  
   unity of, 167, 178  
 Tone, 40, 140, 153, 156–158, 163, 169, 180, 185–189, 200, 215, 248, 323, 377, 386  
 Tragedy  
   French, 181  
   Greek, 180, 181, 189  
 Truth, 33, 45, 139, 143, 178, 230, 252, 274, 276, 298, 315, 319, 329, 337, 355, 390, 391, 399, 404  
 Typification, 105, 174, 179, 233, 236, 237, 301

**U**

Understanding, 4, 14, 16, 20, 23, 25, 27, 48, 49, 59, 71, 75, 98, 117, 122, 145, 155, 161, 163, 164, 176, 191, 197, 198, 253, 254, 259, 302, 316, 325, 338, 340, 360, 362, 390, 398, 403

Unities, the three of drama, 165

**Unity**

  of action, 3, 166, 167, 178  
   of manifold, 37  
   of space, 167, 178

**V**

Value, 24, 28, 46, 51, 59, 62, 78, 119, 126, 127, 132, 148, 165, 168, 174, 206, 235, 315, 347, 378, 379

Verbs, 33, 79, 121, 129, 135, 149, 150

Vital sphere, 205, 235

**W**

*Wahlverwandtschaften, Die (Elective Affinities)*, 400

Wandering, 2, 6, 7, 313, 314, 316, 318, 329, 334–336, 338, 344, 346, 347, 349, 350, 355, 360, 362, 363, 373, 374, 376–379, 383, 388–390, 396, 401, 403, 405

*Wanderjahre*, 2, 5, 6, 151, 238, 239, 313–330, 350, 366, 368, 390

Wide-awakeness, 182, 279, 285

Will, 11, 86, 182, 206, 209, 224, 234, 236, 239, 251, 267, 269, 279, 294, 369, 375, 389

World, the, 4, 31, 37, 122, 153, 177, 202, 243, 258, 265, 318, 336

  of dreams, 106, 182, 204, 231, 287–290, 292–295

  of phantasy, 204, 220, 229–231, 288–295

  of theoretical contemplation, 295, 297  
   within reach, 225, 259, 280, 282–285

  of working, 4, 204, 228, 229, 232, 233, 235, 237, 276–287, 289–302

**Z**

*Zoonpolitikon*, 207